[11] On 29.06.2021, Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Tatatertib 1 Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia bil. 1 tahun 2021 was held to decide on the applicant’s case which found the applicant guilty and subject to the disciplinary punishment of dismissal effective 01.07.2021. [12] The applicant, on 14.7.2021 submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman of the Jawatankuasa Rayuan Tatatertib Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia. [13] On 15.12.2021, Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Rayuan Tatatertib Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia bil. 1 tahun 2021 had convened to consider the appeal of the applicant and decided to confirm and uphold the dismissal sentence made by Jawatankuasa Tatatertib. [14] On 21.12.2021, the second respondent sent a decision letter of the Jawatankuasa Rayuan Tatatertib LHDNM for the applicant’s appeal. [15] The applicant filed the judicial review application under Order 53 of the Rule of Court 2012 on 15.03.2022 seeking for certiorari to quash the first and second respondent’s decisions and order for mandamus because according to the applicant, the first and second respondent's decisions was illegal, void, unlawful and/or in excess of authority, and had been irrational and/ or unreasonable. Principles relating to Judicial Review [16] The principles surrounding the application for judicial review are trite. The court hearing an application for judicial review are allowed to scrutinize not only the decision making process but also for substance, as to whether they are tainted by illegality, irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness, procedural impropriety and also proportionality as per the case of R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 as follows: “In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp 410– 411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By 'illegality' as a ground for Judicial Review I mean that the decision maker must understand directly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of a dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exerciseable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts' exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. 'Irrationality' by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failing to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to Judicial Review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. Lord Diplock also mentioned 'proportionality' as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development.” [17] The Federal Court in Ranjit Kaur a/p S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ 1 stated the following: “[16] The Rama Chandran decision has been regarded or interpreted as giving the reviewing court a license to review without restrain decisions for substance even when the said decision is based on finding of facts. However, post Rama Chandran cases have applied some brakes to the courts’ liberal approach in Rama Chandran. The Federal Court in the case of Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v. Zaid Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789; [1997] 2 CLJ 11 after affirming the Rama Chandran decision held that there may be cases in which for reason of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security the principle in Rama Chandran may be wholly inappropriate. [17] The Federal Court, in Petroliam National Bhd v. Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2004] 2 MLJ 288; [2003] 4 CLJ 625, again held that the reviewing court may scrutinise a decision on its merits but only in the most appropriate of cases and not every case is amenable to the Rama Chandran approach. Further, it was held that a reviewing judge ought not to disturb findings of the Industrial Court unless they were grounded on illegality or plain irrationality, even where the reviewing judge might not have come to the same conclusion.” [18] Founded on these principles, this court will now proceed to analyse the grounds presented by the applicant in this application for judicial review. Preliminary Objection [19] The respondents raised preliminary objections. The preliminary objections are that the application for judicial review is out of time. According to the respondent the timeliness of adhering to the specified rules is of paramount importance, as it directly affects the court's jurisdiction to entertain the judicial review application. Given that the application was filed more than 90 days after the date of the first respondent’s decision, the High Court lacks the jurisdiction to consider the application for judicial review against the first respondent. Consequently, the remedy sought by the applicant in this application is legally inadequate and should be rejected by this court. [See: Abdul Rahman bin Abdullah Munir & Ors v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2008] 6 MLJ 704] [20] The second objection by the respondent is that the decisions of the third and fourth respondents are not the decisions disputed in this application. The reliefs requested by the applicant in enclosure 1, there is no relief requested that disputes or cancels the decision made by fourth respondent. Further, the respondents argue that no decision has been made by the third respondent in this case. Therefore, it was argued by the respondent that all accusations against the third and fourth respondents are not material for this judicial review application. [21] The respondent however, did not deny that the application for judicial review was filed within three (3) months from the date of the decision of the second respondent. Moreover, the respondent cited the case of Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Alcatel Lucent Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Anor [2017] 1 MLJ 563 which involves an appeal on the assessment of tax. This case can be distinguished from Alcatel (supra) as this case involves disciplinary proceedings. [22] Pertaining to the objection that the third and fourth respondent are not the decisions disputed in this application, this court finds the third respondent is the employer of the applicant and the fourth respondent is the applicant’s head of department. As the head of department, the fourth respondent would have knowledge and reported the applicant’s absenteeism. The third respondent, as the employer of the applicant, would have to know about the proceedings against the applicant. [23] For the reasons stated, this court considered the preliminary objections raised and dismissed the said objections.