Ng Poh Hwa (No. K/P: 570617-01-6729) v 1. Ketua Pengarah Kastam (Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman No. WA-25-165-09/2016)

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RUMAINOR BIN SARIF … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN Grounds of Decision Azizah Nawawi, J: Application [1] This is the applicant’s application to quash the decision dated 14.6.2016, in a letter issued by the 2nd respondent and signed by the 4th respondent, which reads: “Tuan, PERMOHONAN PELEPASAN DARI SENARAI HITAM S. 17A AKTA KASTAM AKIBAT TINDAKAN

(A) MENYENARAI HITAM DARI KELUAR NEGARA

(B) TUDUHAN JENAYAH S. 138 AKTA KASTAM 1967 … 3

Dimaklumkan bahawa keputusan sekatan perjalanan keatas tuan, Ng Poh Hwa (No. Kad Pengenalan : 570617-01-6729) pemilik kenderaan LE 911, adalah dikekalkan. Tindakan ini adalah berdasarkan peruntukan Seksyen 17A (1) Akta Kastam 1967 yang memberi kuasa kepada Ketua Pengarah Kastam untuk mengemukakan permohonan kepada Pengarah Imigresen bagi menghalang mana-mana orang yang tidak membayar duti kastam dari meninggalkan Malaysia, manakala perbicaraan bagi kes jenayah pula adalah dibawah bidang kuasa mahkamah.” [2] The second prayer is seeking a declaration that the applicant’s name to be removed from the Immigration Department ‘black list’, which bars him from leaving the country. [3] The grounds of the application in the Statement pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court are as follows (in Bahasa

“Pada 14-6-2016, pihak Responden Pertama telah memutuskan (“Keputusan tersebut”) di mana telah diterima oleh Pemohon pada 28-6-2016 bahawa sekatan perjalanan ke atas Pemohon, pemilik kenderaan LE 911, adalah dikekalkan dan tindakan ini adalah berasaskan peruntukan seksyen 17A(1) 4 Akta Kastam 1967 yang memberi kuasa kepada Responden Pertama untuk mengemukakan permohonan kepada Pengarah Imigresen bagi menghalang mana-mana orang yang tidak membayar duti kastam dari meninggalkan Malaysia.

(ii) Disebabkan keputusan tersebut, Pemohon telah disekat perjalanan ke luar negara dan pemohon tidak dapat memperbaharui pasportnya yang telah luput pada 26-7-2016.

(iii) Perniagaan Pemohon juga terjejas akibat sekatan perjalanan dan sebagai seorang ahli perniagaan, Pemohon tidak dapat hadir ke luar negara bagi tujuan mesyuarat perniagaan dan mengalami kerugian dalam perniagaannya.

(iv) Ia adalah satu hak asasi yang dijamin oleh perkara 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan bahawa nyawa seseorang (dalam ertinya yang paling luas) atau kebebasan dirinya (dalam ertinya yang paling luas) tidak boleh dilucutkan kecuali mengikut tindakan Kerajaan yang adil dalam kedua-dua prosedur atau substans. Kalau satu tindakan Kerajaan yang disoalkan itu adalah adil secara prosedur atau substantive mesti bergantung kepada pola fakta setiap kes. 5

Perlembagaan Persekutuan merupakan undang-undang tertinggi di Malaysia dan merupakan satu dokumen yang digelar sebagai sui generis dan mempunyai prinsip-prinsip tafsiran yang tersendiri di mana peruntukan-peruntukan di dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan harus ditafsirkan secara liberal dan bukannya tafsiran literal terutamanya kepada peruntukan-peruntukan yang menjamin individu-individu perlindungan hak asasi.

