and the Appellant therefore submit that the arguments advanced by the learned Session’s Court Judge are dangerously inaccurate and seriously inconsistent with the current state of the law.”. [28] Pemakaian peruntukan yang terkandung dalam Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bukan semata-mata bertujuan − “In administering these Rules, the Court or a Judge shall have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical non-compliance with these Rules.”. Ketidakpatuhan kepada peruntukan-peruntukan mengenai saman pemula dan penzahiran sebagaimana ditetapkan oleh Aturan 7 dan Aturan 24 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 yang menyebut “shall” adalah peruntukan mandatori kepada pihak-pihak. [29] Dalam permohonan penzahiran oleh Plaintif-Perayu di hadapan Mahkamah Rendah adalah jelas bahawa penzahiran dan pembekalan rakaman CCTV di kawasan kemalangan tersebut diperlukan untuk Plaintif mengambil tindakan undang-undang atau tidak terhadap motolori yang tidak pasti terlibat dalam kemalangan dengan motosikal Plaintif. Jawapan Defendan-Responden (KESAS Sdn Bhd) tidak dikupas lanjut oleh Pn HMS yang bijaksana. Walaupun Pn HMS yang bijaksana dalam alasan penghakimannya menolak afidavit oleh bapa Plaintif, Mahkamah ini mendapati keputusan Pn HMS menolak Saman Pemula tersebut adalah berpunca daripada “non-compliance with these Rules”. Ketidakpatuhan tersebut bukan semata-mata teknikal. Pihak Defendan-Responden terjejas dengan ketidakpatuhan Plaintif-Perayu untuk mengikut tatacara yang ditetapkan. [30] Mahkamah ini tidak menjumpai apa-apa sebab yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 48 alasan penghakiman Pn HMS yang bijaksana sebagai preposterous and outrages; illogical and grossly inconsistent with the law; omission that is so glaring and clearly runs contrary to present well established legal principles; the arguments advanced by the Sessions’s Court Judge are quite unimpressive; and the Appellant therefore submit that the arguments advanced by the learned Session’s Court Judge are dangerously inaccurate and seriously inconsistent with the current state of the law. [31] Mahkamah ini mengekalkan keputusan Pn HMS yang bijaksana kerana prinsip undang-undang dalam kes Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar AlHaj v. Datuk Captain Hamzah Mohd Noor (and another appeal) [2009] 4 CLJ 329 dengan jelas memutuskan − “[4] A general provision such as O. 1A RHC must not supersede a mandatory requirement of the Rules. O. 1A RHC cannot be invoked when a party intentionally disregards in complying with the Rules. Thus, in this case, O. 1A RHC did not apply as the respondents had intentionally disregarded O. 6 r. 7(2A) RHC for their own reasons. [5] In the context of the Rules of the High Court 1980 the phrase “...technical non-compliance...” refers to non-compliance with a rule which is not fundamental or mandatory in nature. O. 1A RHC cannot be invoked to cure the failure to comply with the prerequisites O. 1A RHC. The answer to question two was in the negative.”. [32] Y.A Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera J (Y.A pada ketika itu) dalam kes Ong Commodities Pte Ltd v. kek Tek Huat Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 10 CLJ 585, bagi keperluan untuk “pre-trial discovery of documents” memutuskan − “[6] The remedy of pre-action discovery is primarily intended to enable justice to be done − see O. 24 r. 7A(5). The House of Lords in Ashworth Hospital Authority v. MGN Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2033; [2002] 4 All ER 193, quoted with approval the words of Templeman LJ in British Steel Corporation v. Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at p. 1132 to the following effect: In my judgment, the principle of the Norwich Pharmacal case applies whether or not the victim intends to pursue action in the courts against the wrongdoer, provided that the existence of a cause of action is established and the victim cannot otherwise obtain justice. The remedy of discovery is intended in the final analysis to enable justice to be done.”. [33] Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan Y.A Azizan Md Arshad JC, Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang dalam kes Alam Langkawi Sdn Bhd v. Yew Sow Chee Selaku Pentadbir Pusaka Simati Soon Eng Kooi & Ors [2024] CLJU 1435 yang memutuskan − “[23] Dalam masa yang sama Pihak Defendan-Defendan masih boleh memfailkan semula permohonan penzahiran ini kerana Mahkamah ini tidak melupuskan atas merit tetapi hanya membatalkannya atas ketidakpatuhan kepada Aturan 24 kaedah 7A KKM 2012 semata-mata. [24] Keputusan ini bukanlah muktamad dan ianya tidak menghalang Defendan-Defendan untuk memfailkannya semula dan tiada isu res judicata yang timbul pada peringkat ini. Dalam kes Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v. Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783; [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (Supreme Court) memutuskan bahawa − “The said cause of action may not be re-litigated between the same parties because it is res judicata. In order to prevent multiplicity of actions and also in order to protect the underlying rationales protect of estoppel per rem judicatum and not to act against them, such estoppel of cause of action has been extended to all other causes of action (based on the same facts or issues) which should have been litigated or asserted in the original earlier action resulting in the final judgment and which were not either deliberately or due to inadvertence.”