Neelamegam A/L Rajoo v Pmg Industry Works Sdn Bhd (BA-16-85-11/2025)

This is an appeal against the Director General of Manpower (DGM)’s decision dated 31.10.2025 wherein the Appellant’s claim for salary in lieu of notice and termination benefits was dismissed. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g

After careful consideration of the records of appeal and the submissions, this Court dismissed the appeal. The following are the reasons for that decision. Proceedings before the DGM

The Appellant worked as a lorry driver with the Respondent since 28.9.2018. His last drawn monthly salary was RM4,000.00 and a further RM500.00 for shift allowance.

The following is the chronology of events which are largely undisputed. On 12.2.2025, the Respondent directed the Appellant to go to Kuantan for a 2-week assignment to collect scrap iron. He was to stay at the homestay accommodation provided by the Respondent. The Appellant arrived at Kuantan around 5:00 pm that evening. Upon finding the homestay inhospitable, he reported the matter to the Respondent but he was directed to stay put. The dissatisfied Appellant drove the lorry back to the factory in Semenyih about 1:00 am the following morning and left the key with a foreign worker without informing the Respondent.

At 3:00 pm 13.2.2025, the Respondent terminated the Appellant’s employment with immediate effect and without notice via WhatsApp. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g

The Respondent called 3 witnesses; namely Mahadevan a/l Yohaiah, Rajeshwaran a/l Arumugam and Jamunarani a/p Yohaiah. The Respondent’s evidence established that –

(i) the Appellant had been sent to Kuantan with 4 other workers and a manager, all of whom were to stay at the homestay;

In support of their case, the Respondent adduced photographs of the alcohol bottles consumed by the Appellant and Mahadevan, photographs of the homestay and video recordings showing the Appellant’s past misconducts, specifically his assault of the Respondent’s general workers. DGM’s decision

The DGM dismissed the Appellant’s claim. She held that the Appellant committed a serious offence by driving the lorry back to Semenyih without the Respondent’s authorization S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g and in direct violation of their direction. The Appellant did not deny this. She found that this was an act of gross insubordination and a fundamental breach of the terms of employment.

The DGM was mindful of section 14 Employment Act 1955 (Act 265) and said – “Mahkamah juga mengambil maklum bahawa walaupun prosedur disiplin formal seperti siasatan dalaman lazimnya digalakkan, prinsip undang-undang buruh membenarkan penamatan perkhidmatan dibuat sekiranya salahlaku yang dilakukan adalah jelas, diakui dan menjejaskan kepercayaan majikan, khususnya apabila Pengadu (Appellant) sendiri mengesahkan bahawa tindakan tersebut dibuat atas kehendaknya sendiri. … ... tindakan Pengadu mengambil keputusan sendiri untuk membatalkan tugasan dan membawa lori syarikat pulang ke kilang di Semenyih tanpa kebenaran atau arahan Defendan adalah bertentangan dengan kewajipan asas beliau sebagai Pemandu Lori. Dalam keadaan di mana Prinsip undang-undang buruh tidak membenarkan seorang pekerja untuk bertindak secara unilateral dalam mengendalikan aset majika tanpa kelulusan walaupun terdapat ketidakselesaan atau pertikaian sementara.” S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g Submissions

The Appellant’s arguments can be summarized as follows. The DGM had erred in fact and law as –

(i) she failed to hold that the Appellant was entitled to his claim;

The Respondent raised 2 preliminary objections to the Appellant’s appeal; namely that –

(i) the Appellant’s mode of appeal under O.55 A Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) was incorrect and should rightly been brought under O.55 of the same; and

In respect of the appeal, the Respondent submitted that the DGM was correct to dismiss the Appellant’s claim. They maintained that there was no appealable error that warranted this Court’s intervention. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g Principles of law

Section 77(2) Act 265 provides that the procedure for an appeal from DGM to the High Court is the same procedure as an appeal from the Sessions Court.

