Norliah Binti A P Kunhibava v 1. ) Mohd Noor Amin Bin Mohd Noor Khan (WA-28NCC-114-01/2025)

MOHD NOOR AMIN BIN MOHD NOOR KHAN (NRIC No.: 690319-10-5439)

SHARIZA BINTI KAMARUZZAMAN (NRIC No.: 690322-10-5982)

NUR JASNI BIN MOHAMED (NRIC No.: 721202-14-5161)

NUEMERA (M) SDN BHD (Company No.: 689575-W) …RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

These Grounds concern a Petition (Encl 1) filed by the Petitioner to wind up the 4th Respondent (“Nuemera”) under section 465(1)(f) and/or (h) of the Companies Act 2016 (“CA 2016”). The section (as material) provides: “465. Circumstances in which company may be wound up by

The Court may order the winding up if— …

the directors have acted in the affairs of the company in the directors' own interests rather than in the interests of the members as a whole or acted in any other manner which appears to be unfair or unjust to members; …

the Court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company be wound up;”. 3 2. The Petitioner submits that the Court may order the winding-up of a company under section 465(1)(f) and (h) where there is gross financial mismanagement, including drastic increases in administrative expenses and excessive management fees. It relies on Lim Geok Kee v Ong Hiap Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 422.

All references to sections are with reference to CA 2016.

The Contents of these submissions are as out below. Contents Para No INTRODUCTION 1-5 BACKGROUND FACTS 6-23 THE INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS 24 Encl 9 25-26 Encl 13 27 Encl 19 28 Encl 62 29 Encl 71 30 Encl 99 Chronology 31-32 The ‘Batting Order’ 33-35 THE ISSUES 36-37 The Sequencing of Encl 9 & Encl 13 38-48 The Sequencing of Encls 9, 62 & 71 49-55 CONCLUSION 56

These Grounds deal with the order in which various interlocutory applications filed in the Petition were to be heard.

The Petition against Nuemera is predicated on three (3) grounds:

loss of substratum – falling under the just and equitable limb;

breakdown of relationship of trust and confidence – also falling under the just and equitable limb;

the directors have acted in their own interests rather than in the interest of the members as a whole or acted in a manner which is unfair or unjust to the Petitioner.

The accounts of Nuemera from 2014 to 2022 recognise that its business was the provision of services for mobile telecommunication devices.

Nuemera’s principal activity was running a project known as the PCBS Solution, which was a contract between Nuemera and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (“MCMC”), whereby Nuemera was appointed to build, operate and manage a nationwide blocking service for lost or stolen mobile phones.

The PCBS Solution came to an end upon the suspension of the Project by MCMC.

Disputes arose. Nuemera succeeded in the arbitration against MCMC and was awarded RM113,257,500.00 together with interest at 5% per annum. By end October 2022 and pursuant to the arbitration award, Nuemera received approximately RM137 million which included approximately RM24 million in late payment interest.

The Petitioner claims that trouble started when Nuemera received these monies. The relationship between the shareholders began to unravel. Unsurprisingly, issues such as declarations of dividends arose.

However, in March 2023, RM93.25 million out of the monies received was transferred to Nuemera’s solicitors, Messrs Zaid Ibrahim Sufflan TH Liew (“ZIST”). Incidentally, ZIST are the solicitors on record for Nuemera and the Respondents in this Petition, and Mr. TH Liew, a partner in ZIST, appears as Counsel.

The Petitioner claims that a large portion of these monies were rapidly dissipated out of ZIST. Over RM16 million (purportedly as legal fees) was paid to ZIST itself and its associate in Singapore, Niru & Co. The payments to ZIST were for invoices issued by ZIST, see in Schedule A of the Petition. Payments towards the ZIST invoices were directly deducted from ZIST’s client account. These are set out in Schedule B of the Petition. The misapplication of funds was only part of complaints of misdeeds, see Petitioner’s Reply Submissions at paras 17 to

A further RM17.5 million was transferred to a law firm known as T.L. Chen & Co. as “Consultancy charges”.

The Petitioner challenges these ‘payments’ as exorbitant and improper.

