Ong Bing Hong v Tan Boon Twee (MA-A52NCvC-33-09/2020)

Ikatan Pliding Kandungan 27 (“A”);

Ikatan Dokumen Bersama Jilid 1 Kandungan 32 (“B”);

Ikatan Dokumen Bersama Jilid 2 Kandungan 33 (“C”);

Ikatan Dokumen Bersama Tambahan Kandungan 44 (“D”);

Ikatan Pliding Terpinda Kandungan 47 (“E”);

Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Plaintif Kandungan 50 (“F”);

Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Ke-2 Plaintif Kandungan 55 (“G”);

Isu-Isu Untuk Dibicarakan Kandungan 48; dan

Fakta-Fakta Yang Dipersetujui Kandungan 49. 40 FAKTA-FAKTA YANG DIPERSETUJUI [ 6 ] Fakta-fakta yang dipersetujui pihak-pihak adalah seperti berikut:

Plaintif adalah warganegara Malaysia dan beralamat di No. 36, Jalan Kota Laksamana ¼, Taman Kota Laksamana, 75200 Melaka. 45

(ii) Defendan adalah seorang peguam warganegara Malaysia yang menjalankan amalan guaman dengan nama dan gaya Tetuan Lawrence Tan & Associates yang beralamat di No. 17-1, Jalan PPS2, Pusat Perniagaan Putra Sentosa, 75150 Melaka.

(iii) Pada Mac 2014, Plaintif telah melantik Defendan untuk mewakili Plaintif 50 di dalam satu kes rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan No. Rayuan Sivil: W- 02(NCVC)(W)-574-03 Tahun 2014 terhadap seorang yang bernama Er Teck Hwa dan Ee Chin Li. Plaintif telah membayar yuran guaman sebanyak RM38,000-00 kepada Defendan berkenaan pelantikan tersebut.

(iv) Peguamcara yang terdahulu Plaintif adalah Chan Tse Yuen yang telah mewakili Plaintif di dalam tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Er Teck Hwa dan Ee Chin Li di dalam Guaman Sivil No. 23NCVC-127-11-2012 di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur (selepas ini akan dirujuk sebagai 60 “Guaman tersebut”) dan Chan Tse Yuen telah menyediakan Nota Keterangan untuk perbicaraan Guaman Sivil tersebut.

Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam Guaman tersebut telah menolak tuntutan Plaintif dengan alasan-alasan berikut: 65 a. Plaintif telah hadir ditempat kejadian (iaitu tempat perkuburan) bukannya untuk memotivasikan kawan-kawan beliau tetapi untuk berdepan dengan anak saudara beliau disebabkan salah faham yang telah berlaku di antara mereka. Oleh yang demikian, dakwaan 70 Plaintif bahawa beliau telah hadir di tempat perkuburan tersebut untuk memotivasikan kawan-kawan beliau telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. b. Kandungan-kandungan laporan-laporan polis yang telah dibuat oleh 75 Defendan-Defendan di dalam Guaman Sivil tersebut tidak bersifat fitnah kerana kandungan laporan-laporan tersebut adalah benar secara substantial (“substantially true”). Oleh yang demikian pembelaan justifikasi yang diguna pakai oleh Defendan-Defendan tersebut telah diterima oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. 80 c. Defendan-Defendan di dalam Guaman Sivil tersebut telah membuktikan pembelaan komen berpatutan.

(vi) Plaintif kemudian merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Nota Keterangan 85 tersebut juga dimasukkan ke dalam Rekod Rayuan dan digunakan semasa Perbicaraan Rayuan Guaman Tersebut.

(vii) Plaintif kemudiannya melantik Defendan sebagai Peguamcaranya. Plaintif memberikan kepada Defendan transkripsi Nota Keterangan yang 90 terbaru tersebut untuk digunakan semasa perbicaraan Rayuan pada 15 September 2014.

(viii) Nota Keterangan terbaru tidak dimasukkan ke dalam Rekod Rayuan Tambahan untuk digunakan semasa Rayuan Guaman tersebut.

(ix) Plaintif telah membuat aduan terhadap Defendan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib Peguambela dan Peguamcara di bawah peruntukan Akta Profesion Undang-undang 1976 (Akta 166).

Jawatankuasa Tatatertib telah ditubuhkan dan menjalankan inkuiri ke 100 atas Defendan dan mendapati bahawa tidak wujud liabiliti di pihak Defendan.

(xi) Laporan dan dapatan Jawatankuasa Tatatertib telah dipertimbangkan oleh Lembaga Tatatertib yang mengesahkan dapatan Jawatankuasa 105 Tatatertib tersebut dan menolak aduan Plaintif.

(xii) Plaintif yang tidak berpuas hati dengan dapatan tersebut telah memfailkan Saman Pemula di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Melaka No. MA-17D-1-05/2022 untuk mengetepikan dan membatalkan 110 keputusan Jawatankuasa Tatatertib tersebut.

(xiii) Pada 14 Mac 2023 Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak Saman Pemula tersebut dengan kos sebanyak RM3,000.00. 115 ISU-ISU UNTUK DIBICARAKAN [ 7 ] Manakala isu-isu untuk dibicarakan adalah seperti berikut:

Sama ada kausa tindakan Plaintif di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini adalah sama dengan aduan Plaintif di Lembaga Tatatertib Peguambela dan Peguamcara di bawah Akta Profession Undang-Undang 1976 (Akta 166)?

(ii) Sama ada wujud kecuaian oleh Defendan dalam menjalankan tugasnya sebagai peguamcara yang dilantik untuk mewakili Plaintif di dalam kes Rayuannya di Mahkamah Rayuan (No. Rayuan: W-02(NCVC)(W)-574- 03/2014 seperti mana terkandung di dalam perenggan 9 Pernyataan 125 Tuntutan Terpinda Plaintif?

(iii) Sama ada prinsip res judicata terpakai untuk menghalang Plaintif dari meneruskan tindakan ini dengan membangkitkan isu-isu yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka di dalam Saman Pemula No: 130 MA-17D-1-05/2022?

(iv) Sama ada Defendan dilindungi oleh prinsip “Limited Immunity” di dalam mengendalikan prosiding di Mahkamah Rayuan? 135

Sama ada kausa tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalangi oleh Had Masa dan/atau Akta Had Masa 1953?

