Nor Farah Ain Binti Shaharuddin (AA-83-845-07/2022)

INTRODUCTION This case pertains to an accident. The accused, Nor Farah Ain binti Shaharuddin, was charged under S. 41(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 ("RTA 1987") in this court. She was accused of driving her Toyota Avanza, registered number plate AFJ 5117 ("the accused's car"), dangerously on a road, which caused the death of a motorcyclist, Zainal Faieruz bin Zainuddin ("the deceased").

At the end of the prosecution's case, this court decided that the prosecution had failed to adduced credible evidence to prove the elements of the offence under s. 41(1) of the RTA 1987. However, this court found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against the accused under s. 43(1) of the same act.

The accused was then called to enter his defence under the said offence, where she remained silent upon her rights being read to her. As such, the Court convicted the accused under s. 43(1) of the RTA 1987 for driving the car on a road without due care and attention.

Having heard the parties on the aggravating factors and mitigation, the accused was sentenced to a fine of RM8,500, failing which she would be imprisoned for a period of one month. The court also ordered that the particulars of the offence and conviction are to be recorded into the accused's driving licence by the Road Transport Department.

Aggrieved by the decision, the Prosecution filed a notice of appeal to the High Court of Ipoh in respect of the conviction and the sentences. This judgment contains the full reasons for the decision of this court.

PRELUDE The Prosecution adduced evidence through witnesses SP1 to SP8. It is important to note that the testimonies of SP1 to SP6 were heard by the previous Magistrate. I only heard the evidence of SP7 and SP8. The hearing continued based on the notes of evidence recorded by the previous Magistrate, as well as

I have reviewed the recorded evidence of all earlier witnesses, which enabled me to assess their demeanour and the atmosphere during the trial. As such, I am well-acquainted with the case and have resumed the trial as if I had presided over it from the outset.

FACTS OF THE CASE ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES SP1 was an officer on duty at the Inquiry Office, Ipoh Traffic Branch, on 10.05.2021 (five days after the incident). At around 12:20 a.m., while on duty, kin, Asmarida bin Zainudin, who informed about the death of the deceased (P1).

Prior to that, SP6, who was the Assistant Investigating Officer on duty on 06.05.2021, had received the initial accident report directly from the accused (ID14). After confirming that the accused was the driver of the vehicle involved and obtaining the necessary information, SP6 instructed the photographer, SP3, to take photographs and inspect the vehicle involved at IPD Ipoh. Once the photographs were confirmed to be in the IPRS system, SP6 proceeded to Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun at around 3:00 a.m. to locate the victim of the accident. He was informed that the victim (the deceased) was still in a coma at that time.

10.Subsequently, at approximately 3:30 to 4:00 a.m., SP6 went to the scene of the accident at Jalan Menteri to conduct an inspection and found no signs of debris at the scene. At around 9:30 a.m., SP6 returned to the location to take clearer photographs of the scene, which are included in Exhibit P7.

11.A few days later, SP6 received a report from the deceased's family regarding the death of the deceased (Exhibit P16). Following that, SP6 handed over the case to SP8, as cases under Section 41 of the Road Transport Act 1987 are to be taken over by an Investigating Officer. SP8 officially took over the case and investigated at the accident site on 12.05.2021.

12.Preliminary investigations by SP6 indicated that the motorcycle was travelling towards Jalan Penggerik (route A1-A2), while the car was coming from route A-that the accused was driving along route A-A1 and turned right into the junction heading to Jalan Datok.

13.After completing the initial investigation at the scene, SP8 proceeded to Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun (HRPB) for the post-mortem at the Forensic was confirmed by SP5 in the presence of SP8. The post-mortem was conducted by SP2 after the identity confirmation and upon request from SP8 via form Pol 61: Request for Post-Mortem Examination (P4). After the post-mortem was completed, SP2 issued the Post-also prepared the Death Registration Form (Exhibit P5).

14.During the investigation, SP8 also took both the motorcycle and the car involved in the accident to Puspakom Gopeng for inspection. The inspection was conducted by SP4 on 19.05.2021 in the presence of SP8. The Puspakom inspection reports (P10 & P11), prepared by SP4, were obtained by SP8.