Further, a payment of RM3,585,772.38 used to pay off Amin’s personal housing loan is also said to be improper. Similarly, a declaration of director’s fees and other emoluments in excess of RM16 million (with RM12 million thereof to be paid to Amin himself) is hotly disputed. As was the large expenditure by Nuemera.

In the end, the Petitioner claims that from the RM93.25 million deposited with ZIST on 28.3.2023, what remains as at 7.8.2024 are only the sums of RM82,757.32 and RM1,359,073.32. The latter is retained due to ZIST’s undertaking given in respect of a judgment by a creditor.

All this was reflected in a summary of ZIST’s client account in Maybank.

Particular attention was drawn to ZIST’s invoices for legal fees, which are criticised as over-inflated.

An example cited are the fees paid for ‘Suit 29’, a suit against six (6) government agencies for the tort of misfeasance in public office. The suit was commenced on 29.3.2023 and was withdrawn on 31.7.2023. The total fees invoiced and paid was RM1,064,096.83 over a span of two (2) months from 25.5.2023 to 25.7.2023. This is set out in para 156 of the Petition. All that ZIST did, it is alleged, was to file a six (6) page affidavit on 20.7.2023.

A second example are the fees in ‘Suit 138’ filed on 25.3.2023 against five (5) Defendants, again, for misfeasance in public office. It is alleged that invoices issued from 25.5.2023 to 24.7.2024 were for a total of at least RM1,833,350.99.

The claim is that there have been clear wrongful if not fraudulent acts, see Petitioner’s Reply Submissions which include the misapplication of funds, and in particular at para 19.13 for payments of Nuemera’s funds out of ZIST clients’ account.

Mr. Liew submits that all payments from the RM93.25 million deposited with ZIST and in particular, the fees for Suit 129 of RM1,064,096.83 are justifiable.

This, of course, is for the merits.

The focus of these Grounds are the interlocutory applications. These are as follows.

The Petitioner filed an application for, inter alia, the appointment of interim liquidators (“IL”) over Nuemera (“Encl 9”) pending disposal of the Petition. The proposed liquidators are Dato’ Jeyaraj a/l V. Ratnaswamy and Ralph Ravin Ratnaswamy of MustaphaRaj Insolvency PLT.

The application to appoint the IL is predicated on the third ground, i.e., the directors’ alleged misdeeds and breaches of duty. It includes the misapplication of funds from ZIST’s clients’ account.

The Respondents filed an application to, inter alia, strike out the Petition (“Encl 13”).

The Respondents filed an application for, inter alia, an ad interim stay of Encl 9 and the advertisement of the Petition (“Encl 19”).

The Respondents filed an application (“Encl 62”) to expunge three (3) affidavits filed without leave by the Petitioner on 4.4.2025 (“the 3 Affidavits”), which were allegedly filed in response to Encl 13.

Encl 62 was met with an application (“Encl 71”) to admit the 3 Affidavits.

In short, I ruled that Encl 9 was to be heard first. The Respondents filed an Appeal (“the Appeal”). This was followed by Encl 99 which was filed to stay Encl 9 pending the hearing of the Appeal.

A detailed chronology of events (which may be repetitive of events already stated) was prepared by the Respondents and amended by the Petitioner. After reading the Submissions of the parties, I settled the chronology on the terms set out below. Chronology Date Events 1.

23.1.2025 The Petitioner filed the Winding-Up Petition against the Respondents.

2.

24.1.2025 The Petitioner filed a Summon-in-Chambers for, inter alia, the appointment of the IL over Nuemera (Encl 9).

3.

27.01.2025 The Petitioner served the Winding Up Petition on the Respondents. The Petitioner concurrently served Encl 9.

4.

13.02.2025 The Respondents filed a Summons-in-Chambers to strike out the Petition (Encl 13).

5.

