A is accused of a crime. The facts that either before or at the time of or after the alleged crime A provided evidence which would tend to give to the facts of the case an appearance favourable to himself, or that he destroyed or concealed evidence or prevented the presence or procured the absence of persons who might have been witnesses or suborned persons to give evidence respecting it are relevant. [63] Inferen yang boleh diambil terhadap tindakan SD1 ini seperti dinyatakan dalam kes Yew You supra: “The possibility therefore, cannot be ruled out that, if the lorry driver was at fault, his foremost concern would be to do what he could to exculpate himself.” [E] Dapatan dan Kesimpulan Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 7 [66] Mahkamah memutuskan atas imbangan kebarangkalian, versi Plaintif adalah lebih munasabah, logik dan masuk akal. Mahkamah menolak versi Defendan, dan memutuskan Defendan bertanggungan 100% terhadap kemalangan. DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSION [9] The Defendant’s counsel, in his submissions, challenged the findings of fact by the Sessions Judge on various grounds, including the following: [4] “Kami berhujah bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkilaf apabila beliau mendapati Defendan bertanggungan 100% terhadap perlanggaran yang melibatkan m/sikal simati No. JMR 4455. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah tekilaf atas alasan-lasan berikut: a) Hanya menerima dan bergantung ke atas keterangan utama dari Pegawai Penyiasat (SP-1), Abu Bakar (SP-2) dan Wan Izaiman (SP-4) tanpa mempertimbangkan keterangan dab pengakuan oleh saksi-saksi yang sama semasa Pemeriksaan Balas; b) Kegagalan untuk menghayati bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah gagal melaksanakan beban pembuktian (legal burden) (Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950) dan beban pembuktian keterangan (evidential burden) (Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950) dalam membuktikan allegasi perlanggaran antara m/kar Defendan No. JKM 9685 dan m/sikal simati No. JMR 4455; c) Mencapai suatu hipotesis/kesimpulan yang salah bahawa bahawa m/sikal simati bersentuhan dengan m/kar Defendan walaupun tidak ada sebarang bukti langsung atau senyap untuk menyokong penemuan/kesimpulan tersebut, bahkan kerosakan Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 8 kepada kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut juga tidak menyokong kesimpulan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. THE LAW [10] The law governing appeals from the lower court, after a full trial, is well settled. The appellate courts will not interfere with or disturb the findings of fact by a trial judge unless the decision by the learned trial Judge is plainly wrong or perverse. A decision is plainly wrong if it is one which no reasonable judge could have reached. The Federal Court in S Quarry Sdn Bhd v Desaru Development Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] MLJU 99 laid down several instances when decisions are considered to be plainly wrong or perverse. Some instances where a trial judge’s decision is considered perverse, are where he had: i. misdirected himself on the evidence; ii. failed to judicially appreciate the evidence; iii. failed to consider any material evidence; iv. acted on some irrelevant evidence as to render the decision wholly erroneous; v. made wrong inference from facts; vi. misapprehended the facts; vii. gave reasons which are wholly unsatisfactory or contradictory of each other. Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 9 [11] This basic principle was earlier explained by the learned judge in Foo Lan Foow & Anor v Kamisah Bt Abdul Hanis (as the wife and dependent of Rahman Bin Ismail, deceased) [2004] 5 MLJ 566 as such: “It is trite law that an appellate court will not interfere with the findings of a trial judge more so when the latter had had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses and assessing their ability to tell the truth. The court will also not interfere with the apportionment of blame as long as there was no error of law or of fact in the judgment of the lower court.” [12] Likewise, in Mat Shah Mohamed & Anor v Foo Say Meng & Ors [1983] CLJ (Rep) 254, the Federal Court made the following comment: “The learned judge in this case had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses which opportunity the appellate court did not enjoy and there was no reason in this case for the appellate court to interfere in the case.” [13] In Renal Link (KL) Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Dr Harnam Singh [1997] 3 CLJ 225, the court held: “In our judgment, this appeal really turns upon a pure question of fact based upon the credibility of the witnesses who gave their evidence at the trial. The function of determining where the truth lies, on a balance of probabilities, is entrusted by law to the trial court. Unless we, as a court of appeal, are convinced that there was no judicial appreciation of the evidence by the trier of fact, or that the audio-visual advantage reserved to a trial judge had been missed or that the findings made do not accord with the probabilities of the case when taken as a whole, it would not be open to us to intervene and upset the findings made by a trial judge.” Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 10 [14] This court, in hearing this appeal, will, therefore, have to decide if the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge ought to be reversed or interfered with, applying the guidelines and principle expounded in the cases cited above. THIS COURT’S DECISION ON LIABILITY [15] The Defendant submits that the Sessions Judge erred in his finding of liability because he relied solely on the the demeanour of D1 while giving evidence, and ound D1’s evidence to be inconsistent. i. On close scrutiny of the grounds by the Sessions Judge, he had, on many occasions, analysed the evidence of other witnesses, including SP3, and also the silent evidence in the case. He examined the explanation given by the Defendant on how the damage to the right side of his car happened. The Judge found the Defendant’s explanation to be not credible and improbable on a balance of probabilities. ii. At para (50) of the Sessions Judge’s grounds, he found as follows: [50] SD1 mendakwa ada melanggar pembahagi jalan, namun begitu siasatan SP1 mendapati tiada kesan di bahagian pembahagi jalan sebelah kanan. Oleh itu dakwaan ini ditolak. Taking into account the analysis by the Sessions Judge of evidence by SP3, SP1 (the investigating officer), and the silent evidence as stated in Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 11 his grounds, I find that the Sessions Judge did not rely solely on the demeanour of the Defendant in arriving at his conclusion that the Defendant’s evidence is unreliable and is not credible. [16] Having read the Sessions Judge’s grounds, I find that he had done a proper analysis of all the evidence before him, and I fully agree with his findings that the Plaintiffs’ version of the accident is more credible on a balance probabilities. I therefore, find that the Sessions Judge has not made any appealable error in his findings on liability since there was sufficient evidence for him to arrive at his conclusion. APPEAL ON QUANTUM [17] The guiding principle for appeals on quantum of damages is also well settled. In United Plywood and Sawmill Ltd v Lock Ngan Loi [1970] 1 LNS 164, the Federal Court stated as follows: “ This Court normally does not interfere with an assessment of damages even where the award seemed much too high, so long as there has not been any error of principle discerned in the judgment or the sum manifestly excessive.” In Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani (1985) 2 MLJ 22, YA Datuk Abdul Hamid CJ, explained as follows: “The principle that should guide this Court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case in particular, the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore, it is for the appeal Court Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 12 to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purpose of assessment some irrelevant considerations.” [18] On the issue of quantum, the Defendant’s appeal is against the Sessions Judge’s award for loss of support and special damages. The main grounds of his appeal are that; i. The Sessions Judge decided on a multiplicand of RM3,600.00 per month without any evidence that the deceased contributed that amount of money to the Plaintiffs each month before his death; and ii. The sum of RM3,600.00, as decided by the Sessions Judge, was speculative and that the Sessions Judge did not take into consideration that the Plaintiffs had failed to tender the deceased’s bank statements, which would show the sums given by the deceased to the Plaintiffs every month before his death. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT [19] In a claim for loss of support, the issues to be considered by the court are: i. whether the deceased was working at the time of the accident; ii. if yes, how much was his salary and Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 13 iii. how much did he contribute to his parents before he died. The fact that the deceased was working in Singapore before he died was proven by the Plaintiffs’ oral evidence and the deceased’s work permit (Exhibit P12). The admissibility of the letter of confirmation by the deceased’s employer (Exhibit P13) and his payslip (Exhibit P14) were challenged by the Defendant. The Sessions Judge agreed with the Defendant’s submission and held that Exhibits P13 and P14 were inadmissible. Nevertheless, as submitted by the Plaintiffs, the deceased’s occupation and income were not challenged by the Defendant’s counsel during cross examination of SP2 and SP7 (namely the Second Plaintiff and the First Plaintiff). Thus, based on the case of Sivalingam A/L Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 and Chan Peng Fook v Kan Pak Lee [1974] 2 MLJ 197, such evidence is undisputed and is deemed to be accepted. [20] Thus, the only issue left to be decided by the Sessions Judge was the amount contributed by the deceased to his parents before he died. The Sessions Judge found as follows: [81] Walaupun Mahkamah menolak kemasukan P13 dan P14, Plaintif tidaklah pulang dengan tangan kosong. Fakta yang tidak dibantah ialah simati bekerja di Singapura. Sudah tentulah simati ada pendapatan. Namun berapakah gaji yang patut diberikan kepada simati? Berkaitan isu ini, kedua pihak memetik kes Latif Bin Che Ngah v Maimunah bte Zakaria [2002] 4 MLJ 266 