Nusajaya Land Sdn Bhd v Million Impact Sdn Bhd (A72NCVC-812-07/2019)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO.: JA-A72NCVC-812-07/2019 Antara NUSAJAYA LAND SDN BHD …PLAINTIF Dan MILLION IMPACT SDN BHD …DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 2 Pengenalan [1] Ini merupakan rayuan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif yang tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Mahkamah yang diberikan pada 10.2.2020 di mana Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan Defendan di

Lampiran

Lampiran 7 dengan kos sebanyak RM2,500. Lampiran 7 [2] Lampiran 7 merupakan permohonan yang difailkan oleh Defendan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (selepas ini akan dirujuk sebagai “KKM 2012”) untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan Plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (b) & (d) KKM 2012. Fakta Ringkas Tuntutan Plaintif [3] Melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli Pertama bertarikh 24.10.2005 (selepas ini akan dikenali sebagai “perjanjian pertama”) Plaintif telah menjual sebuah hartanah yang dikenali sebagai Lot No. 457 yang dipegang di bawah Hakmilik GRN 393755, Lot 88290, Mukim Pulai, Daerah Johor Bahru (selepas ini akan dikenali sebagai “hartanah tersebut”) kepada Tey Peng Huat. [4] Hartanah tersebut kemudiannya dibeli oleh Teraju Karisma Sdn Bhd dari pembeli pertama melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 1.11.2010 (selepas ini akan dikenali sebagai “perjanjian kedua”) [5] Defendan dalam tindakan ini kemudiannya telah membeli hatanah tersebut dari Teraju Karisma Sdn Bhd melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 22.4.2011. (selepas ini akan dirujuk sebagai “perjanjian 3 ketiga” tersebut). Menurut Plaintif beradasarkan klausa 13(b) perjanjian ketiga tersebut Defendan mempunyai obligasi kontraktual untuk membayar caj-caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaran hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif. Hujahan Plaintif [6] Klausa 27 perjanjian pertama memperuntukkan Defendan adalah “subsequent purchaser” yang mempunyai obligasi kontraktual untuk membayar caj-caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaran hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif. [7] Selain itu, berdasarkan klausa 13 (b) perjajian ketiga tersebut, Defendan bersetuju untuk membayar segala caj-caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaran hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif. [8] Defendan mempunyai pegetahuan penuh bahawa hartanah tersebut diselia dan diselenggara oleh Plaintif dari semasa ke semasa dan Defendan diwajibkan untuk membayar caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaraan. Alasan Permohonan Defendan/Hujahan Defendan [9] Defendan tidak pernah menandatangani apa-apa perjanjian dengan Plaintif. [10] Defendan telah membeli hartanah tersebut melalui perjanjian bertarikh 22.4.2011 dengan Teraju Karisma Sdn Bhd (perjanjian ketiga). 4 [11] Tiada sebarang peruntukan di dalam perjanjian ketiga yang mempertuntukkan apa-apa obligasi kontraktual kepada Defendan untuk membayar caj-caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaran kepada Plaintif. [12] Defendan tidak terikat dengan terma “successors in title” kerana Defendan tidak mempunyai apa-apa obligasi kontraktual dengan Plaintif. [13] Hartanah tersebut tidak tergolong dalam di bawah Akta Hakmilik Strata 1985/ Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013. [14] Tiada “privity of contract” di antara Plaintif dan Defendan. Analisis dan Dapatan Mahkamah [15] Undang-undang mengenai kuasa budi bicara Mahkamah di dalam pembatalan tindakan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (A. 18 k. 19) KKM 2012 adalah jitu dan mantap. Terlalu banyak otoriti yang telah membincangkan dan memutuskan prinsip-prinsip pemakaian kuasa budi bicara mahkamah di bawah A. 18 k. 19 ini. [16] Kes “landmark” adalah kes Mahkamah Agong, Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7 di mana Mohamed Dzaiddin bin Hj Abdullah SCJ menyatakan bahawa: The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson 5 [1899] 1 QB 86, p. 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable" (Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N.W. Ry. Co. [1892] 3 Ch. 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 (which is in para materia with our O. 33 r. 2 Rules of the High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable... ....This Court as well as the Court below are not concerned at this stage with the respective merits of the claims. But what we have to consider is whether the counterclaim discloses some cause of action and, likewise, whether the defence to counterclaim raises a reasonable defence. It has been said that so long as the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some question fit to be decided by the Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out (Moore v. Lawson [1915] 31 TLR 418 CA); (Wenlock v. Moloney) (supra). 6 [17] Di dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan, Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v. Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2011] 1 CLJ 285, Low Hop Bing JCA turut menyatakan bahawa: [13] In Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor [2008] 1 CLJ 651, at p. 669, in delivering the judgment of this court, I said: [37] There is plethora of weighty authorities setting out trite principles governing an application under Order 18 r. 19(1). It has been consistently stated by our courts that any pleading may be struck out if it is obviously unsustainable. Such discretionary power may only be exercised in plain and obvious cases: see eg, Tractors Malaysia v. Tio Chee Hing [1975] 1 LNS 133; [1975] 2 MLJ 1; Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7; Pengiran Othman Shah Pengiran Mohd Yusoff & Anor v. Karambunai Resorts Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 CLJ 257; Sim Kie Chon v. Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] CLJ (Rep) 293; [1985] 2 CLJ 449 and Hj Hussin Hj Ali & Ors v. Datuk Hj Mohamed Yaacob & Ors & Other Cases [1983] CLJ (Rep) 579; [1983] 2 CLJ 214. [14] In considering the defendant's ground under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), ie, that the plaintiff's pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action, we do not have to look at the affidavits as no such evidence shall be admissible: O. r. 19(2). We must consider only the pleadings for the purpose of determining whether, in the instant appeal, the plaintiff's statement of claim discloses a reasonable 7 cause of action. The expression "reasonable cause of action" means "simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person ": per Diplock LJ in Letang v. Cooper [1965] IQB 222 at 242; [1964] 2 All ER 929 at 934. The test to be applied is whether on the face of the pleadings, the court is prepared to say that the cause of action is obviously unsustainable:See eg, New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v. Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 LNS 1 FC; and Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7 SC. [18] Berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan dalam kes-kes di atas, dapat disimpulkan bahawa kuasa Mahkamah untuk membatalkan tindakan berdasarkan A18 K19 hanya boleh digunakan jika tuntutan Plaintif tidak dapat dipertahankan (“obviously sustainable”) dan kuasa tersebut perlu digunakan dengan lebih berhati hati. (“power should be invoked sparingly”) (Affin Bank Bhd v. Eye Bee Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 LNS 291). [19] Berbalik kepada kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, setelah meneliti permohonan Defendan, affidavit-affidavit yang difailkan serta hujahan bertulis pihak-pihak, Mahkamah telah membenarkan permohonan Defendan di bawah A 18 K19 atas alasan-alasan berikut:- 19.1 Mahkamah mendapati tiada sebarang hubungan kontraktual wujud di antara Plaintif dan Defendan yang mewajibkan Defendan membayar caj pengurusan dan 8 penyelenggaraan kepada Plaintif. Tuntutan Plaintif adalah bersandarkan kepada klausa 10 dan 27 yang dirujuk dalam perjanjian pertama dan klausa 13 (b) dalam perjanjian ketiga untuk menuntut caj-caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaran yang tertunggak dari Defendan. Mahkamah mendapati klausa-klausa yang dirujuk dalam perjanjian pertama tersebut adalah tidak terpakai ke atas Defendan kerana Defendan bukan merupakan pihak dalam perjanjian pertama tersebut. Maka, terma-terma yang terkandung dalam perjanjian tersebut tidak terpakai ke atas Defendan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Wire & Wireless Sdn Bhd v. Eminent Display Sdn Bhd (2019) 1 LNS 1704, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan sepertti berikut:- The fact of the matter is that there are three separate contracts. The Letter of Award from TM to the Defendant. The Collaboration Agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and the TM Agreement between TM and the Defendant. The established doctrine of privity of contract stipulates that only parties to a contract are bound by its terms and conditions. Thus, the Plaintiff who is not a party to the Letter of Award or the TM Agreement cannot be bound by the terms of contracts to which he is not a party. The learned Judge had clearly erred in law in his construction that clause 1.4 of the Collaboration Agreement can be extended to 9 incorporate the Plaintiff as a contracting party to both the Agreements between TM and the Defendant. 19.2 Seterusnya, pemakaian klausa 13 (b) dalam perjanjian ketiga tersebut untuk memfailkan tuntutan ini terhadap Defendan adalah tersalah arah sama sekali. (“misconceived”). Hal ini kerana, Plaintif bukan merupakan salah satu pihak dalam perjanjian tersebut maka Plaintif tidak boleh memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan berdasarkan klausa tersebut. Prinsip ini telah diputuskan dalam kes Woolley Development Sdn Bhd v. Tiara Contours Construction Sdn Bhd (2016) 2 CLJ 610, Dalam kes ini Mahkamah rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut berkenaan “doctrine of privity of contract” :- [52] The decision of the Court of Appeal in Bacom Enterprises Sdn Bhd v. Jong Chuk & Ors [2011] 1 LNS 440; [2011] 5 MLJ 820 illustrates and expounds the doctrine of privity of contract comprehensively. In that case the plaintiff there had sued Bacom Enterprise Sdn Bhd ('Bacom') on the basis of a development agreement made between Bacom and the registered proprietors of some lands. The plaintiff was not a party to the development agreement but he was mentioned there as being the holder of an earlier power of attorney for those lands. The High Court allowed the plaintiff's claim