(vi) Sama ada prinsip “estopple” dan/atau “laches” terpakai terhadap Plaintif bagi menghalang Plaintif daripada mengemukakan dan/atau meneruskan 140 tindakan ini terhadap Defendan? FAKTA RINGKAS KES [ 8 ] Plaintif telah melantik Defendan untuk mewakili Plaintif di peringkat rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan setelah tindakan plaintif untuk suatu kausa tindakan tort fitnah 145 ditolak di peringkat Mahkamah Tinggi. Semasa di Mahkamah Tinggi, Plaintif telah diwakili oleh firma guaman dan peguam lain bernama Chan Tse Yuen. [ 9 ] Daripada kecuaian professional Defendan dalam mengendalikan dan/atau mewakili Plaintif di dalam suatu rayuan sivil di Mahkamah Rayuan No. Rayuan Sivil 150 W–02(NCvC)(W)–574–03–2014 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “rayuan Plaintif tersebut”) sehingga menyebabkan rayuan Plaintif tersebut ditolak oleh panel Mahkamah Rayuan pada 15.9.2014. [ 10 ] Plaintif menuntut bahawa Defendan telah cuai dalam pengendalian rayuan 155 Plaintif di Mahkamah Rayuan seperti berikut:

Gagal untuk mendapatkan Penyata Saksi bagi saksi Ho Hsien Rui dari peguamcara Plaintif yang terdahulu untuk dimasukkan di dalam Rekod Rayuan semasa perbicaraan rayuan tersebut;

(ii) Gagal untuk menghujahkan percanggahan-percanggahan material di dalam Alasan Penghakiman dengan Nota-Nota Keterangan;

(iii) Hanya menyerahkan NK Baru secara serahan tangan pada hari perbicaraan rayuan 15 September 2014;

(Iv) Gagal menjalankan tugasnya di dalam pendengaran rayuan tersebut 165

Gagal untuk memastikan dokumen-dokumen adalah lengkap sebelum bersedia menjalankan pendengaran rayuan tersebut;

(vi) Defendan menyerahkan ringkasan alasan Penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi secara serahan tangan tanpa memfailkan dokumen yang sepatutnya;

(vii) CD-CD CRT tidak dimasukkan sebagai dokumen di dalam Rekod Rayuan;

(viii) Gagal memaklumkan dan membangkaitkan isu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa laporan polis yang dibuat oleh ETH dan ECL adalah tidak benar. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN 175 [ 11 ] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang bahawa beban terletak pada pihak Plaintif untuk membuktikan setiap fakta seperti yang dipohon dalam pernyataan tuntutannya. Beban tidak akan dipindahkan kepada Defendan selagi Plaintif tidak melepaskannya. 180 [ 12 ] Ini adalah selaras dengan Seksyen 101, 102 dan 103 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan bahawa beban pembuktian adalah kepada Plaintif untuk membuktikan tuntutannya:

Beban Bukti 185

Barang siapa yang berkehendakkan Mahkamah memberikan penghakiman tentang apa-apa hak atau laibiliti di sisi undang-undang, dengan bergantung pada adanya fakta-fakta yang ditegaskan olehnya, mestilah membuktikan bahawa fakta-fakta itu ada.

Apabila seseorang terikat untuk membuktikan adanya sesuatu fakta, 190 maka adalah dikatakan bahawa beban bukti terletak pada orang itu.

Pada siapa terletaknya beban bukti Beban bukti di dalam sesuatu guaman atau prosiding terletak pada orang yang mungkin gagal sekiranya tidak ada langsung keterangan diberi oleh 195 mana-mana pihak.

Beban bukti mengenai fakta tertentu. Beban bukti mengenai sesuatu fakta tertentu terletak pada orang yang berkehendakkan mahkamah mempercayai tentang adanya fakta itu, melainkan jika ada diperuntukkan oleh mana-mana undang-undang 200 bahawa bukti mengenai fakta itu terletak pada mana-mana orang tertentu. [ 13 ] Di dalam kes Tenaga Nasional Berhad v. Perwaja Steel Sdn. Bhd. (1998) 2 CLJ 740 Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa: 205 “… He went on to say that under s. 101 of the Evidence Act 1950, that the onus is on the appellant to prove that they are entitled to the claim. The burden is on the appellant and it is his duty to prove its claim affirmatively. In this respect the learned judge found on the evidence adduced before him the appellant failed to prove its claim.” 210 [ 14 ] Manakala di dalam kes Selvaduray v. Chinniah (1939) MLJ 195, Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa: “… that the onus was on the Plaintiff to prove his case and that, the position at 215 the conclusion of the trial being exactly even, the Plaintiff had not discharged the onus which was on him and his action must fail”. [ 15 ] Di dalam kes yang sama Yang Arif Hakim telah merujuk pada kes Nanyang Development (1966) Sdn Bhd v. How Swee Poh [1969] 1 LNS 116;[1970] 1 MLJ 220 145 yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[7] ... the burden of proving a fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmation of the issue and not upon the party who denies it: for a negative is usually incapable of proof.” 225 [ 16 ] Seterusnya, Yang Arif Hakim juga telah merujuk pada kes UN Pandey v. Hotel Marco Polo Pte. Ltd. [1978] 1 LNS 223;[1980] 1 MLJ 4 yang mana Sinnthuray J. telah memutuskan seperti berikut: 230 “[8] ... In civil cases, as much as in criminal cases, a party must prove his case before the burden of proof shifts to the other side ... In a civil case, it is on a balance of probabilities. But the proof is that the balance must be tilted by the plaintiff before the defendant makes his case.” 235 [ 17 ] Dalam kes Hong Yik Trading v. Liziz Plantation Sdn. Bhd. [2017] 8 CLJ 491, Ketua Hakim Negara Arifin Zakaria memutuskan bahawa: “It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party who asserts that the facts exist (section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950). Where a 240 party on whom the burden of proof lies has discharged that burden, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party. However, if the party on whom the burden of proof lies fails to discharge it, the other party need not call any evidence.” 245 [ 18 ] Dalam kes Tan Kim Khuan v. Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1998] 1 CLJ SUPP 147 Augustine Paul PK (pada masa itu) memutuskan seperti berikut: “It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies has discharged it then the evidential burden shifts to the other party ... What shifts is 250 the responsibility of adducing evidence to discharge that burden ... When the burden shifts to the other party it can be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. No adverse inference can be drawn against that party for failure to give evidence 255 himself. If he does not adduce any evidence when the burden has shifted to him he will fail. If the party on whom the burden lies fails to discharge it the other party need not call any evidence. In that event it will not avail him to turn round and say that the respondent has not established his.” 260 [ 19 ] Dalam pembuktian kes Sivil adalah untuk Plaintif membuktikan kesnya atas imbangan kebarangkalian. [ 20 ] Dalam kes Carbon Company Sdn. Bhd. v. Ng Lee Hoon [2017] 6 CLJ 189 yang mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan: 265 “The law on the burden of proof is so settled, pursuant to s 101(1) of the Evidence Act 1950, a party who desires the court to give judgement in its favour as to the legal right or liability bears the burden to prove its case. The burden of proof on that party is two-fold, firstly the burden of establishing a case and secondly the 270 burden of introducing evidence. This burden lies on the party throughout the case and the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Once that party has discharged its evidential burden of proof then the burden would then shift to its adversary. If a party has failed to discharge its burden of proof on the standard required by the law, his adversary does not bear the burden to adduce any 275 evidence. In the case at hand, the plaintiff a sole proprietor has to discharge her burden of proof to prove her case as well as to introduce evidence in support of her pleaded case. It is not the defendant’s duty to fill up the gaps in the plaintiff’s case/or be accused of not establishing their defence.” 280 [ 21 ] Dalam kes Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 1 MLRA 647 Mahkamah telah menyatakan: “The standard of proof in civil cases is the legal standard to which a party is required to prove its case, namely on a balance of probabilities. In civil litigation, 285 the question of the probability or improbability of an action occurring is an important consideration to be taken into account in deciding whether that particular event had actually taken place or not.” PERTIMBANGAN MAHKAMAH 290

