what order, if any, ought to follow. D. STATUTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK [13] Two statutory regimes are invoked. In support of the application the applicant has filed written submissions (Enclosure 5) and a bundle of authorities (Enclosure 6). The bundle comprises extracts of the Mental Health Act 2001 the inquiry provisions in sections 52, 53, 54 and 56, and the provisions governing the appointment and management of the estate in sections 57 to 60 and contains no judicial authority. The determination accordingly turns upon the construction of those governing provisions, which I set out before turning to the submissions built upon them. E. THE MINORITY OF THE SUBJECT AND ORDER 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT 2012 [14] The age of majority in Malaysia is fixed by section 2 of the Age of Majority Act 1971, which provides that, subject to section 4, the minority of all males and females ceases at the age of eighteen years. Section 3(2) further provides that, in computing a person's age, the day of his birth is included as a whole day and that he is deemed to have attained the age of eighteen years at the beginning of the eighteenth anniversary of that day. Muhammad Ashraff Hakimi, who was born on 20 April 2009, was therefore sixteen years of age at the date of the accident and seventeen years of age when this application was filed. He will attain the age of majority on 20 April 2027. [15] Order 76 of the Rules of Court 2012 governs the conduct of proceedings by and against a person under disability. By Order 76 rule 1, a person under disability means a minor or a patient. A "patient" is in turn defined as a mentally disturbed person within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2001. The Act, however, does not define or employ the expression "mentally disturbed person". Instead, section 2 defines "mental disorder" and provides that "mentally disordered" shall be construed accordingly, while Part X adopts the expression "mentally disordered person" to denote a person found by due course of law to be mentally disordered and incapable of managing himself and his affairs. The terminology in Order 76 has therefore not been fully reconciled with that adopted in the Mental Health Act 2001 and, for present purposes, the reference to a "mentally disturbed person" in Order 76 is properly read as a reference to a person who is mentally disordered within the meaning of the Act. A "minor" is separately recognised by Order 76 as a person under disability by reason only of age, the age of majority in Malaysia being eighteen years under the Age of Majority Act 1971. [16] Order 76 rule 2 provides that a person under disability may not bring, make a claim in, defend, make a counterclaim in, or intervene in any proceedings except by his litigation representative, and rule 2(3) requires that the litigation representative act by a solicitor. The appointment of a litigation representative is governed by rule 3; in the ordinary case that rule is given effect by the filing of the litigation representative's written consent in Form 188 and a certificate by the solicitor in Form 189 that, among other things, the litigation representative has no interest in the proceedings adverse to that of the person under disability. The Rules of Court 2012, including Order 76, apply of their own force to proceedings in the Sessions Court. Order 76 also contains the machinery by which a compromise on behalf of a person under disability requires the approval of the court, and by which money recovered on his behalf is controlled and administered. [17] Order 76 rule 1A occupies a distinct and limited field. It is concerned only with the jurisdiction of the High Court, pursuant to the Mental Health Act 2001, to grant leave to institute proceedings against a mentally disordered person. Its focus is therefore on the commencement of proceedings against such a person. By contrast, the procedural requirements governing the conduct of proceedings by or against a person under disability, including the requirement that such proceedings be conducted through a litigation representative, are comprehensively provided for by Order 76 rule 2 and the succeeding provisions. F. PART X OF THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 2001 [18] Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001 governs the management of the estate of a mentally disordered person. Mental disorder is defined in section 2 as any mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of the mind, psychiatric disorder or any other disorder or disability of the mind, however acquired. [19] The scheme of Part X is sequential. Section 52 empowers the court, on an application made before it, to order an inquiry to determine whether a person alleged to be mentally disordered is, by reason of that disorder, incapable of managing himself and his affairs. Section 53 requires reasonable notice of the inquiry to be given to the person alleged to be mentally disordered and to the applicant. Sections 54 and 55 provide for the examination of the person and, where the court thinks fit, his admission to a psychiatric hospital for observation. Section 56 requires the court, at the inquiry, to decide whether the person is, due to his mental disorder, incapable of managing himself and his affairs. It is only upon a finding to that effect that section 58 empowers the court to appoint a committee of the person and of the estate, or, where the person is incapable of managing his affairs but is not dangerous to himself or to others, a committee of the estate alone. Section 59 then defines the powers of management that may be conferred upon a committee of the estate; and section 61 concerns which relatives or next-of-kin may attend before the Registrar in proceedings connected with the management of the estate. [20] Two features of that scheme bear emphasis. First, the appointing power in section 58, the management power in section 59 and the attendance provision in section 61 are not free-standing. Each presupposes, and operates only upon, a prior inquiry and a determination under sections 52 to 56 that the person is a mentally