15.According to both SP6 and SP8, the deceased was travelling from the upper section towards the lower section of route A1-A2 (as shown in Exhibit P15). That route was the rightful path of the deceased and is considered the main road. As the accused approached the white stop lines at route A1, the accused did not stop and/or failed to stop, and suddenly proceeded to enter the junction

ELEMENTS TO BE PROVED UNDER S.41 OF THE RTA Section 41(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987, which states as follows: Causing death by reckless or dangerous driving drives a motor vehicle on a road recklessly or at a speed or in a manner which, having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including the nature, condition, and size of the road and the amount of traffic which is or might reasonably be expected to be on the road), is dangerous to the public, and causes the death of any person, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than five years and not more than ten years, and a fine of not less than twenty thousand ringgit and not more than fifty thousand ringgit; and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and not more than fifteen years, and a fine of not less than fifty 17.In this case, the Accused has been charged under the third limb, namely driving in a manner dangerous to the public and causing death.

18.Based on the charge as per the case of PP V WAN KHAIRIL BIN WAN ISA [2007] 6 MLJ 601, the prosecution must prove, among other things, the following elements: I. That an accident occurred involving the Accused and the deceased at the date, place, and time as stated in the charge; II. That the accident was cau having regard to all the circumstances; and death was caused. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT 1st Element

This Court need not dwell on the first element to be established, as it is undisputed. Therefore, the first element has been proven by the prosecution. 2nd Element 20.Dangerous driving is not defined under the law. Therefore, this matter is motorcar on the road in a manner which, having regard to all the circumstances (including the nature, condition, and size of the road, and the traffic congestion reasonably expected to be present on the road), is dangerous to the public 21.The definition of dangerous driving to the public can be defined as an act or movement by a driver that is dangerous. This interpretation was explained in the case of LIM CHIN POH V. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1969] 2 MLJ 159. In this case, Justice Choor Singh decided: a vehicle, e.g., overtaking a vehicle on the wrong side of it, or overtaking in the face of oncoming traffic or overtaking when unable to see oncoming traffic, or crossing a junction against a traffic light, and so on. There must be some positive act on the part of the driver which is dangerous, having regard to all circumstances.

22.Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in the case of NG BENG KOK V. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [2017] MLJU 321 stated: [31] It appears to us from the decisions of the above cases that the important as follows Therefore, the opinions of the accused whether he was driving dangerously is person would have thought that the defendant was driving dangerously having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, on the road in question; (iii) driving dangerously may involve speeding or reckless driving. (iv) the danger caused by the driving to the public may be either real or potential; (v) to drive which to involve either: [i] deliberate conduct or [ii] intentionally driving dangerously; etent experienced driver, in relation to the manner of the driving and to the relevant circumstances of the case. [32] Section 41(1), 3rd limb of the RTA, inter alia, speaks of the manner of driving which is dangerous to the public. The manner of driving encompasses all matters connected with the management of the car by a driver when it was circumstance to the issue whether he was driving dangerously. If one speeds in an area where there are school children or on a narrow busy road, surely that causing physical injury to some other person who might happened to be using the road, or doing substantial damage to property. [33] Of course, not all speed creates a danger to the public. It depends on the prevailing circumstances at the material time. Reckless driving is driving with a wilful disregard for safety of other road users and a wilful disregard of the consequences of such driving. [35] It is pertinent to note that the 3rd limb to section 41(1) of RTA uses the he enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of statute. When it is so used, those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things, such as they signify according to their natural impart, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares used in the definition or section, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition; it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. [see Commr. of Customs v Caryaire Equipment India (P) Ltd (2012) 4 SCC 645; U.P. Power Corpn Ltd v NTPC Ltd (2014) 1 SCC 371]. s in driving. [37] There is no legal definition of driving which is dangerous to the public. The plain question in proving an offence under the 3rd limb of section 41(1) of RTA is simply this: Was the appellant driving a motor vehicle on a road dangerously, i.e. dangerous towards other persons who might reasonably be expected to be on or near the road having regard to all circumstances (including the nature, condition and size of the road, and the amount of traffic which or might be expected to be on the road). And, if he was, did he thereby cause the death of another person. Therefore, premised on the above, the circumstances that constitute dangerous driving is fairly wide. Taken cumulatively, it involves the manner of driving (which includes, recklessness and speeding) which create a dangerous situation to the public, i.e. which may cause a serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who may happen to be using the road, or doing substantial damage to property.