14.02.2025 The Respondents’ solicitors served Encl 13 on the Petitioner’s solicitors. At the Case Management fixed for Encl 9 via E-Review, the Senior Assistant Registrar (“SAR”) issued directions for parties to file Affidavits in Reply for Encls 9 and 13. Date Events The SAR fixed a further Case Management on 19.03.2025. After the Case Management, the Respondents’ solicitors wrote to the Court to request for a Case Management before me to, inter alia, to address the conduct of the proceedings. On the same day, the Petitioner’s solicitors wrote to Court in response to the Respondent’s solicitors’ letter dated 14.02.2025.

6.

20.02.2025 The Respondents’ solicitors wrote to Court in response to the Petitioner’s solicitors’ letter dated 14.02.2025.

7.

21.02.2025 The Respondents filed a Summons-in-Chambers for, amongst others, an ad interim stay of the advertising and gazetting of the Petition as well as Encl 9, pending the determination of Encl 13 (Encl 19). The Respondents’ solicitors also issued a letter to the Petitioner’s solicitors giving express Date Events notice that contempt proceedings would be initiated if the orders sought in Encl 19 were frustrated. Specific reference was made to Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v. Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241.

8.

27.02.2025 At the Case Management via E-Review, the SAR issued directions for parties to file Affidavits for Encl 19. The SAR fixed a further Case Management on 19.03.2025.

9.

03.03.2025 The Respondents’ solicitors wrote to Court requesting that Encl 19 be heard on an urgent basis.

06.03.2025 At the Case Management via E-Review, the SAR issued directions for parties to file and exchange Submissions by 26.3.2025 and Submissions in Reply by 2.4.2025. The SAR fixed a Hearing date on 09.04.2025 for Encls 9, 13 and 19.

Events

31.03.2025 Petitioner filed Submissions for Encls 9, 13 and 19. Respondents filed Submissions for Encl 13.

01.04.2025 Respondents filed Submissions for Encls 9 and 19.

03.04.2025 The Petitioner’s solicitors contacted the Respondents’ solicitors to propose an extension of time until 07.04.2025 to file and exchange Reply Submissions. The Respondents’ solicitors consented, and the Petitioner’s solicitors wrote to Court requesting an extension of time.

04.04.2025 The Petitioner’s solicitors, without leave, filed the 3 Affidavits together with a Notice of Intention to use the Affidavits.

07.04.2025 Parties filed and exchanged Submissions in Reply for Encls 9, 13 and 19.

Events

08.04.2025 The Respondents’ solicitors filed a Summons-in-Chambers to expunge the 3 Affidavits (Encl 62).

09.04.2025 At the Hearing before me, I directed the parties to refile submissions for Encl 9 only, and fixed a Case Management on 17.04.2025 to give further directions for the Hearing of Encls 9, 13 and 19. I would then decide whether to hear Encl 9 first.

15.4.2025 The Petitioner’s solicitors filed fresh submissions in respect of Encl 9.

17.04.2025 The Respondents’ solicitors filed an Aide Memoire. At the Case Management before me via Zoom, I decided to hear Encl 9 first, before the Respondents’ Striking Out in Encl 13. I also indicated that I would also hear the Respondents’ Application for an ad interim Stay (Encl 19). Date Events After the said Case Management, the Respondents’ solicitors issued a letter to the Petitioner’s solicitors to once again put them on notice that contempt proceedings would be initiated if the orders sought in Encl 19 were frustrated.

21.04.2025 At the Case Management via E-Review, the SAR fixed a Case Management before me on 5.5.2025 via Zoom.

28.04.2025 The Petitioner’s solicitors filed and served the Summons-in-Chambers on the Respondents’ solicitors for leave to admit the 3 Affidavits filed on 04.04.2025 (Encl 71).

30.04.2025 At the Case Management fixed for Encl 71 via E-Review, the SAR issued directions for parties to file Affidavits in Reply for Encl 71. The SAR fixed a further Case Management.

Events

05.05.2025 At the Case Management before me via Zoom, I fixed the Hearing of Encls 9, 62 and 71 on 29.05.2025.

29.05.2025 At the Hearing before me, I maintained my decision to proceed with the Hearing of Encl 9 first, but this time, before hearing and determining Encls 62 and 71.

