Nuemera (M) Sdn Bhd v Mohamed Shihab Bin Kunhi Mohamed (WA-22IP-43-05/2025)

MOHAMED SHIHAB BIN KUNHI MOHAMED [NRIC No.: 680327-10-6301]

ANUJ SINGH [Passport No.: Z2209484]

MARCUS A/L FRANCIS [NRIC No.: 710722-04-5443]

NORLIAH BINTI A P KUNHIBAVA [NRIC No.: 681124-71-5072]

JAMEEL AHMAD [Passport No.: S9864759]

CIS INNOVATIONS SDN BHD [Company No. 1405878A / 202101005579] S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 2! !

ILRON SDN BHD [Company No.: 1084239K / 201401008161]

TROIKA CONSULT SDN BHD [Company No.: 1412533W / 202101012234] … DEFENDANTS ! ! GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 61 – Plaintiff's Application to Strike Out Portions of the Defendants' Pleadings, Affidavits and Submissions) A. INTRODUCTION [1] Before this Court is the Plaintiff’s application filed via Notice of Application dated 19 September 2025 (Enclosure 61), seeking to strike out and/or expunge certain portions of the Defendants' pleadings, affidavits, and written submissions filed in this action. The application is made pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), (c) and/or (d) and Order 41 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC"), as well as the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. [2] The Plaintiff, (Nuemera (M) Sdn Bhd), commenced this action against eight Defendants for, inter alia, breach of confidence, passing off, breach of duty of fidelity, and conspiracy. [3] It is important to highlight at the outset that the present striking-out application filed by Nuemera does not seek to strike out the entirety of the Defendants' Defence or affidavits. Rather, it is targeted at S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 3! ! specific, identified paragraphs and portions of documents filed by two groups of Defendants, namely:

(a) The 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th Defendants ("the Shihab Group" or "D1, D2, D4, D5, D7 and D8"); and

(b) The 3rd and 6th Defendants ("D3 and D6", being Marcus A/L Francis ("Marcus") and CIS Innovations Sdn Bhd ("CIS")). [4] Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to strike out/expunge the following:

(i) Paragraphs 18 to 20 and 27.2.10 of the Defence filed by D1, D2, D4, D5, D7 and D8 (Enclosure 23);

(v) Paragraph 2.3 of the Reply Submissions filed by D3 and D6 (Enclosure 49). S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 4! ! [5] The Plaintiff's case is that the impugned portions introduce three categories of material that are wholly irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in this action:

(a) References to and reliance upon the winding-up petition in Kuala Lumpur High Court Companies (Winding-Up) Petition No. WA-28NCC-114-01/2025 ("WA 114"), filed by the 4th Defendant (Norliah) and supported by the 1st Defendant (Shihab), to wind up the Plaintiff;

(b) References to the criminal conviction of Datuk Mohd Noor Amin bin Mohd Noor Khan ("Amin"), the Plaintiff's CEO, before the Nepal Special Court; and

(c) Allegations directed at the Plaintiff's solicitors, Messrs Zaid Ibrahim Suflan T H Liew & Partners ("ZIST"), containing allegations of misconduct. [6] The Plaintiff contended that these three categories of material are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(c), and/or are otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(d) of the ROC. Additionally, as regards affidavit material, they are said to be scandalous, irrelevant or otherwise oppressive within the meaning of Order 41 rule 6 of the ROC. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 5! ! B. BACKGROUND FACTS [7] It is necessary to set out the background to the substantive action in some detail in order to properly assess the relevance (or irrelevance) of the impugned portions that the Plaintiff seeks to strike out. [8] Nuemera is a Malaysian company engaged in the business of providing technology solutions and services, including in the telecommunications sector. Its case, as pleaded in the Statement of Claim dated 28 May 2025 ("SOC"), is as follows:

(a) Shihab (D1), Anuj (D2), and Jameel (D5) were employed by Nuemera and, in the course of that employment, had access to Nuemera's confidential information, including proprietary presentation slides, technical know-how, business strategies, and client-related information.

(b) Marcus (D3) had a relationship with Nuemera through associated entities.

(c) Norliah (D4) is Shihab's wife.

(d) CIS (D6), Ilron (D7), and Troika (D8) are corporate entities associated with or controlled by the individual Defendants.

(e) The Defendants misappropriated, copied, and utilised Nuemera's confidential information for their own purposes and S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 6! ! benefit, including to set up competing enterprises and to pitch for business using Nuemera's proprietary materials.

(f) In so doing, the Defendants committed breaches of confidence, passing off, breaches of their duty of fidelity owed to Nuemera, and conspired together to injure Nuemera. [9] Part of Nuemera’s pleaded case involves the Mobile Device Project Management System Project ("MDMS Project") with the Nepal Telecommunications Authority, which was one of the significant contracts obtained by Nuemera during the employment of the relevant individual Defendants. The Plaintiff refers to this project in its SOC to illustrate the nature and scope of the confidential information in its possession which was allegedly misappropriated. [10] The Plaintiff applied for interim injunctive relief (Enclosure 4) on 30 May 2025, seeking to restrain D1, D2 and D5 from disclosing or destroying Nuemera's confidential information, from using such confidential information to procure or conduct any business with any third parties similar to Nuemera's business, and for delivery up of confidential materials. [11] The Defendants filed their respective Defences and affidavits in reply in July 2025. It is within these documents, and the subsequent written submissions and reply submissions filed by the Defendants, that the impugned portions appear. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 7! !

(i) The Winding-Up Petition (WA 114) ! [12] In January 2025, the 4th Defendant Norliah, supported by the 1st Defendant Shihab, filed a winding-up petition against Nuemera in WA-28NCC-114-01/2025. In the said petition, various allegations were made concerning Nuemera's management of corporate funds, including an allegation that RM93.25 million was "mismanaged" and transferred to ZIST. [13] The impugned portions of the Defendants' Defence (paragraphs 18 to 20 and 27.2.10 of Enclosure 23) make extensive reference to WA 114, including the allegations contained in the winding-up petition regarding the alleged mismanagement of RM93.25 million. The Defendants also refer to the timing of the winding-up petition and the filing of the present suit to support a contention that this suit was filed for an illegitimate collateral purpose, namely, to pressure Shihab, Norliah, and others to withdraw the winding-up petition. [14] Similar references appear in the Defendants' Written Submissions (Enclosure 37) at paragraphs 7.2, 9 to 18, and 129–130, as well as paragraphs 7 to 16 of their Reply Submissions (Enclosure 43).