(vi) Walaupun Responden Pertama mempunyai kuasa di bawah seksyen 17A(1) Akta Kastam 1967 untuk mengeluarkan suatu perakuan yang mengandungi butir-butir mengenai duti-duti yang kena dibayar dengan suatu permohonan bahawa orang itu adalah dihalang daripada meninggalkan Malaysia kepada Pengarah Imigresen, kuasa tersebut tidak boleh melangkau peruntukan-peruntukan di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

(vii) Dalam perkara 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, mengikut tafsiran liberal, perkataan kebebasan dirinya juga termasuk kebebasan untuk menyeberangi sempadan untuk masuk dan keluar negara sekiranya seseorang ingin membuat demikian. 6

(viii) Oleh kerana satu tuduhan telah dibuat terhadap saya di Mahkamah Majistret Tapah, No. Saman: 87- 62-8/2015 oleh Responden-responden di bawah seksyen 138 Akta Kastam 1967, maka dikhuatiri tindakan senarai hitam di bawah seksyen 17A Akta Kastam 1967 menjadi “sub judice” kerana isu tuntutan duti/cukai belum lagi diputuskan oleh Mahkamah.

(ix) Selagi Mahkamah belum memutuskan tuduhan yang dibuat terhadap saya, maka saya berpendapat bahawa duti dan cukai tersebut tidak harus dibayar oleh saya dan selaras dengan itu, nama saya juga harus dikeluarkan dari senarai hitam ke luar negara.

Saya juga ingin menegaskan kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini bahawa tuduhan yang dibuat terhadap saya adalah bukan berkenaan bayaran cukai dan/atau duti atas sebab hanya kenderaan tersebut disita dan sekiranya Mahkamah memutuskan saya bersalah, hanya kenderaan tersebut yang akan dilucuthakkan daripada saya dan tiada apa-apa bayaran yang harus saya buat.” 7 [4] In his written submission however, the applicant summarized the grounds of the application to be as follows:

The applicant is the registered owner of a Porsche 911 Carrera motor vehicle bearing registration number LE 911 (the “Porsche car”), which was lawfully imported and registered in

(ii) The said Porsche car was exempted from payment of duty by the Director General of Customs pursuant to Rule 21A of the Customs Duty (Exemption) Order 1988;

(iii) That the said Porsche car was seized on 20.10.2013 in ‘Hentian Rehat dan Rawat, Tapah’, outside the island of Langkawi; and

(iv) On or about 13.6.2014, the respondents’ issued a notice to the applicant giving notice that unless the duty of RM550,489.09 and a compound of RM5,000.00 are paid, the 1st respondent will take action under section 17A of the Customs Act 1967. [5] Having considered the application and the submission of the parties, this Court had dismissed the applicant’s application with costs. 8 The Salient Facts [6] The applicant is the registered owner of the Porsche car, which was lawfully imported and registered in Langkawi. [7] The said Porsche car was seized by the Customs on 20.10.2013 at the ‘Hentian Rehat dan Rawat, Tapah’. A notice of seizure was issued to the applicant vide a letter dated 10.12.2013. The Porsche car was seized because there had been a breach of a condition of the Customs Duty (Exemption) Order 1988, that allows vehicles registered in Langkawi to be on the mainland of Peninsular Malaysia for 30 days per trip. In this case and at the time of the seizure, the said Porsche car was on the mainland beyond the 30 days. [8] Vide a Bill of Demand dated 3.1.2014 issued to the applicant, the 2nd respondent claim for duties of RM550,489.09 and an offer of compound of RM5,000.00, pursuant to section 135(1)(d) of the Customs Act 1967. In the said letter, the applicant was also informed that if the applicant did not pay the same, the department will commence legal proceedings against the applicant. The applicant did not challenge this decision in court. [9] The applicant did not make any payment on the duties nor accepted the compound offered. Therefore, a reminder letter dated 2.4.2017 for the payment of the Bill of Demand was sent to the applicant. 9 [10] Vide a letter dated 11.7.2014, the respondents wrote to the Director General of Immigration, enclosing a Certificate under section 17A of the Customs Act 1967 requesting that the applicant be barred from leaving Malaysia. The applicant did not file any application in the Court to challenge this decision to bar the applicant from leaving Malaysia. [11] The applicant had applied for three (3) temporary release to leave Malaysia, vide letters dated 5.9.2014, 20.11.2014 and 8.12.2014 and these requests have been granted. [12] However, the applicant’s letter dated 9.9.2015 requesting for his name to be released from the blacklist was rejected by the respondent in their letters dated 19.9.2015. [13] Vide a letter dated 4.4.2016, the applicant wrote to the Deputy Minister of Finance I for his name to be released from the Immigration Department blacklist. [14] In response to the above letter to the Deputy Minister, the respondent has replied vide the letter dated 14.6.2016, where the respondents have informed the applicant that they are maintaining their earlier position. [15] Hence the applicant filed this application to quash the said letter dated 14.6.2016. 10 The Findings of the Court [16] In Booi Kim Lee v YB Menteri Sumber Manusia & Golden Plus Geaniait SB [1999] 3 MLJ 515, Justice KC Vohrah adopted Lord Diplock’s classification of grounds of judicial review in the House of Lords case of Council of Civil Service Unions V. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. The three (3) grounds described by Lord Diplock are:

illegality;

(ii) irrationality; and

(iii) procedural impropriety. [17] By illegality as a ground for judicial review, it means “that the decision-maker must correctly understand the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it’ and that “… the authority concerned has been guilty of an error of law in its action as for example, purporting to exercise a power which in law it does not possess.” [18] By irrationality it means ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ and “applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided upon could have arrived at it” 11 [19] By procedural impropriety, it includes ‘failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid out..” and “duty to act fairly”. [20] The main ground relied by the applicant in this application is that there has been a breach of the applicant’s fundamental right. In paragraph [20] of the applicant’s written submission, the applicant submits that: “… Article 5(1) of the Constitution has a constitutional guaranteed right to challenge the exercise of discretionary power by the First Respondent.” [21] The applicant then referred to cases on constitutional interpretation, such as Government of Malaysia v. Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 and Lee Kwan Who v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301. The applicant then submits in para [25] of his written submission: “With the aforesaid principles in mind, it is our submission that the First Respondent did not act bona fide, fairly, honestly and honourably and the action of the First Respondent was an abuse of discretionary power.” [22] However, the applicant did not clearly submit in what manner is the decision in the letter dated 14.6.2016 can be said to be illegal, irrational and suffers from procedural impropriety. 12 [23] The letter date 14.6.2016 which the applicant is seeking to quash was in reply to the applicant’s letter dated 4.4.2016, which inter alia, reads: “….. Rayuan

Berpandukan prinsip keadilan dan ekuiti, saya merayu kepada YB Menteri di bawah s. 3(2) Akta Kastam 1967menilai semula arahan penahanan keluar negara sehingga kes pertuduhan dan permohonan lucuthak saman 87-62-8/2015, Mahkamah Majistret Tapah, Perak selesai dan Permohonan Bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: 25-78-05/2015 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lunmpur selesai.” [24] Therefore, the letter dated 14.6.2016 merely informs the applicant that the respondents are maintaining their earlier decision, that is, “Dimaklumkan bahawa keputusan sekatan perjalanan keatas tuan, Ng Poh Hwa (No. Kad Pengenalan : 570617-01-6729) pemilik kenderaan LE 911, adalah dikekalkan.” The other part of the decision is to inform the applicant that the criminal case is within the jurisdiction of the Court. [25] The respondents have maintained their earlier decision to invoke section 17A(1) of the Customs Act 1967 to prevent the applicant from leaving Malaysia, until he has paid all the duties payable in 13 respect of his Porsche car, LE 911. The tax imposed on the applicant was RM550,489.09 with compound fees of RM5,000.00. When the applicant failed to pay the said taxes, the 1st respondent had issued a request to the Director General of Immigration to prevent him from leaving the country in 2014. [26] It is not in dispute that when the respondents made the decision to seize the Porsche car on 20.10.2013, the applicant did not challenge the said decision. It is also not in dispute that when the respondent issued the Bill of Demand dated 3.1.2014, the applicant did not challenge the same. [27] It is also not in dispute that when the respondent issued the Certificate under section 17A of the Customs Act 1967 to the Director General of Immigration on 11.7.2014 to prevent the applicant from leaving Malaysia without paying the duties, the applicant did not challenge the same. In fact, in compliance with the said directions, the applicant had applied for, and was given the consent to travel abroad. [28] Therefore, the applicant had never challenge the decisions to seize the Porsche car, the issuance of the Bill of Demand and the order that bars him from travelling abroad without paying the duties as per the Bill of Demand. 14 [29] Then suddenly, in 2015 and 2016 he made several requests that the ban barring him from travelling abroad without paying the duties, be withdrawn. Hence, the respondent issued the letter dated 14.6.2016, maintaining its earlier decision. [30] I am of the considered opinion that the applicant had sat on his rights when he did not apply to challenge the three main decisions, namely the seizure order (2013), the Bill of Demand (2014) and the decision to bar him from travelling overseas (2014). To challenge those decisions now are clearly an abuse of the process. It simply means that an applicant is allowed to sit on his rights and allowed to challenge the decisions at his convenience, and this clearly goes against Order 53 Rules of Court 2012. [31] Be that as it may, the applicant is now challenging the decision of the respondents maintaining its earlier decision to bar the applicant from travelling overseas. However, the very authority who issued the order to bar the applicant from travelling overseas, the Director General of Immigration has not been made a party. The powers to bar a person from travelling overseas rests with the Director General of Immigration, not the respondent. Therefore, on this ground alone, both the application for an order of certiorari and declaration cannot be granted. [32] Even if we take it that the applicant is challenging the decision of the respondent to issue the Certificate pursuant to section 17A of the Customs Act 1967, I am of the considered opinion that there is 15 nothing illegal in the issuance of the said Certificate as it is not in dispute that the said duties in the sum of RM550,489.09 pursuant to the Bill of Demand dated 10.12.2013 have not paid. Since the duties have not been paid, then section 17A(1) of the Customs Act 1067 allows the respondent to issue a certificate requesting the Director General of Immigration to prevent the applicant from leaving the country. Section 17A reads: “17A. Recovery of customs duties from persons leaving Malaysia