Isu 1 - Sama ada kausa tindakan Plaintif di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini adalah sama dengan aduan Plaintif di Lembaga Tatatertib Peguambela dan Peguamcara di bawah Akta Profession Undang-Undang 1976 (Akta 166)? [ 22 ] Plaintif berhujah bahawa tindakan di Mahkamah Sesyen Melaka ini adalah satu 295 kausa tindakan yang berbeza dengan aduan Plaintif di Lembaga Tatatertib Peguambela dan Peguamcara. [ 23 ] Ini adalah kerana tindakan yang diambil oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan adalah satu tindakan di bawah Tort iaitu di bawah Kecuaian Profesional manakala aduan 300 Plaintif di Lembaga Tatatertib adalah berkaitan dengan aduan salah laku peguam. [ 24 ] Menurut Plaintif Lembaga Tatatertib hanya mempunyai kuasa untuk mendengar aduan Pengadu berkenaan salah laku Peguam dan tidak mempunyai apa-apa kuasa lain untuk mendengar dan memberi perintah lain selain dari isu salah laku 305 peguam sahaja. [ 25 ] Plaintif merujuk kepada kes BAR Malaysia v. Neasarani T Singara Thevar & Anor [2015] 8 CLJ 634 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: 310 “[8] We have read the appeal records and able submission of the parties. After much consideration to the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, we take the view that the appeal must be dismissed. Our reasons inter alia are as follows:

disciplinary actions are quasi penal in nature. Procedural fairness in such proceeding is part of constitutional guarantees under the Federal Constitution. Support for the proposition is found in a number of cases. We do not wish to set them out here. [See Bato Bagi v. Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak [2011] 8 CLJ 766; 320 [2013] 5 BLR 727].

(ii) in addition, the respondent's citation of the following cases in support of their proposition that:

the DC has no jurisdiction to go beyond the complainant and make a finding 325 of guilty on a matter not before it ie. jurisdictional failure; and/or

even if it has the jurisdiction, the additional complaint and/or allegation had to be put first to the respondent, to allow them to give an explanation, otherwise it would tantamount to making a decision behind the back of the respondent was 330 useful in arriving at this decision, namely:

Tan Tiang Hin Jerry v. Singapore Medical Council [2000] 2 SLR 274; (ii) Seah Pong Tshai [1992] 1 SLR 399; (iii) Fairmont Investment v. Secretary for the Environment [1976] 2 All ER 865; (iv) H Sabey & Co Ltd v. Secretary of State for 335 the Environment [1978] 1 All ER 586.

(iii) in the instant case, the complaint by the complainant had nothing to do with money lending transaction. The DC was not mandated to inquire misconduct relating to money lending transaction. The DC conclusion reads as follows: 340 We are of the opinion that the Respondents as Advocates and Solicitors facilitated a money-lending transaction such as that in the present case is highly improper. 345 This is perverse and the DC had acted outside its jurisdiction.

(iv) in addition, we also note that the rule of natural justice has also been breached in the instant case which issue has been dealt with by the learned judge adequately. [See Rohana Ariffin v. Universiti Sains Malaysia & Another Case 350 [1988] 1 CLJ 559; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 390; [1989] 1 MLJ 487].

it was the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that most jurisdiction allow the DC (or its equivalent entity) to go beyond the scope of the complaint provided they are related to the original complaint, and that the respondent is 355 given sufficient notice of the scope and extent of the investigation. The submission of learned counsel on this issue reads as follows:

As an observation, it is noted that most jurisdictions allow the DC (or its equivalent entity) to go beyond the scope of the complaint, provided they are 360 related to the original complaint, and that the Respondent is given sufficient notice of the scope and extent of the investigation. In our case, it is respectively submitted that the numerous money-leading issues were indeed related to the original complaint, adequately ventilated during the various Q&A sessions in the DC inquiry, and sufficient opportunity were given to the 2 Respondents to rebut 365 or explain their positions.

The other issue to be highlighted is that for certain jurisdictions like Singapore and New Zealand, the complainant's Charge has to be framed by the appointed body. Given that Malaysia falls under the 'non-framing' regime, so-to-speak, this 370 essentially means that the parameters of the Complaint can be reasonably extended without any issue, so long as the additional issues are related to the original complaint, and sufficient notice is given to the relevant respondent.

(vi) even as per the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, it must be 375 related to the original complaint by the first complainant as disclosed in his letter dated 15 October 2009 to the Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam and must be given notice of the extent of investigation. Clearly that was not done in this case to justify there was indeed procedural fairness. In addition, the Legal Profession Act does not permit the DC to clothe itself as a judge, prosecutor and 380 executioner. Malaysian jurisprudence and constitutional safeguards do not permit that. [See Md Desa Hashim v. PP [1995] 4 CLJ 677; [1995] 3 MLJ 350; PP v. A Juvenile [1990] 1 CLJ 968; [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 669; [1990] 3 MLJ 117].

(vii) the appellant has brought to our attention one or two cases in Malaysia which 385 support the proposition that the DC can travel outside its mandate. [See Koh Mui Tee v. Chin Lee & Ors [2014] 1 LNS 966; Ding Siew Ching v. Ling Peek Hoe [2014] 8 CLJ 156]. We have read those cases and the counsel in those cases have not guided the court with relevant jurisprudence and case laws to permit the DC to enjoy the role of judge, prosecutor and executioner, taking into 390 consideration the constitutional guarantees to procedural fairness entrenched in our Federal Constitution. [See Kekatong Sdn. Bh.d v. Danaharta Urus Sdn. Bhd. [2003] 3 CLJ 378; [2003] 3 MLJ 1]. [ 26 ] Plaintif juga merujuk kepada Seksyen 94 Akta Profession Undang-Undang 395 1976 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “94 Power of Disciplinary Board to strike off the Roll, suspend for misconduct, etc 400

All advocates and solicitors shall be subject for the purposes of all disciplinary actions to the control of the Disciplinary Board.