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be." [20] The Plaintiff invokes limbs (b), (c) and (d). [21] The principles governing the exercise of this power are well-settled. I refer to the following authorities: [22] The Federal Court in Joseph bin Paulus Lantip & Ors v Unilever Plc [2018] supp MLJ 15 at [44] – [45] restated the applicable test: "[44] Since O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC is coercive in nature and is exercised by summary process, the court exercises this power with the greatest of care and circumspection and only in the clearest case… This rule is only applicable where, on the face of it, the claim or defence is 'obviously unsustainable'. [23] The Supreme Court in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 held that “it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule and the summary procedure S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 10! ! can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable'. [24] I bear in mind that the power to strike out must be exercised sparingly. However, I note that the Bandar Builder principles and the Joseph bin Paulus Lantip formulation are primarily directed at the striking out of entire causes of action or defences. Where, as here, the application is to strike out specific portions of pleadings and affidavits that are said to be scandalous, irrelevant, or oppressive, the threshold analysis is necessarily different. The question is not whether the Defendants' Defence as a whole is obviously unsustainable, but whether the specific impugned portions are scandalous, irrelevant, prejudicial, or oppressive within the meaning of the applicable rules. [25] This distinction is critical. As the Defendants themselves acknowledge, the law defines "scandalous" in this context as "wholly unnecessary and irrelevant, and not just unpleasant allegations." Limb (b): "Scandalous, Frivolous or Vexatious" [26] The word ‘scandalous’ means wholly unnecessary and irrelevant, and not just unpleasant allegations. The Court of Appeal in Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 192 at [17] held as follows: [16] In examining the defendant’s ground under O 18 r 19(1)(b) ie that the plaintiff’s action ‘is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious’ or (d) ie that ‘it is otherwise S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 11! ! an abuse of the process of the Court’, we are entitled to refer to affidavits. [17] In the context of O 18 r 19(1)(b), the word ‘scandalous’ means wholly unnecessary and irrelevant, and not just unpleasant allegations: Boey Oi Leng (t/a Indah Reka Construction & Trading) v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] MLJU 566; [2001] 4 AMR 4807 (HC). A pleading is ‘frivolous or vexatious’ when it is obviously unsustainable. In the light of the factual background as alluded to above, we are of the view that the action instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant is not wholly unnecessary and irrelevant. Hence, it cannot be said to have come within the scope of the words ‘scandalous, frivolous or vexatious’. [Our emphasis] [27] The recent pronouncement in Ng Poh Hwa v Hijauan Kiara Management Corp & Anor [2025] MLJU 2539 at [28], quoting from SS Motor Century Sdn Bhd v Wawasan Sinar Gemilang Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors [2025] AMEJ 1249 at [16][c], similarly stated: …In the context of limb (b) of O.18, r. 19(1) RC 2012, the word “scandalous” means wholly unnecessary and irrelevant and not merely unpleasant allegations. … The words “frivolous or vexatious” refer to a groundless action of statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. The court has to consider the affidavit evidence adduced by the parties (see Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 192 (CA) and Thong’s case (supra)]; S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 12! ! [28] The words 'frivolous or vexatious' generally refer to a groundless action of statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. In considering whether any proceedings were vexatious or frivolous, one is entitled to and ought to look at the whole history of the matter and it is not to be determined by whether the pleading discloses a cause of action or not. (refer case of Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Chong [2013] 3 MLJ 235). The words ‘scandalous’, ‘frivolous or vexatious’ taken together, therefore mean pleadings or assertions in pleadings which are unsustainable and are groundless, irrelevant assertions without legal basis, made only to vex and annoy. Limb (c): "May Prejudice, Embarrass or Delay the Fair Trial" ! [29] Under this limb, a pleading or averment may be struck out if its retention would prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action. This limb contemplates the practical effect of the impugned material on the conduct of the trial. Material that introduces collateral and irrelevant disputes, or that is calculated to divert the Court's attention from the real issues, may properly be struck out under this limb even if it is not "scandalous" in the strict sense. Limb (d): "Otherwise an Abuse of the Process of the Court" [30] This is a residual category. It encompasses conduct that, while it may not neatly fall within one of the preceding limbs, nevertheless amounts to a misuse of the Court's process. The introduction of extraneous and inflammatory material, designed not to advance any S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 13! ! legitimate defence but to embarrass or oppress the opposing party, falls within this limb. Order 41 Rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012 ! [31] Order 41 rule 6 provides as follows: "The Court may order to be struck out of any affidavit any matter which is scandalous, irrelevant or otherwise oppressive." ! [32] The language of Order 41 rule 6 mirrors the language of Order 18 rule 19(1)(b) to (d). The same principles apply. In Cahaya Ideal (M) Sdn Bhd V Orang2 Yg Mengenali Diri Sbg 'Ponga' (Poongavanam A/L Vadivelu) & Ors [1999] MLJU 125, the Court noted thus: Order 41, rule 6 of the RHC states that the Court may order to be struck out of any affidavit any matter which is scandalous, irrelevant or otherwise oppressive. It goes without saying that an affidavit must be pertinent and material and may be ordered to be taken off the file if scandalous and irrelevant matters are inserted therein (Osmaston v. Association of Land Financiers [1878] W.N. 101; Kernick v. Kernick 12 W.R. 335; Goddard v. Parr 3 W.R. 633; and Cracknall v. Janson 11 Ch. D. page 12). [33] In Sangeet Kaur Deo v Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Malaysia [2019] MLJU 2048 at [12]-[14], the Court explained: S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 14! ! "In determining whether an averment is scandalous, the sole question is whether the matter alleged to be scandalous would be admissible in evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleading which is material with reference to the relief prayed." "If a matter is scandalous but yet relevant to the relief prayed, it may not be struck off." "An averment is irrelevant if it does not relate to the fact in issue of the case at hand; or does not have any bearing to the relief prayed for by parties to the proceedings." [34] These principles establish that the question before me is essentially one of relevance: whether the impugned material relates to any fact in issue in this action and whether it has any bearing on the relief prayed for. If it does not, and if its inclusion serves only to scandalise, embarrass, or oppress, then it ought to be struck out. D. PARTIES SUBMISSIONS

