Ngoh Moei Chin v 1. ) Palmani Thevan A/L Balakrishnan (MA-33-11-01/2024)

JANAKI A/P SUPURMANIAM (NO. K/P: 860914-23-5798) ...RESPONDEN BERSAMA GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Preliminary Objection and Enclosure 18 — Respondent's Application for Leave to Amend the Answer) A. INTRODUCTION [1] Two matters fall for determination together. The first is a Preliminary Objection raised by the Respondent (Enclosure 32) seeking an order that the Petitioner's Written Submissions filed on 18 May 2026 be disregarded or expunged on the ground that they were filed approximately ten weeks out of time. The second is the Respondent's substantive application (Enclosure 18) dated 23 December 2025 for leave to amend the Answer to Petition for Divorce filed on 21 November 2024. The Preliminary Objection is logically anterior to the substantive application, because it determines the materials properly before the Court at the hearing of Enclosure 18, and it is accordingly addressed first. The two matters are however the subject of a single set of reasons and a single composite Order, both having been argued at the same hearing on 28 May 2026. [2] This Court has had the benefit of the Petitioner's Written Submissions filed 18 May 2026, the Respondent's Written Submissions dated 11 March 2026 and the Respondent's Reply Submissions dated 26 May 2026, together with the respective Bundles of Authorities. While the arguments traverse considerable ground, the issues for determination are confined, and are addressed sequentially in the analysis that follows.

The procedural context [3] Before turning to the substantive hearing of Enclosure 18, it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent. The procedural sequence may be shortly stated. On 12 February 2026, this Court directed that written submissions in respect of Enclosure 18 be filed and exchanged in accordance with a timetable subsequently agreed by the parties on 9 March 2026. Pursuant to that timetable, the Petitioner's written submissions were to be filed and served on or before 11 March 2026. The Petitioner's written submissions were in fact filed and served on 18 May 2026, approximately nine weeks and 5 days (68 days) out of time. No prior application for extension was made, nor was leave sought of the Court before filing. The Respondent's solicitors received the submissions by electronic mail at 11.40 pm on 18 May 2026, six clear working days before the hearing of Enclosure 18 fixed for 28 May 2026. [4] By Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20 May 2026 (Enclosure 32), the Respondent applied for an order that the Petitioner's written submissions be disregarded or expunged. The grounds, distilled, are three. First, that the submissions were filed in defiance of an express direction of the Court agreed by the parties. Secondly, that no leave was sought to extend time. Thirdly, that the late filing — being only six working days before the hearing — deprived the Respondent of meaningful opportunity to review, research and reply. In support of the objection, the Respondent relies on Order 34 rules 1(1) and 1(3) of the Rules of Court 2012, rules 15 and 31 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978, Nur Ibrahim Masilamani & Anor v Joseph Lopez [2013] 4 CLJ 1202, Classic Shield Sdn Bhd v Solaris Ceria Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] CLJU 1171, Allianz General Insurance Company (Malaysia) Bhd v Best Re (L) Ltd [2018] 2 CLJ 431, and Diong Hiew King @ Tiong Hiew King v Lau Swee Nguong @ Lau Sui Guang [2012] 1 LNS 1086. [5] By letter of the same date (Enclosure 33), the Petitioner's solicitors, Messrs Law Chambers of Sailaja, resisted the objection. They explained, in substance, that the matter is conducted on a pro bono basis; that counsel previously in charge suffered the bereavement of her mother during the period in which the submissions were directed to be filed, and thereafter withdrew from acting; that the firm was unable to secure immediate replacement counsel and had to prepare the matter afresh; and that these circumstances had been communicated to the Respondent's solicitors in March 2026. The Petitioner further contended that written submissions are neither pleadings nor evidence but aids to the Court; that no actual prejudice had been occasioned to the Respondent, who retained adequate time before the hearing to consider the submissions; that procedural non-compliance, absent serious prejudice or bad faith, ought not to deprive a litigant of the right to be heard on the merits; and that, in any event, oral submissions would be advanced at the hearing.

(ii) The juridical status of written submissions [6] Before any question of expunction can be addressed, the proper character of written submissions must be understood. The point is not academic; it shapes the analysis at every subsequent step. [7] A written submission is neither a pleading nor evidence. It does not define the issues in the manner of a pleading under Order 18 of the Rules of Court 2012, nor is it sworn or capable of being subjected to cross-examination as evidence. It is, in juridical character, an aid to the Court a structured exposition of the issues, the applicable law, and the party's contentions, prepared to assist the Court in adjudication. That proposition is well-settled and is indeed conceded, in substance, by both parties in their correspondence before the Court. It is implicit in the structure of Order 34 of the Rules of Court 2012, which treats written submissions as a procedural aid to be filed in advance of case management or hearing, and not as a step in the framing of the action itself. [8] Three consequences follow from this characterisation, and each has a direct bearing on the present objection. First, the late filing of a written submission does not, of itself, alter the pleaded issues in the cause; the pleadings remain undisturbed. Secondly, the Court's discretion whether to receive a late written submission is wider than its discretion in relation to late pleadings or late evidence, because the prejudice flowing from late submissions is generally a prejudice of preparation, not a prejudice of forensic position. Thirdly, the right to be heard, which is an incident of natural justice protected by Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution and by the established procedure of the courts, is engaged where written submissions are excluded; for the exclusion may deprive a party of the most direct means by which legal argument is placed before the Court. [9] None of this is to suggest that timetables for written submissions are dispensable, or that compliance is optional. The orderly conduct of litigation requires that directions be observed. As the High Court reminded the profession in Classic Shield Sdn Bhd v Solaris Ceria Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] CLJU 1171, "[t]he Rules of the Court cannot be treated as decorative pieces to be adhered to the whims and fancy of the parties." Habitual or strategic disregard of timetables would be corrosive of court process and inconsistent with the duty of counsel to assist the Court. The point, rather, is that the consequences of noncompliance must be calibrated to the character of the document concerned, the gravity of the breach, and the prejudice actually occasioned. The remedy must fit the breach.