….. 405

For the purpose of this Part, “misconduct” means conduct or omission to act in Malaysia or elsewhere by an advocate and solicitors in a professional capacity or otherwise which amounts to grave impropriety and includes –

…

…” 410 [ 27 ] Selanjutnya Plaintif berhujah bahawa Lembaga Tatatertib tidak mempunyai sebarang kuasa untuk memutuskan sama ada Defendan telah melakukan sebarang kecuaian atau tidak kerana bidang kuasa untuk menentukan sama ada Defendan telah melakukan kecuaian professional (“professional negligence”) ataupun tidak 415 adalah di Mahkamah ini. [ 28 ] Manakala Defendan telah berhujah bahawa dakwaan Plaintif ini bercanggah dengan pendirian Plaintif sendiri di dalam kertas-kertas kausa yang telah difailkan di dalam prosiding di Lembaga Tatatertib kerana di dalam kertas-kertas kausa tersebut, 420 Plaintif sendiri telah mendakwa bahawa Defendan telah melakukan kecuaian dan bukannya salah laku. [ 29 ] Seterusnya Defendan telah merujuk kepada kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan di dalam prosiding tatatertib seperti berikut: 425

Alasan rayuan di dalam SP di mana Plaintif mengatakan “1. Responden telah cuai dalam menjalankan khidmatnya sebagai peguamcara yang dilantik oleh Perayu.” Rujuk: C/289.

(ii) Di dalam afidavit menyokong SP, Plaintif mengatakan “8. Responden walaupun telah mendapat transkripsi tersebut telah cuai dan gagal untuk mengambil apa-apa tindakan yang sewajarnya untuk memastikan Nota Keterangan yang diperbetulkan tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam Rekod Rayuan Tambahan dan difailkan di Mahkamah Rayuan untuk 435 digunakan di dalam Pendengaran Rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan pada masa yang material.” Rujuk: C/293. “13(iii). Responden telah cuai dan lalai dalam tanggungjawabnya untuk 440 menjaga hak saya sebagai anak guamnya.” Rujuk: C/295. “14. Saya sesungguhnya percaya wujud kecuaian yang telah dilakukan oleh Defendan terhadap saya dan saya percaya bahawa kesilapan tersebut adalah 445 fatal dan menyebabkan kes saya telah ditolak di Mahkamah Tinggi dan juga di Mahkamah Rayuan.” 450 Rujuk: C/296. “15. Setelah fakta-fakta ini kemukakan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam, namun Lembaga telah gagal mengambilkira faktor-faktor kecuaian dan kelalaian Responden dalam menolak Aduan Perayu.” 455 Rujuk: C/296

(iii) Di dalam Afidavit Balasan, Plaintif mengatakan “12 ….. Responden telah cuai dalam menjalankan tanggungjawabnya untuk membuat satu permohonan kepada Mahkamah Rayuan bagi memasukkan dan memfailkan Nota Keterangan yang diperbetulkan tersebut.” 460 Rujuk: C/319. “20. ….Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam telah tidak membuat keputusan yang betul dan tepat apabila menolak aduan Perayu. Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam telah gagal untuk melihat dan memberikan keputusan 465 bahawa Responden telah melakukan “kecuaian” dan “salah laku” di dalam mengendalikan kes Perayu di Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut.” Rujuk: C/322.

(iv) Peguamcara Plaintif sendiri telah mengakui kausa tindakan kecuaian 470 semasa menerima keputusan HMT(SP) di mana nota prosiding pada 14.3.2023 menunjukkan “YA: Tapi, Bar Council telah mendapati tidak ada apa-apa negligence kan. AI: Ya.” 475 [ 30 ] Mahkamah perlu memutuskan sama ada apakah keterangan yang harus diterima sama ada keterangan dokumentari ataupun keterangan lisan melalui saksi dari Plaintif tersebut. [ 31 ] Di dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu Anvest Corp. Sdn. Bhd. v. Wong Siew 480 Choong Sdn. Bhd. [1998] 2 MLJ 30 telah memutuskan bahawa: “The appeal before us involves several material contemporaneous letters and oral evidence as to whether the appellant is the purchaser of the said land. We are of the view that those contemporaneous letters written before any dispute 485 had arisen must be given better credence than the oral evidence, unless the totality of the evidence clearly shows otherwise.” [ 32 ] Manakala di dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu Foo Sam Ming v. Archi Environ Partnership [2014] 1 MLJ 449 telah memutuskan bahawa: 490 “[4] Counsel on both sides took us through the evidence with meticulous care. I am grateful to them for their efforts. But at the end of the day, the evidence before the judge more than sufficiently supports her finding that it was the appellant who personally appointed the respondent to draw plans for the project 495 in question. Counsel for the appellant repeatedly referred us to his client’s oral evidence denying the appointment. However, our attention was drawn by counsel for the respondent to contemporary documentary evidence in the appellant’s own hand that contradicted his viva voce testimony. The learned judge approached the question of appointment by preferring the 500 contemporaneous documents to the rather tenuous and tardy and unconvincing oral explanations given by the appellant on oath. “[5] Was she right in this approach? I think that she was. There are a number of authorities from which support may be drawn for such an approach that the trial 505 judge here adopted. It is sufficient that I quote from two of them. [6] The first is Tindok Besar Estates Sdn. Bhd. .v Tinjar Co. [1979] 2 MLJ 229, where Chang Min Tat FJ said (at p 234): 510 Nevertheless, the learned trial judge expressed himself to be completely satisfied with the veracity of the respondent’s witness and their evidence. He purported to come to certain findings of fact on the oral evidence but did not notice or consider that the respondent’s oral evidence openly clashed with its contemporaneous documentary evidence. For myself, I rely on the acts and 515 deeds of a witness which are contemporaneous with the event and to draw the reasonable inferences from them than to believe his subsequent recollection or version of it, particularly if he is a witness with a purpose of his own to serve and if it did not account for the statements in his documents and writings. Judicial perception of the evidence requires that the oral evidence be critically tested 520 against the whole of the other evidence and the circumstances of the case. Plausibility should never be mistaken for veracity.” [ 33 ] Daripada kedua-dua kes Mahkamah Rayuan di atas jelas bahawa pihak-pihak adalah terikat dengan kertas-kertas kausa yang telah difailkan di Mahkamah 525 berbanding dengan keterangan yang dibawa secara lisan. [ 34 ] Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa daripada kertas-kertas kausa yang telah difailkan di Mahkamah jelas menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif telah memfailkan kausa tindakan kecuaian terhadap Defendan di Lembaga Tatatertib. 530

