Nbc Land Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Klang (BA-21NCvC-40-06/2017)

1.

These are the Grounds of Judgment in respect of my decision in this assessment of damages, which is now under appeal. This matter came before this Court pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeal dated 20 July 2020, by which the case was remitted to the High Court for the assessment of damages arising from the Defendant’s breach of the agreement dated 2 December 2003.

The original High Court decision in this matter was delivered by my learned sister YA Puan S.M Komathy Suppiah on 8 August 30/04/2026 13:21:03 BA-21NCvC-40-06/2017 Kand. 176 2019 who had dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim. The Plaintiff appealed against that decision.

By its order dated 20 July 2020, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. The Court of Appeal held that the Plaintiff’s cause of action founded upon the said agreement was not barred by limitation under the Limitation Act 1953 and affirmed the existence of a binding agreement between the parties. The Defendant was found to be in breach of that agreement.

The appeal in respect of the tortious causes of action in private nuisance and trespass was dismissed and remains undisturbed. Those causes of action are therefore no longer before this Court.

5.

2.

The issue for determination is a narrow but important one. Liability is no longer open to dispute. The sole question is the proper measure and quantum of damages arising from the Defendant’s failure to perform its contractual obligation to rehabilitate the Subject Lands and to bear fifty percent (50%) of the rehabilitation cost.

That question must be answered on the evidence before this Court and in accordance with section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 (“Act 136”).

3.

BACKGROUND FACTS 1 Historical use of the Subject Lands

The Subject Lands comprise Lot 77168 and part of Lot 77169, Mukim Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan. It is undisputed that these parcels were previously utilised as a municipal solid waste dumping ground until approximately the year 2000. Municipal solid waste refers to mixed domestic refuse and related waste materials deposited over time. It is not engineered fill placed in a controlled and compacted manner. It is heterogeneous waste deposited without structured containment or environmental control.

Although dumping ceased around 2000, the waste mass was not excavated or treated at source. Instead, it remained beneath the surface. Waste of this nature continues to undergo decomposition, producing landfill gases, including methane, and generating leachate capable of contaminating groundwater. The material is also inherently compressible and susceptible to progressive settlement over time.

The Plaintiff subsequently acquired the land and obtained approval for residential development. The land is located in proximity to established residential neighbourhoods. This bears directly on the standard of rehabilitation required, because residential development necessarily demands long-term stability and environmental safety.

It is not disputed that the Plaintiff knew at the time of acquisition that the land had been used as a dumpsite and that it was purchased on what is described as an “as is where is” basis. However, that fact does not stand in isolation. It must be considered together with the subsequent contractual undertaking entered into between the parties.

3.2 The 2 December 2003 Agreement

On 2 December 2003, following discussions between the parties, an agreement was reached whereby the Defendant agreed to carry out rehabilitation works in respect of the Subject Lands and to bear fifty percent (50%) of the rehabilitation cost.

At that time, the estimated rehabilitation cost was approximately RM 6 million. The contemplated method involved placing approximately 1.5 metres of soil capping over the site.

The Defendant did not carry out the agreed rehabilitation works.

The Court of Appeal has held that the Defendant was in breach of that agreement and that the contractual claim is not time-barred.

The present assessment concerns only the damages flowing from that breach.

4.

AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE 1 Procedural history of the assessment

Following the order of remittal, the matter proceeded for assessment under Order 37 Rules of Court 2012.

The assessment was initially part-heard before another Judge of this Court, my learned sister YA Puan Jamhirah binti Ali. Expert witnesses had commenced giving evidence and cross-examination had begun. Before the proceedings were concluded, the matter was administratively reassigned and came before me for continuation and completion of the assessment.

Upon reassignment, parties agreed that the proceedings continue before me without recalling any witness. It was further agreed that this Court may rely upon the existing evidential record, including but not limited to:

(a) the Notes of Proceedings (Enclosure 147);

(b) the Plaintiff’s expert affidavit and Updated Detailed Report (Enclosure 94);

(c) the Defendant’s Additional Affidavit and Soil Investigation Report (Enclosures 121–132);

(d) the Plaintiff’s Quantity Surveyor’s affidavit and cost breakdown (Enclosure 95);

(e) the Defendant’s Written and Reply Submissions (Enclosures 148 and 155);

(f) the Plaintiff’s Written and Reply Submissions (Enclosures 150 and 153); and

(g) the bundle of authorities

In conducting this assessment, the Court has considered the evidence as a whole and not merely the documents specifically enumerated above.