(iii) The governing principles [10] The principles governing the Court's discretion to receive or decline a late written submission may be drawn from three sources: the constitutional and statutory foundation for a substantive approach to procedure; the overriding objective in the Rules of Court 2012; and the line of Malaysian authority on the response of the Court to procedural non-compliance. [11] The constitutional and statutory foundation. Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution requires that no person be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law. The concept of "law" in Article 5(1) has, on settled construction in this jurisdiction, been read to include the requirements of fairness in the administration of justice. The right to be heard in a court of law is an incident of that constitutional principle. The right is not absolute, and is subject to reasonable procedural regulation; but a procedural ruling which has the effect of excluding a party's legal argument from consideration must be capable of justification on grounds proportionate to its effect. [12] The overriding objective. Order 1A of the Rules of Court 2012 provides that in administering the Rules, the Court shall have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical non-compliance with the Rules. Order 2 rule 1(2) provides that non-compliance with the Rules shall be treated as an irregularity and shall not nullify the proceedings, save in the exercise of the Court's discretion. These provisions embody a deliberate legislative reorientation of civil procedure towards substance, and they bind the Court in the exercise of every procedural discretion. [13] The authorities relied upon by the Respondent. The Respondent invokes four decisions, each of which the Court has had the benefit of considering: Nur Ibrahim Masilamani & Anor v Joseph Lopez [2013] 4 CLJ 1202, Classic Shield Sdn Bhd v Solaris Ceria Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] CLJU 1171, Allianz General Insurance Company (Malaysia) Bhd v Best Re (L) Ltd [2018] 2 CLJ 431, and Diong Hiew King @ Tiong Hiew King v Lau Swee Nguong @ Lau Sui Guang [2012] 1 LNS 1086. These authorities, properly read, do not assist the Respondent's objection on the facts of the present case. They affirm the framework within which the objection is to be assessed and, when so assessed, demonstrate its insufficiency.

(iv) The principles distilled from the authorities [14] The four authorities, taken together, articulate a coherent body of principle on the Court's response to case-management noncompliance under Order 34 of the Rules of Court 2012. From the reasoning in those decisions, six principles may be extracted, each of which has direct bearing on the present objection. [15] First — Order 34 confers broad case-management powers. Order 34 of the Rules of Court 2012 empowers the Court to actively manage proceedings so as to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of cases. Under Order 34 rule 1(3) and rule 2(3), the Court may strike out a defence, dismiss proceedings, enter judgment, or make any other appropriate order where a party fails to comply with case-management directions. Classic Shield describes Order 34 rule 1(3) as "an important case-management enforcement mechanism", and so it is. These powers exist precisely so that the Court can give effect to substantive justice; they are not punitive instruments but managerial ones. [16] Secondly — court directions are mandatory, not optional. Compliance with judicial directions is integral to the administration of justice. As Classic Shield observes, the Rules of Court cannot be treated as decorative pieces to be adhered to at the whim and fancy of the parties. Failure to comply with procedural directions, particularly in a case prepared for trial, may amount to abuse of process. The defaulting conduct in Diong Hiew King was found to have obstructed the smooth administration of justice, undermined confidence in the bona fides of the defence, and suggested a lack of sincerity in defending the action. Similar observations were made by the Court in Allianz General Insurance and Nur Ibrahim Masilamani. [17] Thirdly - prejudice is not always compensable by costs. The argument that procedural lapses can invariably be remedied by an order for costs was rejected in Diong Hiew King. Where the opposing party has fully prepared for trial and the delay disrupts the orderly conduct of proceedings, costs alone may not suffice. The proper inquiry is whether the prejudice is real and incurable, not whether it might notionally be compensated. [18] Fourthly — counsel owe duties to the Court. Diong Hiew King contains an important statement of professional obligation under the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978. Counsel owe three duties: a duty to the Court, a duty to the profession, and a duty to the client. The first duty is to assist the Court in the expeditious, just and economical administration of justice, including compliance with Court directions save where good reason exists otherwise. The Court relied particularly on rule 6(a) counsel should not accept briefs unless reasonably able to appear and comply; rule 12 counsel should not conduct proceedings merely to delay or harass; and rule 24(b) postponements require good and cogent reasons. [19] Fifthly — change of solicitors is not automatically a valid excuse. Diong Hiew King rejects the proposition that changing solicitors justifies non-compliance with subsisting directions. Incoming counsel who accepts a brief must ensure that they are capable of complying with directions already in place; if they are not, they should not accept the brief. [20] Sixthly — striking out or dismissal is justified only where non-compliance undermines trial management. The cumulative factors which warranted the most stringent orders in the cited authorities — striking out in Nur Ibrahim Masilamani, Allianz General Insurance and Diong Hiew King, and dismissal of the action in Classic Shield were the same. Classic Shield identifies them with particular clarity: a lengthy period available for compliance; incomplete filings; disregard of express directions; absence of satisfactory explanation; and disruption to trial preparation. Diong Hiew King expresses them in slightly different terms but to the same effect: prolonged litigation history; repeated procedural delay; failure to comply with express directions; absence of good explanation; prejudice to the opposing party; and disruption to trial management. Each decision is therefore a strict application of Order 34 in circumstances of serious and sustained procedural noncompliance. [21] The features of Classic Shield in particular. Classic Shield warrants closer attention because, of the four authorities, it represents the most stringent application of Order 34. The defaulting party there had been afforded approximately eleven months to comply with directions for filing of the Joint Statement of Facts, Issues to be Tried, and Bundle of Documents, in the shadow of an express unless order made on 31 May 2022, and with trial dates fixed from 8 to 10 May 2023. At final case management, only the Bundle of Pleadings had been filed; even that was incomplete; the third party's name was omitted from the cause papers; and the third party's counsel had not been served. The Court characterised the conduct as a "blatant disregard" of Court directions without any "palpable reasons". The case is properly understood as standing for the proposition that dismissal under Order 34 rule 1(3) is available, and may be appropriate, where the defaulting party combines (i) an express unless order, (ii) substantial time for compliance, (iii) imminent trial dates, (iv) compliance failures that affect trial readiness, and (v) serious procedural indifference. Classic Shield is materially distinguishable from cases involving isolated defaults, curable prejudice, absence of unless orders, or bona fide explanations for delay. [22] The binding standard — Md Amin Md Yusof v Cityvilla Sdn Bhd. All three of the decisions which have considered the matter expressly Nur Ibrahim Masilamani, Allianz General Insurance and Diong Hiew King affirm and apply the principle laid down by the Court of Appeal in Md Amin Md Yusof & Anor v Cityvilla Sdn Bhd [2004] 3 CLJ 88. That principle represents the binding common standard governing the Court's response to procedural non-compliance. It is conveniently set out in the Court of Appeal's own terms: "Whilst it is true that a party's action or counterclaim could be struck out for non-compliance with a peremptory or an unless order of the court, the order would not be made unless there is a history of failure to comply with other orders. A peremptory or an unless order is an order of last resort... Surely, it would not meet the ends of justice if the order made results in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, all the circumstances of the case, inclusive of whether the failure to comply with the peremptory or unless order was indeed intentional and contumelious, should be looked at by the judge before penalizing the defaulting party." [23] The principle so stated rests on four propositions which must inform the disposition of any application of the present character:

striking out, expunction, or preclusion is an order of last resort, not of first instance;

such an order will not ordinarily be made absent a history of non-compliance with prior orders;

the Court must look at all the circumstances, including whether the default was intentional and contumelious; and

such an order will not meet the ends of justice if it results in a miscarriage of justice. [24] Drawing these strands together, the Court's discretion to expunge or disregard a late written submission is to be exercised on the following considerations:

the character of the document concerned, namely that a written submission is an aid to the Court and not a pleading or evidence;

the extent and explanation of the delay, including whether it is attributable to circumstances beyond the control of the party, to inadvertence, or to deliberate disregard;

the conduct of the parties in relation to the timetable, including whether the opposing party was notified of the difficulty when it arose;

the actual, as distinct from hypothetical, prejudice occasioned to the opposing party, with particular regard to whether sufficient time remains for a meaningful response, whether by Written Reply or by oral argument;

the existence or absence of an express unless order, and the proximity or otherwise of the substantive hearing or trial;

the availability of remedial measures short of expunction, such as adjournment, leave to file a Reply, or directions limiting the matters that may be advanced from the submissions;

the overriding objective in Order 1A and the principle in Order 2 rule 1(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 that procedural non-compliance is to be treated as an irregularity, not a nullity;

the binding standard articulated in Md Amin Md Yusof v Cityvilla Sdn Bhd and applied in Nur Ibrahim Masilamani, Allianz General Insurance and Diong Hiew King, and the cumulative factors identified in Classic Shield and Diong Hiew King, namely that expunction or dismissal is an order of last resort, not ordinarily made absent a history of non-compliance and a finding of intentional and contumelious default; and

the constitutional principle that a party should not, save for cogent reason, be deprive opportunity to have legal argument considered by the Court. [25] The exercise is, in the end, a balancing one. Expunction is a drastic course. It deprives the Court of the assistance which the submissions were intended to provide, and deprives the party of the most direct vehicle by which its legal position is placed before the Court. The course should be reserved for cases in which the cumulative factors identified in the authorities are present - gravity of breach, history of default, intentional and contumelious conduct, real and incurable prejudice, breach of unless orders, and disruption to trial management. Where remedial measures short of expunction will meet the case, those measures are to be preferred.

Application to the present facts [26] Applying the principles set out above to the present objection, the Court is not persuaded that the Petitioner's written submissions should be expunged or disregarded. The analysis proceeds against the six principles distilled from the authorities and the binding standard in Md Amin Md Yusof v Cityvilla. [27] The character of the document. The Petitioner's written submissions are an aid to the Court on a contested interlocutory application. They do not constitute a pleading and they do not constitute evidence. Their late filing has not altered the pleaded issues in this proceeding nor introduced any new evidentiary material. The affidavits in respect of Enclosure 18 the Affidavit in Support, the Affidavit in Reply by the Petitioner, and the Affidavit in Reply by the Respondent were complete by 11 February 2026, well before any question of submissions arose. [28] The extent and explanation of the delay. The delay of approximately ten weeks is not trivial, and the Court does not minimise it. The explanation, however, deserves to be taken on its own terms. The Petitioner is represented pro bono. Counsel previously in charge suffered a bereavement at or about the period when the submissions were due. That counsel subsequently withdrew from acting. Replacement counsel was not immediately available, and the file had to be reviewed afresh. These are not strategic explanations contrived after the fact. They describe the ordinary difficulties of pro bono representation, which the legal profession in this country shoulders as a matter of professional responsibility, and which the Court, in proper cases, should accommodate. Pro bono representation is not a licence for laxity; but neither is it to be treated more strictly than paid representation. Unlike the explanations rejected in Allianz General Insurance as afterthoughts unsupported by evidence, the present explanation is consistent with the Petitioner's solicitors' contemporaneous communications and stands uncontradicted on the materials. [29] Conduct in relation to the timetable. The Petitioner's solicitors state, and it is not contradicted on the materials before the Court, that the Respondent's solicitors were informed of the change in counsel and the surrounding circumstances in March 2026. Whatever else may be said, the difficulty was not concealed. There is no suggestion and no evidence that the Petitioner sought to spring the submissions on the Respondent or to take strategic advantage of any element of surprise. This stands in marked contrast to Nur Ibrahim Masilamani, where the defaulting counsel had been put on notice repeatedly and had failed to engage with opposing solicitors at all. [30] Change of solicitors. The Court is conscious of the fifth principle from Diong Hiew King: that a change of solicitors does not automatically excuse non-compliance. That principle, however, is directed at the situation in which incoming counsel accept a brief and then plead the change as justification for breach of subsisting directions. The present matter is materially different. The change here was not a strategic re-instruction but the consequence of a bereavement and withdrawal which occurred at the precise moment performance was required. The handover involved no transfer between paying solicitors, but rather the re-allocation of a pro bono file within the firm. That distinction is not one of degree but of kind. [31] Counsel's duties to the Court. The fourth principle from Diong Hiew King that counsel owe duties under rules 6(a),12 and 24(b) of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 is fully accommodated, not breached, by the Petitioner's solicitors' conduct. There is no suggestion of acceptance of a brief without ability to comply (rule 6(a)); no suggestion of conduct intended to delay or harass (rule 12); and no application for postponement requiring good and cogent reasons to support it (rule 24(b)). On the contrary, the explanation advanced by the Petitioner's solicitors is precisely the kind of cogent reason that the professional rules contemplate. Rules 15 and 31, specifically invoked by the Respondent, are concerned with general professional standards and the dignity of the profession; they are not engaged on the present facts in any way that would warrant the expunction of an aid to the Court. [32] Actual prejudice. The Respondent contends that six working days is insufficient to review, research and reply to the Petitioner's written submissions. The Court is not unsympathetic to that contention as an abstract proposition. But the question of prejudice must be assessed concretely. The issues in Enclosure 18 are not novel to the Respondent; they have been the subject of full affidavit exchange since December 2025. The Respondent has himself filed written submissions and has had every opportunity to develop his case. Indeed, the Respondent has filed a Hujahan Balasan dated 26 May 2026 responding paragraph by paragraph to the Petitioner's written submissions. The interval between service and hearing, while less than the Court would prefer, has not in fact rendered meaningful response impossible. The Court accepts, as held in Diong Hiew King, that prejudice is not always compensable by costs; but on these facts the prejudice is not of that order. It is a prejudice of preparation time, capable of cure by the very Written Reply which the Respondent has filed. [33] Absence of an unless order. A factor of particular weight, and one that distinguishes the present matter sharply from the authorities, is the absence of any unless order. Classic Shield turned on breach of an express unless order made on 31 May 2022. Nur Ibrahim Masilamani turned on breach of two successive unless orders. Allianz General Insurance turned on breach of directions following two prior indulgences with corresponding unless orders. Diong Hiew King turned on breach of an express direction with the unless framework engaged. The present matter involves no unless order whatsoever. The Court has not given the Petitioner notice that the consequence of breach would be expunction; the Respondent has not previously sought such an order; and no peremptory direction has been made and breached. The first principle of Md Amin Md Yusof v Cityvilla that expunction is an order of last resort and will not be made absent a history of failure to comply with other orders is, on this single fact alone, fatal to the Respondent's objection. [34] Remedial measures short of expunction. The Court has at its disposal a range of measures less drastic than expunction. The Respondent has in fact availed himself of the most direct of these by filing a Hujahan Balasan dated 26 May 2026. Oral submissions may be advanced at the hearing on any matter insufficiently covered by the written record. Each of these measures is more proportionate than expunction. None has been shown to be inadequate to the present circumstances. [35] Application of the Respondent's authorities. The four authorities relied upon by the Respondent do not, when their facts and ratios are properly considered, support the objection. They illustrate the sixth principle: the most stringent orders under Order 34 are justified only where the cumulative factors of serious procedural non-compliance are present. The factual matrix of the present case is materially distinct in every respect. There is a single procedural lapse; on an interlocutory application; explained by circumstances both human and professional; with no antecedent default; no impending trial; no breached unless order; and contemporaneous communication of the difficulty to the opposing solicitors. The present case satisfies the four conventional features of a distinguishable case isolated default, curable prejudice, absence of an unless order, and a bona fide explanation. The cumulative factors which justified the stringent orders in the cited authorities are absent. The binding principle in Md Amin Md Yusof v Cityvilla Sdn Bhd that expunction is an order of last resort, not ordinarily made absent a history of non-compliance and a finding of intentional and contumelious default points unequivocally against expunction on these facts. [36] The overriding objective. To expunge the Petitioner's written submissions would deprive the Court of structured assistance on a contested application and would risk leaving issues unaddressed which the Court would otherwise have the benefit of considering in writing. That is a disservice to the administration of justice, not a vindication of it. The overriding objective in Order 1A of the Rules of Court 2012 points unmistakably towards receipt of the submissions, subject to such conditions as may be just.