30.05.2025 The Respondents filed the Appeal against my ruling on 29.05.2025 to hear Encl 9 first.

13.6.2025 The Respondents filed a Summons-in-Chambers for, amongst others, an order to stay Encl 9 pending final determination of the Appeal (Encl 99).

18.6.2025 At the Hearing before me, I decided to continue with the Hearing of Encl 9. The Respondents’ solicitors served the sealed copy of Encl 99 on the Petitioner’s solicitors.

The events of 5.5.202 and 29.5.2025 are explained further at paras 49 to 55 below.

In short, on 29.5.2025, I decided to proceed with Encl 9 first. Mr. Liew again repeated his arguments that Encl 62 and 71 be heard first. Again, I disagreed and proceeded to hear Encl 9.

The Respondents filed the Appeal.

The main issue is whether I correctly ruled to hear Encl 9 first. In my mind, to determine the ‘batting order’ or the listing of interlocutory proceedings is an exercise of my discretion and mine alone.

AB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 921, the judge at first instance held at paras 27-28 (which was followed by the Court of Appeal): “27 A stay on proceedings may be associated with the grant of interim relief, but it is essentially different. In determining whether proceedings should be stayed, the concerns of the court itself have to be taken into the balance. Decisions as to listing, and decisions as to which cases are to be heard at any particular time are matters for the court itself and no party to a claim can demand that it be heard before or after any other claim. The court will want to deal with claims before it as expeditiously as is consistent with justice.”

Perhaps I ought to add to add a little colour to my rulings on the ‘batting order’. At the Case Management before me on 17.4.2025, the order for the hearing of Encl 9 and Encl 13 was dealt with. The 3 Affidavits, Encl 62 and 71 were not filed nor were in play as yet.

Mr. Liew sought to impress on me that Encl 13 should be heard before Encl 9 as it would fully dispose of the Petition. And further, it would prevent reputational damage to the Respondent by a pending Winding-Up Petition.

I was not in favour of this approach given the nature of the allegations made in the Petition. As explained above, they are based on breaches of directors’ duties and misapplications of assets.

The striking out in Encl 13 would inevitably descend into a trial on affidavits and would delay the Petition. I wanted to deal with the Petition expeditiously and in my judgment, it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to hear Encl 13 first. Three (3) propositions will suffice.

First, a trial on affidavits must be avoided. In Tan Kim Hor & Ors v Tan Heng Chew & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 492, Richard Malanjum JCA (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said (at pages 506-507): “Accordingly, it is our view that it was premature or even presumptuous to make the findings, conclusions and inferences as the court below did when it was only at an interlocutory stage. … One other point that is quite disturbing is the purported conclusions or findings that must have been derived from the materials before the learned judge. Obviously, she must have evaluated the several affidavits filed. But that approach would then be tantamount to conducting a trial by affidavits which should not be the case. Indeed, ‘in the normal way it is not appropriate for a judge to attempt to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit’ (see Eng Mee Yong & Ors v Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212).”

Secondly, a striking out of the Winding Up Petition should also be avoided and the Petition should be heard instead. In Maril-Rionebel (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Other Appeals [2001] 4 MLJ 187, Abdul Hamid Mohamad JCA (as he then was) stated as follows: “As pointed out by my learned brother Gopal Sri Ram JCA, the unhealthy trend is, upon being served with a petition, instead of defending the petition proper at the hearing of the petition, the respondent makes all kinds of interlocutory applications. That would invariably stall the hearing of the petition proper. If the application is dismissed, the respondent would appeal to the Court of Appeal or may even try to go further, further delaying the hearing of the petition … … One of the most abused procedure adopted in winding up proceedings is the application to strike out the petition under O. r. 19 of the RHC 1980 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court. … It is important that the procedure applicable in a writ action should not be incorporated into a winding-up proceeding. It is not meant to be. … it is timely that my learned brother Gopal Sri Ram JCA and this court come out strongly against such practice, which, at the very least is delaying the hearing and disposal of winding-up petitions, which is unfair to the petitioners and clogging the court docket.”