(a) The Shihab Group (D1, D2, D4, D5, D7 and D8) [35] The Shihab Group's opposition to the striking-out application rests on the following principal contentions:

(i) On the collateral purpose argument [36] The Shihab Group submitted that the timing of the Suit and the Injunction Application is telling: the Suit was filed on 28 May 2025, only a few months after the Winding-Up Petition was filed in January S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 15! ! 2025, and just after the Defendants made an application to appoint an Interim Liquidator. They contended that this chronology supports the inference that the Suit and Injunction Application were contrived for a collateral purpose, namely to pressure Shihab, Norliah, and Peter to withdraw the Winding-Up Proceedings, including the application to appoint interim liquidators.

(b) D3 and D6 (Marcus and CIS) [40] D3 and D6 advanced a separate and somewhat narrower opposition to the application. Their principal contentions may be summarised as follows: i. The Plaintiff's application is wholly misconceived and fails to meet the stringent threshold for striking out under Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC and/or Order 41 rule 6 of the ROC. Relying on Bandar Builder, they submitted that the power to strike out is to be exercised sparingly and only in plain and obvious cases where the impugned material is "obviously unsustainable". S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 17! ! ii. The Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support is silent as to which specific paragraphs or portions pertaining to D3 and D6 are sought to be struck out, and discloses no basis or justification directed against D3 and D6. The application is accordingly said to be vague, speculative and procedurally defective. iii. The Winding-Up Petition is unrelated to D3 and D6, having been filed by another Defendant, and therefore bears no relevance to any striking out of D3 and D6's cause papers. iv. As for the reference to the conviction of the Plaintiff's CEO, Amin, in Nepal, D3 and D6 submitted that this arises from the Plaintiff's own pleaded involvement in the MDMS Project with the Nepal Telecommunications Authority and is therefore directly related to the facts pleaded in the SOC. The references to the conviction form part of D3 and D6's defence and explanation in rebuttal of the SOC, and do not constitute improper or irrelevant averments warranting striking out. v. D3 and D6 further submitted, relying on BGMC Corporation Sdn Bhd v MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors [2025] CLJU 82, that a statement is not rendered "scandalous" within the meaning of Order 41 rule 6 merely because it is unpleasant or casts a party in an unfavourable light. E. MY FINDINGS [41] In this judgment, I will endeavour to analyse the three categories of impugned material that the Plaintiff seeks to strike out, namely: S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 18! ! a) References to the Winding-Up Petition (WA 114) b) Amin's Criminal Conviction in Nepal c) Allegations Against Messrs Zaid Ibrahim Suflan T H Liew & Partners (ZIST) Issue 1: References to the Winding-Up Petition (WA 114) ! [42] The Defendants' principal justification for the references to WA 114 is that this suit and the injunction application were filed for an illegitimate collateral purpose, namely, to pressure the Defendants to withdraw the winding-up petition. To support this contention, the Defendants point to the timing of the suit (filed in May 2025, a few months after the winding-up petition was filed in January 2025, and shortly after an application to appoint an Interim Liquidator was made). [43] The Shihab Group further asserts at paragraph 16(a) of their Submissions that it is "an established fact" that RM93.25 million was "mismanaged by Nuemera" and transferred to ZIST, deriving this from the grounds of judgment in the winding-up proceedings. ! [44] I have considered the Defendants' contention with care. However, I find that the references to WA 114 are, in the context of this action, wholly unnecessary and irrelevant, and their inclusion is calculated to prejudice the fair trial of this action. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 19! ! [45] First, the substantive causes of action in this suit are for breach of confidence, passing off, breach of duty of fidelity, and conspiracy. The issues which this Court must determine at trial include:

(a) Whether the information in question (including the presentation slides and related materials) constitutes confidential information belonging to Nuemera;

(b) Whether the Defendants had access to and misappropriated that confidential information;

(c) Whether the Defendants used the confidential information for their own purposes and benefit, including through the corporate Defendants;

(d) Whether the Defendants owed duties of fidelity to Nuemera and breached those duties; and

