I refer to the Supreme Court case of Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd. [1997] 2 CLJ 36 where it was decided that— “[5] Proceedings under s. 256 are not concerned with any contractual claims that the chargor may have against the chargee. They are concerned with the very narrow and limited question whether the chargor has adduced facts that establish cause to the contrary in the sense discussed herein. [6] A narrow and restrictive interpretation of s. 256(3) of the Code is necessary for reasons of policy. It therefore follows that, to resist an application under s. 256(3) of the Code, it is not sufficient to allege breaches by the chargee of the loan agreement between the chargor and the borrower or even of the terms of the annexure to the charge. An allegation that the chargee acted in breach of contract, while it may rise to an independent action in personam, is insufficient per se to defeat the ad rem rights of a chargee under his registered charge to an order for sale. [7] It follows further that, in the absence of strong and compelling reasons (as were present for instance in Public Finance Bhd. V. Narayanasamy [1971] 1 LNS 107 and Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd v. Lee Tan Hwa) a Court would not be justified in withholding relief to a chargee under s. 256 of the Code. In our judgment, cause to the contrary within s. 256(3) may be established only in three categories of cases. First, it may be taken as settled that a chargor who is able to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the indefeasibility doctrine housed in section 340 of the Code establishes cause to the contrary. Secondly, a chargor may show cause to the contrary within s. 256(3) of the Code by demonstrating that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale. Thirdly, a chargor may defeat an application for an order for sale by demonstrating that its grant would be contrary to some rule of law or equity.”. [Emphasis added]