(vi) Conclusion on the Preliminary Objection [37] Weighing the relevant factors against the six principles drawn from the authorities and the binding standard in Md Amin Md Yusof v Cityvilla, the Court is not satisfied that expunction is warranted. The delay is regrettable and explained; the prejudice is real but limited and remediable, and has in fact been remediated by the Respondent's own Hujahan Balasan; the conduct of the Petitioner's solicitors does not evince contumacy; no unless order has been breached; and the proximity of the hearing has been managed by notice and by the Respondent's own contemporaneous response. To deploy an order of last resort in response to a single, explained and frankly disclosed instance of default would be at variance with the binding principle and with each of the authorities the Respondent has cited. [38] The Preliminary Objection (Enclosure 32) is accordingly dismissed. The Petitioner's written submissions filed on 18 May 2026 are received as an aid to the Court. The Respondent's Hujahan Balasan dated 26 May 2026 is likewise received. The weight to be accorded to any submission, whether of the Petitioner or of the Respondent, is a matter for the Court. The Court records, for the avoidance of doubt, that the indulgence extended on this occasion is not to be assumed in future. Compliance with directions agreed and recorded is the ordinary expectation of the Court. As Classic Shield makes plain, the Rules of Court are not decorative pieces to be observed at the whim and fancy of the parties; they are the foundation upon which judicial economy and fairness to opposing parties depend.

(vii) General guidance [39] The Court adds, as a matter of general guidance for the conduct of comparable applications in future, the following observations.

Parties who anticipate difficulty in complying with directions concerning written submissions should communicate that difficulty to the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, and should, where the difficulty is material, apply to the Court for an extension before the time for compliance expires. Such applications, if made timeously and on proper grounds, will ordinarily be considered with sympathy.

Parties who find themselves in receipt of late submissions should raise their objection promptly, and should not delay the objection to the eve of the hearing in such a way as to compound the procedural difficulty.

The Court will not generally expunge written submissions filed late where the lapse is explained, the opposing party is not materially prejudiced, no unless order has been breached, and remedies short of expunction are available. The six principles drawn from Nur Ibrahim Masilamani, Allianz General Insurance, Diong Hiew King and Classic Shield, and the binding standard in Md Amin Md Yusof v Cityvilla Sdn Bhd, govern the inquiry. Where the cumulative factors identified in those authorities are present — substantial time afforded for compliance, breach of an express unless order, incomplete or absent filings, disregard of express directions, absence of satisfactory explanation, and disruption to trial preparation or management — the Court reserves to itself the fullest discretion to mark its disapproval by expunction, dismissal, or such other order as the justice of the case requires. [40] Having disposed of the preliminary objection, the Court now turns to the substance of Enclosure 18. C. ENCLOSURE 18: THE SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