(ii) Isu 2 - Sama ada wujud kecuaian oleh Defendan dalam menjalankan tugasnya sebagai peguamcara yang dilantik untuk mewakili Plaintif di dalam kes Rayuannya di Mahkamah Rayuan (No. Rayuan: W-02(NCVC)(W)-574-03/2014 sepertimana terkandung di dalam perenggan 9 Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda Plaintif? 535 [ 35 ] Plaintif menyatakan bahawa Defendan telah cuai dalam menjalankan khidmatnya dan butiran kecuaian adalah seperti berikut:

Gagal untuk mendapatkan Penyata Saksi bagi saksi Ho Hsien Rui dari 540 peguamcara Plaintif yang terdahulu untuk dimasukkan di dalam Rekod Rayuan semasa perbicaraan rayuan tersebut;

(ii) Gagal untuk menghujahkan percanggahan-percanggahan material di dalam Alasan Penghakiman dengan Nota-Nota Keterangan;

(iii) Hanya menyerahkan Nota Keterangan yang baru secara serahan tangan pada hari perbicaraan rayuan 15 September 2014;

(iv) Gagal menjalankan tugasnya di dalam perbicaraan rayuan tersebut 550

Gagal untuk memastikan dokumen-dokumen adalah lengkap sebelum bersedia menjalankan perbicaraan rayuan tersebut; 555

(vi) Defendan menyerahkan ringkasan alasan Penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi secara serahan tangan tanpa memfailkan dokumen yang sepatutnya;

(vii) CD-CD CRT tidak dimasukkan sebagai dokumen di dalam Rekod Rayuan;

(viii) Perkara ini telah menyebabkan Mahkamah Rayuan tidak boleh menggunapakai Nota Keterangan Kedua tersebut;

(ix) Gagal memaklumkan dan membangkitkan isu kepada Mahkamah 565 Rayuan bahawa laporan Polis yang di buat oleh Er Teck Hwa dan Ee Chin Li adalah tidak benar. [ 36 ] Menurut Plaintif, wujud kecuaian yang telah dilakukan oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif dan Plaintif percaya bahawa kecuaian tersebut adalah fatal dan menyebabkan 570 Rayuan Plaintif telah ditolak di Mahkamah Rayuan. [ 37 ] Plaintif telah merujuk kepada kes Nyo Nyo Aye v. Kevin Sathiaseelan Ramakrishnan & Anor And Another Appeal [2020] 5 CLJ 82 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan bahawa wujud kecuaian oleh Defendan yang “gagal menasihati 575 anak guamnya” seperti berikut: “[62] Further, at para. 29 (iv), the learned JC held that the defendants were negligent in not filing for an extension of time from the court on an urgent basis to enable the plaintiff to pay the SFC after the stay of proceedings application 580 was dismissed. The learned JC also found at para. (ix) that the first defendant was negligent and/or in breach of the retainer when he failed to advise the plaintiff diligently on the importance and/or the need for actions to be taken as follows: Based on the evidence before me, it was apparent that apart from the cause 585 papers being filed for purposes of the stay, there was no documentary evidence nor independent evidence to show that the first defendant had rendered such advice to the plaintiff. [63] And, having gone through the acts or omissions of negligence, the learned 590 JC concluded as follows: Hence, I am constraint to hold that the first defendant was negligent and/or in breach of the retainer when he failed to advise the plaintiff diligently on the importance and/or the need for actions to be taken. 595 [64] On the need to call expert evidence, we are of the view that in our instant case the fact that no expert was called to give evidence on the standard of care, is not fatal. The case of Shearn Delamore and Tetuan Theselim Mohd Sahal have to be distinguished. Tetuan Shearn Delamore (supra) it is a case on 600 intellectual property and the case of Tetuan Theselim Mohd Sahal (supra ) involves an SPA. Both these cases on intellectual property and conveyancing require an expert to be called to establish the standard of care required or expected from competent practitioners practicing in those specialised fields to establish whether the standard of care has been breached. In our instant case, 605 it is a simple case. It pertains to the duty of a practitioner to inform and advise the client of the consequence of non-payment of SFC which would result in the case being struck off. It involves the duty of the practitioner to be diligent, to ask for an extension of time if time has expired and foremost to inform the client on the prospect of success of the client's case and not lead the client on and when 610 the case got struck off to turn the table against the client by alleging that the case has no prospect or chances of winning after all. We found the learned JC had extensively delved into the facts of the case before His Lordship made his findings that the defendants are negligent and in breach of their retainer. The learned JC also found the defendants' version improbable as against the 615 plaintiff's version which is probable since the defendants, as professionals, have not kept any records of correspondences of their communication with the plaintiff on matters of great importance. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the learned JC's findings are correct and therefore do not warrant our appellate intervention”. 620 [ 38 ] Sebaliknya Defendan berhujah bahawa setelah membandingkan nota keterangan asal dengan nota keterangan baru ianya tidak perlu dibawa ke perhatian Mahkamah Rayuan atas alasan berikut: 625

Tidak wujud sebarang perbezaan yang material diantara NK Asal dengan NK Baru tersebut.

(ii) NK Baru tersebut telah diserahkan kepada Defendan terlalu lewat iaitu hanya beberapa hari sahaja sebelum pendengaran pada 15.9.2014.

(iii) Defendan berpendapat bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan tidak akan 630 membenarkan sebarang permohonan untuk mengemukakan NK Baru tersebut di dalam tempoh masa yang begitu singkat sebelum pendengaran rayuan pada 15.9.2014.

(iv) Lagipun NK Asal telah digunapakai dan dirujuk di dalam prosiding GSMT tanpa sebarang bantahan daripada peguamcara-peguamcara Plaintif dan 635 Defendan-Defendan.

