Nordin Bin Kassim v Murallitharan A/L Munisamy (W-08-99-03/2024)

Bahawa dapatan dan rekomendasi yang dibuat oleh Jawatankuasa Disiplin kepada Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam ke atas Perayu yang bertarikh 20.2.2019 supaya Perayu memulangkan RM100,000.00 yang diterima daripada Responden dalam tempoh masa enam (6) bulan dan jika gagal Perayu dibatalkan dari Senarai Peguambela dan Peguamcara (struck off the Roll as Advocate & Solicitor diketepika);

Bahawa

Lembaga Tatatertib Peguambela & Peguamcara yang dibuat dibawah seksyen 103D Akta Profession Undang-Undang, 1976 bertarikh 28.5.2022 yang mengenakan denda ke atas Perayu sebanyak RM30,000.00 S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg dan Perintah supaya Perayu membayar balik (restitute) Responden RM95,000.00 diketepikan; dan

Relief-relief lain yang dianggap wajar dan suai manfaat oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini. [2] On 25 September 2023, the learned High Court Judge dismissed the Appellant’s Originating Summons with costs of RM1,000.00 each to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondent and the Intervener. [3] Dissatisfied, on 24 October 2023, Appellant filed Notice of Motion (No: W-08-286-10/2023) for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the entire decision of the High Court. However, the Appellant had failed to include Majlis Peguam i.e. the Intervener in the said Notice of Motion. [4] It is pertinent to note that the Appellant in his Notice of Motion dated 24 October 2023 did not apply for an extension of time to file Notice of Appeal notwithstanding that the thirty (30) days to file the said Notice of Appeal has expired. [5] Subsequently, the Appellant’s filed Amended Notice of Motion dated 1 February 2024 (Enclosure 5). The Appellant Amended Notice of Motion to include the Intervener i.e Majlis Peguam was allowed on 1 February 2024. [6] The Amended Notice of Motion was heard by the Court of Appeal on 22 March 2024 where the Court of Appeal ruled that no leave to appeal was required even though the amount of the subject matter of the appeal is less than RM250,000.00. S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg [7] On 26 March 2024, the Appellant filed Notice of Motion (Enclosure 1) for extension of time to filed Notice of Appeal after a delay of 154 days and/or about five (5) months from the decision of the High Court. Background Facts [8] The salient facts are as follows - [9] The Respondent had paid a sum of RM100,000.00 into the Appellant’s client-solicitor account as payment for purchasing the Amlink Insurance Policy from Am Assurance. [10] The Respondent did not receive the said Insurance Policy as promised by one, Ms. Norihan Talib who is an agent representing Am Assurance. [11] The Respondent demanded the Appellant to refund the RM100,000.00 paid into the Appellant’s client-solicitor account. [12] The Appellant admitted receiving the banker's cheque amounting RM100,000.00 paid into their client-solicitor account, however Appellant does not know who paid the RM100,000.00 into the said account. [13] All instructions were received by the Appellant from their client, Puan Norizan who is an agent representing Am Assurance (is a product) from Tanjung Trading. Based on Tanjung Trading's instructions, Appellant shall make the payment out to the respective Tanjung Trading clients from the client-solicitor account from time to time. S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg [14] According to the Respondent, Encik Nordin Bin Kassim gets the commission directly from Am Assurance for each sale of the Insurance Policy. No cash payment shall be collected by Am Assurance personally however the purchasers of the Insurance Policy Scheme were instructed to make payment of the Insurance premium by way of banker's cheques into the Appellant's legal firm. [15] However, the Respondent did not receive any Am Assurance Insurance Policy in his favour as duly represented by Puan Norihan Talib. [16] The Respondent then lodged a complaint with the Disciplinary Board against the Appellant who are currently partners practicing under the name and style of Messrs Nordin Kassim & Aziz. [17] The Disciplinary Committee was appointed on 27 March 2018 to investigate the complaint lodged against the Appellant. [18] The Disciplinary Committee hearing proceeded for two (2) days namely on 17 October 2018 and 2 November 2018 in the presence of both the Respondent and his witnesses and the Appellant to hear the above complaint. [19] On 20 February 2019, Disciplinary Committee made the following unanimous findings as follows: "1. a. By way of an admission, the Respondent has admitted having received RM100,000.00 made payable by the Complainant into the Respondent's client-solicitor account for the payment of purchasing the AmLink Insurance Policy from Am Assurance. S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg b. The payment was paid by way of Maybank Bankers Cheque No: 018037 dated 23.9.2013 in favour of the Respondents' firm into a client’s solicitor-account. c. Unfortunately the Complainant did not receive any Am Assurance Insurance Policy in favour of the Complainant as duly represented by Puan Norihan Talib who is an agent for Am Assurance agent. According to the Respondent, Encik Nordin bin Kassim, she gets the commission directly from Am Assurance for each sale of the Insurance Policy. No cash payment shall be collected by Am Assurance personally however the Purchasers of the Insurance Policy Scheme were instructed to make payment of the Insurance premium by way of banker's cheques into the Respondents' legal firm.