disordered person within the meaning of the Act. Secondly, that inquiry is, by design, a process on notice; the Act does not contemplate that a person be declared incapable, and that the management of his affairs be transferred to another, without the safeguards of notice, examination and the participation of relatives for which sections 53, 54 and 61 provide. G. THE APPLICANT'S SUBMISSIONS [21] The written submissions (Enclosure 5) advance two contentions. The first is that Muhammad Ashraff Hakimi is, by reason of the injuries sustained in the accident, incapable in mind and body of managing himself, his affairs and his property. For that the applicant relies upon the medical report dated 10 January 2026 which records a Glasgow Coma Scale of 7 out of 15 on presentation, neurosurgical intervention by way of a right burr-hole and the insertion of an intracranial pressure monitor, and a poor recovery of consciousness on discharge and upon the long-term care assessment dated 24 April 2026, which records a Barthel Index of nil and continuing neurological deficits comprising spastic hemiplegia, hemiparesis, swallowing impairment, loss of speech and cognitive impairment. The applicant submits that sections 52 and 56 of the Act confer jurisdiction upon the court to inquire into and determine whether a person has a mental disorder and is, in consequence, incapable of managing himself and his property; that section 58 empowers the court, upon such incapacity being established, to appoint a committee of the estate; and that section 59 defines the powers of management to be exercised for the patient's benefit. [22] The second contention is that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be appointed. She is, on the submission, the patient's mother and, since her divorce from his father on 15 July 2024, his sole guardian and the person upon whom the daily care of him and of her other children has fallen. The applicant submits that no member of the immediate family objects to her appointment, and that the patient's father, who resides in Perak and is himself seriously unwell, is in no position to undertake the management of the patient's affairs. The purpose of the appointment, she submits, is to enable her to operate the patient's bank account, to meet the cost of his medical and nursing care, to act as his litigation representative in the intended accident claim, and otherwise to preserve and manage his property for his benefit alone. Upon these submissions the applicant seeks the declaratory and appointing relief set out in the summons. H. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Issue (a): The Representation Relief Is Unnecessary Because The Subject Is A Minor [23] The starting point is the legal status of Muhammad Ashraff Hakimi. He is a minor. His inability to conduct litigation in his own name arises, in the first place and independently of his medical condition, from his age. Order 76 rule 1 treats minority as a self-sufficient ground of disability. [24] It follows that the intended accident action must be brought by a litigation representative under Order 76 rule 2. But that requirement is satisfied within the action itself. A minor sues by his litigation representative as of course; the appointment of a litigation representative for a minor who is a plaintiff does not depend upon any prior order of the court. That is put beyond argument by Order 76 rule 3(2), which provides that, save in the cases identified in rules 3(4), 3(5) and 6 none of which arises here - "an order appointing a litigation representative of a person under disability is not necessary." What the Rules require is only that the litigation representative act by a solicitor and that there be filed the litigation representative's consent together with the solicitor's certificate that the litigation representative has no adverse interest. [25] That those requirements can be, and are intended to be, met without recourse to this court is demonstrated by the applicant's own exhibit NBA-3. The draft Sessions Court papers already name the applicant as the first plaintiff's litigation representative and already include the solicitor's certificate under Order 76 rule 3 and the applicant's written consent. Her interest is not adverse to her son's; on the contrary, as co-plaintiff and registered owner of the motorcycle he was riding, her interest is aligned with his. Nothing in Order 76 requires her, in addition, to obtain leave from the High Court to represent him, to make decisions in the conduct of the action, or to sign documents in it. Order 76 applies directly in the Sessions Court, where the litigation representative is constituted. [26] Prayers (c), (d) and (e) are therefore unnecessary. I make clear that their refusal proceeds not from any doubt as to the applicant's suitability she is plainly the proper person to act but from the fact that the orders would add nothing to the authority she already holds under Order 76. A court should not make orders that are without legal utility. [27] I have considered whether the practical convenience of a sealed order, placing the applicant's standing in the Sessions Court beyond argument, might justify granting the representation relief despite its strict superfluity. It does not. The standing of a litigation representative is conferred by the Rules and is not enlarged by a declaratory order to like effect. Two further concerns sometimes advanced in support of such applications the administration of any damages that may be recovered, and continuity of representation should the plaintiff remain incapacitated after attaining majority are real, but neither is answered by the orders sought. The first is provided for by the machinery in Order 76 for the approval of compromises and the control of money recovered on behalf of a person under disability, which operates at the stage of settlement or judgment. The second is addressed below. Issue (b): The Relief Under The Mental Health Act 2001 Is Not Properly Engaged [28] The declaratory and appointing relief in prayers (a) and (b) is sought under sections 58, 59 and 61 of the Mental Health Act 2001. For three reasons it cannot be granted