HC, dimana isteri simati mendakwa simati yang bekerja di Singapura, memberinya RM4,000.00 tanpa dokumen dan tanpa kehadiran saksi. Mahkamah menggunakan notis kehakiman dan membuat pemerhatian trend rakyat Malaysia bekerja di Singapura untuk mendapatkan gaji yang lebih Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 14 tinggi. Mahkamah menggunakan budibicara dan membenarkan kehilangan tanggungan RM1,500.00 sebulan: “in the circumstances of this case, though the deceased’s income of RM4,000.00 per month was not substantiated, I still find the amount of RM1,500.00 per month as loss of support to the deceased’s widow and the six children fair and reasonable.” Sama ada Mahkamah boleh menggunakan budibicara dalam memberikan awad kehilangan tanggungan? [82] Peguam Defendan yang bijaksana menghujahkan RM1,000.00. Pada pendapat saya, jumlah ini adalah tidak memadai. Adalah diperhatikan kes Latif bin Che Ngah supra diputuskan pada tahun 2002, keadaan inflasi dan kadar tukaran matawang tidak sama seperti sekarang. Mahkamah menggunakan kuasa budibicara dan memutuskan pendapatan simati bagi tujuan sumbangan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dibenarkan pada kadar RM3,600.00 sebulan. Ini adalah kadar munasabah bagi gaji simati mengambilkira simati bekerja di Singapura yang mempunyai kadar tukaran asing yang lebih tinggi dari Malaysia. [83] Simati berumur 25 tahun semasa meninggal dunia. Kiraan pendarab yang ditetapkan di bawah s.7(3)(iv))d) Civil Law Act 1956 ialah 16: Kehilangan tanggungan; RM3,600.00 X 12 bulan X 16 tahun Jumlah: RM691,200.00 [21] Reading para 81 of the Sessions Judge’s grounds above, he made a finding that the Defendant failed to challenge the evidence that the Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 15 deceased was, in fact, in employment in Singapore; hence it can be inferred that he was earning a salary. The only issue is what was the amount of salary he was paid and the second question was, what was the amount he contributed to his parents. The Sessions Judge took judicial notice of the general scale of salaries for the deceased’s job in Singapore as done by the Judge in Latif Bin Che Ngah v Maimunah bte Zakaria [2002] 4 MLJ 266, and awarded a sum of RM3,600.00 per month as the multiplicand. The Sessions Judge took into account the current exchange rate of the Singapore dollar being much higher than the Ringgit and held that the sum of RM3,600.00 per month was reasonable. He then took into account the age of the deceased and applied the multiplier of 16 years in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(3)(iv))d) of the Civil Law Act 1956, which is 16 years. He then awarded the sum of RM691,200.00 as damages for loss of support for the Plaintiffs. Since the decision of the High Court in Latif Che Ngah above is still good law, I am of the view that the Sessions Judge did not commit any error of law in arriving at his decision and further, his determination of loss of support in the sum of RM3,600.00 per month is not too excessive to justify any interference by an appellate court. [22] Likewise, I find that the Sessions Judge’s award of special damages is not too high or unreasonable to warrant any appellate intervention. Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 16 Thus, the Defendant’s appeal and the Plaintiffs’ cross appeal on quantum are dismissed. CONCLUSION [23] For the aforesaid reasons, I dismiss the Defendant’s appeal on both liability and quantum with costs of RM5,000.00, while the Plaintiffs’ cross appeal on quantum is dismissed with costs of RM3,000.00 subject to allocatur fee. Dated 24th June 2021 Signed, ………………………….. Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Johor Darul Ta’zim Curia Advisari Vult Counsel / Solicitors: For the Appellant : Satvinder Singh A/L Hardial Singh Messrs Khalil Surinder & Associates (Kuala Lumpur) Suite 2115, Level 21 Plaza Pengkalan Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 17 51100 Kuala Lumpur (Ref: KS/TN/BI/1024/2015-125/SST/t) For the Respondents: Saralathevi A/P Murthy Messrs Teo & Associates Wisma SK Teo, No. 84 & 86 Jalan Padi 1, Bandar Baru Uda 81200 Johor Bahru Johor Darul Ta’zim (Ref: TSK/AC/5613/2015/T/SR/Azwa) Cases Referred To: S Quarry Sdn Bhd v Desaru Development Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] MLJU 99 Foo Lan Foow & Anor v Kamisah Bt Abdul Hanis (as the wife and dependent of Rahman Bin Ismail, deceased) [2004] 5 MLJ 566 Mat Shah Mohamed & Anor v Foo Say Meng & Ors [1983] CLJ (Rep) 254 Renal Link (KL) Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Dr Harnam Singh [1997] 3 CLJ 225 United Plywood and Sawmill Ltd v Lock Ngan Loi [1970] 1 LNS 164 Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani (1985) 2 MLJ 22 Sivalingam A/L Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 Chan Peng Fook v Kan Pak Lee [1974] 2 MLJ 197 Latif Bin Che Ngah v Maimunah bte Zakaria [2002] 4 MLJ 266 Legislation Referred To: Seksyen 103 dan 106 Akta Keterangan 1950 Seksyen 8(e) Akta Keterangan 1950 Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 Before The Honourable Judicial Commissioner Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz 18 Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 Section 7(3)(iv))d) Civil Law Act 1956 Rules of Court 2012 Hearing Date : 10.01.2021 Decision Date : 17.02.2021