(e) Whether the Defendants conspired to injure Nuemera. [46] None of these issues has any connection to WA 114 or the allegations contained in the winding-up petition. Whether or not Nuemera's corporate funds were mismanaged, whether RM93.25 million was transferred to ZIST, and whether Nuemera is the subject of a winding-up petition, have absolutely no bearing on whether the Defendants misappropriated confidential information. [47] Second, the Defendants' contention that the suit was filed for a "collateral purpose" does not, even if it were true, provide a defence S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 20! ! to the substantive claims. A plaintiff who has a recognised cause of action, properly pleaded with substantive particulars, is entitled to prosecute that action. The motive of the plaintiff in bringing the action is irrelevant to whether the cause of action is made out: see the principle in Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212, which has long established that the existence of a proper cause of action negates any defence based on alleged collateral purpose. [48] The Plaintiff has pleaded substantive causes of action with detailed particulars. Whether the Plaintiff also has a separate motive is irrelevant to the Court's determination of the issues in this suit. The Defendants' proper remedy, if they believe the suit is an abuse of process, is to apply to strike out the entire action or to stay it. They have not done so. Instead, they seek to introduce the material from WA 114 into the body of the Defence and their affidavits, thereby importing into this action a collateral and heavily disputed controversy that will inevitably delay, complicate, and prejudice the fair trial of the real issues. [49] Third, the assertion that it is "an established fact" that RM93.25 million was "mismanaged by Nuemera" is itself misleading. The allegations in WA 114 are precisely that allegations. They are contested and no final determination has been made. For the Defendants to present these contested allegations as "established fact" in this action not only introduces irrelevant material but does so in a manner that is misleading and prejudicial. [50] I have had regard to the principle articulated in Sangeet Kaur Deo v Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Malaysia (supra) that S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 21! ! where matter is scandalous but yet relevant to the relief prayed, it may not be struck off. However, I am satisfied that the WA 114 material is not relevant to any relief prayed for by either party in this action. It does not go to any fact in issue. [51] The prejudicial effect of the WA 114 material clearly outweighs any probative value. The introduction of this material creates a risk that the trial of this action will be side-tracked into an inquiry about the merits of the winding-up petition, the management of Nuemera's funds, and the circumstances of the transfer to ZIST — all of which are matters properly before the Court hearing WA 114, not this Court. [52] As learned counsel for the Plaintiff had plainly stated “the bottom line is that WA 114 is before another Judge in another Court and he will decide on it in due course in the ordinary way”. I have no reasons to disagree with learned counsel on this point. The Court of Appeal explained the concept of ‘relevance’ in YB Dato' Hj Husam bin Hj Musa v Mohd Faisal bin Rohban Ahmad [2015] 3 MLJ 364 at [9]: Parliament has entrusted the court the role of deciding what is relevant and the discretion for the court to allow the relevant evidence to be admissible. Just because the evidence is relevant does not mean it is admissible as of right. It is usually the case but not necessarily. The jurisprudence is captured in Janab's Key to the Law of Evidence (2014) at pp 224 and 226 as follows: S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 22! ! It is trite that relevancy per se is not the passport to admissibility. Courts often guards jealously evidence which has the characteristics of hearsay elements or opinion evidence to be admitted if its prejudicial effect will compromise the integrity of the decision-making process itself. … What are relevant facts have been defined in section 3. Relevant facts are those facts which render probable or improbable the existence or nonexistence of the fact in issue, because they are connected with the fact in issue. According to section 5 only two kinds of facts may be proved. They are facts in issue and relevant facts. What facts are relevant, are set out in sections 6 and 55. The object of the section is to ensure that irrelevant and unconnected evidence is prohibited from being given in a judicial proceeding so that the court's time is saved and miscarriage of justice is avoided. Facts relevant to the issue have been arranged in the Act in the following order:

(a) connected with the facts in issue as part of the same transaction, occasion, cause effect, motive or conduct, etc.;

(b) admission and confession;

(c) statements of persons who cannot be called as witness;

(d) statements made under special circumstances;

(e) relevancy of judgment;

(f) opinion evidence;

(g) character evidence. [Underlined Emphasis added] S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 23! ! [53] The admissibility of documentary evidence is governed by the Evidence Act 1950 (EA). Evidence that is irrelevant is ipso facto inadmissible. Sections 40 to 43 provide for the admissibility of judgments. There is no provision for the admission of evidence before the Court which has not yet been assessed and reflected in a judgment. Section 5 of the EA states that evidence can only be given for facts in issue and other relevant facts. [54] Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others. [55] Hence, whether Nuemera is being wound up or not, and on what grounds, is not a relevant fact in defence of a claim for breach of confidence, passing off, breach of duty of fidelity and conspiracy. The contents of the winding up papers are therefore irrelevant. The fact that a winding up petition has been adduced to wind up Nuemera, which Nuemera strenuously contests, has no possible bearing to this action. [56] I therefore find that the references to WA 114 in the impugned portions of the Defendants' cause papers are:

(a) Scandalous within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), being wholly unnecessary and irrelevant to any issue in this action;

(b) Liable to prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of this action within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(c); and S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 24! !

(c) Otherwise an abuse of the process of this Court within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(d), as they are designed to divert attention from the real issues and to import extraneous and contested controversies into this action. ! [57] As regards the corresponding affidavit material, I find it to be scandalous, irrelevant, and otherwise oppressive within the meaning of Order 41 rule 6 for the same reasons. Issue 2: Amin's Criminal Conviction in Nepal [58] In addressing this point, learned counsel for the Plaintiff took pains to set out the genesis of the "Amin Conviction" conundrum. In this regard, I can do no better than to refer to the relevant paragraphs of learned counsel's submissions, which run along the following lines: The Conviction Allegation

The Nepal conviction is also wholly irrelevant but raised as a smokescreen to try to disguise the misappropriation on confidential information for which the application for interim relief has been made.

Again, though it is irrelevant we provide context as Amin has attested to in affidavit.

Nuemera had a joint venture project in Nepal with the Nepal Telecommunications Authority (NTA) known as the ‘MDMS Contract’ or ‘MDMS Project’. The joint venture parties on one side were Nuemera, OSI Digital Pvt Ltd (OSI) and Namaste S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 25! ! Global Comm Pte Ltd (Namaste). The joint venture contracted with NTA.

Nuemera was the lead partner of the joint venture. As Amin is the Chairman of Nuemera, he was always the person ultimately in charge of the MDMS Contract.

Amin dealt with matters from a ‘helicopter’, macro level. He hardly dealt with the matters on the ground including running the MDMS Contract.

The persons who were active on the ground, were in fact Shihab, Anuj and Jameel. They dealt with day-to-day matters on which they reported to Amin.

Disputes arose between Nuemera and NTA under the MDMS Contract. These centred on NTA’s failure to pay Nuemera what was due to it under the MDMS Contract.

The non-payment meant, among other things, that certain equipment that was already in Nepal for installation in the MDMS Contract was detained by the Customs Authorities in Nepal.

The MDMS Contract was governed by Nepalese law. It however provides for disputes to be resolved by arbitration in Singapore under the SIAC (Singapore International Arbitration Centre) Rules.

Nuemera therefore appointed Niru & Co LLC (N&C), a firm of Advocates & Solicitors in Singapore, for advice and to deal with the dispute with counsel in Nepal, working with them. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 26! !

While this was ongoing, the Nepalese authorities took the view that there had been possible corruption in the contract selection process. They investigated the MDMS Project and chose to prefer charges against all the parties potentially directly or indirectly involved in the contract, namely NTA and all its employees involved in the contract, Nuemera, OSI and Namaste and their various officers.

Shihab, Anuj, Jameel and Amin were charged in Nepal and asked to appear before the Nepal Special Court to face the Special Court proceedings.