on this application. [29] First, the provisions invoked do not stand alone. Section 58 is the appointing provision; it is exercisable only upon an inquiry under section 52 and a determination under section 56 that the person is a mentally disordered person incapable of managing himself and his affairs. Section 59 presupposes the appointment of a committee of the estate under section 58; and section 61 is concerned only with the attendance of relatives in management proceedings. The applicant's own submissions recognise this structure. They acknowledge, by reference to sections 52 and 56, that it is for the court upon an inquiry to determine whether a person has a mental disorder and is, in consequence, incapable of managing himself and his affairs; and they cast section 58 as the power to appoint a committee once that incapacity has been established. Yet the summons does not seek that inquiry, and none has been held. The appointing, management and attendance provisions are thus invoked while the gateway upon which they depend — the inquiry and determination under sections 52 to 56 — has been neither sought nor undertaken. The committee and trustee appointments sought in prayer (b), and the declaration of incapacity sought in prayer (a), cannot be made in the absence of that inquiry. [30] Secondly, the manner in which the application is brought is incompatible with the scheme of Part X. The summons is ex parte. The Act, by contrast, contemplates an inquiry on notice: section 53 requires notice of the inquiry, sections 54 and 55 provide for the examination of the person said to be mentally disordered, and section 61 requires the court to determine which relatives or next-of-kin may attend. A determination that a living person is incapable of managing himself, coupled with the transfer of the management of his affairs and property to another, is not a matter to be disposed of without notice. The interests of the person himself, and of other next-of-kin here including his father, named in the birth certificate exhibited as part of exhibit NBA-1 are engaged, and the safeguards of the Act exist precisely to protect them. [31] Thirdly, the relief is in any event premature and wider than the facts warrant. The medical reports in exhibit NBA-2 establish, and I accept for the present purpose, that Muhammad Ashraff Hakimi has suffered a catastrophic injury and is presently wholly dependent upon others. But the Acacia Care Centre assessment was prepared to quantify the cost of future care; it is not a determination of mental disorder under the Act, and this application does not invite the inquiry through which such a determination would be made. Further, prayer (b) seeks the management of an estate and of assets owned and to be owned, and casts the applicant as trustee of his harta pusaka. A living person has no harta pusaka; and on the material before the court no existing estate or asset is identified that presently requires management, the only prospective asset being the cause of action and any damages that may be recovered in the intended suit for which, as already noted, Order 76 itself provides. The committee-of-estate machinery is neither shown to be needed now nor properly invoked. [32] For completeness, prayer (a) conflates distinct legal concepts. Registration as a person with disabilities (orang kurang upaya) under the Persons with Disabilities Act 2008, the description of a person as non compos mentis, and the status of a mentally disordered person under the Mental Health Act 2001 are not one and the same, and a declaration rolling them together would lack precision even if the inquiry had been undertaken. I. THE POSITION UPON ATTAINING MAJORITY [33] The applicant's underlying concern to protect her son's interests and to see his claim pursued is legitimate, and nothing in these grounds should be read as discouraging it. It is met, for the present, by the litigation-representative machinery of Order 76. A different question will arise if Muhammad Ashraff Hakimi attains his majority, on 20 April 2027, while remaining incapable of managing himself and his affairs. His disability as a minor will then end, and the footing on which the applicant may act for him as of course will fall away. If his incapacity persists, he will at that point answer the description of a patient under Order 76 and of a mentally disordered person under the Mental Health Act 2001, and the proper course will be an application under Part X of the Act, on notice, in which the question of his mental disorder is determined upon inquiry and, if established, an appropriate committee is appointed and the conduct of the litigation regularised. That is the proper occasion for the relief now sought under the Act; this is not. J. CONCLUSION [34] The application fails in each of its limbs, but for reasons that differ between them. The relief concerning the conduct of the intended action is refused because it is unnecessary: the applicant may bring and conduct that action as her son's litigation representative under Order 76 of the Rules of Court 2012 without any order of this court. The relief concerning the declaration of incapacity and the appointment of a committee and trustee is refused because it is not properly engaged: the provisions of the Mental Health Act 2001 relied upon presuppose an inquiry under sections 52 to 56 that has neither been sought nor undertaken; the ex parte mode of the application is incompatible with the safeguards of that inquiry; and the relief is, in any event, premature and wider than the facts warrant. [35] I should not be taken as deciding any question that does not arise. In particular, I make no finding as to whether Muhammad Ashraff Hakimi is a mentally disordered person within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2001; that question can be answered only upon an inquiry properly constituted under Part X of that Act. Nor do I express any view upon the merits of the intended accident claim, including the manner in which the collision occurred, which is a matter for the Sessions Court. K. ORDERS OF THE COURT [36] Measured against the prayers in the summons, I make the following orders: