Oasis Garden Development Sdn Bhd v Ranner Wolfgang (WA-12BNCvC-61-05/2024)

RANNER WOLFGANG (No. Pasport Republik Austria: L03525344) Pasport baru: P7698223

LEONG SOO LENG (No. Pasport Republik Singapura: E2003231D) Pasport baru: E5700500K …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mengenai Mahkamah Sesyen Di Kuala Lumpur Dalam Wilayah Persekutuan, Malaysia

Ranner Wolfgang (No. Pasport Republik Austria : L03525344) Pasport baru : P7698223

Leong Soo Leng (No. Pasport Republik Singapura : E2003231D) Psport baru : E5700500K …Plaintif-Plaintif Dan Oasis Garden Development Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat : 788611-K) …Defendan] 25/09/2025 10:40:16 WA-12BNCvC-61-05/2024 Kand. 33 S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of the Sessions Court (SC) that allowed the Respondent’s claim. [2] This Court has allowed the appeal in part. Only prayer 1(c) is allowed pertaining to the defect inspection cost of RM3710.00. The reasons are as deliberated. [3] For convenience, the parties are referred in their respective capacity at the Sessions Court. The Appellant is referred to as the Defendant and the Respondents are referred to as the Plaintiffs. BRIEF FACTS [4] On 13.04.2013, the Plaintiffs entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) with the Defendant for the purchase of a condominium unit located at M City, Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur, for the sum of RM2,013,800.00 (Unit). [5] Vacant possession of the unit was delivered on 27.08.2016. Following delivery, the Plaintiffs submitted multiple Defects Notification Form (DNF) to the Defendant, citing issues such as water leakage and electrical faults. The DNFs were dated between 23.09.2016 and 11.06.2018, with the final two submitted on 09.04.2018 and 11.06.2018 respectively. S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ [6] In accordance with the Defendant’s standard operating procedure (SOP), a “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” would be issued upon completion of any rectification works carried out in response to the DNFs. During trial, the Defendant’s witness (SD1) confirmed that the last “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” was issued on 27.12.2017. However, no documentary evidence was produced to show that similar notices were issued in respect of the DNFs submitted in 2018. The witness was unable to confirm whether any notices had been issued for the complaints dated 09.04.2018 and 11.06.2018. [7] The learned Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) found that the Defendant had breached Clause 29(3) of the SPA. Accordingly, the SCJ awarded the Plaintiffs RM131,019.00 for repair costs, RM37,500.00 for rental expenses, RM3,710.00 for inspection fees, interest at 5% from the date of judgment (14.08.2024) until settlement, and costs of RM7,000.00. Plaintiffs’ Contention [8] The Plaintiffs contended that no judicial intervention is warranted, as the decision of the SCJ dated 14.08.2024 was not ‘plainly wrong’. The findings were based on a proper judicial appreciation of the evidence, and the Defendant has failed to demonstrate any error of fact or law. [9] The Plaintiffs further contended that the defects were not fully rectified by the Defendant, this was as evidenced and admitted by the Defendant own witnesses and confirmed in the Defendant’s email dated 08.08.2018. The Defendant failed to issue any “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” for the 2018 complaints, despite acknowledging receipt of the DNFs dated 09.04.2018 and 11.06.2018. The S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ last Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works was issued on 27.12.2017. [10] It was also not disputed that the Plaintiffs’ unit was a “stakeholder unit” under Clause 29(3) of the SPA. The Defendant’s witness (DW2) confirmed this during trial, and the Defendant’s own email correspondence. The Defendant failed to produce the required architect’s certificate to confirm that all defects had been rectified, nor was any explanation offered for its absence. Therefore, the SCJ correctly found that the Defendant breached Clause 29(3). [11] The Defendant did not call the architect as a witness, who was a material witness capable of confirming whether the defects had been rectified. The failure to call the architect and to produce the certificate warranted an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act

The SCJ invoked this inference, noting that the Defendant’s own pleadings and evidence were inconsistent. [12] The Plaintiffs had issued four letters of demand dated 07.03.2018,