No findings on quantum had been made by the previous Judge. The assessment therefore falls to be undertaken afresh on the entirety of the evidential record.

I am satisfied that no prejudice arises from this course. The expert evidence is extensively documented in affidavit form and supported by detailed technical reports. The cross-examination of each expert is comprehensively recorded in Enclosure 147. The parties expressly consented to continuation without recall.

4.1.1 Plaintiff’s expert — PW1

The Plaintiff’s geotechnical expert was PW1, Ir. Dr. Yah Kem Chui. He affirmed an affidavit contained in Enclosure 94 and relied upon reports named “Report on Evaluation and Assessment of Waste Dumping Ground on Proposed Mixed Development at Kota Pendamar Indah, Sungai Sedu Estate, Pandamaran on Parcel A, Lot 77168 and Lot 77169, Mukim Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan for NBC Land Sdn Bhd’ dated February 2021, March 2018 and May 2017.

The report was prepared following four phases of site investigation conducted over a substantial period. These investigations included borehole drilling, gas monitoring, groundwater sampling, laboratory chemical testing and trial pit excavation. The significance of this lies not merely in the number of tests carried out, but in the cumulative and consistent picture which those investigations revealed. PW1’s conclusions were not based on an isolated observation or a single sampling event. They were based on repeated and methodical investigation of the actual condition of the Subject Lands.

The investigations confirmed that municipal solid waste deposits remain beneath the site, reaching depths of approximately fourteen (14) metres in certain boreholes. This is not a case of superficial debris or shallow fill. The evidence shows a deep and continuing waste body beneath the site. That matters because the deeper the waste mass, the more serious and persistent are the attendant issues of gas generation, leachate and long-term settlement.

Chemical testing revealed elevated Biological Oxygen Demand (“BOD”) and Chemical Oxygen Demand (“COD”) levels in groundwater samples. Elevated BOD and COD readings indicate the presence of organic contamination consistent with decomposing waste material. This is not merely a historical record of what the land once was. It is evident that the decomposition process remains active and continues to affect the site environment.

Gas monitoring detected methane within the waste mass. Methane is a flammable gas generated through anaerobic decomposition. PW1’s report records that methane concentrations had, at certain points, exceeded one hundred percent (100%) of the ‘Lower Explosive Limit’, which represents the threshold at which ignition may occur. This is a serious finding. It means the risk is not theoretical. It is an identified and measured hazard.

PW1 further identified long-term settlement risk arising from the compressibility and ongoing degradation of the waste mass. The concern here is not merely aesthetic or minor. Decomposing waste is unstable and subject to uneven compression over time. For land intended for residential development, such instability goes directly to safety, structural performance and suitability for the intended end use.

PW1 concluded that complete removal of the waste mass and replacement with suitable engineered fill was necessary to eliminate the hazards at source. That conclusion was tied to the actual conditions observed: the depth of waste, the existence of methane, the evidence of groundwater contamination, and the continuing risk of settlement.

4.1.2 Defendant’s expert — DW1

The Defendant called DW1, Ir. Md Rozi bin Shaari. His Additional Affidavit and Soil Investigation Report are contained in Enclosures 121–132.

DW1’s report confirms that municipal solid waste remains beneath the site, with thickness ranging between approximately six (6) metres and fourteen and a half (14.5) metres. Thus, on the critical factual issue of the continuing presence of substantial waste beneath the site, there is in substance no dispute between PW1 and DW1.

DW1 acknowledges the presence of methane gas and groundwater contamination indicators. Crucially, DW1 identifies three principal engineering hazards requiring management:

(i) landfill gas emission;

DW1 proposed three methods of rehabilitation, described as Method A, Method B and Method C.

4.1.3 Evaluation of DW1’s Methods A, B and C (Enclosure 121, Paragraph 10)

Method A is the least intrusive of the three proposals. It involves limited excavation of surface waste layers, retention of the bulk of the waste mass in situ, and the placement of a soil capping layer over the site. The premise of Method A is that the risks associated with the waste mass may be contained rather than eliminated.

However, the evidential position of DW1 in relation to Method A is decisively affected by his concession under cross- examination, as recorded in the Notes of Proceedings (Enclosure 147, page 107 onwards). DW1 accepted, in clear terms, that Method A:

(a) does not address landfill gas migration;

(b) does not provide any system for leachate control; and

(c) does not mitigate long-term settlement arising from deeper waste layers.

This concession is significant and determinative. It represents an acceptance by the Defendant’s own expert that Method A fails to address each of the three principal hazards which he himself identified as requiring management.

In those circumstances, Method A is not merely less effective. It is, on the Defendant’s own evidence, incapable of achieving proper rehabilitation of the site. For land intended for residential development, where long-term safety and stability are essential, Method A cannot be regarded as an adequate solution.

Methods B and C adopt containment-based approaches incorporating engineered systems for gas management, leachate control and settlement mitigation. Unlike Method A, they recognise the need to address the identified hazards. However, their evidential foundation is materially deficient.

First, the costing for both methods is incomplete. The evidence shows that essential components necessary for effective gas and leachate management were not fully included in the costing exercise. This is not a minor omission. Where the viability of a method depends on engineered control systems, the absence of full costing for those systems renders the proposal inherently unreliable as a basis for quantification.

Second, the internal coherence of the costing is undermined by discrepancies acknowledged in cross-examination. Acreage inconsistencies and computational errors were identified in relation to the proposed works. These are not immaterial points. They go directly to the reliability of the figures presented and the practical usefulness of the proposals as a basis for judicial assessment.

Third, no independent quantity surveying evidence was adduced by the Defendant to support either Method B or Method C as a complete, internally consistent and financially reliable alternative. In a case of this scale and technical complexity, the absence of such evidence is significant. The Court is left without a properly verified cost framework for either method.

The Court’s task is not to choose between abstract engineering possibilities. It is to determine, on the evidence, a method which is presented as a complete, workable and costed solution. Methods B and C do not meet that threshold. They remain, on the evidence before this Court, incomplete proposals lacking the necessary financial and technical certainty required for adoption.

All three methods share a common limitation. They retain the waste mass in situ and seek to manage its consequences rather than eliminate its source. In the context of deep waste deposits, methane generation, groundwater contamination and long-term settlement risk — all of which are common ground between PW1 and DW1 — a containment-based approach is insufficient to achieve proper rehabilitation for residential development.

4.1.4 Quantity Surveyor — PW2

The Plaintiff called PW2, Sr. Kuh Cho Sen, a registered Quantity Surveyor. His affidavit and cost breakdown are annexed to Enclosure 96.

PW2 quantified the cost of implementing complete removal, including:

(a) excavation of approximately 1,947,541 tonnes of waste;

(b) transportation to licensed sanitary landfill;

(c) landfill tipping fees;

(d) supply and compaction of suitable engineered fill; and

(e) preliminaries at thirteen percent (13%). The total estimated cost is RM234,034,231.00.

PW2’s methodology was structured and transparent. His exercise was not an arbitrary estimate detached from the condition of the site. The excavation quantity was derived from the geotechnical and borehole data.

The transportation and disposal costs reflected the reality that the waste, once excavated, had to be lawfully transported and disposed of at licensed facilities. The provision for engineered fill was necessary because once the waste mass was removed, the land had to be restored to a condition capable of supporting development. Preliminaries at 13% were proportionate to the scale and complexity of the works involved.

The Court finds the evidence of PW2 to be cogent, structured and supported by underlying data derived from the site investigations. The methodology adopted was transparent and capable of scrutiny.

In contrast, the Defendant did not adduce a complete alternative costing supported by independent quantity surveying evidence. This absence is material. Where a quantified claim of this scale is challenged, a party who seeks to displace it must do more than criticise it in general terms. It must provide a coherent evidential basis for a different figure or a different valuation framework. That was not done here.

5.

The Defendant’s position is that the Plaintiff’s claim is excessive, that it exceeds what was contemplated in 2003 when the estimated cost was RM6 million, that complete removal amounts to betterment, and that the Plaintiff failed to mitigate its loss.

The Plaintiff’s position is that the obligation undertaken by the Defendant was an obligation to rehabilitate the land and to bear fifty percent of the cost of that rehabilitation; that the actual condition of the site now established by the evidence shows that complete removal is necessary to render the land suitable for residential development; and that the quantified cost put forward through PW2 is the reasonable cost of carrying out that work.

6.

The present assessment is undertaken strictly pursuant to the order of remittal made by the Court of Appeal. The issues of liability and the existence of the contractual obligation having been conclusively determined, the role of this Court is confined to the assessment of damages on the evidence now before it.

The governing statutory provision is section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950, which provides: “74. Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract

Section 74 performs two related functions. First, it affirms the right of an innocent party to compensation for loss caused by breach. Second, it imposes limits on recovery by requiring that the loss be one which arises naturally in the usual course of things or which was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting, and by excluding losses which are remote or indirect.

The application of section 74 in the present case must be approached in light of the posture of the proceedings. Liability has already been determined by the Court of Appeal. The Defendant’s obligation to rehabilitate the land, and to bear fifty percent (50%) of the cost of that rehabilitation, is no longer in dispute. The function of section 74 at this stage is therefore not to determine liability, but to govern the measure and limits of recoverable damages.

7.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT 1 Causation

The first inquiry under section 74 is one of causal connection. The Court must be satisfied that the loss claimed flows from the breach. Here, the breach consists of the Defendant’s failure to carry out the agreed rehabilitation works.

The evidence establishes that, as a consequence of that failure, municipal solid waste remains beneath the land at significant depth, methane continues to be generated, groundwater contamination persists, and settlement risk remains inherent in the site. These conditions are not supervening events. They represent the continuing state of the land in the absence of performance of the rehabilitation obligation.

The Defendant’s breach is not merely historical. It is continuing in its consequences. The hazardous condition of the land — methane generation, contaminated groundwater and settlement instability — exists today because the agreed rehabilitation was not carried out when it ought to have been.

The cost now required to remedy those conditions is therefore not a new or independent loss. It is the present manifestation of the original breach. Had the Defendant performed its obligation within a reasonable time after 2 December 2003, the waste mass would have been addressed then and the land restored to a condition suitable for development. The cost now claimed is therefore the cost of achieving that outcome.

I, therefore find that the requirement of causation under section 74 is satisfied.

7.2 Remoteness

The second inquiry is that of remoteness. Section 74 limits recovery to losses which arise naturally from the breach or which were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.

In the context of a contractual obligation to rehabilitate land which was known to be a former dumping ground, it cannot be said that the cost of addressing the waste mass and its associated hazards is outside the usual course of things. On the contrary, such cost is inherent in the very nature of the obligation undertaken.

The Defendant places reliance on the fact that, in 2003, the parties contemplated a method involving approximately 1.5 metres of soil capping at an estimated cost of RM6 million. However, section 74 does not confine recovery to the precise quantum or method contemplated at the time of contracting. It requires the Court to consider whether the type of loss falls within reasonable contemplation.

The type of loss in this case is the cost of rehabilitating land containing municipal solid waste so as to render it suitable for development. That type of loss was plainly within contemplation. The fact that the scale of the cost has increased, in light of subsequent investigations and the passage of time, does not render it remote. It reflects the actual condition of the land which the Defendant was obliged to address.

In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the loss claimed falls squarely within section 74(1) and does not offend section 74(2). The need to rehabilitate a former dumping ground for development is an obvious and foreseeable consequence of the Defendant’s failure to perform its obligation. There is nothing remote or indirect about the loss now claimed.

7.3 Betterment

The third inquiry is the principle of restoration without betterment, which is embedded within section 74. Damages in contract are compensatory. The objective is to place the innocent party in the position it would have occupied had the contract been performed, and no more.

The Defendant argues that complete removal would confer betterment upon the Plaintiff. I do not accept that contention.

The Defendant’s argument on betterment proceeds on a false comparison. The correct comparison is not between the Plaintiff’s present position and the physical condition of the land in 2003. The correct comparison is between the Plaintiff’s present position and the position it would have occupied had the Defendant performed its obligation within a reasonable time after the agreement.

If the Defendant had performed its obligation in or shortly after 2003, the waste mass would have been addressed then. The Plaintiff would have had land rehabilitated and suitable for development. On that footing, the removal of the waste mass does not confer an advantage beyond performance. It merely achieves, albeit belatedly, what the contract required.

The award of the cost now required to achieve that outcome does not place the Plaintiff in a better position than performance would have done. It restores the contractual position. The fact that the works are now more extensive and higher is a consequence of non-performance. It does not transform the award into one of betterment.