against Bacom. The decision was reversed by this court where it was stated, inter alia, as follows: 10 ...The plaintiff is definitely not a party to the sale agreement and hence cannot enforce or rely for protection on its provisions even if some provision therein was intended to benefit him. In Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446, which dealt with the English position on the doctrine of privity, Lord Reid said (at pp 472-473): In considering the various arguments for the appellants, I think it is necessary to have in mind certain established principles of English law of contract. Although I may regret it, I find it impossible to deny the existence of the general rule that a stranger to a contract cannot in a question with either of the contracting parties take advantage of the provisions of the contract, even where it is clear from the contract that some provision in it was intended to benefit him. That rule appears to have been crystallised a century ago in Tweddle v. Atkinson [1861] 1 B & S 393) and finally established in this House in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847. [102] In Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v. Schmidt [1967] 1 LNS 67; [1968] 1 MLJ 170, the Privy Council held that the doctrine of privity applies in Malaysia. And further down at pp. 866 to 867: ... This would of course be in line with the doctrine of privity. The doctrine is clear. A non-party cannot 11 bring an action on the contract. A person not a party to a contract cannot enforce or rely for protection on its provisions. The rule of privity relates to who can enforce the contract. The doctrine of privity is clearly illustrated in Pollock & Mulla on Indian Contract & Specific Relief Acts (12th Ed), Vol 1 at pp 25-26; it reads: Two aspects of the Doctrine The doctrine has two aspects. The first aspect is that no one but the parties to the contract is entitled under it. Contracting parties may confer rights and benefits upon a third party in the form of promise to pay, or to perform a service, or a promise not to sue (at all or in circumstances covered by an exclusion or limitation clause). But the third party on whom such right or benefit is conferred by contract can neither sue under it nor can rely on defences based on the contract. The second aspect of the doctrine is that parties to a contract cannot impose liabilities on a third party. A person cannot be subject to the burden of a contact to which he is not a party. It is the counterpart of the proposition that a third party cannot acquire rights under a contract. This rule, for example, also bars a person from being bound by an exemption clause contained in a contract to which it is not a party, so that a contract between A and B cannot impose a liability on C. 12 Justification for the Doctrine The rule of privity has been justified on a number of grounds. First, it is unjust to enable a third party to sue on the contract and not be liable for it. Secondly, enabling third parties to enforce contracts would affect or limit the rights of contracting parties to vary or terminate the contract.'... [53] In the instant case, the second defendant was not party to, nor privy to the sale and purchase agreement which was concluded between the plaintiff and Cherating. As such, the plaintiff could not seek to enforce the settlement agreement against a non-party, namely the second defendant. The successor-in-title clause did not have the effect of allowing the second defendant to step into the shoes of Cherating for the reasons cited above. Accordingly, it was not possible for the plaintiff to seek to enforce the sale and purchase agreement or the settlement agreement against the second defendant, who was a stranger to both agreements. 19.3 Berkenaan hujahan Plaintif bahawa Defendan adalah “successors in title/successor bound ” , Mahkamah mendapati hujahan Plaintif ini juga tersalah arah (“misconceived”). Hal ini kerana, tidak dapat sebarang “novation” (kontrak berasingan) ataupun “preamble” yang dirujuk dalam perjanjian ketiga tersebut berkenaan perjanjian pertama untuk mewujudkan obligasi kontraktual terhadap Defendan. Secara alternatifnya, 13 Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa terma berkenaan “successors in title/successor bound ” yang dirujuk adalah tidak terpakai ke atas Defendan kerana Defendan bukan merupakan salah satu pihak dalam perjanjian pertama sepertimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Wolley Development (supra). 19.4 Selanjutnya, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Leisure Farn Corporation v Chow Tat Chow & Anor (2019) 1 LNS 169, di mana fakta kes ini adalah lebih kurang sama dengan fakta kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Dalam kes ini, Plaintif telah menuntut tunggakan caj-caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaraan terhadap D1 dan D2. D2 telah membeli hartanah tersebut dari D1. Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes ini hanya membenarkan tuntutan terhadap D1 dan menolak tuntutan terhadap D2 atas alasan tiada sebarang obligasi kontraktual di antara Plaintif dan D2 yang mewajibkan pembayaran caj-caj pengurusan dan penyelenggaran kepada Plaintif. Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut:- [53] It is in this context that the doctrine of privity of contract becomes relevant. As learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant contended, the 2nd Defendant was simply not privy to the Plaintiff's SPA. As was stated in the very instructive judgment of Nallini Pathmanathan JCA (as she then was) when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Wooley Development Sdn Bhd v. Tiara Contours Construction Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 CLJ 610 at pages 622 and 623: 14 "The Doctrine Of Privity Of Contract [52] The decision of the Court of Appeal in Bacom Enterprises Sdn Bhd v. Jong Chuk & Ors [2011] 1 LNS 440; [2011] 5 MLJ 820 illustrates and expounds the doctrine of privity of contract comprehensively. In that case the plaintiff there had sued Bacom Enterprise Sdn Bhd ('Bacom') on the basis of a development agreement made between Bacom and the registered proprietors of some lands. The plaintiff was not a party to the development agreement but he was mentioned there as being the holder of an earlier power of attorney for those lands. The High Court allowed the plaintiff's claim against Bacom. The decision was reversed by this court where it was stated, inter alia, as follows: ... The plaintiff is definitely not a party to the sale agreement and hence cannot enforce or rely for protection on its provisions even if some provision therein was intended to benefit him. In Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446, which dealt with the English position on the doctrine of privity, Lord Reid said (at pp 472-473): In considering the various arguments for the appellants, I think it is necessary to have in mind certain established principles of English law of contract. Although I may regret it, I find it impossible to deny the existence of the general rule that a stranger to a contract cannot in a question with either of the contracting parties take 15 advantage of the provisions of the contract, even where it is clear from the contract that some provision in it was intended to benefit him. That rule appears to have been crystallised a century ago in Tweddle v. Atkinson [1861] 1 B & S 393) and finally established in this House in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847. [102] In Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v. Schmidt [1968] 1 MLJ 170, the Privy Council held that the doctrine of privity applies in Malaysia. And further down at pp. 866 to 867: ... This would of course be in line with the doctrine of privity. The doctrine is clear. A non-party cannot bring an action on the contract. A person not a party to a contract cannot enforce or rely for protection on its provisions. The rule of privity relates to who can enforce the contract. The doctrine of privity is clearly illustrated in Pollock & Mulla on Indian Contract & Specific Relief Acts (12th Ed), Vol 1 at pp 25-26; it reads: Two aspects of the Doctrine The doctrine has two aspects. The first aspect is that no one but the parties to the contract is entitled under it. Contracting parties may confer rights and benefits upon a third party in the form of promise to pay, or to perform a service, or a promise not to sue (at all or in circumstances covered by an exclusion or limitation 16 clause). But the third party on whom such right or benefit is conferred by contract can neither sue under it nor can rely on defences based on the contract. The second aspect of the doctrine is that parties to a contract cannot impose liabilities on a third party. A person cannot be subject to the burden of a contract to which he is not a party. It is the counterpart of the proposition that a third party cannot acquire rights under a contract. This rule, for example, also bars a person from being bound by an exemption clause contained in a contract to which it is not a party, so that a contract between A and B cannot impose a liability on C. [53] In the instant case, the second defendant was not party to, nor privy to the sale and purchase agreement which was concluded between the plaintiff and Cherating. As such, the plaintiff could not seek to enforce the settlement agreement against a non-party, namely the second defendant. The successor-in-title clause did not have the effect of allowing the second defendant to step into the shoes of Cherating for the reasons cited above. Accordingly it was not possible for the plaintiff to seek to enforce the sale and purchase agreement or the settlement agreement against the second defendant, who was a stranger to both agreements." (Emphasis added) 17 [54] Thus the contention, also raised by the Plaintiff, that clause 9.1 of the Plaintiff's SPA would operate to bind the Plaintiff's successor in title, would not bind the 2nd Defendant by reason of the doctrine of privity of contract. Similarly, and contrary to what learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted, the 2nd Defendant did not acquire any benefit under the Plaintiff's SPA, or any sale and purchase agreement, as was the case in Stadco Sdn Bhd v. Cherating Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 6 CLJ 822; [2015] 1 LNS 395; [2016] 7 MLJ 410. What the 2nd Defendant acquired, pursuant to the 2nd Defendant's SPA, and not the Plaintiff's SPA, was an indefeasible title to Lot 49446, free from encumbrances and which was transferred to him as a transferee, and not acquired by him through any form of succession. Correspondingly of course, it also follows that the Plaintiff is under no obligation