We have requested Respondents to produce their Bank Statement to show whether the Complainant's Banker Cheque No. 018037 dated 23.9.2013 was cleared in the Respondent client-solicitor account and upon perusal of the Respondents Bank Statement, it is evidently clear that the Complainant Banker's Cheque for RM100,000.00 was deposited and cleared.

4.The instruction to release the payments received in the Respondents client-solicitor accounts derives from Puan Norizan who is an agent representing Am Link Insurance from Tanjung Trading. Based on Tanjung Tradings instruction the Respondents shall make the necessary payment out to the respective Tanjung Trading client. However, the Respondents fail to show any proof of S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg Letter of Appointment or Warrant to Act in favour of Puan Norihan and/or Tanjung Trading as the Respondents' client. The Respondent informed the DC that they shall call Puan Norihan Talib to attend the DC Hearing and clarify the above Complainant however an unfortunately Pn. Norihan Talib nor representative of Tanjung Trading appeared as the Respondents' witness during the DC proceeding.

Having heard the Complainant and Respondents' explanation and further evaluated all the documents as produced in the Record of Complainant during the said Hearing, we have unanimously decided that there is a misconduct caused or done by the Respondents under Section 94 (3) of LPA particularly paragraph (n) and (o) of the Legal Profession Act.

The conduct of receiving the sum of RM100,000.00 from the Complainant has to be viewed seriously and the Respondents denial of not knowing who have deposited the said payment into their client-solicitor account is wholly unacceptable and untenable. In fact, the Respondents has deemed admitted receiving such payment but their denial on who has deposited the money is most unacceptable and unwarranted.

As such we recommend the Respondents to refund the RM100,000.00 received from the Complainant from the date of decision within 6 months failing which we recommend the Respondents to be struck off from the role as Advocates & Solicitors." S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg [20] On 28 May 2022, the Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board affirmed the findings of liability by the Disciplinary Committee and ordered as follows: "That the 1st Respondent do pay a fine of Ringgit Malaysia Thirty Thousand (RM30,000.00) payable to the Discipline Fund within one

month from the date of the Order AND IN DEFAULT THEREOF Section 103 (1) of the LPA shall apply. The Disciplinary Board FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE 1st Respondent do make restitution to the Complainant for the sum of Ringgit Malaysia Ninety Five Thousand (RM95,000.00) only within one (1) month from the date of this Order." The Relevant Law Relating to Enlargement or Abridgement of Time Rules of The Court of Appeal 1994

Time limit for appeal. No appeal shall, except by leave of the court, be brought after the expiration of thirty days-

in the case of an appeal from an order in Chambers, from the date when such order was pronounced at the hearing;

in the case of an appeal against the refusal of an application, from the date of such refusal; S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg

in all other cases, from the date on which the judgment or order appealed against was pronounced. Our Findings [21] We turn now to the cases relating to factors that need to be considered by this Honourable Court before extension of time can be granted. [22] In Rohman Norhakim Abd Aziz v. 1. Ismail Mohd Ishak 2. Liberty Insurance Berhad [2020] 1 LNS 1903, the High Court held as follows: “[19] It is undisputable here that the delay of 6 months here is by any standard inordinate and substantial. The plaintiff's claim was dismissed on 6 March 2019. The appeal against the dismissal of the claim was filed within time but was not served on the first defendant within the timeframe required by Order 55 Rule 3(4) (at [10] supra). The application for extension of time was only filed in November 2019 [20] The onus is on the plaintiff as the applicant to provide the court with good and substantial for reasons for the long delay. The only reason proffered by the plaintiff for the failure to serve within time was that his former solicitors had failed to do so. It was not explained why the plaintiff did not procure an affidavit from the former solicitor to explain why he had not served the notice of appeal and record of appeal on the first defendant on time. [21] There is a general rule that where a solicitor's default is put forward as the explanation for the delay, this does not amount to a sufficient ground to grant an extension of time to file or serve a notice of appeal. I accept the plaintiff's contention that this rule is not absolute and in S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg appropriate cases the court can grant an extension as the court does not like an innocent litigant to suffer for the mistake of his lawyers. [22] Reverting to the instant applications, there is no material before the court to show why the plaintiff's former lawyer had not served the appeal and record of appeal on time. Having regard to all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that good and substantial reasons have been proffered by the plaintiff for the delay to justify the exercise of the court's discretion in his favour. Even if I am minded to accept that the mistake made by the plaintiff's former solicitor is a sufficient ground to explain the delay, there is a far more serious obstacle in the plaintiff's way and it has to do with the third factor.” [23] In Raja Guppal a/l Ramasamy v. Sagaran a/l Pakiam [1999] 2 MLJ 677, Haidar JCA (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the panel held as follows: “By way of postscript, we quote ‘It is time the litigants and their legal advisers realize and appreciate that rules made are to be observed and complied with and not flouted or wantonly ad libitum ‘per Abdoolcader J, in dealing with the failure of the appellant to comply with the statutory provision requiring service of the copy of the record of appeal on the respondents or their solicitors in the Federal Court case of Ng Yit Seng & Anor v Syarikat Jiwa Mentakab Sdn Bhd & Ors [198112 MLJ 194 at p 195." [24] In Bala Subramaniam Sengodan v. Ahamed Sidique Abdul Latiff & Another Appeal [2015] 4 MLRA 200, the Court of Appeal through S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg the judgment delivered by Mohd Zawawi Salleh JCA (as he then was) had this to say: “[34] The power to extend the time to file a notice of appeal is discretionary, and has to be exercised judicially, having regard to established principles. In Soh Keng Hian v. American International Assurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 MLRA 146, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was), in delivering the judgment of the court, said at p 147: "It is axiomatic that this court is seised of a wide discretion to extend time in proper and deserving cases. But it is not unprincipled discretion. There must be some relevant evidential material available to us before we may exercise discretion." [35] The principles governing the grant of leave to file a notice of appeal out of time may be summarised as follows:

Rules of Court providing a time limit for the conduct of litigation, must, prima facie, be obeyed (Ratnam v. Comaraswamy and Others [1964] All ER 933 and Revici v. Prentice Hall Incorporated and Others [1969] All ER 772).

(ii) Where there has been a non-compliance with a time limit, the court has a discretion to extend time (See Thiruchelvasegaram Manickavasegar v. Mahadevi Nadchatiram [1998] 2 MLRA 211);

(iii) In exercising its discretion, the court will consider: S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg

the length of the delay;

the reasons for the delay;

the chances of the appeal succeeding if time for appealing is extended; and

the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted; (See Development & Commercial Bank Bhd v. Liew Weng Hang & Ors [2007] 2 MLRA 291, Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad v. Sistem Bis Komputer Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 2 MLRH 550 and Abdul Rahim Ponniah Abdullah v. Kulim Intensive Driving Centre Sdn Bhd [2000] 5 MLRH 536). [36] The above factors may not necessarily be exhaustive, but they are certainly convenient yardsticks to assess the merits of an application for extension of time to file a notice appeal. Ultimately, it is for the court to uphold its own rules, while always endeavouring to avoid or redress any injustice that might result from the strict application of the rules of court. [40] The following passage from Ratnam v. Comaraswamy and Others (supra), is very much relevant to the present application: "The Rules of Court must, prima facie, be obeyed, and, in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to be providing a time table for the conduct of litigation." [41] In Revici v. Prentice Hall Incorporated and Others (supra), Lord Edmund Davies LJ said: "... the Rules of the Supreme Court are there to be observed; and if there is non-compliance (other than of a minimal kind), that is something which has to be explained away. Prima facie, if no excuse is offered, no indulgence should be granted..." [42] In that case Lord Denning MR dealt with the issue of delay and noncompliance with rules as follows: "Nowadays we regard time very differently from what they did in the nineteenth century. We insist on the rules as to time being observed. We have had occasion recently to dismiss many cases for want of prosecution when people have not kept to the rules as to time. So here, although the time is not so very long, it is quite long enough. There was ample time for considering whether there should be an appeal or not (I should imagine it was considered). Moreover (and this is important), not a single ground or excuse is put forward to explain the delay and why he did not appeal. The plaintiff had 3½ months in which to lodge his notice of appeal to the judge and he did not do so. I am quite content with the way in which the judge S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg has exercised his discretion. I would dismiss the appeal and refuse to extend the time anymore." [25] In exercising the discretion as to whether to grant an extension of time, the Federal Court in National of Union Bank Employee v. Director General of Trade Union & Anor [2013] 7 CLJ 957 held that the court will consider and take into account the followings factors:

The length of delay;

Whether or not there are cogent reasons for the delay; and

The likelihood and degree of prejudice, as well as injustice to the opposite party, should the court exercise its discretion to grant the extension. [26] In Chong Kueng Ying & Ors v. Lovis Lavagna [1972] 1 MLJ 180, Suffian F.J. (as he then was) delivering judgment of the court held as follows: “the mistake of a legal adviser is not sufficient ground for granting leave.” [27] In Schin Hua Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v. Tuan Yusoff Bin Tuan Mohamed [1974] 1 MLJ 58, Ali F.J. (as he then was) delivering judgment of the court held as follows: “Here is a clear admission that the failure to serve the notice was due to the solicitor's mistake. Needless to say, that such mistake is S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg not a ground for granting special leave. That must be so for the obvious reason that it is not possible to draw a dividing line between a mistake which can support the exercise of a discretionary power and that which cannot. A mistake is a mistake whatever may be the reason for it.” Reasons for The Delay [28] The Appellant in his Affidavit in Support of the Amended Notice of Motion explained for the delay in filing the Notice of Appeal as follows:

18.Pada 25.09.2023. Yang Arif Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid bin Wan Salleh setelah mendengar hujah-hujah pihak-pihak telah menolak rayuan saya. Saya Pemohon tidak berpuas hati diatas keputusan tersebut dan ingin membuat rayuan diatas keseluruhan keputusan tersebut.

19.Walau bagaimanapun saya telah membuat permohonan melalui Notis Usul dibawah Seksyen 68 Akta Mahkamah Keadilan 1964 oleh kerana jumlah yang diperintahkan saya membayar kepada Responden adalah kurang daripada RM250,000.00. Permohonan saya telah didaftarkan di Mahkamah Rayuan sebagaimana Rayuan Sivil No. WA-08-286-10/2023. (Sesalinan Notis Usul Terpinda Perintah bertarikh 24.10.2023 dikembarkan dan ditandakan sebagai 'Eksibit NBK 10').

Seterusnya Mahkamah Rayuan telah menetapkan beberapa kali pegurusan kes secara e-review. Mahkamah, pihak Reponden dan S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg Pencelah tidak pernah menimbulkan isu bahawa permohonan melalui Notis Usul saya tidak mematuhi /menyalahi tatacara rayuan dalam kes-kes rayuan dibawah Akta Profession Undang-Undang.

Pada permulaan pendengaran Notis Usul saya pada Jumaat 22/03/2024 yang baru lalu dihadapan panel Yang Arif, Yanf Arif Hakim-Hakim, dan setelah membaca penghujahan pihak Pencelah yang diterima beberapa hari sebelum itu yang menimbulkan isu bahawa peruntukkan seksyen 68 Akta Mahkamah Keadilan tidak terpakai, saya telah memberitahu Panel YA Hakim-Hakim berkait terdapat peruntukan dalam dua (2) Akta yang disebutkan diatas. Pihak Pencelah memberi hujah bahawa rayuan atas keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi adalah dibuat terus dan bukan melalui seksyen 68 Akta Mahkamah Keadilan. Pihak Responden pula berhujah bahawa kebenaran untuk merayu harus diperolehi dan seksyen 68 Akta Mahkamah Keadilan 1964 adalah terpakai.