02.05.2018, 10.08.2018, and 26.08.2019 through their solicitors, which were never disputed or replied to by the Defendant. The Defendant, being a subsidiary of a listed company with its own legal department, had ample opportunity to respond. Hence. its silence amounts to an admission of the claims. [13] The Defendant also received a quotation dated 06.07.2018 from Dynamic Plus Concept, forwarded on 10.08.2018, but failed to dispute its contents or assert that the works were renovations rather than defect rectification. The Defendant only raised such contentions during trial, S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ which the SC found to be an afterthought. The SCJ held that the Defendant was estopped from disputing the quotation and the nature of the works. [14] In light of the above, the Plaintiffs contended that the appeal should be dismissed. Defendant’s Contention [15] To support this appeal, the Defendant contended that Clause 29(3) of the SPA is not applicable in this case, as it is expressly subject to Clause 29(2). The Plaintiffs failed to comply with the mandatory procedures under Clause 29(2), which require notifying the Defendant of repair costs and allowing a further 14 days for rectification before undertaking the works independently. As such, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to rely on Clause 29(3), and the issue of the architect’s certificate is irrelevant. [16] The Defendant further contended that it carried out substantial rectification works following the Plaintiffs’ complaints, including tile replacement, door repairs, and repainting, as evidenced by contemporaneous documents. The key was returned to the Defendant on 20.08.2018 and handed back to the Plaintiffs on 21.09.2018. There is no evidence of outstanding defects after this date, and the Plaintiffs did not raise further complaints. Therefore, the Plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden of proof. [17] The Defendant further submits that the SCJ was erred in drawing an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, based on the absence of the architect’s certificate. Since Clause 29(3) is not applicable, the certificate is not determinative of whether defects were S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ rectified. The Defendant’s witness clarified that the request for access on 08.08.2018 was made because the Plaintiffs were dissatisfied, not because the works were incomplete. [18] In response to the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the quotation dated 06.07.2018 from Dynamic Plus Concept, the Defendant argues that further rectification works were carried out after receiving the quotation. Therefore, the quotation is no longer relevant, and the Plaintiffs cannot rely on it to claim costs. The Defendant also notes that there were no complaints after 21.09.2018, indicating that the defects had been addressed. [19] In conclusion, the Defendant contended that the appeal ought to be allowed with costs, as the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the SPA procedures, did not prove the existence of outstanding defects, and improperly relied on Clause 29(3) and the architect’s certificate as irrelevant. Decision of the Sessions Court Judge [20] Generally, the SCJ decided that- “[26] Selanjutnya, di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Plaintif-plaintif telah beberapa kali menghantar surat-surat tertentu kepada Defendan melalui peguamcaranya pada 7.3.2018 (mukasurat 4-8 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama), 2.5.2018 (mukasurat 9-10 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama), 10.8.2018 (mukasurat 11-12 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama) dan juga 26.8.2019 (mukasurat 13-14 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama). Defendan mengakui bahawa mereka telah menerima surat-surat tuntutan tersebut. Namun demikian, tiada sebarang pembuktian yang dimajukan oleh Defendan untuk menunjukkan bahawa :-

mereka tidak mengakui tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif tersebut; dan