They all agreed not to travel to Nepal to appear at the proceedings as there was too much uncertainty as to how the law there applied.

On the basis that none of them would travel to Nepal and appear at the proceedings, Purna Man, Senior Advocate of the Nepal Bar, and a former President of its equivalent of our Bar Council whom N&C (as instructing solicitors) had consulted and appointed to represent Nuemera in the proceedings, advised that it would be best that even if none of them (Shihab, Anuj or Amin) attended the Special Court in Nepal, a Statutory Declaration should be made for use before the Nepal Special Court.

Senior Advocate Purna Man advised that the Statutory Declaration should give a comprehensive and chronological statement of the involvement of Nuemera and its officers in the project. This would demonstrate that Nuemera and all its representatives conducted themselves above board with no improper or any wrongdoings. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 27! !

The key approach to be made in the Statutory Declaration was that aside from the fact that none of them were engaged in any wrongdoings, it was to set out the facts clearly with all the supporting documents.

In particular, the suggestion that there was corruption with NTA, was inconsistent with the fact of the ongoing dispute with NTA relating to outstanding payments due from NTA.

Surely if there was corruption in which NTA was induced to favour Nuemera, Nuemera would have been paid promptly and not been put in a position where Nuemera would have had to issue a Notice of Arbitration against the NTA. This was well before the prosecution even started.

N&C were well-versed with the facts as they had advised on the prospects of arbitral proceedings against NTA. They were therefore best placed to draft the Statutory Declaration to state the facts of the dispute with NTA based on available documents.

Shihab’s contention therefore that N&C are Singapore lawyers and not qualified to practice law in Nepal is therefore a cynical and intentionally misleading statement. It is also a clear gross oversimplification and misrepresentation of the actual facts. He has also consciously avoided stating that he had been on few conference calls with Amin and the Singapore lawyers. He had not raised any objections to N&C S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 28! !

Shihab, to suit his narrative, makes no mention of Purna Man, Senior Advocate, who was also instructed by N&C in the matter and was working with them.

As Shihab, Anuj and Jameel had on the ground and day to day experience in the MDMS Contract, it made sense that they would sign the Statutory Declaration on a joint and several basis.

This was better than a single Statutory Declaration as each of Shihab, Anuj and Jameel would have the support of each other and the Statutory Declaration would contain what they collectively knew to form a consistent and compelling narrative to clear all of them and Amin and Nuemera. That was the advice of Purna Man, Senior Advocate and counsel for Nuemera and all its officers.

A detailed 200-paragraph draft joint Statutory Declaration was accordingly prepared by N&C on the basis of the available documents. It was vetted by Purna Man, Senior Advocate. It was then sent to Anuj for him to obtain the input of Shihab and Jameel. This was the draft joint Statutory Declaration.

At the time, neither Shihab, Anuj or Jameel objected to signing the joint Statutory Declaration. In any case there was no reason why they would object. It involved no more than putting on record what they know and why none of them or Nuemera was guilty of any wrongdoing.

However, later, particularly after Shihab’s resignation from Nuemera with effect from 1 September 2024, and began to work with the other S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 29! ! Defendants, all three of Shihab, Anuj and Jameel simply ignored the draft joint Statutory Declaration.

However, Amin acted responsibly. He had no alternative but to sign the Statutory Declaration on behalf of Nuemera and its officers, which was then submitted to the Nepal Special Court.

In so doing, he also protected the interests of Anuj, Shihab and Jameel because if Nuemera’s actions were clean and unsullied, they too would be entitled to an acquittal.

Amin did not attend the Nepal Special Court hearing as agreed.

Instead, Purna Man, Senior Advocate, submitted Nuemera’s case based on his Statutory Declaration.

The Nepal Special Court found Amin guilty only because he was and is the Chairman of Nuemera, which was in turn the lead in the joint venture that was involved in the MDMS Contract.

Purna Man, Senior Advocate was surprised by the outcome and is convinced that there is a very good case on appeal to the Supreme Court in Nepal.

Purna Man, Senior Advocate has been instructed to lodge an appeal.

The time for appealing has however not yet begun to run, as no Grounds of Decision (Judgment) has been delivered. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 30! !

A long account has been provided to make things clear.

As with WA 114, there is no relevance of the criminal conviction to any issue in this action.

It certainly has no bearing on whether the Defendants are liable for breach of confidence, passing off, breach of fidelity or conspiracy.

Reference to Amin’s criminal conviction in Nepal is therefore wholly irrelevant, making the reference scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. [59] Based on the above, the Defendants' position on this issue can be summarised as follows:

(a) The Plaintiff itself pleaded the MDMS Project in Nepal in its SOC;

(b) Amin's criminal conviction arose out of the MDMS Project;

(c) The conviction is relevant to explain Nuemera's financial difficulties, which in turn explain the real motivation behind this suit; and

(d) The references to the conviction form part of the Defendants' defence and justification to rebut the SOC. [60] I have considered these contentions carefully and I find them to be unpersuasive. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 31! ! [61] The Plaintiff's reference to the MDMS Project in the SOC was made for a specific and limited purpose that is to illustrate the nature and scope of the confidential information in Nuemera's possession, including the information which was subsequently allegedly misappropriated by the Defendants. The MDMS Project is referred to as an example of the type of work Nuemera was engaged in and for which its confidential information (including presentation slides, technical know-how, and business strategies) was developed and used. [62] The fact that the Plaintiff referred to the MDMS Project does not open the door to every conceivable fact tangentially connected to that project, including the criminal conviction of the Plaintiff's CEO in Nepal. The scope of relevance must be assessed by reference to the issues in this action, not by a chain of association. [63] The Defendants have not explained, with any specificity or coherence, how Amin's criminal conviction is relevant to any issue in this action. Their contention is that the conviction led to or is evidence of Nuemera's "financial difficulties," which in turn explain the motivation for this suit. However I find that:

(a) No particulars have been provided in the pleadings to establish a causal connection between the conviction and any alleged financial difficulties of Nuemera;