22.Setelah mendengar hujah pihak-pihak dan setelah penangguhan sebentar, Pengerusi Panel Hakim-Hakim telah menerangkan bahawa panel bersetuju Seksyen 68 Akta Mahkamah Keadilan 1964 tidak terpakai. YA Pengerusi Panel Hakim juga telah memberitahu bahawa panel tidak ada kuasa untuk melanjutkan masa kepada permohonan Notis Usul saya dan telah menolak Notis Usul saya. Bagaimanapun saya mendapat kefahaman bahawa dari apa yang diperkatakan oleh YA Pengerusi panel bahawa adalah terbuka kepada saya untuk membuat permohonan untuk perlanjutan masa untuk membuat rayuan. S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg

Saya sesungguhnya percaya dan yakin bahawa dari fakta dan keadaan kes ini saya mempunyai alasan yang kukuh untuk mendapatkan satu perintah perlanjutan masa untuk memfailkan rayuan. Saya juga yakin terdapat isu undang-undang yang penting dan perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ini seperti berikut iaitu:

23.1 Sama ada saya sebagai peguamcara kepada Norihan bt Talib mempunyai duty of care ke atas Responden dibawah undang-undang yang mana Responden bukan anakguam saya tetapi adalah pelanggan kepada anak guam saya dan yang ada perjanjian membeli polisi insuran dengan anak aguam saya.

23.2 Sama ada Jawatankuasa Disiplin dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang dalam membuat dapatan bahawa saya telah melakukan satu "misconduct' yang terjumlah kepada 'grave impropriety' dibawah seksyen 94(3) (n) dan (o) walhal Responden bukanlah seorang 'client' dan yang mana saya tidak diwajibkan menjaga kepentingan beliau.

23.3 Sama ada Jawatankuasa Disiplin telah khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang dalam membuat dapatan bahawa wang RM100,000.00 didapati 'due and owing to the Complainant' walhal dari keterangan yang dikemukakan bahawa wang RM100,000.00 tersebut adalah hutang yang tertunggak yang telah diakui dan perlu dibayar oleh Norihan Talib yang telah berurusan dengan Responden untuk membuat perjanjian membeli polisi insuran terlebih dahulu. S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg

23.4 Sama ada Lembaga telah khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat dapatan bahawa liabiliti saya atas 'misconduct' disebabkan menggunakan (appropriation) wang Responden walhal didalam keterangan jelas wang tersebut telah digunakan dan dipakai oleh Norihan Talib/Tanjung Trading yang telah diakui dan menawarkan jadual bayaran balik dan juga telah dibuat bayaran balik RM5,000.00 kepada Responden.

23.5 Sama ada kegagalan Responden membuat tuntutan sivil di Mahkamah Sivil keatas Norihan bt Talib/Tanjung Trading atas kegagalan Norihan bt Talib membeli polisi insuran bagi pihak Responden seperti yang telah mereka persetujui telah memprejudiskan Pemohon yang telah diperintah membayar wang yang telah digunakan oleh Norihan bt Talib kepada Responden.

23.6 Sama ada skim pelaburan yang dijalankan oleh Norihan Talib/Tanjung Trading yang menyerupai skim cepat kaya adalah satu aktiviti haram dan tidak sah dan penglibatan Responden didalam aktiviti tersebut menghalang beliau dari membuat apa-apa tuntutan terhadap mana-mana pihak termasuk saya sebagai Pemohon.

Notis Usul yang terdahulu dibuat dengan penuh kepercayaan bahawa ianya adalah prosedur yang betul sehinggalah dihujahkan sebaliknya oleh pihak Pencelah. Dengan itu saya percaya Notis Usul yang difailkan ini adalah suatu tindakan yang jika ditolak akan menyebabkan ketidakadilan kepada pihak saya. Saya juga S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg mempunyai keadaan-keadaan yang istimewa untuk memohon Notis Usul ini dan sekiranya ianya dibenarkan tidak akan memprejudiskan Responden. Responden mempunyai hak untuk mengambil tindakan undang-undang atas wang pelaburan daripada Norihan Talib/Tanjung Trading.

25.Justeru, saya sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini sewajarnya memberikan perhatian kepada kepentingan keadilan oleh kerana Jawatankuasa Disiplin dan Lembaga telah melakukan ketidakpatuhan undang-undang.