Sekiranya permohonan ditolak oleh Mahkamah Rayuan, Plaintif akan dikenakan kos. [ 39 ] Selanjutnya Defendan menjelaskan bahawa beliau telah membuat suatu 640 “judgment call” sebagai peguamcara yang mengendalikan selepas mengambil kira fakta-fakta seperti yang dinyatakan tersebut. [ 40 ] Defendan telah merujuk kepada kes Kesang Leasing Sdn. Bhd. v. Tetuan Zul Rafique & Partners (sued as a firm) [2015] 7 MLJ 573 di mana John Louis O’ 645 Hara J. telah mengatakan prinsip undang-undang atas isu “judgment call” ini seperti berikut: “[17] This principle had been established as far back as the 19th century in the English case of Purves v Landell (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 91 where Lord Brougham at 650 p 103 held that: But it is only if he has been guilty of gross negligence, because it would be monstrous to say that he is responsible for even failing into what must be considered a mistake. You can only expect from him that he will be honest and diligent; and if there is no fault to be found either with his integrity or diligence, 655 that is all for which he is answerable. It would be utterly impossible that you could ever have a class of men who would give a guarantee, binding on themselves, in giving legal advice and conducting suits at law, to always be right. In court proceedings we often see advocates, who have exercised reasonable 660 care and competence, taking diametrically opposite views. It will then become the function of judges to decide which view is the correct one. The view is that is not accepted may be considered wrong. The fact that one view turns out to be wrong does not mean that the advocate has been negligent. In the same vein, it is also not unusual to find that judges who had held a particular view be later 665 found to be incorrect when the matter is taken up and, decided on appeal. In other words, there is really no duty to be right, only to ensure that one acts with integrity and diligence in exercising reasonable care and still that is expected of him or her. 670 In the instant case, I do not think there was any breach of duty on the part of the defendant, I think SD1 had quite appropriately and justifiably raised fairly persuasive arguments which any reasonable competent practitioner would have done. It was unfortunate for him and the plaintiff in this case that the learned judge did not did it in their favour. It was a matter, to my mind, which could have 675 gone either way, as it sometimes happens in the court of law. It was a “judgment call.” [ 41 ] Berkenaan isu sama ada terdapat perbezaan yang material di antara nota keterangan asal dengan nota keterangan yang baru, hujahan Plaintif bahawa 680 perbezaan tersebut adalah penting kerana beliau tidak pernah memberikan sebarang ceramah motivasi tetapi hanya memberikan motivasi atau galakan kepada kawan-kawan beliau. [ 42 ] Mahkamah ini telah melihat mengenai isu ini melalui alasan penghakiman 685 Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur yang menyatakan bahawa: “28. In the first place, the plaintiff said she had gone to the cemetery at 6.00 a.m. (although the defendants’ version is that she arrived there at 5.30 a.m) to ‘motivate” her friends. I find it inherently incredible that one would go to a 690 cemetery of all places, to give motivational talks especially in the early hours of the morning when it is still dark. This is all the more so in the present case as all the scheduled activities had already been carried out i.e. the “sembahyang hajat” and the release of the “Kong Ming” lanterns which has incidentally, caused some burns on Hong’s face and most of the protestors (of about 100) were still fast 695 asleep.

Secondly, she had gone there with a group of people – whom she claimed to be all relatives. She admitted that the one who the defendants alleged had threatened the said Hong was also her nephew. If her intention of going to 700 the cemetery was indeed to ‘motivate’ her friends, she did not explain why it was necessary to turn up at the cemetery with a group of her relatives. There was no evidence from her of the friends that she purportedly motivated. …………………..

From the pleadings above, it is clear that there is bad blood between the plaintiff and the Hong family. The Hong brothers in their police reports had in fact made reference to a misunderstanding between the said Hong and the plaintiff. It is clear from the evidence that the plaintiff was not telling the truth as 710 to her ‘reason for going to the cemetery early that morning. It was not to ‘motivate’ her friends but to confront her nephew, not in a friendly way but in an overtly hostile manner, over a misunderstanding between them, which according to D2 was in respect of a press statement issued by Hong that the plaintiff was not authorized to make any statements on behalf of the NGO as she did not 715 represent the NGO.” [ 43 ] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi telah mempertimbangkan keterangan bahawa sama ada Plaintif telah memberikan ceramah motivasi atau hanya untuk memotivasikan kawan-kawan beliau. Namun demikian, akhirnya Mahkamah 720 Tinggi telah menolak kedua-dua versi keterangan ini kerana tidak mempercayainya. Ini bermakna tiada perbezaan yang material di antara nota keterangan yang asal dengan nota keterangan yang baru. [ 44 ] Malahan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang mendengar Saman Pemula juga telah 725 membuat keputusan yang sama dan ini dapat dilihat melalui alasan penghakiman beliau seperti berikut: “47. I make this finding because the difference between the words “motivation” and “motivation talk”, would seem indistinguishable and irrelevant in 730 the contexts of the case before the High Court. This is especially so where whatever words are used, the learned judge had made a finding that the Respondent went to the cemetery “not to motivate” her friends but to confront her nephew, not in a friendly way but in an overtly hostile manner …” 735 [ 45 ] Mahkamah Rayuan semasa menolak rayuan Plaintif menyatakan bahawa mereka tidak akan mengganggu keputusan dapatan fakta oleh Mahkamah Tinggi seperti berikut: “We have the view that this appeal should be dismissed and it is dismissed 740 because reason is simply that this appeal relates to finding of fact by the trial judge. The principle of law is clear and that is the Appeal Court would not disturb findings of the trial judge except in exceptional circumstances which the learned counsel had failed to show.” 745 [ 46 ] Dapatan yang sama juga telah dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang mendengar Saman Pemula seperti berikut: “48. This court is of the view that it cannot be said that the Respondent had misconducted himself, even if it was true that there were errors in the original 750 NOE. These errors cannot be attributed as a reason for the High Court judge deciding against the Respondent or that the Court of Appeal would have overturned the findings of fact of the High Court judge if the corrected NOE had been before it.” 755 [ 47 ] Daripada alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Tinggi yang mendengar Saman Pemula, jelas bahawa kegagalan tuntutan dan rayuan Plaintif adalah bahawa bukan disebabkan oleh perbezaan nota keterangan dan kegagalan mengemukakan nota keterangan baru di Mahkamah Rayuan. 760 [ 48 ] Berkaitan isu “judgment call”, Mahkamah Tinggi yang mendengar Saman Pemula berkaitan rayuan terhadap keputusan Lembaga Tatatertib Melaka telah memutuskan seperti berikut: 765 “46. After comparing the relevant parts of the original NOE and the corrected NOE and the corrected NOE and also taking into consideration the above quoted passages of the judgment, I am of the considered view that the Respondent was correct in advising the Appellant that it would be futile to add in the corrected NOE as part of the appeal record.” 770 [ 49 ] Mahkamah juga telah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Nor Dagang Sdn. Bhd. v Tetuan Mohd Yusof Endut [2001] 5 MLJ 561 di mana Hamid Embong J. telah memutuskan bahawa: 775 “This court maintains the view that an advocate and solicitor who holds himself as possessing reasonable competence in his vocation owes a duty to his client to exercise that duty with reasonable care and competence. Events may turn out to prove that an advocate and solicitor had been wrong in making a decision but this does not mean that he had been negligent. His only duty is to exercise 780 reasonable care and competence, there is no duty to be right.” [ 50 ] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa tiada kecuaian yang wujud oleh Defendan akibat dari kegagalan mengemukakan nota keterangan yang baru di Mahkamah Rayuan yang menyebabkan rayuan Plaintif telah ditolak.