to provide the 2nd Defendant any of the services or benefits to be provided under the Plaintiff's SPA. [55] Counsel for the Plaintiff argues that if the 2nd Defendant does not wish to have the obligations under the MD and the DMC, he is welcome to purchase a property outside the resort. To this one may be forgiven for responding that if a developer wishes to retain control over any of its landed developments, it should not part with title to them. It should own the lands within the development and the roads that lead up to the pieces of 18 land within it. The developer cannot seek to devolve ownership and title in property and yet seek to control it against the will of its owner and to extract payment for providing services that the owner had not requested or contracted for. [56] No matter how good or worthwhile the services provided by the Plaintiff might be, no matter what advantage it might bring to the neighbourhood, there still remains the individual liberty to say, "No, I do not wish to contract with you". To allow private individuals or enterprises to impose on another a contract, to extract payment against the other's will, and to thereby delimit the latter's enjoyment of his own property and the rights afforded by law, is fundamentally incompatible with freedom of contract, is unjust and has far reaching and frightful consequences. [57] Albeit in a very different context, it can be inferred from the very recent decision of the Federal Court in Cubic Electronics Sdn Bhd v. Mars Telecommunications Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 723; [2018] 1 LNS 2017, that the concept of freedom of contract still exists and remains in good health. As his Lordship Richard Malanjum, CJSS (as his Lordship then was) stated at paragraph 47, when delivering the judgment of the Federal Court: "47. We begin by stating that the law of contract performs three pivotal functions. Firstly, it enables 19 parties to create legally binding obligations with each other. Secondly, it provides a means as to the enforcement of these obligations. Underlying these two functions is the notion of freedom of contract. The regulation of freedom of contract is the third function of the law of contract." (Emphasis added) [58] This Court therefore does not see any reason to depart from this settled principle of law of long and distinguished pedigree, and to require the 2nd Defendant, against his will, to contract with the Plaintiff with the consequence of delimiting his rights to Lot 49446 and committing him to long term financial obligations to the Plaintiff. It is also by reason of the doctrine of privity that what was an obligation on the part of the 1st Defendant under the Plaintiff's SPA to pay the Maintenance Charges claimed, cannot be the subject of a valid claim against the 2nd Defendant. 19.5 Memandangkan tiada “privity of contract” di antara Plaintif dan Defendan serta Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus untuk memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan, Mahkamah sememangnya mempunyai budibicara untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan Plaintif di bawah A 18 K19 KKM 2012. Perkara ini telah diputuskan dalam kes Tan Poh Yee v. Tan Boon Thien & Other appeals (2017) 3 CLJ 20 569, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- [18] The fundamental principle of law on this point has been constantly followed and repeated by our courts that only a party to a contract can sue on it and only the parties to a contract have enforceable rights and obligations under such contract. We may categorically state, as an extension to this principle, that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit. We shall, in this regard, refer to the case of Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd v. Dynaforce Corporation Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 533; [2015] 1 MLJ 284 wherein Abdul Malik Ishak JCA handing down the judgment of this court said at pp. 560- 561 (CLJ); pp. 307 to 308 (MLJ): [67] After Tweddle v. Atkinson, the doctrine of privity was firmly established as part and parcel of the English common law in the case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847 (HL). There, Viscount Haldane LC aptly said at p. 853: My Lords, in the law of England certain principles are fundamental. One is that only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our law knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio arising by way of contract. Such a right may be conferred by way of property, as, for example, under a trust, but it cannot be conferred on a stranger to a contract as a right to enforce the contract in personam. 21 A second principle is that if a person with whom a contract not under seal has been made is to be able to enforce it consideration must have been given by him to the promisor or to some other person at the promisor's request. These two principles are not recognised in the same fashion by the jurisprudence of certain Continental countries or of Scotland, but here they are well established. [68] Mohamed Dzaiddin J (later the Chief Justice) rightly said in Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd v. Suruhanjaya Pelabuhan Pulau Pinang & Anor [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 534; [1988] 1 MLJ 269 at p. 271 that, 'It is clear that the English doctrine of privity of contract applies to our law of contract'. [69] The doctrine of privity of contract is here to stay. In Murphy v. Bower (1866) IR 2 CL 506, the court categorically stated that, 'no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit'. Bluntly put, only the parties to the contract have enforceable rights and obligations under the contract. [70] As an established principle of contract law, the common law doctrine of privity of contract stands for the simple proposition that, 'no one but the parties to a contract can be bound by it or entitled under it' (Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd v. Beattie [1980] 2 SCR 228, at p 229). 