The application and the opposing positions [41] Having disposed of the Preliminary Objection, the Court turns to the substance of Enclosure 18. This is the Respondent's application dated 23 December 2025 for leave to amend the Answer to Petition for Divorce filed on 21 November 2024. The application is brought after the Respondent's representation passed from the Jabatan Bantuan Guaman Melaka to Messrs Lim, Wong & Partners, and after that firm relinquished representation of the Co-Respondent on 18 December 2025. [42] The application engages familiar principles governing the amendment of pleadings, but is set against an unusual procedural backdrop. The proposed amendments are not uniform in character. Some are textual or grammatical. Others introduce a substantive new prayer concerning the parties' alleged matrimonial home and the proceeds of its sale. A third category seeks to retract, qualify or modify admissions contained in the original Answer concerning the relationship between the Respondent and the Co-Respondent before their customary marriage in December 2017. [43] The opposing positions, distilled to their essence, are these. The Petitioner contends that the proposed amendments are not made in good faith, are afflicted by inordinate and unexplained delay, would occasion irremediable prejudice, transform the character of the defence, and amount to an impermissible withdrawal of admissions upon which she has ordered her case. The Respondent contends that the proposed amendments are necessary to place the real controversy before the Court, are referable to errors in the original Answer prepared through the Legal Aid Department, do not alter the character of the action which remains a petition for divorce and occasion no prejudice incapable of being met by costs, the proceedings not having been set down for trial. The authorities marshalled in the Respondent's Hujahan Balasan are engaged at the points in the analysis where their propositions become material: Dato' Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal [2010] 8 CLJ 1 and Tropical Profile (M) Sdn Bhd v Cantilever Bumi Sdn Bhd [2025] CLJU 2348 on the question of stage and delay; Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd & Ors v Bumi Warna Indah Sdn Bhd [2004] 4 CLJ 825 on the correction of error attributable to previous representation; Yap Teak Sing & Ors v Hiew Fook Sang [2025] CLJU 207 and China Orient Asset Management Corporation Sdn Bhd v Alexma Corporation Sdn Bhd [2018] 2 MLRA 680 on the character of the suit and the proper meaning of prejudice; and V Veeriah v General Manager, Keretapi Tanah Melayu [1972] CLJU 160 on the prerequisites of section 115 of the Evidence Act 1950, as and when that question becomes ripe for determination.

(ii) Material facts and procedural history [44] The Petition for Divorce (Enclosure 1) was filed on 26 January 2024. The Petitioner pleads, in substance, that the Respondent has committed adultery with the Co-Respondent, that he subsequently went through a form of customary marriage with the Co-Respondent on 15 December 2017 during the subsistence of his statutory marriage to the Petitioner, and that a daughter has been born of that customary union. She further pleads matters relating to the matrimonial home, expenditure during the marriage, and resulting damage to her health. [45] The Respondent and the Co-Respondent obtained legal aid through the Jabatan Bantuan Guaman Melaka. Messrs Lim, Wong & Partners were assigned by that Department to represent them. On 21 November 2024, the Answer of the Respondent and the Co-Respondent (Enclosure 12) was filed. It was signed personally by the Respondent and by the Co-Respondent. The Answer responded paragraph by paragraph to the Petition, and contained the following matters which are presently material:

at paragraph 11, the Respondent denied any illicit relationship or fornication with the Co-Respondent prior to their customary marriage, asserting acquaintance only from 2009 in the course of an Amway business;

at paragraph 24, the Respondent and the Co-Respondent denied cohabiting prior to their customary marriage of 15 December 2017;

at paragraph 26, the Respondent affirmatively averred that the matrimonial home at HS(D) 434898 PTD 132012, Mukim Tebrau (No. 3, Jalan Setia Tropika 2/21, Taman Setia Tropika, Johor Bahru) was jointly owned, with the Respondent and the Petitioner each holding a half share;

at paragraph 27, the Respondent averred that he had transferred his half share to the Petitioner upon condition that she consent to his marriage to the Co-Respondent;

at paragraph 30, the Respondent and the Co-Respondent admitted their customary marriage and the birth of a daughter from that union; and

at paragraph 31, the Respondent and the Co-Respondent denied any clandestine relationship or fornication before the customary marriage. [46] The Petitioner filed her Reply (Enclosure 13) on 17 December 2024. In substance the Reply joined issue with the Answer, made detailed responses to the matters raised, and disputed the proposition that the Respondent had any subsisting beneficial interest in the matrimonial home. [47] By letter dated 18 December 2025, Messrs Lim, Wong & Partners informed the Court that they had ceased to act for the Co-Respondent, retaining the file only for the Respondent. The Co-Respondent's representation has, since that date, been unsettled. [48] On 23 December 2025, Messrs Lim, Wong & Partners filed Enclosure 18 on behalf of the Respondent only, supported by the Respondent's Affidavit in Support of the same date. The Petitioner filed her Affidavit in Reply on 28 January 2026, and the Respondent his Affidavit in Reply on 11 February 2026. [49] The proposed amendments, as appears from the Schedule annexed to the Respondent's Affidavit in Support and elaborated in his Written Submissions, fall into discrete groups. Some are textual or grammatical. Others (paragraphs 1A, 1B, the amended paragraphs 26 and 27, and a new prayer 29A) advance a substantive claim that the Respondent retains a beneficial interest of 50% in the matrimonial home, alternatively that he is entitled to compensation in lieu, and that the property has been transferred to the Petitioner's sister without his knowledge. Yet others (touching paragraphs 11, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 24, 30, 31, 37 and 38) modify or qualify the admissions identified at paragraph 43 above. A further category (paragraphs 21, 29, 31, 39, 43, 51, 52, 54 and 55) removes the Co-Respondent's participation from the joint Answer in consequence of the change of representation. [50] The proceeding has not been set down for trial. No directions for trial have been issued. Discovery has not been concluded. Save for the filing of pleadings and the present interlocutory application, the matter remains at an early procedural stage in substantive terms, although the chronological lapse since filing is now over two years.

(iii) Issues for determination [51] Three issues arise:

Issue 1: whether the proposed amendments, considered as a whole and in their distinct categories, satisfy the principles governing the grant of leave to amend pleadings under Rule 22 read with Rule 15 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 and Order 20 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012;

Issue 2: whether the proposed qualification and modification of admissions in the original Answer is permissible, having regard to the principles governing the retraction of pleaded admissions and the doctrine of approbation and reprobation; and

Issue 3: whether, if any of the amendments are otherwise permissible, the prejudice (if any) to the Petitioner is one which may be compensated by costs or by other conditions, or whether it stands as an absolute bar to the amendment.