Thirdly, allegations of mala fides or fraud cannot be determined on affidavit without being tested in cross-examination, see Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 5) [1994] 1 BCLC 429 at pp 432 to 433; see also Tay Bok Choon v Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 433 (PC) at p 436, for disputed affidavit evidence.

In my judgment, the decision as to which application was to be heard first would involve a balancing exercise; balancing the interests of the parties in the context of the applications.

As to the choice between Encl 9 and Encl 13, the analysis is to balance the need to protect the reputational risk to Nuemera as against protecting its assets, which may be at the risk of misappropriation.

It seems to be that balance is easily determined. In my judgment, the need to protect the assets of Nuemera by the appointment of the IL (under Encl 9) far outweighs any reputational risk that may be suffered by Nuemera by an extant winding up petition.

As such, I decided that Encl 9 be heard first. The Sequencing of Encls 9, 62 & 71

After the 3 Affidavits were filed on 4.4.2025, Encls 62 and 71 then entered the mix.

At the CM on 5.5.2025 I wanted to fix hearing dates for Encl 9. After Mr. Liew’s persistence, I was prepared to hear Encls 62 and 71 first and then to immediately hear Encl 9.

Mr Liew objected. He maintained that once Encls 62 and 71 were decided, there would be a need for consequential orders and thus Encl 9 could not be heard. This would mean Encl 9 would be further delayed. I was not prepared to allow Encl 9 to be delayed in this fashion. I then fixed Encl 9, Encl 62 and Encl 71 for hearing on 29.5.2025

On 29.5.2025, Mr. Liew again maintained that Encls 62 and 71 should be heard first. He again argued that the status of the 3 Affidavits should be decided first by disposing of Encl 62 (to expunge the 3 Affidavits) and Encl 71 (to admit the 3 Affidavits) before Encl 9 may be heard. The crux of his submission was just the same. That it is only after the resolution of the disputed evidence forming the basis of Encl 9, that Encl 9 could be heard.

It is to be remembered that Encl 9 is the Petitioner’s application. And that the 3 Affidavits were the Petitioner’s affidavits filed for the purposes of Encl 13. Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Ranjit Singh in rebuttal, undertook not to rely on the 3 Affidavits for the purposes of Encl 9. Encl 62 and Encl 71 was therefore rendered moot.

Mr. Liew nevertheless maintained his objections.

I took the view that by the Petitioner not relying on the 3 Affidavits on the hearing of Encl 9, the Respondents would not be prejudiced by the 3 Affidavits. The balance was in favour of hearing Encl 9 first, particularly given the allegations of misapplication of Nuemera’s substantial funds deposited in the client’s account of Mr. Liew’s firm’s clients’ account.

As such, at the hearing on 29.5.2025, I exercised my discretion to hear Encl 9 first.

On 13.6.2025, the Respondents filed Encl 99. This was an application to stay Encl 9 pending the Appeal against my ruling to hear Encl 9 first. In his submissions in response to Encl 99, Mr Ranjit Singh set out a chronology (which is repetitive) to establish a clear motive to derail the hearing of Encl 9, in particular, by having the other applications heard first:

on 13.2.2025, the Respondents’ solicitors filed Enclosure 13 seeking for, amongst others, an order to strike out the Petition and an order for stay of Encl 9 pending disposal of Encl 13;

on 21.2.2025, the Respondents subsequently filed another application (Encl 19) for an ad interim stay of Encl 9 and the advertising and gazetting of the Petition;

during the case management or hearing on 9.4.2025,

17.4.2025, 18.4.2025, 29.5.2025 and 18.6.2025, Mr. Liew repeatedly insisted that the Court first hear the other applications instead of Encl 9;

on 29.5.2025, after I finally ruled that Encl 9 be heard first, Mr. Eugene Raj as supporting Counsel of Mr. Liew, immediately asked for a short adjournment of Encl 9 as he was Counsel dealing with Encl 9 and was feeling ‘feverish’. I denied the request although I allowed the adjournment after Mr. Ranjit Singh finished for the day;

on 30.5.2025, the Respondents filed the Appeal against my decision to hear Encl 9 first. About two (2) weeks after the filing of the Appeal and nearing the next hearing (on 18.6.2025), the Respondents filed Encl 99 on 13.6.2025 for an order to stay Encl 9 until the determination of the Appeal.

