Norhalis Bin Mohd Zaid v Public Prosecutor (C-05(M)-501-10/2018)

Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA [APPELLATE JURISDICTION] CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 BETWEEN NORHALIS BIN MOHD ZAID (KP: 860318-46-5597) … APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT [In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Temerloh Criminal Trial No: 45B-01-07/2016 Between Public Prosecutor And Norhalis bin Mohd Zaid] CORAM: KAMARDIN HASHIM, JCA RHODZARIAH BUJANG, JCA MOHAMAD ZABIDIN MOHD DIAH, JCA Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 2 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] The appellant in this case was charged at the High Court, Temerloh for the offence of murder under section 302 of the Penal Code. The charge reads: “Bahawa kamu pada tarikh 17 Julai 2015, jam lebih kurang antara 6.30 petang hingga jam 2.00 pagi pada 18 Julai 2015, bertempat di kawasan sekitar Hotel Sun Inns Equine, yang beralamat di No. 3, 5, 7, 9 Jalan LP 2A/1, Taman Lestari Perdana di dalam daerah Seri Kembangan, di dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah didapati membunuh Noor Salwana binti Wahab No. K/P: 970616-06-5582 dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan.” [2] At the end of the case for the prosecution, the learned Judicial Commissioner of the High Court (‘the learned JC’) was satisfied that a prima facie case had been established against the appellant on the said charge. The appellant was thus ordered to enter his defence. [3] At the conclusion of the trial, he was found guilty as charged and convicted accordingly by the learned JC. He was sentenced to death. [4] Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to this Court against both his conviction and sentence. We heard his appeal on 10.10.2019, where at the end of it, we dismissed the appeal and affirmed the said conviction and sentence. We now give our reasons for dismissing the appellant’s appeal. Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 3 The Facts [5] The evidence proffered by the prosecution is entirely circumstantial in nature and was well encapsulated in the learned JC’s grounds of judgment. The evidence may be summarized as follows:

(ii) the said act was done with intention to cause bodily injury; and

(iii) that the injury caused was intended and was not accidental or otherwise unintentional, and the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. [17] The law on murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder is in section 299 and 300 of the Penal Code. What is culpable homicide had been defined under section 299. What is murder is defined in section

300. The distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder had been explained by Raja Azlan Shah, FCJ (as his Lordship then was) in Tham Kai Yau & Ors v. PP [1976] 1 LNS 159; [1977] 1 MLJ