Where the Director General has reason to believe that any person is about or is likely to leave Malaysia without paying any customs duties,he may issue to any Director of Immigration a certificate containing particulars of the duties so payable with a request that such person be prevented from leaving Malaysia unless and until he pays all the duties so payable or furnishes security to the satisfaction of the Director General for its payment.

Subject to any order issued or made under any written law relating to banishment or immigration, any Director of Immigration who receives a request under subsection (1) in respect of a person shall exercise all measures which may include the removal or retention of any certificate of identity, passport, exit permit or other 16 travel documents in relation to that person as may be necessary to give effect to the request.” [33] Section 17A of the Customs Act 1967 is similar to section 104 of the Income Tax Act 1967, which allows the Director General of Inland Revenue to issue a certificate to the Director General of Immigration requesting that a person be prevented from leaving Malaysia unless and until he has paid his taxes. Section 104 of the Income Tax Act 1967 was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Tai Choi Yu v Government of Malaysia [1994] 2 CLJ 174, where the Court held as follows: “One of the primary functions of the DGIR under the Act is to collect and recover assessed tax effectively, and to do that, he must employ all the modes of recovery authorised in Part VII (ss. 103 to 111) of the Act. Action under s. is one of the authorised modes. It is the requirement of s. 103 of the Act that a person pays his assessed tax on the service of the notice of assessment on him failing which the DGIR may besides using all other authorised modes, proceed to recover in Court the assessed tax as a debt due to the Government, and if judgment is obtained, to execute the judgment. Under s. 104(1) of the Act, the DGIR, if he is of the opinion that a person is about or likely to leave Malaysia without paying all tax payable by the person, is authorised to issue a certificate requesting 17 the Director of Immigration to prevent the person from leaving Malaysia.” (emphasis added) [34] Therefore, based on the above principles, I agree with the learned Senior Federal Counsel that the issuance of the Certificate under section 17A of the Customs Act 1967 is within the power of the 1st respondent. [35] However, the applicant went further and challenged the legality of the respondent’s decision on the basis of double jeopardy. Paragraphs [16] and [17] of the applicant’s Further Submission reads: “16. The act of the Customs Department demanding the Applicant for payment of duty and compound amount to double jeopardy.