Mr. Ranjit Singh submitted that Encl 99 was yet another calculated attempt by the Respondents to obstruct Encl 9, in the face of substantial and compelling evidence that would lead to an adverse outcome on Encl 9. I did not have to go that far although Mr. Ranjit Singh’s arguments had considerable force.

In short, I found that the test for stay of proceedings (in contrast to stay of execution) is as stated by the Federal Court in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak [2019] 4 MLJ 421 following (AB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 921 at paras 29 to 30. The test was stated thus: “[30] In short, the principles distilled from the English Court of Appeal decision in AB (Sudan) are these:

every claimant is entitled to expect expeditious judicial adjudication. The strength of this expectation will be calibrated according to the individual litigation equation;

the judicially imposed delay flowing from a stay order requires good reason;

judicial choreography whereby one case is frozen awaiting the outcome of another is justified for example where the assessment is that the latter will have a critical impact upon the former;

great caution is to be exercised where a stay application is founded on the contention that the outcome of another case will significantly influence the outcome of the instant case (see: R (on the application of AO & AM) at para [23]); and

a stay application will require especially compelling justification in a case qualifying for urgent judicial decision (see: R (on the application of AO & AM) at para [24]).”

Here, there was no good reason within the principles above to further delay Encl 9 by a judicial stay. Indeed, there can be no good reason when Encl 62 and Encl 71 (and the Appeal) will have no bearing on Encl 9 as the 3 Affidavits will not be relied by the Petitioner at the hearing of Encl 9. Indeed, as Encl 9 is plainly urgent, the further need to show the higher standard of ‘compelling justification’ to delay Encl 9, was a fortiori, not met.

Finally, I also took the view that my ruling to hear Encl 9 first was non-appealable within sections 3 and 68 of the Courts of Judicature Act as it was a ruling that did not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties within Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v. Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 2 MLJ 1 at paras 11 and 142. There was therefore no reason to preserve the unappealable Appeal by granting a stay.

I am reminded that sections 3 and 68 are designed to prevent delays in the lower Court by appeals against its every decision. Stays of unappealable rulings would equally defeat that purpose. As such, a lower Court should be entitled to determine that a ‘ruling’ is not appealable rather than being constrained to leave that decision to the appeal Court, see Oriental Steel Pipe Sdn Bhd v United Security Services Sdn Bhd [2025] MLJU 203 at para 24 and cf Kahlong Jewellery Sdn Bhd v Lee Jinn Loong [2024] 10 MLJ 515 at para 25. And thereafter, to prevent unnecessary delays by dismissing a stay pending an unappealable appeal, in limine.

For the above reasons, I dismissed Encl 99. Dated the 18th day of July 2025 ..........................tt............................... YA TUAN SAHERAN SUHENDRAN JUDICIAL COMMISIONER OF THE HIGH COURT HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL 11) (INSOLVENCY 2) HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA Case References: • AB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 921 • Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v. Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 2 MLJ 1 • Kahlong Jewellery Sdn Bhd v Lee Jinn Loong [2024] 10 MLJ 515 • Lim Geok Kee v Ong Hiap Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 422 • Maril-Rionebel (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Other Appeals [2001] 4 MLJ 187 • Oriental Steel Pipe Sdn Bhd v United Security Services Sdn Bhd [2025] MLJU 203 • Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak [2019] 4 MLJ 421 • Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 5) [1994] 1 BCLC 429 • Tan Kim Hor & Ors v Tan Heng Chew & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 492 • Tay Bok Choon v Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 433 (PC) Legislation Reference: • Companies Act 2016 Decision Date: 29th Mei 2025 Counsel for the Petitioner: Solicitors: Ranjit Singh, Elizabeth Lau & Wee Yun Zhen. Messrs. Elizabeth Lau (Kuala Lumpur) Counsel for the Respondents: Solicitors: Liew Teck Huat, Eugene Jayaraj, Sufiah Yusoff, Ong Kang Nyong & Divesh Ramani.