(iii) Isu 3 - Sama ada prinsip res judicata terpakai untuk menghalang Plaintif dari meneruskan tindakan ini dengan membangkitkan isu-isu yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka di dalam Saman Pemula No: MA-17D- 1-05/2022? 790 [ 51 ] Plaintif berhujah bahawa Saman Pemula di Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka adalah bagi merayu dan membatalkan perintah Lembaga Tatatertib yang memutuskan tidak wujud salah laku Defendan manakala tuntutan di Mahkamah ini berdasarkan kecuaian. 795 [ 52 ] Manakala Defendan berhujah bahawa prinsip res judicata terpakai kerana Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka telah membuat dapatan fakta dan undang-undang berkenaan isu-isu yang sama dibangkitkan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan di Mahkamah ini. 800 [ 53 ] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa melalui alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka, jelas bahawa isu-isu yang sama di Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka telah dibangkitkan di Mahkamah ini. [ 54 ] Alasan Penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka telah memutuskan bahawa 805 tidak wujud perbezaan material di antara nota keterangan asal dengan nota keterangan baru dan tidak wujud salah laku oleh Defendan. [ 55 ] Malahan, isu “judgment call” juga telah diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka bahawa Defendan adalah betul di dalam menasihati ank guamnya. 810 [ 56 ] Walaupun Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka memutuskan isu salah laku yang dibawa ke Lembaga Tatatertib, namun isu-isu yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka dan di Mahkamah ini adalah sama. 815 [ 57 ] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa prinsip res judicata terpakai adalah terpakai di Mahkamah ini.

(iv) Isu 4 - Sama ada Defendan dilindungi oleh prinsip “Limited Immunity” di dalam mengendalikan prosiding di Mahkamah Rayuan? 820 [ 58 ] Plaintif berhujah bahawa Defendan tidak dilindungi dan tidak terpakai oleh prinsip “Limited Immunity” ini kerana Defendan sendiri gagal untuk melindungi dirinya dengan telah gagal memberikan perkhidmatan dan usaha wajar (due diligence) dalam mewakili Plaintif di dalam Rayuannya. 825 [ 59 ] Ini adalah kerana Defendan sendiri telah gagal memfailkan Rekod Rayuan Tambahan yang mengandungi Nota Keterangan Kedua yang baru dan betul sehingga Mahkamah Rayuan tidak dapat menyemak dan menggunakan Nota Keterangan Kedua tersebut dalam memberikan keputusan yang tepat. 830 [ 60 ] Ini menyebabkan Mahkamah Rayuan hanya boleh bersandarkan kepada Rekod Rayuan yang sedia ada yang mempunyai Nota Keterangan Asal yang tidak tepat dan semestinya tidak dapat mengubah sebarang keputusan yang telah diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. 835 [ 61 ] Manakala Defendan berhujah bahawa Defendan seharusnya dilindungi oleh prinsip “Limited Immunity”. [ 62 ] Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes-kes yang membincangkan tentang prinsip “Limited Immunity”. 840 [ 63 ] Di dalam kes Mohd Nor Dagang Sdn. Bhd. v Tetuan Mohd Yusof Endut [2001] 5 MLJ 561 di mana Hamid Embong J. telah memutuskan bahawa: “In my view this limited immunity should, at common law, be also extended to an 845 advocate and solicitor in our country in his work which is intimately connected with the conduct of the litigation in court. In Malaysia, statutory protections against civil actions or prosecutions are accorded to the other participants in a court proceeding, also founded on public 850 policy. So, for example, a judge and other judicial officers are protected under s 14(1) of the court of Judicature Act 1964 (“the CJA”) in the exercise of their judicial duties. Seemingly, there would be thus instances where the common law would accord 855 the necessary protection to an advocate and solicitor with a limited immunity blanket in the exercise of his function in attending to a cause or proceeding in court. My view is that such an immunity is necessary on public policy considerations having regards to the factors taken into account by the House of Lords in the case. These factors may now be summarized as follows:

the consideration that a proper administration of justice may not be achieved if barristers are inhibited by the fear of being sued for negligence by a disgruntled client at the expense of exercising the duty he owes to the court; 865 ii) the public interest consideration in that issues already decided at a trial may have to be relitigated in the ensuing negligence suit between the client and his barrister to establish the negligence and damage following; iii) the existing general immunity attached to all the other participants in proceedings before a court vis judges, court official, witnesses or parties 870 based on public policy to ensure that trials are conducted without the stress and fear on the part of those participants, not for their benefit but in the higher interest of the advancement of justice. For this case, on the authorities, which command profound respect, I am of the 875 view that the defence of limited immunity is applicable to the defendant and on the facts, I find that the acts complained of as purportedly giving rise to negligence are acts preparatory to and so intimately connected and akin to the actual conduct of the case in the Temerloh suit.” 880 [ 64 ] Di dalam kes Malaysian Motor Insurance Pool (administered by MMIP Services Sdn Bhd) v. Murali a/l Sandrakasan & Anor [2021] 11 MLJ 776 Firuz J. telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “[59] As far as Malaysia is concern, the decision of Abdul Hamid J (as His 885 Lordship then was) in Mohd Nor Dagang, was duly followed Awang Armadajaya JC in the case of Messrs Shahinudin & Ranjit v Ravichantiran a/l Ganesan [2020] MLJU 846. It also has to be stated that in Sri Alam Sdn Bhd v Tetuan Radzuan Ibrahim & Co (sued as a firm) [2010] 1 MLJ 284, Harminder Singh JC (now FCJ), the court chose to follow the rationale taken by the House of Lords in Arthur JS 890 Hall & Co v Simons which held that there is no immunity in civil proceedings and that public policy considerations were no longer persuasive in criminal proceedings. [60] Having scrutinized the authorities on this issue of limited immunity ie with 895 reference to acts preparatory to and are intimately connected to the conduct of a suit, I find myself incline to follow the approach adopted by the Australian and New Zealand Courts based on the original rationale of the House of Lords in Saif Ali as followed in the case of Mohd Nor Dagang. 900 [61] To my mind, whether such a defence is applicable would entirely depend on the facts of the case and the evidence adduced at the trial proper. Ipso facto, door to defence of limited immunity should not be shut to achieve justice and to uphold public policy. Without it advocates and solicitors would decline to represent individuals who are in great need of legal representation in court and 905 to handle cases particularly involving citizens of the lower income group who more often than not cannot afford to pay average legal fees. This is due to fear that their exposure will be higher than the returns in accepting such legal brief.” [ 65 ] Berdasarkan kepada kedua-dua otoriti di atas jelas bahawa prinsip “Limited 910 Immunity” seharusnya terpakai kepada pengamal undang-undang. [ 66 ] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpandangan dan bersetuju dengan kes-kes tersebut bahawa prinsip “Limited Immunity” terpakai juga kepada Defendan. 915