26.Oleh itu, berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, saya dengan rendah dirinya memohon kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia membenarkan permohonan ini dan saya dibenarkan dan diberi perlanjutan masa untuk saya memfailkan rayuan untuk mengenepikan keputusan Jawatankuasa Disiplin, Lembaga Disiplin dan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. Our Decision

There was an inordinate delay of 154 days and / or about five (5) months in taking out Enclosure 1. The Appellant failed to furnish any relevant evidence to explain for the delay in filing the Notice of Appeal against the High Court decision within the time limit prescribed.

The inexcusable long delay for the current motion is pursuant to the Appellant’s own conduct and this Honourable Court find no favour with the Appellant contention that the delay was pursuant to the Appellant’s application for leave to appeal. S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg

The Appellant being an advocate and solicitor has only himself to be blame for the unwarranted delay. There has been a flagrant breach of the rules of the court and there was no acceptable explanation for it.

Failure by the Appellant to include the Intervener as a party in the Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal and thereafter carrying out the necessary amendments on 1 February 2024 after objections were raised there in further delays pursuant to the Appellant’s own conduct. Hence, the Appellant should live with the consequences of his own fault.

The Appellant’s conduct to file the Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal on the last day of the prescribed 30 days period (i.e. on 24 October 2023) to obtain leave to file Notice of Appeal (when leave to appeal is not required) against the decision of the High Court dated 25 September 2023 is at the Appellant’s own risks.

Failure by the Applicant to include a prayer for extension of time to file the Notice of Appeal in the Notice of Motion nor in the Amended Notice of Motion wherein the presiding panel on 22 March 2024 having held unanimously that leave to appeal is not required remarked that there is no application for extension of time to file the Notice of Appeal before the Court.

Even if this Honourable Court is minded to allow an extension of time to the Appellant, we still find that the proposed appeal devoid of any merits based on the followings grounds: S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg

The Appellant’s admission on having received the Respondent's Maybank Bankers Cheque No. 018037 dated 23 September 2013 for the sum of RM100,000.00.

(ii) The Appellant’s admission that the said Bankers Cheque cleared in his client-solicitor account.

(iii) The Appellant failed to show any evidence that the said monies in the client solicitor account of Nordin Kassim & Co was disbursed to the Respondent.

(iv) There were no compelling grounds to interfere with the findings of the Disciplinary Board after having unanimously found that there was misconduct caused or done by the Appellant under the Legal Profession Act 1976.

There was nothing to indicate unfairness in terms of procedure and the manner in which the Disciplinary Committee/ Disciplinary Board had conducted itself. [29] In dealing with disciplinary matters and finding made by the Disciplinary Committee/Disciplinary Board, Justice Gopal Sri Ram (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal of Gana Muthusamy v. LM Ong & Co [1998] 3 MLJ 341 at pp 344-345; [1998] 4 CLJ 878 at pp 344-345, said as follows: “It is primarily for members of the Bar to decide what amounts to conduct unbecoming of an advocate and solicitor in particular S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg circumstances, according to standards established by members of that honorable profession. Courts must necessarily exercise caution when entertaining an appeal in which the central question is whether particular conduct is unprofessional and cases meriting curial interference will be rare. Otherwise it will be the court and not the profession that will determine the yardstick of professional behavior. We would, in this context, express our agreement with the following passage in the Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors issued by the Council of the Law Society in 1974, quoted by the learned judges of the High Court in their judgment: One of the hallmarks of a developed profession is that it should lay down and maintain standards of professional conduct for its members based upon the best thinking of those members as to what constitutes proper conduct for a member of that profession.” Conclusion [30] In the result, it is our unanimous decision that the Appellant’s Notice of Motion (Enclosure 1) for extension of time to file Notice of Appeal is without merits and is dismissed. [31] We award costs to the Respondent in the sum of RM5,000.00. S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg [32] We order no costs to the intervener. Date: 10 January 2025 - sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel For the Appellant : Nordin Kassim & Aziz (Kuala Terengganu) For the Respondents : Jeffrey & Co. (Kuala Lumpur) For the Intervener : Abu Talib Shahrom (Kuala Lumpur) S/N ZxNjc6DApU6jrnruarebWg