174. [18] In Tham Kai Yau [supra], the Federal Court explained: “section 299, Penal Code enacts that a person commits culpable homicide, if the act by which the death is caused is done: (a) with the intention to cause death; (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; (c) with the knowledge that … the act is likely to cause death. Section 300, Penal Code defines murder as follows. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done: (1) with the intention of causing death; (2) with Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 9 the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; (3) with the intention of causing such bodily injury to any person, and … is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The words which I have italized show the marked differences between the two offences. Where there is an intention to kill, as in (a) and (1), the offence is always murder. Where there is no intention to cause death or bodily injury, then (c) and (4) apply. Whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon the degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result, it is murder. Illustration (d) of s. 300, Penal Code is a case of this description. Where the offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, immature age, or other special circumstances, to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death, it is murder. Illustration (b) of s. 300, Penal Code is a good example. The essence of (b) and (3) is this. It is culpable homicide if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death; it is murder, if such injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Illustration (c) given in s. 300, Penal Code is an example. It is on a comparison of these two limbs of s. 299 and s. 300 that the decision of doubtful cases as the present must generally depend. The distinction is fine, but noticeable. In the last analysis, it is a question of degree of probability.” [19] Intention or mens rea is not something capable of being established by direct evidence, it is a matter of inference. It could be gathered from all the facts and circumstances of each and every case. It could be from the nature of the injuries, the weapon used and to which part of the body the injuries were inflicted. This leads us to examine the evidence of the Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 10 pathologist (PW1). On external examination, PW1 discovered marks of injuries on the neck consistent with blunt force trauma. In her opinion, the cause of death was pressure to the neck. In her evidence, PW1 confirmed that the injuries to the deceased neck was caused by ligature strangulation using a rope or its like. The police did recover the probable murder weapon from the Perodua Viva car driven by the appellant. It was a nylon rope green in colour at both end tied with a piece of wood (P29A). This can be seen in photograph marked as P25(13) at page 89 Appeal Record Volume 3A. [20] Applying the guiding principles in Tham Kai Yau [supra], we are of the view that the learned JC had come to the right decision that the appellant had the intention to cause the death or any bodily injury as is likely to cause death to the deceased. It is most probable that the rope as in photograph P25(13) was used to strangulate the neck of the deceased eventhough no DNA of either the appellant nor the deceased were found on it. This can be explain due to the lapse of time by the time when it was recovered by the police. [21] We disagree with the learned counsel’s argument that the sexual encounter was consensual. Nothing was established to show that it was so. Whereas on the other hand, there was evidence of motive by the appellant to force himself on the deceased which was evidenced from the fact that the deceased was taken to the hotel in the weak state and under the influence or spelt of something. From the appellant’s own mouth, the deceased went to see the appellant not to have sex but to confide with him about her having a problem with her fiancé. In fact the rope recovered from Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 11 the Perodua Viva car showed that the murder was pre meditated by the appellant. [22] It was true that the appellant did asked PW6 and PW6 friends’ help to carry the deceased but just for the purpose of bringing down the deceased from the room on the first floor as the appellant himself on his own cannot lift the deceased due to her weight. The appellant had indicated that he wanted to seek medical treatment for the deceased. Eventhough PW6 suggested that the appellant took the deceased to the clinic next door, the appellant declined as he knew that the deceased had already dead. Instead the appellant asked PW17 about the nearest hospital. The appellant was told that Hospital Putrajaya was the nearest hospital yet the appellant did not take her to that hospital. Instead the appellant said he want to take the deceased to Kuantan Hospital. This was very illogical and shows that the appellant knew that the deceased was already dead at that time. [23] All these had been considered by the learned JC in his judgment which we reproduce in extenso: “[37] Berpandukan kepada nas undang-undang di atas, mahkamah dapati cebisan keterangan ikut keadaan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan memadai dan mematuhi ujian yang dinyatakan dalam nas-nas yang dirujuk. Terdapat keterangan yang jika disimpulkan mencukupi untuk membuktikan penglibatan OKT dalam pembunuhan ini. [38] Keterangan Ikut Keadaan ialah seperti berikut:

(ii) SP17 mengesahkan OKT mendaftar masuk dengan si mati. Semasa daftar masuk si mati masih boleh berjalan tetapi perlahan-lahan seperti orang sakit;

(iii) SP6 dan SP17 mengesahkan si mati diangkat keluar dari hotel dan masuk ke dalam kereta Viva dipandu oleh OKT meninggalkan hotel berkenaan;

(iv) SP17 mengesahkan semua tetamu perlu mendaftar masuk sebelum dibenarkan masuk ke bilik;

(vi) Pada malam kejadian tidak ada orang lain masuk ke dalam hotel atau bilik kecuali tetamu;

(vii) SP17 mengatakan hanya terdapat satu pintu masuk dan satu tangga untuk naik ke tingkat atas;

(viii) SP17 mengatakan OKT tidak pernah memaklumkan kepadanya ada orang lain yang masuk ke biliknya menyerang si mati atau menyerangnya;

(ix) OKT tidak pernah memberitahu SP19 dia atau si mati diserang semasa berada dalam bilik No. 209 jika benar kematian si mati disebabkan oleh orang lain;

(xi) Terdapat DNA si mati yang dijumpai dalam vagina si mati dan pada pakaian OKT;