(ii) ekoran dari aduan-aduan dan surat-surat tuntutan tersebut, kesemua kerosakan-kerosakan yang berlaku telah pun S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ diperbetulkan. Defendan di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini telah memilih untuk mendiamkan diri dan hanya mengemukakan pembelaan bahawa kerosakan-kerosakan telah diperbetulkan setelah guaman sivil ini difailkan terhadap mereka. Defendan hanya membangkitkan pembelaan bahawa sebutharga yang diberikan oleh kontraktor tersebut adalah untuk kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian dalaman dan bukan untuk kerja-kerja pembaikkan kerosakan apabila guaman sivil ini difailkan terhadap mereka. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa tindakan Defendan ini mencerminkan bahawa sebenarnya mereka tidak mempunyai pembelaan yang bermerit dan pembelaan yang diberikan adalah bertujuan untuk mengelakkan diri mereka dari tanggungjawab mereka di bawah perjanjian ini. Ini merupakan prinsip yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes OCBC BANK (MALAYSIA) BHD V OMEGA HORIZON SDN BHD & ORS [2004] 7 CLJ 443 yang telah dirujuk dan diterimapakai di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini di mana telah diputuskan bahawa :- “(9) The defendants also chose not to reply to the letters of and to regularise their account vide letters dated 15 January 1999, 12 February 1999, 5 March 1999 and 28 May 1999 (exh. FCL6, exh. FCL7, exh. FCL8 and exh. FCL9). The plaintiff followed up with a letter of demand against the defendants for the excess on 16 June 1999 (exh. NT7(a) to exh. NT7(fr) and on 15 December 1999 with a letter of recall demanding for the total outstanding balance which the defendants failed to comply (exh. NT8(a) to exh. NT8 (gr). Why did the defendants chose to ignore? If what they contend is genuine, they should as any reasonable man would grab the earliest opportunity possible rather than remain silent and raise it as a defence only when proceedings are commenced against them.” [29] Adalah juga merupakan kes Defendan bahawa mereka telah siap melakukan kerja-kerja pembaikkan kerosakan-kerosakan mengikut “Defects Notification Forms” (DNF) yang diserahkan oleh Plaintif-plaintif bertarikh 23.9.2016,