Isu 5 - Sama ada kausa tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalangi oleh Had Masa dan/atau Akta Had Masa 1953? [ 67 ] Plaintif berhujah bahawa kausa tindakan bermula pada tarikh Defendan telah cuai dan gagal menjalankan tugasnya dengan sempurna dengan hanya menyerahkan 920 Nota Keterangan Kedua tersebut secara serahan tangan pada tarikh perbicaraan Rayuan iaitu pada 15 September 2014. Walaupun Saman di dalam tindakan di sini telah difailkan pada 14 September 2020 ianya masih di dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan. 925 [ 68 ] Hujahan Plaintif berdasarkan kepada kes CIMB Bank Berhad v. Lee Kim Kee & Ors And Another Appeal [2018] 1 MLRA 484 yang memutuskan bahawa: “ [39] We noted from the pleadings, the plaintiff had pleaded negligence and/or fraud in paras 8 and 9 of the Amended Statement of Claim respectively. Section 29 of the LA 1953 clearly stipulates that the limitation period shall not begin to 930 run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. In this case, we were of the opinion that although the plaintiff was made aware that her solicitor had absconded vide a newspaper reporting sometime in August 2001, that information alone did not and could not have constituted actual discovery of the negligence/fraud. At most, it was only an 935 indicator that something was not right. The plaintiff had, even before the news that her solicitor had absconded, made several attempts to inquire about the compensation sum. This was evident vide her letters to the Firm dated 12 March 2000 and 5 August 2000. 940 [40] We observed that the actual discovery of the negligence/fraud was only made after the plaintiff, together with her new solicitors, with reasonable diligence, had obtained all the relevant documents from the Bank in August 2002. On 10 August 2002, the plaintiff lodged a police report on her findings. The filing of the Originating Summons was in 2003 at the Penang High Court in No: 24- 945 194-2003 and which was converted into a writ action in Civil Suit No: 22-654- 2006 vide a Court Order dated 19 October 2006; whilst the filing of the Civil Suit No: 22-320-2007 against the Bank was in 2007. These two actions were clearly within the time prescribed by law and therefore not statute-barred both in negliegence and/or fraud. 950 [41] We were of the view that it would not have been reasonable to contend that the accrual of the causes of action for negligence and/or fraud were to commence seven months after the plaintiff finding out that her solicitor had absconded. Despite the defendant's submission, we were of the considered opinion that the 955 alleged seven-month time-frame from the plaintiff's knowledge of her solicitor's abscondment for the limitation period to begin and (as assessed by the defendant) for the plaintiff to have had reasonably discovered the full extent of the matter, was an entirely arbitrary calculation and wisdom acquired only after the facts were established. 960 [ 69 ] Oleh yang demikian, di bawah Akta Had Masa 1953 Plaintif mempunyai tempoh dalam masa 6 tahun dari tarikh perbicaraan tersebut dan tindakan Plaintif tidak dihalangi oleh had masa dan ianya masih sah di sisi undang-undang. 965 [ 70 ] Defendan tidak berhujah mengenai isu ini. [ 71 ] Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa tarikh bermulanya kecuaian sebagaimana didakwa Plaintif bermula pada masa Nota Keterangan Kedua tersebut dibuat secara serahan tangan pada tarikh perbicaraan Rayuan iaitu pada 15 September 2014. Oleh 970 kerana Saman di dalam tindakan di sini telah difailkan pada 14 September 2020 ianya masih di dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan.

(vi) Isu 6 - Sama ada prinsip “estopple” dan/atau “laches” terpakai terhadap Plaintif bagi menghalang Plaintif daripada mengemukakan dan/atau 975 meneruskan tindakan ini terhadap Defendan? [ 72 ] Plaintif berhujah bahawa tindakan Plaintif terhadap Defendan masih lagi tidak dihalang oleh had masa dan oleh kerana itu isu ini bukanlah satu isu yang perlu dibangkitkan oleh Defendan. 980 [ 73 ] Defendan tidak berhujah mengenai isu ini. [ 74 ] Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa bahawa tindakan Plaintif terhadap Defendan masih lagi tidak dihalang oleh had masa. 985 KESIMPULAN [ 75 ] Mahkamah telah mendengar keterangan pihak-pihak, membaca dan menimbangkan hujahan bertulis yang telah difailkan oleh peguam cara-peguam cara. Mahkamah juga telah melihat dan meneliti alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan berkenaan kes-kes yang telah difailkan oleh Plaintif sebelum 990 ini. [ 76 ] Secara keseluruhannya Mahkamah mendapati bahawa tiada perbezaan ketara di antara nota keterangan asal dan nota keterangan baru di Mahkamah Tinggi. Malahan, Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan tidak bersandarkan kepada 995 perbezaan nota keterangan tersebut dalam penghakiman mereka. [ 77 ] Apa yang jelas bahawa, Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan telah membuat keputusan berdasarkan bahawa Defendan-Defendan di dalam Guaman Sivil tersebut telah membuktikan pembelaan justifikasi dan komen berpatutan 1000 berdasarkan kepada fakta-fakta kes di hadapan Mahkamah. [ 78 ] Oleh yang demikian, walaupun nota keterangan baru di Mahkamah Tinggi tidak dikemukakan di Mahkamah Rayuan, namun ia bukan penyebab kepada rayuan Plaintif telah ditolak. Ini adalah kerana Mahkamah Rayuan telah bersetuju dengan dapatan Mahkamah Tinggi dan seterusnya mengekalkan keputusan Mahkamah 1005 Tinggi tersebut. [ 79 ] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa atas imbangan kebarangkalian pihak Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan. Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan adalah ditolak 1010 dengan kos. [ 80 ] Kos adalah mengikut skala. Bertarikh 03 Mac 2025. 1015 t.t. (DARMAFIKRI BIN ABU ADAM) HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (3) AYER KEROH MELAKA 1020 Peguamcara Plaintif: Tetuan Che Muji Che Noh & Co. yang beralamat di No. 334-1, Jalan Haruan 5/8, Pusat Komersial Oakland II, 70300 Seremban, Negeri Sembilan. 1025 Peguamcara Defendan: Tetuan K.P. Ng & Amardas, Peguamcara Defendan yang beralamat di No. 43-M, Jalan Ong Kim Wee, 75300 Melaka.