(b) No evidence has been adduced in the affidavits to show that the MDMS Project was terminated because of Amin's criminal S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 32! ! conviction or that such termination, if it occurred, was attributable to any financial difficulties on Nuemera's part;

(c) No particulars or evidence have been provided to establish that Amin's conviction contributed to, caused, or was in any way connected to any alleged financial difficulties of Nuemera; and

(d) Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that Nuemera faced financial difficulties, the Defendants have not explained how such financial difficulties would constitute a defence to, or even be relevant to, claims for breach of confidence, passing off, breach of the duty of fidelity, or conspiracy to injure. A company's financial health does not determine whether its confidential information was misappropriated or whether its former employees breached their duties of fidelity. [64] I also find that the Defendants' chain of reasoning that Amin was convicted, which led to the MDMS Project ending, which caused financial difficulties, which motivated the filing of this suit is an exercise in speculative conjecture. Each link in this chain is unsubstantiated by pleaded particulars or evidence. The Court is not required to entertain such conjecture, particularly when it is deployed to import scandalous and prejudicial material into the proceedings. [65] Critically, even if the Defendants' theory were accepted in full, that Nuemera was in financial difficulties and that this suit was motivated by those difficulties, this would not provide any answer to the substantive claims. A plaintiff in financial distress is no less entitled S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 33! ! to protect its confidential information and to seek redress for breaches of confidence than a plaintiff in robust financial health. The motivation for bringing the suit is irrelevant to the merits of the causes of action pleaded. [66] For the reasons stated, I am satisfied that the real purpose of introducing Amin's criminal conviction into these proceedings is to scandalise and embarrass the Plaintiff's CEO and, by extension, the Plaintiff itself. It is a classic ad hominem attack which is an attempt to impugn the character of the person behind the Plaintiff rather than to address the substance of the Plaintiff's claims. This is precisely the type of material that the words "scandalous" and "frivolous or vexatious" in Order 18 rule 19(1)(b) are designed to address. [67] I find the contention by D3 and D6 that the reference to Amin's conviction is "directly related to the facts pleaded in the SOC" because the Plaintiff itself referred to the MDMS Project is, with respect, misplaced. The Plaintiff referred to the MDMS Project in the SOC for a specific and limited purpose that is to illustrate the nature and scope of its confidential information and the types of projects for which such information was developed and utilised. This limited reference does not open the floodgates to every conceivable fact tangentially connected to the MDMS Project, including the personal criminal conviction of the Plaintiff's CEO in a foreign jurisdiction. [68] The principle is elementary: relevance must be assessed by reference to the issues that the Court is called upon to decide, not by a chain of tangential association. As stated in Sangeet Kaur Deo v Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Malaysia at para [14], an S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 34! ! averment is irrelevant if it does not relate to the fact in issue of the case at hand or does not have any bearing on the relief prayed for by the parties. On that score, the conviction of Amin in Nepal does not relate to any fact in issue in this action and has no bearing on the relief sought. [69] I also note the Defendants' reliance on BGMC Corporation Sdn Bhd for the proposition that a statement is not rendered scandalous merely because it is unpleasant or casts a party in an unfavourable light. In the case of BGMC Corporation Sdn Bhd it was held that the test is one of relevance. Where the impugned statements form part of the factual matrix necessary to explain or support a party’s case, they ought not to be struck out. Applying this principle, learned counsel for the 3rd and 6th Defendants submitted that in the present case, the reference to the Plaintiff’s CEO conviction in Nepal is directly tied to his pleaded involvement in the NCIS Technology project with the Nepal Telecommunications Authority—an issue expressly raised in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim. According to learned counsel the conviction was mentioned solely to provide context and justification for the D3’s and D6’s position, not to disparage the Plaintiff. [70] I accept that proposition as a matter of principle. However, the test is not merely whether the material is "unpleasant." The test, as consistently stated in the authorities, is whether the material is "wholly unnecessary and irrelevant." [71] For the reasons I have set out, Amin's criminal conviction is wholly unnecessary and irrelevant to any issue in this action. It is not the S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 35! ! unpleasantness of the allegation that renders it scandalous; it is its complete irrelevance combined with its manifest prejudicial effect. [72] Finally, I find that the prejudicial effect of the reference to Amin's criminal conviction is obvious and significant. It introduces into these proceedings the spectre of criminality on the part of the Plaintiff's principal officer. Such material, if allowed to remain, would inevitably colour the Court's perception of the Plaintiff and its claims, notwithstanding its total irrelevance to the issues to be decided. [73] I therefore find that the references to Amin's criminal conviction in Nepal in the impugned portions of the Defendants' cause papers are:

(a) Scandalous within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), being wholly unnecessary and irrelevant to any issue in this action;

(b) Liable to prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of this action within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(c), given the manifest prejudicial effect of such material; and

(c) Otherwise an abuse of the process of this Court within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(d), being deployed as a smear tactic designed to detract from the substantive issues. ! [74] As regards the corresponding affidavit material (including paragraph 11.1 of Marcus' Affidavit in Reply, Enclosure 22), I find it to be scandalous, irrelevant, and otherwise oppressive within the meaning of Order 41 rule 6 for the same reasons. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 36! ! Issue 3: Allegations Against ZIST [75] The impugned portions of the Defendants' cause papers contain allegations directed at Messrs Zaid Ibrahim Suflan T H Liew & Partners ("ZIST"), the Plaintiff's solicitors. These allegations include, inter alia, the assertion that RM93.25 million was transferred from Nuemera to ZIST, which the Defendants derive from the winding-up proceedings in WA 114. [76] The Shihab Group contends that this is a "necessary and relevant fact" derived from the grounds of judgment of the learned Judge in the winding-up proceedings. [77] D3 and D6, on the other, contended that the allegation was made merely to show a link between the Plaintiff’s involvement with LESB, which is directly relevant to the present suit, particularly since the Plaintiff’s solicitors had undertaken due diligence for the Plaintiff in relation to LESB. Learned counsel for the 3rd and 6th Defendants submitted that such statements do not in any way amount to scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious content warranting a striking out. [78] I have considered the parties submissions on this point. I find that the allegations against ZIST are wholly irrelevant to any issue in this action and are, moreover, made in bad faith. [79] Foremost, the identity or conduct of the Plaintiff's solicitors is not a fact in issue in this action. At the risk of repeating myself, the causes of action pleaded are breach of confidence, passing off, breach of S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 37! ! duty of fidelity, and conspiracy. None of these causes of action turns on, or is even tangentially connected to, the relationship between Nuemera and its solicitors, the quantum of fees paid to its solicitors, or the transfer of any funds to its solicitors. [80] The Defendants have been unable to provide any coherent explanation for why these allegations are relevant. The Shihab Group's Submissions do not provide any explanation at all for these allegations and how they relate to this action. This conspicuous silence is telling. If the material were truly relevant, one would expect the Defendants to be able to articulate with precision how it relates to the issues that this Court must decide. Their inability to do so confirms the Plaintiff's contention that the material was introduced purely to scandalise and embarrass. [81] The contention by D3 and D6 that the allegation was made to show "a link between Marcus and the Plaintiff through LESB" is, with respect, contrived and incoherent. Even taking this explanation at face value, the Defendants have not explained what relevance any such "link" has to the claims of breach of confidence, passing off, breach of fidelity, or conspiracy. A link between a defendant and a plaintiff through a third entity may conceivably be relevant in some contexts, but the Defendants have not identified what context or issue it is relevant to in this action. The explanation, even if it were accepted, does not save the material from being struck out. [82] Further I find that the allegations against ZIST are particularly objectionable because they are directed not at a party to the proceedings but at the solicitors acting for a party. The making of S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 38! ! serious and unsubstantiated allegations against a party's legal representatives in the course of litigation is a matter of grave concern. It has the potential to:

(a) Intimidate and embarrass the solicitors, thereby interfering with the Plaintiff's right to effective legal representation;

(b) Create a side issue or satellite dispute that distracts from the real issues in the case;

(c) Prejudice the fair trial of the action by introducing inflammatory and irrelevant material; and

(d) Undermine the proper administration of justice by importing personal attacks on officers of the Court into the litigation. ! [83] I am satisfied that the allegations against ZIST were introduced into these proceedings not for any legitimate purpose but to embarrass, intimidate, and oppress. This is precisely the type of conduct that Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), (c), and (d) and Order 41 rule 6 are designed to address. [84] The fact that the Shihab Group derives the allegation from the grounds of judgment of the learned Judge in the winding-up proceedings does not make it relevant to this action. A fact may be noted in the grounds of judgment of one case and yet be wholly irrelevant to a different case involving different causes of action and different issues. The source of the allegation does not determine its relevance; its connection to the facts in issue does. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 39! ! [85] I therefore find that the allegations against ZIST in the impugned portions of the Defendants' cause papers are:

(a) Scandalous within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), being wholly unnecessary and irrelevant to any issue in this action;

(b) Liable to prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of this action within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(c); and

(c) Otherwise an abuse of the process of this Court within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(d). [86] As regards the corresponding affidavit and submissions material, I find it to be scandalous, irrelevant, and otherwise oppressive within the meaning of Order 41 rule 6 for the same reasons. [87] For completeness, the Plaintiff also seeks to expunge certain paragraphs from the Written Submissions and Reply Submissions filed by both groups of Defendants. These are paragraphs 7.2, 9 to 18, 80, and 129–130 of the Shihab Group's Written Submissions (Enclosure 37), paragraphs 7 to 16 of the Shihab Group's Reply Submissions (Enclosure 43), and paragraph 2.3 of D3 and D6's Reply Submissions (Enclosure 49). [88] While Written Submissions and Reply Submissions are not, strictly speaking, "pleadings" within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1), the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to regulate the proceedings before it and to ensure that the process of the Court is not abused. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 40! ! This includes the power to expunge from the record submissions that are scandalous, irrelevant, or oppressive, or that constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. [89] The impugned portions of the Written Submissions and Reply Submissions contain the same categories of irrelevant material as the impugned portions of the pleadings and affidavits — namely, references to WA 114, Amin's criminal conviction, and allegations against ZIST. For the same reasons that I have ordered the striking out of the impugned portions of the pleadings and affidavits, I order the expungement of the corresponding portions of the Written Submissions and Reply Submissions. [90] I note, in particular, that the submissions are replete with references to the details of WA 114, including the specific allegation that RM93.25 million was "mismanaged" and transferred to ZIST, which is presented as "an established fact" when it is, in truth, a contested allegation in separate proceedings. Allowing such material to remain in the submissions would be to countenance an attempt to prejudice this Court by presenting disputed allegations as established facts. [91] Before I conclude, I would also address the other points raised by the Defendants in their submissions. Both groups of Defendants rely heavily on the well-established principle that the power to strike out must be exercised sparingly and only in "plain and obvious" cases. They cite the case of Bandar Builder in support. [92] I have fully considered this point. In my considered view the present application is different in nature. It does not seek to strike out any S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 41! ! Defence in its entirety or to deny any Defendant the opportunity to defend the action. It seeks only to excise specific portions of pleadings, affidavits, and submissions that are irrelevant and prejudicial. [93] The threshold for striking out specific portions of pleadings and affidavits that are scandalous, irrelevant, or oppressive is necessarily different from the threshold for striking out an entire action or defence. As stated in Sangeet Kaur Deo at [12], the sole question in determining whether an averment is scandalous is whether the matter alleged to be scandalous would be admissible in evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleading which is material with reference to the relief prayed. This is an inquiry into relevance, not into the sustainability of the defence as a whole. [94] Applying this test, I am satisfied that the impugned material relating to all three categories (WA 114, Nepal conviction, and ZIST allegations) would not be admissible in evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleading which is material with reference to the relief prayed in this action. This is, in my judgment, a plain and obvious case for the exercise of the Court's power under Order 18 rule 19(1)(b), (c), and (d) and Order 41 rule 6. [95] D3 and D6 raised an important point and contended that the Plaintiff's AIS is "silent" as to which specific paragraphs pertaining to D3 and D6 are sought to be struck out, and that this omission is "fatal." I reject this objection as the Notice of Application (Enclosure 61) clearly identifies paragraph 13 of the D3 and D6 Defence (Enclosure 21), paragraph 11.1 of Marcus' Affidavit in Reply S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 42! ! (Enclosure 22), and paragraph 2.3 of D3 and D6's Reply Submissions (Enclosure 49). The paragraphs are specifically enumerated. D3 and D6 were in no doubt as to what was being sought against them, as evidenced by their ability to file substantive submissions in opposition addressing precisely those paragraphs. The fact that the AIS may have elaborated more fully on the Shihab Group's cause papers does not render the application defective as against D3 and D6. The test is whether D3 and D6 had adequate notice of the case they had to meet, and whether they were able to respond substantively. Both conditions are clearly satisfied. [96] D3 and D6 further contend that the winding-up petition in WA 114 is unrelated to them, as it was filed by another Defendant and does not concern or implicate either D3 or D6. To the extent that D3 and D6 do not themselves make reference to WA 114 in their impugned paragraphs, this objection may be well-taken. However, the Plaintiff's application against D3 and D6 is directed at paragraph 13 of their Defence (which relates to Amin's Nepal conviction), paragraph 11.1 of Marcus' Affidavit (which also relates to the conviction), and paragraph 2.3 of their Reply Submissions. My findings on the irrelevance of the Nepal conviction material apply with equal force to these paragraphs. To the extent that D3 and D6's impugned paragraphs contain references to the allegations against ZIST, my findings on that issue also apply. F. CONCLUSION [97] In summary, my findings are as follows: S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 43! ! a) The winding-up petition in WA-28NCC-114-01/2025 and the allegations contained therein have no relevance whatsoever to any issue in this action. The causes of action pleaded are breach of confidence, passing off, breach of duty of fidelity, and conspiracy. Whether Nuemera is the subject of a winding-up petition, whether its funds were mismanaged, and whether RM93.25 million was transferred to ZIST, have no bearing on whether the Defendants misappropriated confidential information or breached their duties. The "collateral purpose" argument does not provide a defence to the substantive claims, and even if it did, the extensive and detailed references to WA 114 go far beyond what would be necessary. The material is scandalous (being wholly unnecessary and irrelevant), liable to prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of this action, and otherwise an abuse of the process of this Court. b) On Amin's criminal conviction in Nepal, the conviction has no relevance to any issue in this action. The Defendants have failed to establish any coherent or particularised connection between the conviction and the issues to be decided. The chain of reasoning advanced by the Defendants is speculative, unsubstantiated, and, even if established, irrelevant to the merits of the claims. The material is introduced for the purpose of scandalising and embarrassing the Plaintiff's CEO, and its prejudicial effect overwhelmingly outweighs any probative value (which is nil). The material is scandalous, liable to prejudice the fair trial, and an abuse of process. S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 44! ! c) On the allegations against ZIST, the allegations are directed at the Plaintiff's solicitors and have no connection to any issue in this action. The Defendants have been unable to provide any coherent explanation for their relevance. The material is scandalous, prejudicial, and oppressive, and its inclusion constitutes an abuse of the process of this Court. [98] For all of the above reasons, I allow the Plaintiff's application in Enclosure 61 in its entirety. [99] For the reasons set out above, I order that the following portions of the Shihab Group's cause papers be struck out and/or expunged:

(a) Paragraphs 18 to 20 and 27.2.10 of the Defence dated 2 July 2025 (Enclosure 23);

(b) The corresponding portions of the Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Shihab on 2 July 2025 (Enclosure 15) that contain material relating to WA 114, Amin's criminal conviction, and allegations against ZIST;

(c) Paragraphs 7.2, 9 to 18, 80, and 129–130 of the Written Submissions dated 13 August 2025 (Enclosure 37); and

(d) Paragraphs 7 to 16 of the Reply Submissions dated 27 August 2025 (Enclosure 43). [100] For the reasons set out above, I order that the following portions of D3 and D6's cause papers be struck out and/or expunged: S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 45! !

(a) Paragraph 13 of the Defence dated 2 July 2025 (Enclosure 21);

(b) Paragraph 11.1 of the Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Marcus A/L Francis on 2 July 2025 (Enclosure 22); and

(c) Paragraph 2.3 of the Reply Submissions dated 27 August 2025 (Enclosure 49). [101] In sum, I make the following orders:

(a) Paragraphs 18 to 20 and 27.2.10 of the Defence filed by the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th Defendants (Enclosure 23) are hereby struck out.

(b) Paragraph 13 of the Defence filed by the 3rd and 6th Defendants (Enclosure 21) is hereby struck out.

(c) Paragraph 11.1 of the Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Marcus A/L Francis on 2 July 2025 (Enclosure 22) is hereby expunged.

(d) The corresponding portions of the Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Shihab on 2 July 2025 (Enclosure 15) relating to WA 114, Amin's criminal conviction in Nepal, and allegations against ZIST are hereby expunged.

(e) Paragraphs 7.2, 9 to 18, 80, and 129–130 of the Written Submissions filed by the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 46! ! Defendants (Enclosure 37) are hereby expunged from the record.

(f) Paragraphs 7 to 16 of the Reply Submissions filed by the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th Defendants (Enclosure 43) are hereby expunged from the record.

(g) Paragraph 2.3 of the Reply Submissions filed by the 3rd and 6th Defendants (Enclosure 49) is hereby expunged from the record.

(h) The costs of this application being RM8,000.00 are payable by each set of the Defendants to the Plaintiff. Dated this day of 5th May 2026. -Sgd-EDWIN PARAMJOTHY MICHAEL MUNIANDY JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER COMMERCIAL DIVISION (NCC 7) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw 47! ! Counsel: For the Plaintiff : Liew Teck Huat together with Ong Kang Nyong, Divesh Ramani and Sufiah Yusoff (Messrs. Zaid Ibrahim Suflan T H Liew & Partners) For the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th Defendants : Gerald Samuel together with Elizabeth Lau and Hugo Ng (Messrs. Elizabeth Lau) For the 3rd and 6th Defendants : Preakas Sampunathan and Adeline Loh Qiao Ping (Messrs. Preakas & Partner) S/N 3oW13yfj30qXY1rujxPbw