4.11.2016,

15.3.2017,

18.3.2017,

22.3.2017,

15.5.2017,

16.5.2017, 17.6.2017, 19.6.2017, 17.8.2017, 5.9.2017,

13.12.2017, 27.12.2017, 9.4.2018 dan 11.6.2018. Defendan selanjutnya memplidkan bahawa DNF yang terakhir sekali diterima oleh mereka adalah pada 11.6.2018. SD1 walaubagaimanapun telah memberikan keterangan bahawa adalah merupakan SOP Defendan bahawa apabila setelah kerja-kerja pembaikan kerosakan-kerosakan siap dilakukan, maka Defendan akan menyerahkan “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” kepada pemilik hartanah. Namun demikian, tiada sebarang S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ pembuktian yang telah diberikan oleh Defendan untuk menunjukkan bahawa bagi kerja-kerja pembaikkan untuk tahun 2018, “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” telah diberikan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. Kali terakhir “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” tersebut diserahkan kepada Plaintif-plaintif adalah pada 27.12.2017 dan perkara ini telah diakui oleh SD1 di dalam keterangannya. SD1 tidak dapat mengesahkan samada aduan-aduan bagi tahun 2018, “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” diserahkan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. [30] Keterangan dan pembuktian yang diberikan oleh Defendan melalui saksi-saksinya adalah bertentangan dengan apa yang telah mereka plidkan di dalam Pembelaan mereka. Ini menunjukkan bahawa sebenar-benarnya, Defendan telah gagal untuk memperbaikki kesemua kerosakan yang telah diadukan oleh Plaintif-plaintif walaupun telah memplidkan yang berbeza. Selanjutnya, e-mail Defendan bertarikh 8.8.2018 adalah merupakan bukti yang jelas dan nyata bahawa Defendan mengakui yang kerja-kerja pembaikkan masih belum siap kerana Defendan telah menggunakan perkataan “menyambung” (continue) di dalam permohonannya untuk diberikan akses kepada hartanah Plaintif-plaintif. Tiada juga sebarang pembuktian yang diberikan oleh Defendan bahawa ekoran dari e-mail tersebut, kerja-kerja pembaikkan telah siap dilakukan. Jika benar ianya telah siap dilakukan, maka adalah merupakan tanggungjawab Defendan untuk menunjukkan bahawa mereka telah menyerahkan “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” telah diberikan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. Justeru, ini terus mematahkan pembelaan Defendan tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat ini adalah satu pembelaan yang diberikan hanya untuk melarikan diri mereka dari bertanggungjawab ke atas perjanjian yang dibuat oleh kedua-dua pihak.”. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [21] The Plaintiffs claimed the costs to rectify the defects, loss of rental and other incidental costs, arising from the allegation that the Defendant failed to rectify the defects according to Schedule H of the SPA. Clause 29 of the SPA deals with the Defect Liability Period and provides for specific procedures to be complied with by the Plaintiffs to claim the rectification costs from the stakeholder money (SPA Procedures). The Defendant S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ contended that since the Plaintiffs chose to abandon the SPA Procedures, such SPA Procedures are not applicable in this case. This Court disagrees. [22] The SCJ was also relying on the fact that the Plaintiffs’ Unit was a stakeholder unit based on the Defendant’s email to the Plaintiff dated 08.08.2018. Thus, the SCJ held that there was a breach of Clause 29(3) of the SPA because there was no certificate by an architect (Certificate) to certify that the defects have been rectified. The SCJ further decided that there was no Certificate given by the Defendant pursuant to Clause 29(3) of the SPA to confirm that the defects have been rectified, and that the Certificate is a conclusive proof that the defects were not rectified by the Defendant. [23] Further, the SCJ applied adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act as the Defendant did not call the architect as its witness who the SCJ think is a material witness. Thus, the Defendant had failed to issue any Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works to prove that defects were rectified in 2018. [24] For clarity, clause 29(3) of the SPA provides-S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ [25] In this regard, upon reading the relevant provisions of section 29 particularly section 29(3) of the SPA, this Court is of the considered view that the requirement for the Certificate is for the purpose to release the retention sum known as stakeholder sum, held by the Defendant’s solicitor. This Certificate given by an architect, is to certify that the defects have been repaired and made good. And this Certificate is issued by the Defendant’s architect to the Defendant’ solicitors. Upon receiving this Certificate, then only the Defendant will be able to get the stakeholder sum released, but only after deduction of the Plaintiffs’ costs of repair which repair works was conducted by the Plaintiffs themselves, prior to certain steps to be followed in accordance to Clause 29. [26] Therefore, in regards as to whether the defects have been rectified or not, it is not vital, whether the Plaintiffs’ unit is a stakeholder unit or otherwise. However, inference could be made that if the Defendant had repaired and made good the defects, there should not be any issue for the Defendant to produce the Certificate to show that the defects had been rectified, But, this did not happen. [27] Additionally, there is a notice known as “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works”, where the Defendant’s witness (SD1) confirmed that the last “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” was issued on 27.12.2017. But this notice was not issued out for the two (2) subsequent DNFs dated 9.4.2018 and 11.6.2018. Thus, shown that the repair works were not actually completed. [28] SD1, the Defendant’s witness, had testified that it is the Defendant’s SOP to issue a form known as “Notice of Completion of Defects S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ Rectification Works” to the owner, in this case the Plaintiffs, once the defects were rectified. [29] Moreover, it was not disputed that the Defendant had pleaded that they have received the two NDFs dated 9.4.2018 and 11.6.2018 from the Plaintiffs. The Defendant at paragraph 13 of its defence pleaded- “13. Defendan menyatakan bahawa antara lainnya:- Pada setiap masa yang material, Defendan telah membaiki “defects” dalam Unit tersebut yang didakwa oleh Plaintif-Plaintif berdasarkan ‘Defects Notification Form (“DNF”) bertarikh 23/9/2016, 4/11/2016, 15/3/2017, 18/3/2017, 22/3/2017, 15/5/2017, 16/5/2017, 17/6/2017, 19/6/2017, 17/8/2017, 5/9/2017, 13/12/2017, 27/12/2017, 9/4/2018 dan 11/6/2018 yang diserahkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Defendan. Defendan tidak lagi menerima apa-apa DNF daripada Plaintif-Plantif selepas DNF bertarikh 11/6/2018.” [30] However, the SOP was not followed as the Defendant failed to produce the “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” to prove that it has completed all the defects and make good the same. The SCJ deliberated on this point that- “[29] Adalah juga merupakan kes Defendan bahawa mereka telah siap melakukan kerja-kerja pembaikkan kerosakan-kerosakan mengikut “Defects Notification Forms” (DNF) yang diserahkan oleh Plaintif-plaintif bertarikh 23.9.2016, 4.11.2016,

