Nurzaila Binti Ahmad Suffian v Suhani Binti MD Nasir (JA-23NCvC-15-07/2025)

This is the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 4 and supported by her Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 5) seeking an interim injunction under Order 29 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) to restrain the Defendant, whether personally or through her servants or agents, from harassing, intimidating or defaming the Plaintiff pending disposal of the main action.

Both parties filed Written Submissions and bundles of authorities and made oral submissions before this Court on 16 October 2025. The decision was fixed for today (4 November 2025).

The Plaintiff is the lawful wife of Mohd Fais bin Adan (“Mohd Fais”), while the Defendant is his former wife. The Defendant and Mohd Fais were divorced by khul’ on 13 March 2023 before the Syariah Court in Johor Bahru.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has, since about October 2022, embarked on a course of harassment and intimidation against her, including –

an incident on 16 October 2022 at the Plaintiff’s residence where the Defendant allegedly shouted insults in public;

WhatsApp messages dated 17 April 2023 and 21 April 2025 allegedly containing threats to disseminate semi-nude photographs of the Plaintiff and to defame her; and

Instagram Threads postings between January and May 2025 referring to the Plaintiff by name and making derogatory remarks.

The Plaintiff claims these acts caused humiliation, emotional trauma and psychiatric injury. She annexed a police report (LARKIN/005819/25) and a medical report from Hospital Permai diagnosing Major Depressive Disorder.

The Defendant denies all allegations, contending that the Plaintiff fabricated the claims and that the application is motivated by malice. The Defendant further asserts that the Plaintiff acted unconscionably in her relationship with Mohd Fais prior to the divorce and that this suit is intended to alienate the Defendant’s children from their father.

Based on the established principle in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193, the issue before this Court is whether the Plaintiff satisfies the three-limb test in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John, that –

whether there is a serious question to be tried;

whether damages would be an adequate remedy; and

where the balance of convenience lies.

Having considered the affidavits, the written and oral submissions of both parties, and the authorities cited, this Court applies the principles in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John makes the following findings –

whether there is a serious question to be tried

The Federal Court in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John held that an applicant for an interlocutory injunction must first show a serious question to be tried, that is, a bona fide issue worthy of full adjudication.

The Plaintiff has adduced evidence in the form of WhatsApp messages, screenshots of Threads postings and a police report which, on their face, show a continuing course of conduct directed at her by the Defendant which, if proven, may found causes of action in nuisance, intimidation and defamation.

The Federal Court in Mohd Ridzwan bin Abdul Razak v Asmah bt Hj Mohd Nor [2016] 4 MLJ 282 introduced the tort of harassment into Malaysian law The Federal Court adopted the definition of harassment from Lord Sumption in Hayes v Willoughby [2013] 1 WLR 935 as “a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress”.

The ingredients of the tort, as set out in this case, are –

the existence of a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct;

targeted at another person; and

calculated to cause alarm, fear and distress to that person.

Applying those principles to the present case, the Plaintiff's evidence discloses a pattern of conduct spanning approximately three years, from October 2022 to May 2025. The conduct alleged i.e threats via WhatsApp to disseminate intimate images, defamatory posts on Instagram Threads naming the Plaintiff and an incident at the Plaintiff's residence, is if proven, unreasonable and oppressive. The posts specifically target the Plaintiff by name. The Plaintiff's diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder and the lodging of a police report evidence alarm, fear and distress. These allegations, taken at their highest, are capable of constituting the tort of harassment as recognised by the Federal Court. There is accordingly a serious question to be tried.

Although arising in the context of matrimonial proceedings under s.103 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, the decision in Tee Bee Chin (P) v Goh Swee Por (L) [2018] MLJU 192 is instructive by analogy. In that case, the High Court granted an interlocutory injunction to protect the petitioner from alleged harassment, holding that the existence of a police report supported by contemporaneous evidence such as CCTV footage and medical reports provided sufficient evidential foundation for protective relief, notwithstanding conflicting affidavit evidence. The underlying principle that contemporaneous documentary evidence supports the grant of interim protective relief, is equally applicable to applications under Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012.

The Defendant, relying on the principles in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 and Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 as applied in Saratah a/p Sivalingam v Reetha Ramudoo [2025] 11 MLJ 419, contends that an interlocutory injunction should not be granted on what she characterises as speculative and unsubstantiated allegations. She submits that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any serious question to be tried and that the affidavit evidence discloses no continuing harassment capable of sustaining the relief sought.

In this Court’s view, those authorities do not assist the Defendant on the facts of this case. The Plaintiff’s evidence consists of WhatsApp messages, screenshots of Threads postings and a police report made contemporaneously with the alleged incidents. While their truth is disputed, they are not bare assertions; they provide an evidential foundation sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. The Defendant’s denials therefore give rise to factual disputes best resolved at the full hearing. At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to make definitive findings of credibility, only to be satisfied that the first limb in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John is met.

The Defendant contends that the Instagram Threads account bearing the handle @hanylestary is not hers and further that the account is set to private mode and cannot be accessed by the public. This Court notes the apparent inconsistency in the Defendant's position: on one hand, she denies ownership of the account, yet on the other, she asserts knowledge of its privacy settings. Notwithstanding these denials, the Defendant has not adduced any evidence, such as the identity of the actual account holder or a statutory declaration from the purported owner to rebut the Plaintiff's assertion. At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to make a definitive finding on ownership; it is sufficient that the Plaintiff has raised a triable issue supported by screenshots and contemporaneous evidence.

Similarly, the Defendant denies that the WhatsApp messages sent from the phone numbers 010-888 6760 and +6011-1466 0210 originated from her. As to the first number, the Plaintiff points out that this is a number the Defendant herself has used in prior communications, a fact the Defendant has not convincingly rebutted. As to the second number, which allegedly belongs to a third party, the content of those messages is strikingly similar in tone and substance to those sent from the first number and both sets of messages concern the same subject matter and make similar threats. These factual disputes are matters for trial. For present purposes, the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient prima facie evidence linking the messages to the Defendant such that the Plaintiff has established an arguable case.

The Defendant submits that the alleged incidents occurred between June 2022 and May 2025 and that no harassment was ongoing at the time the application was filed in July 2025. This Court does not accept that a two-month gap between the last alleged incident and the filing of the application negates the need for injunctive relief. The evidence discloses a pattern of conduct spanning approximately three years with the most recent posts on Threads dated 22 May

The cessation of such conduct may be attributable to the commencement of legal proceedings or the filing of the police report, rather than any genuine change in the Defendant's disposition. In Tee Bee Chin (P) v Goh Swee Por (L) [2018] MLJU 192, the Court granted injunctive relief notwithstanding intervals between incidents, recognising that the risk of recurrence justified protective orders. In the present case, the threats to disseminate intimate images remain unfulfilled but not withdrawn and the Defendant has not undertaken to refrain from such conduct. The purpose of an interim injunction is preventive, not merely reactive.

In Synergistic Duo Sdn Bhd v Lai Mei Juan [2017] 9 MLJ 697, the High Court granted an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing defamatory postings on Facebook, holding that the continued publication on social media would cause the plaintiff to suffer “irreparable harm to its reputation which cannot be adequately compensated with damages”. The Court further noted that unlike printed publications, social media postings "can reach any person worldwide" and operate in a “borderless unrestricted environment”. These observations are equally applicable to the Threads postings in the present case.

Accordingly, the absence of an incident in the immediate weeks preceding the application does not defeat the Plaintiff's entitlement to relief.

whether damages would be an adequate remedy

The second limb directs the Court to consider whether damages would adequately compensate the Plaintiff if interim relief is refused. As explained in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 and adopted in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John, if damages would be an adequate remedy, an interlocutory injunction should ordinarily not be granted.

In the present case, the Plaintiff has exhibited a medical report in Exhibit N-4 to her Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 5), confirming a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder. The report records that she is under ongoing clinical supervision and treatment. The Plaintiff attributes the deterioration of her mental health, at least in part, to the Defendant’s persistent harassment and threats to disseminate her semi-nude photographs. Taken together with the pleaded course of conduct and contemporaneous police report, the evidence indicates more than transient upset.

As observed by the Federal Court in Mohd Ridzwan bin Abdul Razak – “… lowers the dignity and respect of the person who is harassed, let alone affecting his or her mental and emotional wellbeing”.

The harm complained of is emotional, reputational and psychological. In particular, the threat to publish intimate images and the fear of renewed harassment are, by their nature, not amenable to precise monetary valuation. Even if damages could be assessed after trial, they could not fully restore the Plaintiff’s sense of safety or undo the impact of any wrongful disclosure of private images. In this Court’s view, such injury is not adequately remediable by an award of damages.

The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff's psychiatric condition pre-dates their interactions and is therefore unrelated to the alleged harassment. This submission, even if factually correct, does not defeat the Plaintiff's application. It is well established that a tortfeasor takes the victim as he finds her. If the Plaintiff had a pre-existing vulnerability and if the Defendant's conduct exacerbated that condition, the Defendant cannot escape liability by pointing to the prior infirmity. Moreover, the medical report exhibited by the Plaintiff records ongoing treatment and does not suggest that her condition is unconnected to external stressors. At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to determine causation with precision; it is sufficient that there is credible evidence of harm that may be aggravated if no protective order is made.

In the circumstances, this Court is satisfied that damages would not be an adequate remedy were the injunction to be refused. The second limb in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John is therefore met.

where the balance of convenience lies

As to the third limb, the Defendant contends that the grant of an injunction would indirectly affect the children’s relationship with their father, since the children are under her custody and any contact with him is channelled through her. These concerns are relevant to the balance of convenience. However, they can be addressed by tailoring the order so that it restrains only acts of harassment and defamatory publications, without preventing legitimate communication in relation to the children.

This Court accepts that the order must not hinder legitimate parental contact. This Court wishes to make clear that nothing in this order is intended to, or shall have the effect of, restricting the Defendant's rights as custodial parent or Mohd Fais bin Adan's rights of access to the children of the marriage. The injunction is directed solely at the Defendant's conduct towards the Plaintiff. Communication between the Defendant and Mohd Fais concerning matters relating to their children, including but not limited to arrangements for access, education, health and welfare, shall continue unimpeded. The Defendant's submission that the injunction would prevent the children from seeing their father is, with respect, a mischaracterisation of the relief sought. The Plaintiff has not asked for, and this Court has not granted, any order that would interfere with the parent-child relationship.

The Plaintiff’s prayers in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g) target only harassment and defamatory publications. The relief can therefore be confined so as not to impinge on family communication.

As observed in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John, the purpose of an interim injunction is to produce a just result for the period between the application and trial and to maintain the status quo. Hence, this Court is of the view that in this case, preserving the Plaintiff's safety and dignity constitutes the proper status quo.

The potential prejudice to the Plaintiff, ie, further humiliation, mental anguish and reputational injury, to this Court opinion outweighs any inconvenience to the Defendant, who will merely be required to refrain from unlawful or abusive conduct. The balance of convenience thus favours the Plaintiff.

The Defendant urges the Court to deny relief on the ground that the Plaintiff lacks clean hands and has acted with mala fide. Specifically, the Defendant contends that –

the Plaintiff's relationship with Mohd Fais caused the breakdown of the Defendant's marriage;

this application is a tactical manoeuvre to alienate the Defendant's children from their father; and

the Plaintiff has made false complaints to the Defendant's employer.

These submissions conflate moral grievance with legal entitlement. The doctrine of clean hands requires that the applicant must not have acted unconscionably in relation to the very matter for which relief is sought. Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that the Plaintiff's conduct contributed to the dissolution of the Defendant's marriage, such conduct does not confer upon the Defendant a licence to harass, intimidate or defame the Plaintiff. Nor does it disentitle the Plaintiff from seeking protection from unlawful acts.

As for the allegation that this application is designed to obstruct parental access, this Court has already addressed this concern by tailoring the order so as not to interfere with lawful communication concerning the children. The Defendant's assertion remains speculative and unsupported by evidence.

Accordingly, this Court finds no basis to refuse relief on equitable grounds. The Plaintiff has approached this application in good faith, seeking protection from conduct that, if proven, would be unlawful.

The Defendant has also raised, by way of cross-allegation, that the Plaintiff sent an email to the Defendant's employer making defamatory statements about the Defendant, for which the Defendant lodged a police report (No. LARKIN/007975/25 dated 29 May 2025). This allegation, even if true, does not afford the Defendant a defence to the present application. The Defendant's remedy, if any, lies in separate proceedings. It is not for this Court, at this interlocutory stage, to adjudicate on cross-complaints that do not directly bear on whether the Plaintiff is entitled to protection from the conduct complained of in her application.

Based to the above, applying Keet Gerald Francis Noel John this Court finds –

there exists a serious question to be tried;

damages would not be an adequate remedy; and

the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction is allowed in part. The Defendant, whether personally or through her servants or agents, is restrained from –

harassing, threatening or intimidating the Plaintiff, directly or indirectly, through any medium;

publishing or republishing any statement or image concerning the Plaintiff on WhatsApp, Instagram, Threads or any social-media platform that may defame, insult or humiliate her; and

communicating with the Plaintiff personally, save through legal representatives.

This order shall not operate to restrict lawful communication between the Defendant and her former husband in relation to their children.

Pursuant to Order 29 rule 1(2) ROC 2012, this Court also records the Plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages, as affirmed in paragraph 45 of her Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 5).

Cost shall be cost in the cause. Dated : 4 November 2025 -sgd-Dr Noradura Binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Solicitor for the Plaintiff : Ibrahim Bin Hashim Messrs. Hassan Ibrahim & Co. Solicitor for the Defendant : Siti Nur Fadhilah Afiqah Binti Mohammad Ridhuan Messrs. Lydiana Law Chambers