22 [19] This principle was similarly applied in the earlier case of Bacom Enterprises Sdn Bhd v. Jong Chuk & Ors [2011] 1 LNS 440; [2011] 5 MLJ 820 in which this court said at paras. 101 to 103: [101]... The plaintiff is definitely not a party to the sale agreement and hence cannot enforce or rely for protection on its provisions even if some provision therein was intended to benefit him. In Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446, which dealt with the English position on the doctrine of privity, Lord Reid said (at pp. 472-473): In considering the various arguments for the appellants, I think it is necessary to have in mind certain established principles of the English law of contract. Although I may regret it, I find it impossible to deny the existence of the general rule that a stranger to a contract cannot in a question with either of the contracting parties take advantage of provisions of the contract, even where it is clear from the contract that some provision in it was intended to benefit him. That rule appears to have been crystallised a century ago in Tweddle v. Atkinson ((1861) 1 B & S 393) and finally established in this House in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. Selfridge & Co Ltd ([1915] AC 847). [102] In Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v. Schmidt [1967] 1 LNS 67; [1968] 1 MLJ 170, the Privy Council held that the doctrine of privity applies in Malaysia. In delivering 23 the judgment of the Board, Lord Wilberforce said (at p. 174): It is true that s 2(d) of the Contracts (Malay States) Ordinance gives a wider definition of 'consideration' than that which applies in England particularly in that it enables consideration to move from another person than the promisee, but the appellant was unable to show how this affected the law as to enforcement of contracts by third parties, and it was not possible to point to any other provision having this effect. On the contrary paras (a), (b), (c) and (e) support the English conception of a contract as an agreement on which only the parties to it can sue. There is not the slightest room for doubt that the instant case is eminently one in which the respondent was definitely not a party to the purported 2004 agreement and hence could not enforce or rely on its terms and provisions for protection. It was also for the above reasons that we held that the respondent's contention that his pleading had established locus standi was wholly devoid of any merit and must be rejected. It is trite law that an abuse of the process of the court arises under O. 18 r. 19(1)(d) of the Rules of Court 2012 where the process of the court has not been used in a bona fide manner and has been abused (Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v. Sabah Forest 24 Industries Sdn Bhd [2011] 1 CLJ 285; [2011] 2 MLJ 192). This court will not assist nor grant the reliefs sought by the respondent who comes to court with questionable intention and accordingly the bottom line is that such conduct attracts the application of O. 18 r. 19(1)(d) of the Rules of Court 2012 and the inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the court's process (Raja Zainal Abidin Raja Haji Tachik & Ors v. British-American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606; [1993] 3 MLJ 16). Conclusion [33] For all these reasons, it would be our inevitable finding that the conclusion reached by the learned judge in dismissing the appellants' applications was unreasonable and erroneous. It was plain and obvious that the respondent's claim under consideration in this appeal was wholly unmeritorious and clearly disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous, vexatious as well as an abuse of the process of the court for which we had absolutely no hesitation in dismissing the claim in limine. 19.6 Mahkamah mendapati adalah tidak adil untuk Plaintif mengenakan bayaran terhadap perkhidmatan yang tidak pernah dipersetujui oleh Defendan dalam mana-mana perjanjian sepertimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Leisure Farm (supra). 25 Kesimpulan [20] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati tuntutan Plaintif adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah serta “vexatious and frivolous” sepertimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Tan Poh Yee (supra) maka Mahkamah menggunakan telah menggunakan kuasa budi bicaranya di bawah A 18 K19 untuk membatalkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan dengan kos sebanyak RM2,500. Bertarikh 14.4.2020 Disediakan oleh, Salini a/p Retanam Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Sivil 2 Peguam Plaintif Nurakila Tetuan Frances Azlina & Partners Peguam Defendan Nadirah 26 Tetuan Dennis Nik & Wong