The Applicant shall not be punished twice for the said offence as the Applicant is now acquitted and released from the said charge and the said vehicle is forfeited under section 127 of the Customs Act 1967. It would follow that in such an event, there is no question of any duty payable on the said vehicle.” 18 [36] First of all, the issue of double jeopardy is not a ground relied in the Statement pursuant to Order 53 Rules of Court 2012. Therefore, the applicant cannot rely on the issue of double jeopardy, as it is not a pleaded ground. [37] Be that as it may, I am of the considered opinion that the issue of double jeopardy is not applicable in this case. [38] The protection against double jeopardy in this country is provided by Article 7 clause 2 of the Federal Constitution, which reads; “ 7.

…

A person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence shall not be tried again for the same offence except where the conviction or acquittal has been quashed and a retrial ordered by a court superior to which he was acquitted or convicted”. [39] In PP v Teh Cheng Poh [1978] 1 MLJ 68, Arulanandom J held that a person cannot be said to be in double jeopardy unless he has been convicted or acquitted for the same offence before. [40] On the same issue of double jeopardy, Justice Suriyadi made the following finding in Lye Pong Fong v PP [1998] 6 MLJ 304 at page 309: 19 “ … if a detention order is not a conviction, then surely a restrictive residence order will never qualify. If no conviction has been recorded, then it follows that the issue of double jeopardy does not arise at all…. Even if the subject’s liberties are curtailed, by reason of the fact that the normal criminal and preventive laws are complimentary to each other, the concept of double jeopardy as provided by law are inapplicable here.” [41] In the case of Palautah Sinnappayan & Anor v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2009] 3 MLRA 307, the Federal Court held as follows: “[14] With respect, we could not agree with the contention of the appellants that the doctrine autrefois acquit applies to the appellant’s case. We are of the view that the scope and extent of protection enshrined under art. 7(2) of the Federal Constitution only applies to criminal offence wherein a person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence by the court shall not be tried again for the same offence.” (emphasis added) [42] Therefore, the principle of double jeopardy only applies in criminal conviction, whereby a person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence by the Court shall not be tried again for the same 20 offence. In the present case, there is no issue of the applicant being tried twice on the same offence. [43] Added to that, I am of the considered opinion that there are two different issues here, one in relation to duties and the other is related to a criminal offence as per the charge. In respect of the duties imposed, the 1st respondent is empowered by section 15 of the Customs Act 1967, which reads: “15. Reimposition of Duty

If any goods, on which customs duty has not been paid by reason of an exemption granted under section 14, cease to comply with the conditions subject to which such exemption was granted or cease to be kept or used by the person or for the purposes qualifying them for such exemption, such goods shall, upon such cesser, become liable to the customs duty and the person to whom such exemption was granted and any person found in possession of such goods shall be jointly and severally liable to pay such customs duty.