(iv) Statutory and legal framework [52] The procedural source of the power invoked is Rule 22 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 ("the DMPR"), which applies Rule 15 of the DMPR with the necessary modifications to the amendment of pleadings other than petitions. Rule 15(2) requires leave for amendment after service of the pleading. Rule 3 of the DMPR imports the Rules of Court 2012 (substituted for the Rules of the High Court 1980) for matters not specifically provided. The applicable rule is therefore Order 20 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012, which provides: "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow the plaintiff to amend his writ, or any party to amend his pleading, on such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just and in such manner, if any, as it may direct." [53] The discretion thus conferred is wide but is not unfettered. The principles governing its exercise were authoritatively stated by the Federal Court in Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 213. The general principle is that the Court will allow such amendments as cause no injustice to the opposite party. Three basic questions are to be considered in determining whether injustice would result:

whether the application is bona fide;

whether the prejudice caused to the other side can be compensated by costs; and

whether the amendment would in effect turn the suit from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. [54] These principles, although enduring, are not exhaustive. The Federal Court in Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe & Another Appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301 cautioned that where an application to amend is made at a very late stage, the principles in Yamaha Motor ought not to be the sole consideration. Their Lordships endorsed the observations of Lord Griffiths in Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 38 (House of Lords) that justice cannot always be measured in money, and that a court is entitled to weigh the strain that late-introduced issues impose on litigants — particularly personal litigants — alongside the legitimate expectation that trial will resolve the issues defined by the pleadings. [55] The complementary guiding object was stated by the Supreme Court in Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Leong Yew Chin [1987] 1 MLJ 230: amendments are ordinarily to be made for the purpose of determining the real controversy between the parties or of correcting any defect or error in the proceedings. The object of the Court is to decide the rights of the parties, not to punish them for mistakes in the conduct of their case, where correction can be effected without injustice. [56] The concept of "prejudice" in the context of amendment was clarified by the Court of Appeal in China Orient Asset Management Corporation Sdn Bhd v Alexma Corporation Sdn Bhd [2018] 2 MLRA 680: "Prejudice in the context of amendment applications cannot mean that if the amendment is allowed, the chances of success of the litigation of the affected party will be severely diminished. Prejudice simply means that if the amendment is allowed, the party affected will be unable to pursue or defend the suit, for example, where the material evidence necessary to pursue or defend the suit, and which is necessitated by the amendment, is lost or no longer available. In such a case, the prejudice is clearly seen. In every other case, where no such prejudice arises, the party can be compensated with costs." [57] Late and substantial amendments call for stronger justification. The High Court in K Rajashekar a/l Kanapathy & Ors v Palm Court Condominium & Ors [2014] 9 MLJ 297 observed that the later an application is made, the stronger the grounds required to justify it; the delay must be explained and the explanation must withstand scrutiny. Equally, however, the High Court in Tropical Profile (M) Sdn Bhd v Cantilever Bumi Sdn Bhd [2025] CLJU 2348 emphasised that where a matter remains at the "infancy stage", the defendant retains the liberty to reassess defence strategy without temporal constraint; and the Court of Appeal in Dato' Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal [2010] 8 CLJ 1 confirmed that an amendment made at the stage of pre-trial case management is made at an "early stage" of the proceedings. [58] Where an amendment seeks to retract or qualify an admission, the considerations are tighter still. An admission in a pleading is a deliberate concession of fact on which the opposing party orders her case. The principle of approbation and reprobation, and the doctrine of estoppel by conduct as embodied in section 115 of the Evidence Act 1950, both bear upon the inquiry. The Court does not lightly permit a litigant to disown what she has formally pleaded, particularly where the pleading is signed in person. The Respondent's reliance on V Veeriah v General Manager, Keretapi Tanah Melayu [1972] CLJU 160 to the effect that section 115 estoppel requires the satisfaction of seven cumulative prerequisites is properly directed to the question whether the original Answer operates as an estoppel against the Respondent, not to the antecedent question whether leave to amend should be granted. Whether estoppel ultimately runs is a matter for trial. The question now is whether the pleading may be reformulated; the evidentiary force of the original Answer, and any estoppel arising from it, is preserved for trial regardless. [59] These principles, taken together, do not produce a mechanical answer. They identify the considerations the Court must weigh. The weight to be accorded to each turns on the particular character of the amendment proposed.

Analysis: categorisation of the proposed amendments [60] A global disposition of the application either allowing or refusing the amendment in its entirety would not be just. The proposed amendments are not homogeneous, and their assessment by reference to the principles stated above produces differing outcomes. The Court therefore identifies four categories:

Textual and expository amendments — minor clarifications, grammatical corrections, and amplifications of pre-existing averments. These appear at paragraphs 3, 7, 9, 12, 16, 17, 25, 32, 33, 35, 42, 44, 44A, 50 and at other points identified in the Respondent's Affidavit in Support;

Procedural realignment the removal of the Co-Respondent's participation from the joint Answer, in consequence of the present solicitors no longer holding instructions from her (affecting paragraphs 21,29,31,39,43,51,52,54 and 55);

Substantive new claim the introduction of averments concerning the Respondent's beneficial interest in the matrimonial home, allegations regarding its transfer to the Petitioner's sister and the non-sharing of sale proceeds, and a new prayer 29A for declaratory and consequential relief (new paragraphs 1A, 1B, amended paragraphs 26 and 27, new prayer 29A);

Modification of admissions alterations to paragraphs which contained admissions concerning the relationship between the Respondent and the Co-Respondent before the customary marriage (paragraphs 11,14,15,18,20, 22,24,30,31,37 and 38). [61] Each category is considered separately. The principles in Yamaha Motor, as refined by Hong Leong Finance Bhd, apply throughout, but they yield different answers in different categories.

(vi) Category (a): textual and expository amendments [62] Amendments in this category do not alter the substance of the defence. They expand, clarify, or correct existing averments. The Petitioner's Written Submissions oppose the application globally but do not identify specific prejudice attributable to these textual amendments. Applied to this category, the three considerations in Yamaha Motor plainly tilt in favour of allowance: such amendments are bona fide on their face, any inconvenience can be cured by costs, and they do not transform the character of the suit. [63] Further, amendments of this kind are precisely the type contemplated by Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Leong Yew Chin minor corrections in service of the real controversy between the parties. They are allowed.

(vii) Category (b): procedural realignment [64] The amendments in this category are, properly understood, not amendments of substance but the procedural consequence of an event that has already occurred — namely, the withdrawal of Messrs Lim, Wong & Partners from acting for the Co-Respondent on 18 December 2025. It would not be tenable for those solicitors to maintain pleadings ostensibly on behalf of a party from whom they hold no instructions. [65] There is, however, one matter requiring care. The Answer dated 21 November 2024 is a joint pleading signed personally by the Co-Respondent. Permitting the Respondent to remove the Co-Respondent's participation from his amended Answer cannot have the effect of expunging the Co-Respondent's own admissions or denials from the record. The original Answer remains, on the record, the Co-Respondent's pleading until she elects, through her own representation, to amend it. [66] The amendments in this category are allowed, but the original Answer (Enclosure 12) shall remain on the record as the pleading of the Co-Respondent, who is at liberty to file her own Answer (or to amend her existing pleading) through such representation as she may obtain. The Petitioner is not prejudiced by this realignment; if anything, it clarifies the parties' respective positions.