15.3.2017,

18.3.2017,

22.3.2017,

15.5.2017,

16.5.2017,

17.6.2017,

19.6.2017,

17.8.2017,

5.9.2017,

13.12.2017,

27.12.2017, 9.4.2018 dan 11.6.2018. Defendan selanjutnya memplidkan bahawa DNF yang terakhir sekali diterima oleh mereka adalah pada 11.6.2018. SD1 walaubagaimanapun telah memberikan keterangan bahawa adalah merupakan SOP Defendan bahawa apabila setelah kerja-kerja pembaikan kerosakan-kerosakan siap dilakukan, maka Defendan akan menyerahkan “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” kepada pemilik hartanah. Namun demikian, tiada S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ sebarang pembuktian yang telah diberikan oleh Defendan untuk menunjukkan bahawa bagi kerja-kerja pembaikkan untuk tahun 2018, “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” telah diberikan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. Kali terakhir “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” tersebut diserahkan kepada Plaintif-plaintif adalah pada 27.12.2017 dan perkara ini telah diakui oleh SD1 di dalam keterangannya. SD1 tidak dapat mengesahkan samada aduan-aduan bagi tahun 2018, “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” diserahkan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. “[30] Keterangan dan pembuktian yang diberikan oleh Defendan melalui saksi-saksinya adalah bertentangan dengan apa yang telah mereka plidkan di dalam Pembelaan mereka. Ini menunjukkan bahawa sebenar-benarnya, Defendan telah gagal untuk memperbaikki kesemua kerosakan yang telah diadukan oleh Plaintif-plaintif walaupun telah memplidkan yang berbeza. Selanjutnya, e-mail Defendan bertarikh 8.8.2018 adalah merupakan bukti yang jelas dan nyata bahawa Defendan mengakui yang kerja-kerja pembaikkan masih belum siap kerana Defendan telah menggunakan perkataan “menyambung” (continue) di dalam permohonannya untuk diberikan akses kepda hartanah Plaintif-plaintif. Tiada juga sebarang pembuktian yang diberikan oleh Defendan bahawa ekoran dari e-mail tersebut, kerja-kerja pembaikkan telah siap dilakukan. Jika benar ianya telah siap dilakukan, maka adalah merupakan tanggungjawab Defendan untuk menunjukkan bahawa mereka telah menyerahkan “Notice of Completion of Defects Rectification Works” telah diberikan kepada Plaintif-plaintif. Justeru, ini terus mematahkan pembelaan Defendan tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat ini adalah satu pembelaan yang diberikan hanya untuk melarikan diri mereka dari bertanggungjawab ke atas perjanjian yang dibuat oleh kedua-dua pihak.” [31] Also, the Defendant did not dispute the quotations and the works done based on the quotations. In this regard the SCJ explained- “[28] Defendan di dalam kes ini telah memplidkan bahawa sebutharga yang telah diberikan oleh kontraktor tersebut adalah merupakan untuk kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian dalaman dan bukannya untuk memperbaikki kerosakan-kerosakan tersebut. Namun demikian, Defendan telah gagal memberikan sebarang pembuktian apabila mereka menerima surat-surat tuntutan S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ tersebut, mereka telah memaklumkan kepada Plaintif-plaintif tersebut bahawa sebutharga tersebut bukan untuk kerja-kerja pembaikkan, sebaliknya adalah untuk pengubahsuaian dalaman, justeru adalah merupakan luar dari skop perjanjian tersebut.” “[31] Defendan juga telah memplidkan bahawa kerja-kerja pembaikkan yang dikatakan telah dilakukan oleh Plaintif-plaintif tersebut sebenarnya adalah untuk pengubahsuaian dan bukannya kerja-kerja pembaikan kerosakan. Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, apabila Plaintif-plaintif telah menyerahkan sebutharga bertarikh 6.7.2018 dari kontraktor tersebut pada 13.8.2018, maka adalah merupakan tanggungjawab Defendan untuk menyangkal sebutharga tersebut dan memaklumkan bahawa sebutharga tersebut adalah untuk kerja pengubahsuaian dan bukannya pembaikkan.” “[32] Defendan di dalam kes ini tidak pernah menafikan penerimaan sebutharga tersebut. Defendan telah beberapa kali diberikan peluang untuk menjawab dan menyangkal tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif ini melaului surat-surat tuntutan yang diberikan, namun, Defendan memilih untuk tidak memberikan sebarang respons kepada tuntutan yang dibuat. Defendan hanya membangkitkan penafian-penafian ini apabila guaman sivil ini terhadap mereka. Apabila ini berlaku, Mahkamah tidak mempunyai pilihan lain melainkan menolak percubaan penafian Defendan tersebut di tahap ini. Ini merupakan prinsip yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes OCBC BANK (MALAYSIA) BHD VS OMEGA HORIZON SDN BHD & ORS [2004] 7 CLJ 