The general principles of law in respect of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court hearing appeals from the subordinate Court or statutory tribunals is as pronounced in Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v. Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 149 wherein Abdul Wahab Patail, delivering the judgement of the Court of Appeal held at 153 – “It is clear it is a general principle and that there are exceptions when appellate intervention is necessary to ensure justice is done. In the cases regularly cited, the terms ‘intervene’ and ‘interfere’ are used interchangeably. A more precise use of terminology would remove much unnecessary confusion and argument. It is more precise to say that an appellate court will intervene to correct an injustice when it is shown to have occurred in the trial court, but it would be an interference otherwise.” (China Airlines Ltd v. Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Maltran Air Services Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1996] 2 MLJ 517 at 527 & UMW Motor Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Allan Chong Teck Hin [2021] 3 MLJ 107 at 117). S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g Preliminary objections

(i) Mode of commencement

There are two provisions in the ROC that prescribe the procedure for bringing an appeal to the High Court, namely –

(i) O.55 ROC regarding appeals from the Subordinate Courts; in particular, O.55 r.3(1) ROC which reads – “An appeal against a decision made after trial shall be substantially in Form 111 and shall be filed in the Court from which the decision is appealed.”; and

This Court was mindful of –

(i) the Court of Appeal decision in Austral Amalgamated Tin Bhd v. Abdul Wahab Kopon & Ors & Anor Appeal [2004] S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g 2 CLJ 316, where Nik Hashim JCA (as His Lordship then was) held at 320 – “...the labour office is not a 'subordinate court' under the CJA... It is only an inquiry and not a court proceeding. It is therefore erroneous to classify the labour office as an 'inferior court'...”; and

At first blush, reading the provision and the judgment alone, it would appear that the procedure for an appeal from the DGM’s decision must comply with O.55A ROC.

Section 77 of Act 265 reads – “(1) If any person whose financial interests are affected is dissatisfied with the decision or order of the Director General... such person may appeal to the High Court. (2) Subject to any rules made under section 4 of the Subordinate Court Rules Act 1955 [Act 55], the procedure in an appeal to the High Court shall be the procedure in a civil appeal from a Sessions Court with such modifications as the circumstances may require.”

This Court is of the view that the phrase “the procedure in an appeal... shall be the procedure in a civil appeal from a Sessions Court” mandates that the procedure for appeals from S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g the DGM’s decision be brought using the procedure under

It must be borne in mind that section 77 of Act 265 is a substantive statutory provision, whereas the ROC consists only of rules prescribing procedure. Section 77 of Act 265 must take priority over the ROC.

This view is supported by the judgment in Yong Teng Hing v. Walton International Ltd; Registrar of Trademarks, Malaysia (Interested Party) [2011] 7 CLJ 401, where Richard Malajum CJSS held at 419 – “...our courts in considering matters as the present case recognise that the provisions of the governing legislations dictate whether the general or the exception rule apply.”

Section 77 Act 265 clearly constitutes an exception to the general rule. On these grounds, the Court does not accept the Respondent's argument that the Appellant erred in the mode of commencing her appeal in the High Court. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g

O.55 r.4(3) ROC reads - “The memorandum of appeal shall be substantially in Form 112 and shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads, without argument or narrative, the grounds of objection to the decision appealed against, and specigying the pint of law or the fact which are alleged to have been wwrongly decided: …”

This Court was mindful of Chuah Tim Lan v. RHB Bandk Bhd & Anor [2008] 6 MLJ 793; [2008] 6 CLJ 500, wherein Suriyadi JCA (as His Lordship then was) held at 800 - “The relevancy of this memorandum of appeal cannot be understated as it is from this document that any respondent or court will know what the appeal is all about. Everyone involved in the appeal process will instantly know the points of law or facts which are alleged to have been wrongly decided.”

Having perused the Appellant’s memorandum of appeal, this Court finds that the Respondent’s complaint is without merit. The Appellant has set out his grounds for challenging the DGM’s decision in a fairly comprehensible manner. The Respondent has been fully apprised of the Appellant’s exact case and there is no surprise or prejudice to them. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g Evaluation and findings The Appellant’s termination

The central issue for determination before the DGM, and now before this Court on appeal, is whether the Appellant is entitled to the salary in lieu of notice and the termination benefits under Act 265.