(viii) Category (c): substantive new claim concerning the matrimonial home [67] The submission against this category is that it introduces a wholly new claim a proprietary claim grafted onto a defence to a divorce petition and thereby converts the suit from a defence against divorce to an affirmative claim for proprietary relief in the nature of a counterclaim. That submission, while not without superficial force, does not on reflection withstand examination. [68] The division of matrimonial property is not a discrete cause of action separate from the divorce; it is among the ancillary matters which the Court is empowered, and indeed expected, to determine in a petition for divorce under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. Section 76 of that Act vests the Court with jurisdiction to order the division of assets acquired during the marriage by the joint efforts of the parties or otherwise. The question whether the Respondent retains any interest in the matrimonial home is integral to the relief that may flow from the divorce decree, not collateral to it. [69] Further, the existing Answer at paragraph 26 already raises the matrimonial home. The Respondent has, since November 2024, affirmatively averred that the property was jointly owned and that he transferred his half share to the Petitioner upon the condition specified. The amendment expands on that existing averment, adding particulars (the alleged transfer to the Petitioner's sister, the alleged non-sharing of proceeds) and a corresponding prayer. The amendment supplements an issue already on the pleadings; it does not introduce a foreign subject. [70] This distinguishes the present case from K Rajashekar a/l Kanapathy & Ors v Palm Court Condominium & Ors, where the proposed amendment would have converted a claim for damages into a claim for rescission of tenancy agreements based on a completely different factual matrix. Here, the factual matrix is the matrimonial relationship and its dissolution; the amendment refines the relief sought in respect of property which is already pleaded. The position is closer to that in Yap Teak Sing & Ors v Hiew Fook Sang [2025] CLJU 207, where the proposed amendment was held not to turn the suit "from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character as the issue in dispute is still about defamation action". Here, the issue in dispute remains about divorce and its ancillary incidents. [71] The third limb of Yamaha Motor is therefore not transgressed. The character of the suit is and remains a petition for divorce with consequential ancillary relief. As to the second limb, the prejudice to the Petitioner is that of meeting an enlarged case on the property issue by amending her Reply, conducting any further discovery, and preparing for trial on the expanded facts. Applying the test in China Orient Asset Management, that prejudice does not deprive the Petitioner of the ability to maintain her action; it is the ordinary burden of meeting an enlarged case, which is compensable by costs. [72] As to the first limb (bona fides), the explanation advanced by the Respondent in his Affidavit in Support is that a private title search conducted on 3 December 2025 disclosed the absence of any transfer from him to the Petitioner, and the existence of a joint loan in respect of the property in which he is named. Whether that explanation will withstand scrutiny at trial is a different question; for present purposes, it suffices that the explanation is not on its face an afterthought, and that the matrimonial home was always going to be a live issue in the proceeding. [73] The amendments in this category are accordingly allowed, with costs in favour of the Petitioner to be addressed below.

(ix) Category (d): modification of admissions [74] This is the most difficult category. The original Answer contains admissions and denials of particular force in the framing of the issues. The Respondent, having signed that Answer personally, now seeks to qualify or modify it. The Petitioner relies upon the formality of those admissions and contends that the Respondent is estopped from departing from them, invoking section 115 of the Evidence Act 1950. [75] Two competing considerations are in play. The first is that the advice of solicitors may differ from firm to firm, and that a party should not be irreversibly bound by an error of the previous representation where the matter is at an early stage and the opposing party can be compensated. That principle is well captured in Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd & Ors v Bumi Warna Indah Sdn Bhd [2004] 4 CLJ 825, where the High Court accepted that the application for leave to amend was made to correct errors in the original defence after the engagement of new solicitors. The High Court there observed that the advice of solicitors may differ from firm to firm and from time to time, and that the discovery of error upon engagement of new solicitors may legitimately found an application for leave to amend so as to set out the relevant facts, issues, and real questions in controversy. The Federal Court in Alloy Consolidated Sdn Bhd & Anor v Dato' Dr Hj Adam Harun [2011] 5 CLJ 705 likewise affirmed that amendments may be permitted at any stage where they do not occasion uncompensable injury, and where the original error may have arisen from inadvertence. [76] The second consideration cuts the other way. An admission in a pleading is not a casual statement. It is a formal concession on which the opposing party orders her case. The Answer in this matter was signed personally by the Respondent and by the Co-Respondent. Each affixed signature to a pleading that traversed the Petition paragraph by paragraph. The proposition that the Respondent had no knowledge of what he was signing, or that the entire content is attributable to error by the Jabatan Bantuan Guaman or the assigned solicitors, must be approached with caution. [77] As to the section 115 estoppel argument, the Respondent's submission, supported by reference to V Veeriah and Jannath Gani & 2 Ors v Jamilah Sheikh Daud & Ors [2023] 1 LNS 388, is that the seven cumulative prerequisites for estoppel are not made out, and that questions of estoppel and election are in any event matters for trial rather than for summary determination at the interlocutory stage. There is force in that submission. The proper forum for testing the binding force of the admissions is at trial, where the credibility of the Respondent's account of the genesis of the original Answer may be tested in evidence. On this interlocutory application, the Court is not required to determine the truth of that account. The question now is whether leave should be granted to formulate the amended pleading in the manner proposed. [78] In striking the balance, the Court has regard to the following:

the proceeding has not been set down for trial, no directions for trial have been given, and the matter remains procedurally at the pleading stage notwithstanding the chronological lapse;

the Petitioner may amend her Reply and may, in any event, deploy the admissions in the original Answer at trial for the original Answer remains a sworn pleading admissible as a prior inconsistent statement, irrespective of any amendment now permitted;

the interests of justice favour the determination of the controversy on its real merits rather than on procedural concessions which may not reflect the Respondent's true position; and