. [34] Plaintif-Perayu dalam proses untuk mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap pelaku (motolori) yang terlibat dalam kemalangan jalan raya dengan Plaintif-Perayu memerlukan dokumen rakaman CCTV tempat kemalangan daripada KESAS Sdn Bhd. Plaintif-Perayu masih boleh memfailkan semula permohonan penzahiran ini. Prinsip Campur tangan dan Gangguan Mahkamah pada peringkat rayuan [35] Ciri utama bagi sesuatu “appellate intervention” adalah jelas dan mantap dalam semua peringkat rayuan. Tugas Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan ialah untuk memastikan sama ada Mahkamah yang membicarakan itu mencapai keputusannya berdasarkan keputusan atau dapatan secara betul mengenai keterangan dan berasaskan kepada undang-undang. [36] Selanjutnya, Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator Of The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ memutuskan − “[148] Given the aforesaid, we form the view that rather than adopting a rigid set of rules to demarcate the boundaries of appellate intervention insofar as findings of fact are concerned, the “plainly wrong” test as espoused in decisions of this court should be retained as a flexible guide for appellate courts. As long as the trial judge’s conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts.”. [37] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 memutuskan – “[14] In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention, ie to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase ‘insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence’ merely related to such process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention, ie that a decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test.”. [38] Begitu juga dalam kes Kerajaan Malaysia v. Global Upline Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2017] 1 MLJ 170 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa “an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion and where there has been insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence.”. [39] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 memutuskan “the principle on which an appellate court could interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is ‘the plainly wrong test’ principle”. [40] Prinsip undang-undang mengenai appellate intervention only justified that on the available evidence, that the SCj is erred (Kes Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 146). [41] Dua ujian yang dikenal pasti perlu dipenuhi bagi tujuan appellate intervention adalah “plainly wrong test” and “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence test” (the case of Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 at 98-99). [42] Dalam kes Ong Leong Ciou & Anor v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2019] 3 MLRA 322 at 329, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa – “[125] We are mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relation to the findings of facts made by the court of first instance. The general principle is that the conclusion of a trial judge is a finding of fact on the oral evidence based on the demean our and credibility of the witness before him or her. Generally, such finding ought not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is plainly wrong. It would not be sufficient to warrant an appellate interference merely because the appellate court entertains doubt whether such finding is right.”. [43] Dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa – “... an appellate Court should not interfere with factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial Judge was plainly wrong or one that no reasonable Judge could have reached. If it is not, the fact that the appellate Court may have reached a different conclusion on the facts, is irrelevant.”. [44] Dalam kes rayuan dari Mahkamah Sesyen ini, apabila dapatan undang-undang oleh Pn HMS yang bijaksana adalah tepat maka rumusan bahawa Saman Pemula bagi penzahiran (discovery) tidak perlu dibetulkan dan/atau diusik oleh Mahkamah ini. Pembacaan dan pemahaman Pn HMS yang bijaksana adalah betul dan teratur. Kesimpulan [45] Berdasarkan alasan yang saya nyatakan di atas, penghakiman saya memutuskan bahawa keputusan Pn HMS yang bijaksana adalah tidak khilaf dan keputusan Pn HMS yang bijaksana adalah menurut lunas undang-undang. Oleh yang demikian rayuan Plaintif-Perayu ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM3000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur). [46] Pada peringkat rayuan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, saya telah menjalankan appellate role. Oleh itu Mahkamah ini would not interfere with findings of facts. The findings and interpretation of the law by the learned SCj are correct. Bertarikh: 6 September 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Sivil NCvC12 Peguam cara: Bagi Pihak Plaintif−Perayu: Kengadharan A/L Ramasamy Tetuan R Kengadharan & Co., Petaling Jaya Bagi Pihak Defendan−Responden: Ang Lay Ling Tetuan Douglas Chai Chambers, Petaling Jaya