I, therefore reject the contention that the award constitutes betterment.

7.4 Nature of the contractual obligation and measure of damages

It is necessary to identify the precise nature of the obligation breached.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Defendant agreed to rehabilitate the former dumping ground and to bear fifty percent (50%) of the rehabilitation cost. The obligation is expressed in substance — to rehabilitate — rather than in fixed technical specification.

The Defendant contends that the parties in 2003 contemplated a rehabilitation method involving approximately 1.5 metres of soil capping at an estimated cost of RM6 million, and that to award damages based upon complete removal of approximately 1.95 million tonnes of waste exceeds what was within contemplation and is therefore too remote.

I do not accept that the existence of a historical estimate circumscribes the scope of recoverable loss under section 74. The agreement was not framed as an agreement to apply 1.5 metres of soil irrespective of site evolution. It was framed as an agreement to rehabilitate. Rehabilitation, in its ordinary and technical sense, connotes restoration of land to a condition fit for its intended purpose. At the time of the agreement, the land was intended for development. Today, it is approved for residential development. The standard of rehabilitation must therefore be assessed against that objective.

Where an obligation to carry out rehabilitation works is not performed, the natural measure of damages is the reasonable cost of carrying out those works. The Court is therefore concerned with the cost of cure, rather than diminution in value or some abstract measure. In circumstances where the land is intended for residential development, and where the evidence establishes the presence of continuing hazards, the cost of achieving a proper and safe rehabilitation constitutes the appropriate measure.

7.5 Mitigation

The Defendant also contends that the Plaintiff failed to mitigate its loss.

The duty to mitigate requires a claimant to take reasonable steps to reduce loss flowing from breach. It does not require a claimant to undertake large-scale remediation at its own expense while the Defendant disputes liability. Nor does it require the claimant to adopt an inferior engineering solution that leaves significant hazards in place.

In the present case, the Plaintiff consistently maintained that the Defendant was contractually bound to carry out the rehabilitation works and to bear fifty percent (50%) of the cost. It cannot be said that the Plaintiff acted unreasonably in not undertaking unilateral remediation.

Further, in light of DW1’s concession that Method A fails to address landfill gas, leachate and settlement, and in the absence of any complete and reliable costing for Methods B and C, I am unable to conclude that a reasonable alternative was available which the Plaintiff failed to adopt.

I, therefore find no failure to mitigate that would justify any reduction of the award.

8.

Having addressed the governing legal principles, the Court turns to apply them to the detailed evaluation of the expert evidence and the quantification of damages.

The technical baseline is largely common ground. Both PW1 and DW1 accept the presence of deep waste, methane gas, groundwater contamination and settlement risk. The Plaintiff’s expert recorded waste thickness reaching approximately fourteen metres in certain boreholes.

The Defendant’s Soil Investigation Report confirms thickness ranges between approximately six metres and fourteen and a half metres. There is therefore no credible basis to treat the waste mass as shallow or marginal.

Both experts accept the presence of methane gas. PW1’s monitoring records methane concentrations historically exceeding one hundred percent of the Lower Explosive Limit. DW1 does not deny the existence of methane gas within the waste mass.

Both experts accept groundwater contamination indicators, including elevated BOD and COD readings. Both experts recognise long-term settlement risk arising from the compressibility and degradation of deep waste deposits. The Defendant’s own report identifies landfill gas, leachate management and settlement mitigation as the three principal hazards requiring management.

Against that evidential framework, the sufficiency of the Defendant’s proposed methods must be assessed. Method A involves limited removal and soil capping. However, the Notes of Proceedings in Enclosure 147 record that under cross-examination, DW1 accepted that Method A does not address landfill gas management, does not address leachate control, and does not mitigate long-term settlement arising from deeper waste layers.

This concession is significant. The Court cannot ignore it. It goes directly to the adequacy of the proposed rehabilitation method. A method that leaves deep decomposing waste in situ while not addressing methane migration, groundwater contamination and settlement risk cannot, in this Court’s judgment, constitute comprehensive rehabilitation for residential development.

Methods B and C were presented as enhanced mitigation approaches. However, the evidence reveals that certain necessary works referred to in those methods were expressly excluded from the cost calculations. Acreage discrepancies were acknowledged in cross-examination. Computational errors were admitted. The Defendant did not call an independent Quantity Surveyor to provide a complete and coherent costing for a technically sufficient alternative.