443, yang telah dirujuk di perenggan [27] di atas.” [32] In the case of KGN Jaya Sdn. Bhd. v. Pan Reliance Sdn. Bhd. [1996] 2 CLJ 611; [1996] 1 AMR 839; [1996] 1 MLJ 233, with regard to the appellant’s conduct in remaining silent, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) held- “Viewed in this way, we perceive that the key to the whole case lies in the conduct of the appellant in this case. Encik Darshan Singh, in response to a question put to him by a member of the panel hearing this appeal, frankly conceded that his client did indeed receive the statements of account of which we have S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ earlier spoken. It follows that a reasonable man similarly circumstanced as the appellant would, if it were really true that there had been no appointment of sub-agency as later claimed by it, have, post haste sent these accounts back to the respondent and denied any liability. But that is not what happened. The appellant remained silent, held onto the accounts, and did nothing about it. The denial by its solicitor’s letter of 4 January 1993, came long after the delivery of the account. When asked why his client had kept silent for a rather long period of time, Encik Darshan Singh’s response was that his client was a large company and did not do anything until the letter before action was received. We trust that we will be forgiven if we are unable to detect the logic in this response.” [33] On such expense, the Plaintiffs were left with no choice but to rent at an alternative residential premises as evidenced from the Tenancy Agreement dated 15.12.2017. Such expense totals up RM37,500.00. The Landlady was called to give evidence during the trial and the necessary receipts (for the rentals) were duly tendered at trial. [34] In regards to the inspection report, this Court is inclined to the submission made by the Defendant that the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the two conditions of admissibility to admit the evidence of IDP- 1 and IDP-2. [35] Firstly, the Plaintiffs did not call the maker of the documents, i.e. a person known as Nurul who prepared the report. Instead, the Plaintiffs attempted to adduce the two documents through SP1, who purportedly “verified” “the documents. It is clearly stated that one Nurul prepared the reports. The persons who conducted the inspections were Amin and Yusri, and SP1 admitted during cross-examination that although he was S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ present during the inspection, he did not personally inspect the Property himself. [36] Secondly, the Plaintiffs have failed to adduce the original document in Court. The Plaintiffs have attempted to rely on a certificate signed by one Nurul Syahida Bt Che Hasim, purportedly pursuant to Section 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 on the basis that these reports are documents generated by computer. The Defendant contended that both “IDP1” and “IDP2” are not documents generated by computer as envisaged by section 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 as they are essentially input gathered from various observations and/or inspections conducted by the employees. In other words, these reports are not merely documents generated automatically from the computer (for example invoices and payment receipts) but are reports which contain observations and findings of the employees. As such, Section 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 is inapplicable to these documents. [37] The Defendant then cited the case of Yinson Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Perfect Mix Portfolio Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 212; [2021] 4 MLRH 21 where the Court held- “[15] Secondly, it is my view that one should not rush into labelling documents as 'computer-generated' without appreciating the type of document one is dealing with. In the present case, the Plaintiff referred to documents such as invoices, delivery notes and debit notes. Just because these documents were computer printouts, it did not automatically mean that they were 'computer-generated' or 'documents produced by a computer' encapsulated by section 90A of the Evidence Act. I drew guidance from the case of Approfit Sdn Bhd v. Kent Sing Construction Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [2001] 1 LNS … [16] This means that documents encompassed by section 90A of the Evidence Act should be confined to those where the output is the product of data derived through computational, algorithmic or analytical methods by S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ the specific software used, rather than a mere regurgitation of its input. This distinction had earlier been made by the Singapore High Court in the cases of Aw Kew Lim & Ors v. PP [1988] 2 CLJ Rep 697; [1987] 2 MLJ 601 and PP v. Ang Soon Huat [1990] 1 LNS 103; [1991] 1 MLJ 1, both of which dealt with the term 'computer output' referred to in the previous section 35 of the Singapore Evidence Act. In PP v. Ang Soon Huat, it was opined by the Singapore High Court that where the computer printout was based on a mere regurgitation of the data fed into the computer, such evidence amounted to hearsay and the unavailability of the maker had to be proved. However, if the printout was a product of data derived through computational, algorithmic or analytical methods by the specific software used, only then would such evidence amount to computer output and would be treated as real evidence. [17] An illustration of such distinction may be found in Aw Kew Lim & Ors v. PP, where the computer printout from the Registry of Businesses disclosing the particulars of firms, was held to amount to a mere regurgitation of the information fed into the computer, and as such, did not fall within the ambit of 'computer output'. [38] In this context, this Court agrees with the case referred by the Defendant in Chin Foh Bhd & Anor v Kwan Yun Hong @ Kuan Onn Hing & Ors [2012] 9 MLJ 854; [2013] 1 LNS 772; [2012] MLRHU 1228 where it was held- “[19] The supply contract, invoices as well the letter dated 18 April 2002 confirming payment were all marked as ID. Learned counsel for the defendant referred to the case of Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 180 where Abdoolcadeer J in his judgment said: … certain exhibits which have been put in the course of these proceedings for identification but have not in fact been proved as they should have been and are accordingly not exhibits in the strict sense and cannot therefore form part of the record in this case, namely, D41 and D43 which were both put in for identification only and which are the audited accounts and annual report of the Bank for the years 1973–74 and 1972 respectively. As these two exhibits have not been proved and properly admitted as such, they must in the ultimate analysis be discounted and I shall accordingly disregard references to S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ them and also all oral testimony as well adduced in relation thereto. [20] Therefore the aforesaid documents marked as ID could not be evaluated and/or considered by this court and must be disregarded.” [39] Further, this Court observed that the SCJ has not addressed the issue of admissibility of IDP-1 and IDP-2 when allowing the claim for the cost of inspection. Thus, this is considered as an appealable error that warrants the appellate intervention. [40] Accordingly, the legal principle on appellate intervention can be found in the case of Dream Property Sdn. Bhd. v Atlas Housing Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 2 MLJ 441; [2015] 2 CLJ 453; [2015] 2 MLRA 247 where the Federal Court held- “[60] It is now established that the principle on which an appellate court could interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is 'the plainly wrong test' principle; see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 (at p 10) per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah & Sarawak). More recently, this principle of appellate intervention was affirmed by the Federal Court in UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Intergrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 785 where it was held at p 800: It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking, intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence (see Chow Yee Wah & Anor v Choo Ah Pat [1978] 1 LNS 32; Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484; and Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309).” (emphasis added) S/N UTdzQzjrk6x1vXb3MI4aQ [41] Except for the costs of inspection, this Court would agree with the decision of the SCJ, to a certain extent, but for different reasons as deliberated herewith. Therefore, this Court finds that the appellate intervention is warranted only on the issue of the inspection report. CONCLUSION [42] As such, the appeal is allowed in part only. The rest of the Order of the SCJ is affirmed. Dated: 25 SEPTEMBER 2025 -SGD- (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of The High Court NCvC 1 Kuala Lumpur COUNSELS For the Appellant : Justin Voon dan Victor Pang Messrs Justin Voon Chooi & Wing For the Respondents : Yap Yoon Jan Messrs Yap Siew Yee & Co.