(xii) Keterangan SP6, SP17 dan SP18 disokong oleh rakaman CCTV yang menunjukkan dengan jelas rentetan atau naratif peristiwa yang berlaku dari mula OKT masuk ke hotel itu untuk daftar masuk sehinggalah OKT keluar meninggalkan hotel bersama si mati dengan menaiki kereta Viva. Rakaman video dengan jelas menunjukkan OKT memimpin si mati naik ke tingkat 1 melalui tangga dan kemudiannya rakaman menunjukkan si mati telah diangkat, dibawa turun ke bawah dan dimasukkan ke dalam kereta; dan

(xiii) Pasukan forensik telah menemui satu tali (P29A) di dalam kereta Viva yang ditemui di bahagian alas kaki di bahagian pemandu. Laporan DNA menunjukkan tiada DNA dikesan pada kesatan surih pada tali tersebut, namun daripada keterangan SP1 sewaktu memeriksa keadaan leher si mati tidak menolak kemungkinan tali itu digunakan untuk menjerut mangsa. Di dalam gambar bedah siasat dapat menjelaskan kecederaan yang dialami di bahagian leher si mati. SP1 mengatakan bahagian dalaman leher si mati seperti manual strangulation. Lebam-lebam yang dialami si mati menunjukkan tali nylon (P29A) adalah konsisten dengan kecederaan si mati di bahagian leher. [39] Mahkamah berpendapat walaupun P29A tidak dapat dibuktikan telah digunakan untuk menjerut leher si mati (di mana dinafikan) kerana tidak ada kesan DNA pada tali tersebut mahkamah berpendapat ketiadaan tali atau wayar atau kain kasar tidak akan menjejaskan pembuktian kes pendakwaan. Dalam kes Mahadzir Yusof & Anor v PP [2010] 1 LNS 1258 mahkamah memutuskan: Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 14 “The evidence clearly showed the cause of death was due to a blunt object possibly the wooden baseball bat which was never recovered. However this does not mean that without the murder weapon an otherwise solid case will result in an acquittal. This would mean that all criminals will getaway scott free due to the non production of the murder weapon.” [40] Kesemua keterangan ini menunjukkan OKT berpeluang untuk melakukan jenayah itu memandangkan dia ada bersama dengan si mati hampir pada setiap masa. Keterangan itu juga menunjukkan OKT adalah orang yang terakhir dilihat bersama dengan si mati di hotel dan juga di tempat kemalangan. Dalam kes Ahmad Najib bin Aris v PP [2009] 2 MLJ 613, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut: “[45] It must be noted that the appellant had the opportunity to have committed the crime (see s 7 illustration (c) of the Evidence Act 1950). The evidence of opportunity in this case has been supplemented by proof of circumstances of such a nature as to lead to the inference that it was probable that advantage would be taken by the appellant of the opportunity (see Aziz bin Muhamad Din v PP [1966] 5 MLJ 473. The evidence adduced by the prosecution showed that the appellant was seen together with the deceased by the prosecution witnesses PW4, PW5 and PW12 through the sequence of events taking place at the various locations.” [41] OKT sendiri telah mengakui dalam laporan polisnya (P112) yang dibuat pada 26.7.2017 bahawa si mati telah mati. Dalam P112, OKT mengatakan seperti berikut: “Pada 18/7/2015 saya memandu motokar no. CCT 9269 jenis Perodua Viva bersama dengan satu mayat yang dikenali Noor Salwana binti Wahab dalam perjalanan dari Hospital Putrajaya menuju ke Terengganu …” Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 15 [42] Keterangan ini membuktikan pengakuan OKT bahawa beliau telah tahu si mati telah mati. Pengakuan ini telah dibuat secara sukarela oleh OKT semasa dia membuat laporan polis dan semesti ianya benar. Oleh itu OKT boleh disabitkan atas pengakuan itu sahaja walaupun pengakuan itu ditarik balik, Sinaraju v PP [1960] 1 LNS 126, Sathidas v PP [1970] 1 LNS 142, Juraimi Husin v PP [1998] 2 CLJ 383. Dalam kes Juraimi Husin [supra], Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: “Lastly, we accept as settled law that once a confession is admitted in evidence an accused person may be convicted solely on its strength.” [43] Selanjutnya OKT mengatakan dalam laporan polisnya dia dan si mati dalam perjalanan dari Hospital Putrajaya. Walau bagaimanapun, semakan oleh SP19 mendapati maklumat ini adalah tidak benar. P114 iaitu