The Appellant argued that the DGM failed to properly evaluate crucial evidence in particular that the Respondent’s allegation that he had been drinking alcohol prior to abandoning the assignment was unproven. This Court finds that the Appellant’s argument devoid of merit as he had misconstrued the DGM’s finding of serious misconduct.

A perusal of the DGM’s comprehensive grounds of decision reveals that she correctly identified the Appellant’s misconduct as his unauthorized act of driving the Respondent’s lorry back to Semenyih. The Appellant did not dispute the Respondent’s evidence that he was directed to remain in Kuantan and that, if he wished to leave, he was to hand the lorry and its keys over to the manager.

The DGM found that the Appellant acted in direct defiance of a lawful and reasonable command. He abandoned his assignment, drove the lorry back to Semenyih without the Respondent’s permission. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g

It is trite employment law that an employee owes an implied duty of obedience, trust, and confidence to their employer. The DGM was correct to hold that that driving the lorry away from an assignment without the Respondent’s authorization constitutes a fundamental breach of employment terms and an act of gross insubordination.

In Menon v. The Brookland Selangor Rubber Co Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 15; [167] 1 LNS 100, Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Highness then was) held - “It is well-established law that willful disobedience of a lawful and reasonable order of the employer will justify summary dismissal. It is also axiomatic that one act of disobedience or misconduct can justify instant dismissal if it is of a nature which goes to show that the servant is repudiating the contract or one of its essential conditions: see Laws v London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd [1959] 2 All ER 285 287 288.”

The DGM was fully mindful of Section 14 Act 265 and she correctly held that although formal domestic inquiries are generally encouraged, employment law principles firmly permit immediate dismissal where the misconduct is clear, admitted, and fundamentally destroyed the substratum of trust between the employer and employee. The Appellant himself confirmed that the course of action was taken entirely of his own accord. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g

In Maritime Intelligence Sdn Bhd v. Tan Ah Gek [2021] MLJU 2189, Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ held at [para 104] – “In relation to domestic inquiries, the general principles of good industrial practice and natural justice require that an employer ought to hold a domestic inquiry prior to dismissing a workman for misconduct. However a failure to hold a domestic inquiry is not fatal. Otherwise an employer who had perfectly just cause or excuse on the substantive merits of a case to dismiss an employee, would be compelled to reinstate or pay compensation to a workman guilty of grave misconduct, simply because it had failed to comply with this procedural requirement. Therefore the position in law as enunciated in the leading case of Dreamland (above) is that where an employer fails to hold an inquiry, or an inquiry is found to be defective, it is open to the employer to establish afresh at the inquiry before the Industrial Court, that the dismissal was indeed with just cause or excuse. In other words, the employer is at liberty to establish the basis for the decision to terminate the workman.” (Lim Eye Thun v. Majlis Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 444 di 462; [2010] 2 CLJ 45; [2010] 4 AMR 125).”

In light of his own admission, this act alone, on its own, served as a sufficiently serious offence to justify summary termination. An employee cannot act unilaterally in managing or moving an employer's assets without prior approval under any circumstances. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g

The Appellant’s further contention that the DGM failed to address her mind to the principle of proportionality regarding the punishment imposed is similarly without merit. This is evident where the DGM expressly observed – “Mahkamah seterusnya mengambil kira prinsip bahawa tahap hukuman mestilah berkadar dengan kesalahan. Dalam konteks ini, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa membawa pulang lori syarikat atas kehendak sendiri tanpa izin, yang mengakibatkan kegagalan melaksanakan tugasan yang diarahkan, merupakan satu perlanggaran amanah yang serius. Oleh itu, penamatan perkhidmatan tidak boleh dianggap sebagai hukuman yang berlebihan atau tidak seimbang.”

The DGM was entirely correct in law and fact to conclude that the penalty of immediate termination was neither excessive nor disproportionate. The gravity of the Appellant’s misconduct fully warranted the termination. Decision

This Court finds no appealable error of law or fact that warrants appellate intervention. The DGM's evaluation of the evidence was comprehensive and fully supported by the facts presented during the proceedings before her. S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g S/N Cmr2z3Erv0Sz3pKwjyP/4g