If any goods, which are liable to customs duty under subsection (1) and on which such duty has not been paid, are found in the possession or on the premises of any person other than the person authorized to possess them under the terms of such exemption, such 21 goods shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to be uncustomed goods.” [44] In the present case, the Porsche car was registered in Langkawi, a duty free island. Therefore, the said car was exempted from payment of duty under Rule 21A of the Customs Duty (Exemption) Order 1988. However, pursuant to the Customs Duties (Exemption) (Amendment) 2010, which takes effect on 11.2.2010, which amended item 21A, in column (4) the Customs Duty (Exemption) Order 1988, and reads as follows: “(iv) that the vehicle/motor cycle may remain in the principal customs area for a period not exceeding 30 days per trip, subject to a maximum period of 90 days in any one year”. [45] In other words, the Porsche car may be brought to the mainland from Langkawi, but may only remain for 30 days per trip. In this case, the Porsche car should have been returned to Langkawi on 6.2.2013 yet it was seized at the R & R, Tapah, Perak on 20.10.2013. Therefore, there is clearly a breach of the condition (iv) of the Customs Duty (Exemption) Order 1988. The applicant cannot deny this now as the applicant had never challenged the seizure order. 22 [46] Therefore, since there has been a breach of a condition of the exemption, section 15 of the Customs Act 1967 empowers the respondent to reimpose duties on the applicant. The duties imposed are payable as civil debt due to the Government under section 22B of the Customs Act 1967, which reads: “22B. Recovery of custom duty as a civil debt Without prejudice to any other remedy, any customs duty payable under this Act may be recovered by the Minister as a civil debt due to the Government of Malaysia, or where the customs duty is a duty of a category assigned to the State by Article 112C of the Federal Constitution, to the Government of that State.” [47] With regards to the criminal charges, the applicant was charged under section 138 of the Customs Act 1967, which reads: “138. Penalty for offences not otherwise provided for Every omission or neglect to comply with, and every act done or attempted to be done contrary to, the provisions of this Act, or any breach of the conditions and restrictions subject to, or upon which, any licence or permit is issued or any exemption is granted under this Act, shall be an offence against this Act and in respect of any such offence for which no penalty is expressly 23 provided the offender shall be liable to a fine of not exceeding **twenty thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both.” [48] Therefore, because of the applicant’s action in taking the Porsche car to the mainland for more than 30 days, it is a clear violation of a condition Customs Duty (Exemption) Order 1988. Thus, the respondent is empowered to reimpose duties on the car owner under section 15 of the Customs Act 1867. At the same time, the same breach amount to a criminal offence under section 138, upon which the applicant had been charged in court. [49] Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that all the actions of the respondents are within the legal parameters of the Customs Act

It is on this basis that the applicant had never challenged the seizure order (2013), the Bill of Demand (2014) and the decision to bar him from travelling overseas (2014). As such, it cannot be said that respondent did not act bona fide, fairly, honestly and honourably or that the action of the 1st respondent was an abuse of discretionary power. [50] With regards to the declaratory prayer seeking an order to remove the applicant’s name from the Immigration Department ‘blacklist, this Court is bound by the case of Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 72 where the Federal Court has held that the decision of the Director General of 24 Immigration is not reviewable under section 59A of the Immigration Act 1959/1963. The court held as follows: “Secondly, in our view, s. 59A is more elaborately expressed and more exclusionary in its scope. Whereas the repealed section provides that an order of the Minister, the Director General or the State Authority under the Act or any subsidiary legislation shall without prejudice to any provisions giving right to appeal to the Minister in respect of the order of the Director General, be final and shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever, the language in the present s. 59A is explicit with respect to the exclusion of the judicial review by any court of any act or decision made by the Minister, Director General or the State Authority under the Act except for non-compliance of any procedural requirement. Judicial review under the section is defined to include proceedings commenced by way of an application, writ or any other suit or action mentioned in para. (2) of s. 59A. By deliberately spelling out that there shall be no judicial review by the court of any act or decision of the Minister or the decision-maker except for non-compliance of any procedural requirement, Parliament must have intended that the section is conclusive on the exclusion of judicial review under the Act.” (emphasis added) 25 Conclusion [51] In the premise, I find no merit in the application and the application is dismissed with cost. (AZIZAH BINTI HAJI NAWAWI) JUDGE HIGH COURT MALAYA (Appellate and Special Powers Division 2) KUALA LUMPUR Dated: 8 August 2018 For the Applicant : Dato’ Harpal Singh Grewal/Nahvinah Selvaraj/Archana Nair Messrs A.J. Ariffin, Yeo & Harpal Kuala Lumpur. For the 1st - 4th Respondent : SFC, Puan Farah Ezlin Yusop Khan/ FC, Tuan Hasifulkhair Mohd Jamaluddin Jabatan Kastam Diraja Malaysia Putrajaya. Cases referred:

Booi Kim Lee v YB Menteri Sumber Manusia & Golden Plus Geaniait SB [1999] 3 MLJ 515.

Government of Malaysia v. Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 and Lee Kwan Who v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301.

Tai Choi Yu v Government of Malaysia [1994] 2 CLJ 174. 26

PP v Teh Cheng Poh [1978] 1 MLJ 68.

Lye Pong Fong v PP [1998] 6 MLJ 304.

Palautah Sinnappayan & Anor v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2009] 3 MLRA 307.

Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan [2002] 3