23.In addition, the legal principle in the case of RAMIAH V. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1972] 2 MLJ 258, where His Lordship Justice Raja Azlan Shah stated: shown that: i) there must be a situation created by the accused which, viewed objectively, is dangerous; ii) that when creating such a situation, the accused was at fault. Fault here involves a failure; a falling below the care and skill of a competent and experienced driver in relation to the manner of driving and the relevant circumstances.

ted a risk to other road users. The central question, therefore, is whether the en viewed through the lens of a reasonable person, can be said to have created a situation that posed a danger to others on the road?

25.It is an undisputed fact that there is no eye witnesses and/or CCTV/Dash Cam to support the occurrence of this accident. This case is prosecuted purely on circumstantial evidences; exhibits and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

26.As such this court is reminded of the principle enunciated in the case of MAGENDRAN MOHAN V. PP [2011] 11 CLJ 805: [10] The mode of evaluating circumstantial evidence has been stated by the Supreme Court of India in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR [1952] SC 343 as follows: It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

27.In the case of MUNESWARAN RAMASAMY V. PP [2016] 2 CLJ 210, YAA Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat HMR [as she was then] stated: [21] Apabila kes pendakwaan adalah bergantung kepada keterangan ikut keadaan, keterangan yang telah dibuktikan hendaklah menunjukkan dengan nyata kepada satu dan hanya satu kesimpulan, iaitu kebersalahan tertuduh 28.With that, these are the analysis of the Court: -

Assessment of Collision Based on Vehicle Damage and Point of Impact The damage sustained by both motor vehicles, when considered together with the point of impact, provides crucial evidence in determining the dynamics of the collision. This assessment helps to establish how the accident occurred, the positions and movements of the vehicles at the time of impact, and whether the collision was consistent with dangerous driving on the part of the Accused. It is obvious that the accident took place in the rightful path of the deceased. This is supported by oral testimony of SP6 and SP8. Besides, SP7 who was the first person to arrive at the scene of accident, testified that there was blood as marked Whether the manner of driving by the accused was dangerous can deduced by several evidences. The damages sustained by both motor vehicles was adduced via Exhibit P6 and P8 supported by the testimony of SP4 as well as Exhibit P10 and P11. On the motorcar, there was damage to the left passenger side at the front door. While the motorcycle, the front part was severely damaged. The only conclusion that can be deduced is that the collision occurred whilst the motorcar turning into the junction. This brings the Court to the next question. Where is the point of impact? PW6 testified that his preliminary investigation revealed that the accident area was dry and that there was no debris found. Based on P15, PW6 impact, which was located in front of Jalan Datok. otorcycle was being ridden near the left-hand side of his direction of travel and was obstructed by the movement of the Avanza, which allegedly entered Jalan Datok. The damage to the Avanza was at the left front passenger door. This was the version adduced by the Prosecution. However, logically, which was already obstructing the path. Furthermore, PW8 was unsure whether the Avanza was stationary or crossing the road at the time of the accident. When shown four photographs (IDD17A-B and IDD18A-B), however, PW6 agreed that he was not certain of the exact point of impact between the two vehicles. Based on IDD17A-B, it is evident that the motorcycle was found in centre line of the road. This suggests that the deceased was riding his motorcycle near the centreline of the road rather than near the left-hand edge. In the absence of direct evidence, the closest evidence this Court can rely on are IDD17 and IDD18. These photographs show that the point of impact stated by PW6 and PW8 does not align with the physical evidence. were in the middle of the road, at least 1 to 1.5 meters away from the marked collision cannot be conclusively determined, creating reasonable doubt as to whether the accident occurred in the manner alleged by the prosecution.

(ii) Was the accused driving recklessly/speedily? The case of PP V. ZULKIFLI OMAR [1998] 1 CLJ 1079; [1988] 6 MLJ 65 stated: - Excessive speed is not the sole decider for 'driving recklessly'; there must also be a finding on the manner and the other aspects of the defendant's driving, viz, the prevailing circumstances at the material time of the accident, including the nature, condition and size of the road, and the amount of traffic which is or might be expected on the road. The risk created by the manner in which the vehicle is driven must be both obvious and serious, and the court has to be satisfied that the essential or core ingredients of recklessness have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. During the trial, the Prosecution however, did not pose any questions to the witnesses regarding the manner of driving by the Accused. This Court finds such an omission to be signific case, as the manner of driving is a crucial fact in establishing the second element of the charge. Without addressing this aspect, the Prosecution failed to provide necessary evidence to support the allegation that the It is important to note that, according to the testimony of SP6, the location of the collision was on a downhill slope for the Deceased. This is also evident from the photographic evidence in P7. Based on the damage sustained by the motorcycle, as recorded in P10, it can be reasonably inferred that the motorcycle was travelling downhill at a high speed and was unable to stop in time. Notably, there were no visible brake marks or signs of skidding at the scene of the incident. Furthermore, SP6 testified that the Deceased, being positioned uphill, would have had a clear and unobstructed view of the 1-kilometre stretch of road leading to the point of collision, thereby suggesting that he should have been able to see th vehicle in advance. This court would refer to the case of AZIZ SATAR MAT DALI V. PP [2022] 8 CLJ 296: Court nevertheless found that the appellant was careless (not reckless) when he made the turn into the slip road. He admitted that had been transporting goods to Ng Chin Hong Hardware in Jerlun for the past four years prior to the accident. He would make deliveries there approximately three to four times in a month. He was familiar with that road and always made deliveries at the hardware store. Based on PW5's evidence, the appellant had slowed down a bit and then turned right. The prosecution suggested to the appellant that he wanted to pass through to the slip road before the motorcycle came as he thought he would be able to make it. In my opinion, based on the appellant's admission, being familiar with that road, the appellant thought he would be able to turn right by just slowing down a bit (rather than fully come to a stop) and then turning into the slip road. It may well have been that he did not see the motorcycle coming because otherwise he would not have turned right if he had seen it coming from the opposite direction. The Court found that the appellant was careless in his action rather than reckless. The Court had earlier made a finding that the deceased was also careless because having the advantage of the view coming down the slope, he should have been able to see a big lorry in front of him at the material time and slowed down by braking or take As such, little to no evidence was adduced regarding the manner of driving by the Accused.

(iii) Delay in Investigator Arriving at the Accident Scene accident after learning that her brother had been admitted to the hospital as a result of the collision. Upon arrival, she observed bloodstains on the road and admitted to washing them away with water. SP6, the initial assistant investigating officer, testified that he arrived at the accident scene at 4:00 a.m. approximately four hours after the incident. The Court notes that, according to ID14, the report lodged by the Accused was made at 12:47 a.m. However, SP6 provided no explanation for the delay in his arrival. Additionally, no evidence was led as to whether SP6 or SP8 were aware of investigate her actions. As a senior investigator, SP6 ought to have foreseen that a civilian, particularly a grieving family member such as SP7, might act impulsively out of emotional distress. Had SP6 arrived at the scene as soon as possible and taken appropriate measures to secure and preserve the integrity of the accident site, the act of SP7 washing away the bloodstains would likely not have occurred. resulting in the contamination of the scene the Court finds that this lapse has caused prejudice to the Accused.

(iv) Failure to Produce Coherent Testimony as Investigators As investigating officers, this Court is of the view that SP6 and SP8 were expected to provide clear, consistent, and credible testimony particularly on key aspects such as the presence of neutral evidence, the manner of driving by the Accused, and the point of impact. However, having observed the demeanor of both SP6 and SP8, the Court is not satisfied that a thorough and coordinated investigation was carried out. Notably, the Court finds that SP6 and SP8 appeared to have undertaken entirely different roles in the course of the investigation, such that their testimonies should not have overlapped. Yet, this was not the case. SP8 falsely claimed in Court that she had visited the accident scene with SP6. In contrast, SP6 made no mention whatsoever of conducting a joint investigation with SP8. The only point of interaction between them, as per This inconsistency raises serious doubts about the reliability of their testimonies and the overall integrity of the investigative process.

29.In the absence of the above material aspects of investigation, a reasonable the collision occurred without due care and attention of the Accused, but not in the manner as alleged under the charge. 3rd Element 30.It is an undeniable fact that the Deceased was admitted to Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun (HRPB) following the collision. The fact that he was a schizophrenia patient is irrelevant to this case, as is the fact that he passed away five days later. The Defence argued that the cause of death stated in P3 and P5 was inconsistent. However, the Court is convinced that the discrepancy is merely a clerical error, as both diagnoses point to the same fatal outcome. The crucial element is whether the injuries that led to his death resulted from the collision.

31.The Court has examined the post-mortem report, P3, in which the doctor stated that the autopsy revealed the Deceased had sustained traumatic brain injury which was fatal in nature due to the forceful impact of the accident. The doctor concluded that the cause of death was the head injury. Once again, this finding, when viewed objectively, indicates that the Deceased was riding the motorcycle at high speed, which contributed to the accident and his death. Had the Deceased been riding at a reasonable speed, it is unlikely that the impact of the collision would have been so severe as to cause traumatic brain injury.

32.When considered cumulatively, elements 2 and 3 do not establish a complete and compelling chain of evidence that unequivocally leads to the conclusion that the Accused drove dangerously, thereby causing the accident and the death of the Deceased.

considered view that the Prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case under Section 41(1) of the Road Transport Act upon maximum evaluation of its own evidence against the Accused.

34.A central fact in this case is the nature of the damage sustained by the Car, which clearly indicates that the collision was initiated by the motorcycle, rather than the Car. This finding is significant. The Car sustained only minimal damage to the front-left portion of its body, whereas the motorcycle suffered extensive damage to its front section. This suggests that it was the motorcycle that collided with the Car, not the reverse.

35.The facts and findings may have taken a different turn had the Car exited a junction and collided with the motorcycle while the latter was proceeding lawfully on the main road. However, in the present case, the Car was turning into a junction, not exiting it. This shifts the burden of responsibility, to some extent, to the Deceased to operate his motorcycle in a manner that would have allowed him to respond to any unexpected hazard, including a vehicle entering the junction.

36.It must be noted that there were no eyewitnesses to the incident. The investigating officer arrived at the scene approximately four hours after the circumstantial evidence, each piece of which must be considered on its own merit. After evaluating the evidence individually and collectively, the Court finds that it does not establish that the Accused was driving in a dangerous manner. While it is not disputed that the Accused was turning into the junction, there is no evidence to suggest that she entered it at speed or in a reckless manner.

37.Her failure was limited to entering the junction without exercising sufficient care and attention to oncoming traffic, which constitutes an offence under Section 43(1) of the Road Transport Act.

38.The investigating officer neither determined nor investigated the speed of the motorcycle, and in fact admitted to being uncertain about it. However, based on the extent of damage to both vehicles and the nature of the collision, the Court is of the view that the Deceased was travelling at high speed, which ultimately led to him being thrown from the point of impact.

39.The Court also finds relevance in the legal principle established IN PP V. ONG KIA CHAN [2006] 4 CLJ 334, which emphasizes the duty to maintain a proper lookout. This duty applies not only to the Accused but equally to the Deceased. All road users are responsible for their own safety as well as that of others.

40.Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded by the explanations provided by SP6 and SP8 regarding the absence of brake marks, which they attributed to the Court finds that the Deceased, by travelling at high speed despite approaching a known junction and failing to brake upon seeing the Car entering it, was in fact riding in a reckless and dangerous manner.

any driver entering from a major road into a minor road who becomes involved in an accident resulting in death could automatically be charged under Section 41(1) of the Road Transport Act. The Court does not accept that this reflects the true nature or legislative intent of that provision.

42.Nevertheless, based on the totality of the evidence, the Court finds that the Prosecution has successfully proven the charge against the Accused under Section 43(1) of the Road Transport Act, namely, that she drove without due care and attention to other road users.

Accused, the Court must consider various aggravating and mitigating factors. In this regard, the Court refers to the Court of Appeal case of PP V. KHAIRUL JASMI ABDUL MAJID [2016] CLJU 225; [2016] 1 LNS 225; [2016] MLJU 1645; [2016] 3 AMR 220, where the Court held that: "We are satisfied that the learned High Court judge in arriving at the appropriate sentence had considered the interests of the public and also the mitigating factors including the plea of guilty before the commencement of trial; the saving of much of the court's time; the fact that the death was as a result of a fight that ensued between the respondent and the deceased; the full cooperation given by the accused to the police throughout the investigation when he passed the sentence of twelve years imprisonment and had achieved the objective of sentencing. The length of sentence would have a rehabilitative influence in restoring the accused back into society besides creating fear in the minds of future offenders.

44.In applying the discretionary power on sentencing, there are several factors the court should consider. These general principles were laid down in Federal Court's case of MOHD ABDULLAH ANG SWEE KENG V. PP [1987] CLJ 209 (REP); [1987] 2 CLJ 405 as below: "In assessing the length of custodial sentence, the court must look at the overall picture in perspective by considering, firstly, the gravity of the offence committed; secondly, the facts in the commission of the offence; thirdly, the presence or absence of mitigation factors, and fourthly, the sentences that have been imposed in the past for similar offences to determine the trend of sentencing policy, if any."

45.The Court also takes guidance from the case of PP v. MORAH CHEKWUBE CHUKWUDI [2017] CLJU 864; [2017] 1 LNS 864; [2017] MLJU 958; [2017] AMEJ 0782, which outlines the factors that the Court must consider before passing sentence in a given case, as follows: "It is well established that there are a number of factors that courts take into consideration before sentencing. Some of them are as follows: (a) the gravity or severity of the facts constituting the offence; (b) the circumstances in which it was committed; (c) the rampancy of such offence in the area; (d) the offender's previous record; (e) the offender's contribution and support to his family members; (f) the offenders means; (g) the effect of conviction and sentence on his job opportunities;

the age and health of the accused; (i) whether it is his first offence; (j) whether the accused had cooperated with the police after the commission of the offence;

whether the accused had pleaded guilty; (i) status of the accused; (m) whether there was violence during the crime; (n) public interest, etc..."

MITIGATION PLEA In mitigation, learned Counsel submitted that the Accused was 25 years old at the time of the accident. At the time of sentencing, she is married with one child and is currently eight months pregnant with her second. The Accused has demonstrated full cooperation throughout the proceedings, consistently attending Court without absence or failure to attend without valid reasons since she was first charged on 28 July 2022.

47.She is a first-time offender and had promptly pleaded guilty upon the original charge under Section 41 of the Road Transport Act being reduced to Section 43 of the Road Transport Act. The Accused is currently unemployed and does not have a permanent source of income; however, she engages in small-scale home-based business activities whenever possible. Her husband is the sole breadwinner supporting the family.

48.Given that she is nearing her delivery date, Counsel pleaded that the Court consider imposing a non-custodial sentence. Should the Court deem a custodial sentence necessary, Counsel respectfully urged the Court to consider imposing a one-day imprisonment. With regard to the fine, Counsel further submitted that a minimum fine in the region of RM5,000 be imposed,

AGGRAVATING FACTORS The Prosecution submitted that a commensurate sentence to serve as a deterrent and lesson to the Accused is meted out. Trend of Sentencing 50.This Court's research reveals that there are no precedents involving a full trial under Section 43(1) of the Road Transport Act. The only relevant cases are those previously charged under Section 41(1) APJ, where the charge was later imposed was a fine ranging between RM4,000.00 and RM10,000.00. None of these cases resulted in a custodial sentence after the charge was amended to Section 43(1) APJ.

age, clean record, guilty plea, the mitigating circumstances under which the offence was committed, public interest, the mitigation plea submitted by the Accused, and the sentencing trend in precedent cases, the sentence of a fine of RM8,500.00, in default one month imprisonment, together with an endor and proportionate to the offence committed. The Court has duly considered all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, and the decision is firmly grounded in sound legal principles.

52.The Court expresses its sympathy to the family of the deceased, who lost his life as a result of this incident. Cases of this nature must serve as a reminder to all road users to exercise greater caution as even a minor act of negligence on the part of a driver can lead to the loss of innocent lives.