the Petitioner's case on adultery does not, on its own legal theory, stand or fall on the impugned admissions. [79] The last point requires elaboration. The Petitioner's case is, in significant part, that the customary union between the Respondent and the Co-Respondent on 15 December 2017 during the subsistence of the Respondent's statutory marriage to the Petitioner is, in the eye of Malaysian law, conclusive of adulterous conduct. By the operation of sections 5 and 6 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, the customary union is void; cohabitation pursuant to that void union, and the birth of a daughter from it, are pleaded and admitted in the proposed amended Answer no less than in the original. The premarital cohabitation between the Respondent and the Co-Respondent is, on this theory, a peripheral rather than a necessary fact. The Petitioner is not deprived of her adultery case by the modification of admissions on that peripheral matter. [80] The Court accordingly considers that the amendments in this category should be allowed, but subject to firm safeguards. Specifically:

the original Answer dated 21 November 2024 (Enclosure 12) remains on the record and may be referred to, deployed, and put to the Respondent in cross-examination at trial as a prior statement bearing his signature;

the Respondent is on notice that the Court at trial will require a credible explanation, supported by evidence, for any material divergence between the original Answer and the amended Answer, and that the weight to be accorded to either version is a matter for trial; and

costs are to be addressed below. [81] These safeguards reconcile the competing considerations. The Respondent is permitted to formulate his defence as he now wishes it to stand. The Petitioner retains the forensic benefit of the original Answer as an evidentiary instrument. The interests of justice are served by allowing the controversy to proceed to trial on its real merits, with the original record preserved.

Delay and bona fides [82] The Petitioner urges that the application is afflicted by inordinate delay the original Answer having been filed in November 2024 and the amendment application brought in December 2025, a gap of approximately thirteen months. The chronological observation is accurate and the delay must be taken seriously. [83] The relevant counter-considerations are, however, these. First, the proceeding has not been set down for trial. The application is not made on the eve of trial, in the course of trial, or post-trial. The discipline articulated in Hong Leong Finance Bhd that justice cannot always be measured in money where issues are introduced late applies most acutely where the late introduction disrupts an imminent or ongoing trial. The present case is not such. The position is on this point closer to Dato' Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor [2010] 8 CLJ 1, in which the Court of Appeal characterised an amendment at the stage of pre-trial case management as having been made at the "early stage of the proceedings". [84] Second, the change of solicitors did not occur until December 2025. The Respondent's evidence is that the original Answer was prepared through the Jabatan Bantuan Guaman in terms which he did not appreciate, and that the inconsistencies were identified upon retaining present solicitors and conducting a fresh review. The Court does not, on this interlocutory application, make findings as to the credibility of that account. But the explanation, taken with the contemporaneous relinquishment of representation of the Co-Respondent (a step that bespeaks a genuine reassessment of the file rather than an opportunistic manoeuvre), suffices to displace a finding of mala fides. [85] Third, the Petitioner has not identified any specific evidentiary prejudice flowing from the lapse of time no witness lost, no documents destroyed, no recollection materially impaired by the passage of months. The submission proceeds on the abstract proposition that delay alone defeats the application. That is not the law: Hock Hua Bank makes plain that amendments may be sought and granted at any stage of the proceedings, subject to the overriding inquiry into injustice. Delay is a factor in that inquiry; it is not, alone, dispositive. [86] The application is therefore not to be refused on the ground of delay or absence of bona fides.

(xi) Prejudice and costs [87] The Petitioner's case on prejudice has two limbs: that her case strategy was built upon the original Answer; and that she will be required to address new issues that were not formerly in contention. The Court accepts that both propositions reflect real consequences of the amendment. The question is whether those consequences amount to prejudice which is uncompensable in costs. [88] Applying the formulation in China Orient Asset Management, prejudice in the sense of an inability to pursue or defend the suit has not been demonstrated. No material evidence has been lost. No witness is unavailable. The proceeding has not been set down for trial. The Petitioner remains in a position to amend her Reply, to advance further discovery, and to put her case in full. [89] That said, the burden of meeting an enlarged case the further preparation, the further instructions to be taken, the further document review is not trivial, and it would not be right that the Petitioner should bear it. Costs occasioned by the amendment are properly the Respondent's responsibility, irrespective of the eventual outcome of the divorce proceedings. D. CONCLUSION [90] Drawing the strands together: as to the Preliminary Objection, expunction is an order of last resort and the cumulative factors which would warrant such an order are absent; the Petitioner's written submissions are accordingly received as an aid to the Court. As to the substantive application in Enclosure 18, the textual and procedural-realignment amendments raise no real objection; the new prayer concerning the matrimonial home falls within the Court's ancillary jurisdiction under section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 and amplifies a subject already pleaded; the modification of admissions is permitted, but on terms that preserve the Petitioner's forensic position; and the prejudice to the Petitioner, whilst real in the sense of additional work, is compensable in costs. [91] The Preliminary Objection is dismissed. The application in Enclosure 18 succeeds in substance, subject to the safeguards and orders that follow. E. ORDERS OF THE COURT [92] The Court orders as follows:

The Respondent's Preliminary Objection (Enclosure 32) is dismissed. The Petitioner's Written Submissions filed on 18 May 2026, and the Respondent's Hujahan Balasan dated 26 May 2026, are received as aids to the Court on the hearing of Enclosure 18.

Leave is granted to the Respondent under Rule 22 read with Rule 15 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 and Order 20 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 to file and serve an Amended Answer in the form annexed to Enclosure 18, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.

The original Answer of the Respondent and the Co-Respondent dated 21 November 2024 (Enclosure 12) shall remain on the Court record. It shall be admissible at trial and may be referred to, deployed, and put to the Respondent in cross-examination as a prior statement bearing his signature.

The Petitioner is at liberty to file and serve an Amended Reply within fourteen (14) days of service of the Amended Answer.

The Co-Respondent is at liberty to file her own Answer, or to amend her existing pleading, through such representation as she may obtain, within fourteen (14 ) days of the date of this Order. Until she does so, the original Answer (Enclosure 12) stands as her pleading on the record.

There shall be no order as to costs.

Liberty to apply, including in respect of further directions for trial. Dated 28 May 2026 humanity (YA Dato' Sri Raja Segaran A/L S. Krishnan) (Judicial Commisioner) High Court Of Malaya Malacca High Court (MELAKA) Lawyer For Pempetisyen : Cik Sailaja a/p Thirunawukarasan Tetuan Law Chambers of Sailaja Peguambela dan Peguamcara No.51, Jalan Merdeka, Taman Melaka Raya, 75000 Melaka. Lawyer For Responden : Cik Sia Sin Yee bersama Encik CW Chia Tetuan Lim Wong & Partners Peguambela dan Peguamcara No.13, Tingkat Bawah, Jalan Kemajuan Off Jalan Payamas, 84900 Tangkak, Johor.