surat dari Hospital Putrajaya mengesahkan mereka tidak pernah menerima pesakit bernama Noor Salwana binti Wahab. Laporan polis ini menunjukkan OKT berbohong dan tidak ada sebab untuk beliau berbuat demikian kecuali untuk melindungi dirinya daripada jenayah pembunuhan. [44] Dalam kes Syed Ali bin Syed Abdul Hamid & Anor v PP [1982] CLJ Rep 340 Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: “In other jurisdiction a false statement made by an accused person concerning the surrounding circumstances in which an offence was committed whilst he had an opportunity to commit the offence can be regarded as a corroboration of the evidence against him. Eade v The King [1924] 34 CLR 154 and also Regina v Lucas [1981] 3 WLR 120 also R v Tripodi [1961] V.R 186. We accept the decisions in these cases to be good law. In this case we hold that the representation he made to PW4 regarding the purpose of borrowing the car was a deliberate lie and is therefore a Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 16 corroborative evidence against him for which he must explain. Such lie is a reflection of his consciousness of guilt as regards the use he intended to make of the car in question.” [45] Di samping itu tindakan OKT yang tidak menghantar si mati untuk mendapatkan rawatan di Hospital Putrajaya membuktikan dia telah tahu si mati telah mati. [46] Setelah menimbangkan dengan teliti keseluruhan keterangan, mahkamah tidak ada keraguan OKT merupakan orang yang terakhir berada dengan OKT di hotel dan di dalam kereta. Berdasarkan kepada keterangan hanya satu kesimpulan yang boleh dibuat iaitu OKT yang telah menyebabkan kecederaan iaitu dengan menjerut leher yang pada lazimnya boleh menyebabkan kematian kepada si mati, Mohd Bakri bin Belaho v PP [2008] 1 MLJ 190 MR. Justeru itu pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan elemen (iii) pertuduhan. [47] Oleh yang demikian di akhir kes pendakwaan mahkamah memutuskan pihak pendakwa raya telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap OKT dan dia telah dipanggil membela diri di atas pertuduhan. OKT memilih memberi keterangan pembelaan secara bersumpah.” [24] In cases where the evidence is wholly circumstantial as in the present appeal, the learned JC have to consider not only strength of each individual strand of evidence but also whether the combined strength of these strands when twisted together is sufficient to make a rope strong enough to hang the appellant (see Chan Chwen Kong v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 22). [25] In Magendran Mohan v. PP [2011] 1 CLJ 805; [2011] 6 MLJ 1, the Federal Court in dealing with circumstantial evidence had this to say: Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 17 “[10] The mode of evaluating circumstantial evidence has been stated by the Supreme Court of India in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and another v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 343 as follows: “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance by fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstance should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” [26] We are of the view that the learned JC had adequately considered in totality all the evidence and was satisfied that the prosecution had proved the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. We as the appellate court should be slow to disturb the finding of facts of the learned JC. We are satisfied that the learned JC committed no appealable errors and was therefore not wrong in convicting the appellant on the murder charge under section 302 of the Penal Code. Conclusion [27] Based on the above reasons, we find no merit in the appellant’s appeal. The conviction was safe and amply supported by the evidence on record. The appeal was dismissed. Conviction and sentence of the High Court was affirmed. Criminal Appeal No: C-05(M)-501-10/2018 18 Dated: 1 November 2019 signed (KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel For the Appellant: Dato’ N. Sivananthan Jay Moy (with him) Messrs Sivananthan For the Respondent: Samihah Rhazali Deputy Public Prosecutor Attorney General’s Chambers Putrajaya