The Court must evaluate not only conceptual engineering proposals but also their practical and financial coherence. In the absence of a complete, internally consistent and independently supported costing for a method that adequately addresses the identified hazards, the Court cannot adopt the Defendant’s alternatives as the basis for damages assessment.

The Plaintiff’s proposed method, by contrast, eliminates the source of hazard. Removal of the waste mass eliminates methane generation at source, removes the contamination reservoir responsible for leachate, and removes the compressible waste layer responsible for settlement instability. The scale of intervention is extensive, but the scale of intervention must be proportionate to the scale of the hazard. In the present case, the documented depth of waste, methane generation, groundwater contamination and settlement risk justify a comprehensive solution.

I, therefore find that complete removal and replacement with suitable engineered fill constitutes proper rehabilitation in the present circumstances. This is not a preference-driven choice. It is the conclusion compelled by the evidential record as a whole.

8.1 Assessment of Quantum

The Court now turns to the quantification of the cost of implementing that method.

The Plaintiff relies on the evidence of PW2, Sr. Kuh Cho Sen (Enclosure 96). The total assessed cost is RM234,034,231.00. PW2’s quantified cost is grounded in site investigation data and detailed costing. The excavation quantity of approximately 1,947,541 tonnes is derived from borehole data and reflects the actual condition of the site. The Defendant did not produce any competing volumetric model. I, therefore accept that the excavation quantity reflects the physical condition of the site.

Transportation costs reflect the necessity of removing large quantities of waste to licensed sanitary landfill facilities. Disposal costs are regulated and unavoidable. Replacement with engineered fill is necessary to restore ground stability following excavation. Preliminaries at thirteen percent are proportionate to the scale and complexity of the works.

The Defendant’s challenge to the Plaintiff’s quantification does not displace the evidential basis of PW2’s assessment, nor does it provide a coherent alternative figure. I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that RM234,034,231.00 represents the reasonable cost of rehabilitation.

97.

8.2 Interest

The Court must next determine the appropriate order for interest.

Section 11 of the Civil Law Act 1956 confers discretion upon the Court to award pre-judgment interest. The cause of action accrued when the Defendant refused to honour its contractual undertaking. Proceedings were thereafter commenced. The award represents unliquidated damages requiring judicial assessment. The Plaintiff has been kept out of funds which the Defendant was contractually obliged to contribute.

In balancing fairness to both parties, I consider it just and equitable that pre-judgment interest run at five percent (5%) per annum from the date of filing of the writ until 26 February 2026. The rate of five percent reflects a fair balance between compensating the Plaintiff for the loss of use of money and avoiding an unduly punitive burden on the Defendant in circumstances where the quantum required judicial determination.

Post-judgment interest shall run at five percent (5%) per annum from 26 February 2026 pursuant to Order 42 rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 until full realisation.

9.

For the reasons set out above, I find that the reasonable cost of rehabilitation of the Subject Lands is RM234,034,231.00, that the Defendant is contractually liable for fifty percent (50%) thereof, and that judgment should therefore be entered for the Plaintiff in the sum of RM117,017,116.00 together with interest and costs as set out below.

10.

For the reasons set out in this Judgment:

(a) The reasonable cost of rehabilitation of the Subject Lands is assessed at RM234,034,231.00.

(b) The Defendant is liable for fifty percent (50%) thereof. € Judgment is entered for the Plaintiff in the sum of RM117,017,116.00.

(d) Pre-judgment interest at five percent (5%) per annum shall run from the date of filing of the writ until 26 February 2026. € Post-judgment interest at five percent (5%) per annum shall run from 26 February 2026 pursuant to Order 42 rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 until full realisation.

(f) Costs of the assessment proceedings are awarded to the Plaintiff in the sum of RM 50,000.00. Dated 30 April 2026 -sgd-DATO’ ANITA BINTI HARUN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Plaintiff : Guok Ngek Seong, Harold Tan Kok Leng & Liu Poh Yeng (Messrs Harold & Lam Partnership) For the Defendant : Atiqah binti Azman & Muhd Fadzli Amin bin Muhd Yusoff (Messrs Khairul Fadzli Amin & Co.)