Ong Keh Keong v Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam (B-02(A)-1397-07/2018)

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA (APPELLATE DIVISION) CIVIL APPEAL NO.: B-02(A)-1397-07/2018 BETWEEN ONG KEH KEONG … APPELLANT AND LEMBAGA TATATERTIB PEGUAM-PEGUAM … RESPONDENT (In the High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam In the State of Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia Application for Judicial Review No.: BA-25-154-12/2016 Between Ong Keh Keong … Applicant And Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam … Respondent) CORAM: HAMID SULTAN BIN ABU BACKER, JCA HANIPAH BINTI FARIKULLAH, JCA KAMALUDIN BIN MD SAID, JCA 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

1. The appeal relates to an application for judicial review by the appellant (applicant) against the decision of the learned High Court Judge at Shah Alam on 31.5.2018.

2. The applicant, an advocate and solicitor was subject of a complaint by the Disciplinary Board.

3. On 19.12.2016, the applicant filed this judicial review application against the respondent’s ruling. In the judicial review application, the applicant sought for the following:

(ii) a certiorari order to quash and annul the Disciplinary Committee Report dated 28.6.2016 and to annul the appointment of the Disciplinary Committee.

4. From the statement in support of the application at the High Court, the applicant relied on the following grounds: “24. Saya amat terkilan dan mempertikaikan keputusan Responden yang dibuat pada 13.10.2016 yang telah setuju dengan keputusan DC 3 dalam Laporan DC yang telah mendapati saya bersalah dan telah mengenakan hukuman denda RM5,000.00 dan penggantungan daripada praktis sebagai peguam selama 1 bulan.

25. Saya berkata selepas menghantar surat bertarikh 26.4.2016 bersertakan surat akuan En Khor kepada DC saya tidak terima apa-apa maklum balas daripada DC sehingga bulan Ogos 2016 iaitu melalui surat DC kepada Responden.

26. Oleh itu, saya berkata saya tidak tahu bahawa pendengaran Aduan Tersebut telah tamat walaupun saya masih ingin memanggil Cik Wong sebagai saksi untuk memberitahu DC bagaimana terdapat perjanjian jual beli yang mempunyai tarikh-tarikh berlainan.

27. Sememangnya, saya adalah dalam keadaan kebuntuan (“helpless”) kerana saya tidak tahu bahawa pendengaran Aduan Tersebut telah tamat dimana saya langsung tidak memasukkan Hujahan Bertulis untuk menentang Aduan Tersebut.

28. Saya sesungguhnya percaya hak asasi saya seperti yang terkandung dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan untuk mendapat pendengaran dan pengadilan yang saksama dan adil dihadapan DC telah dicabuli serta dinafikan DC dan Responden tanpa apa-apa alasan munasabah.

29. Seterusnya, saya telah dimaklumkan oleh Responden melalui suratnya bertarikh 4.11.2016 yang melampirkan Laporan DC di mana setelah meneliti Laporan DC, saya mendapati DC telah menamatkan pendengaran Aduan Tersebut tanpa membenarkan saya untuk memanggil saksi utama, Cik Wong untuk menerangkan percanggahan tarikh-tarikh pada perjanjian jual beli tersebut. 4 30. Dalam laporannya, DC telah membuat penemuan fakta dan liabiliti dan memutuskan bahawa saya salah laku dalam perlakuan saya dan sebagai hukuman, saya telah didenda RM5,000.00 dan digantung daripada mempraktis sebagai seorang peguam selama sebulan dan Responden dalam mesyuaratnya pada 13.10.2016 juga setuju dengan penemuan liabiliti dan hukuman yang dikenakan ke atas saya sepertimana yang dinyatakan dalam Laporan DC.

31. Saya sesungguhnya berkata Responden langsung tidak mempertimbangkan isu-isu ketidakadilan dan kesilapan yang dibuat oleh DC seperti berikut:- a) DC telah menamatkan pendengaran Aduan Tersebut tanpa memberi saya peluang untuk memanggil saksi utama, Cik Wong iaitu bekas staf dan kerani di firma saya untuk memberi keterangan mengenai tarikh-tarikh yang berbeza pada perjanjian jual beli tersebut. b) DC telah menafikan hak saya untuk memanggil Cik Wong sebagai saksi dalam pendengaran Aduan Tersebut walaupun saya telah memaklumkan kepada DC bahawa saya perlu memanggil Cik Wong untuk menerangkan fakta sebenar pindaan pada tarikh-tarikh perjanjian jual beli tersebut. c) Dalam Laporan DC, DC telah terkhilaf apabila menyatakan bahawa saksi saya, En Khor tidak pernah hadir di mana-mana hari pendengaran Aduan Tersebut sedangkan En Khor telah hadir pada hari pertama pendengaran dan telah menunjukkan Perjanjian Jual Beli beliau yang bertarikh 12.4.2013. 5 d) Dalam Laporan DC, DC juga telah gagal mempertimbangkan kandungan surat akuan En Khor yang menyatakan Cik Wong telah berjanji untuk menolong beliau untuk memastikan bahawa tiada apa-apa faedah lewat akan dikenakan ke atas En Khor. e) DC juga telah menyalahkan En Khor yang tidak dapat hadir pendengaran manakala DC sendiri yang telah melapangkan tarikh 22.2.2016 yang telah ditetapkan untuk pendengaran Aduan Tersebut dimana En Khor sedia untuk hadir sebagai saksi untuk disoal balas oleh Peguamcara En Chuah. f) DC gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa atas keadaan sedemikian maka Pemohon terpaksa memohon surat akuan daripada En Khor untuk memberi keterangan bagi pihak Pemohon dan bukan seperti yang dinyatakan oleh DC dalam Laporan DC. g) DC juga gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa cadangan keterangan En Khor melalui surat akuan adalah dimaklumkan oleh En Kem kepada Pemohon melalui emelnya bertarikh 30.3.2016 maka tidak terpulang kepada DC untuk menyatakan kandungan surat akuan tersebut tidak boleh diterima oleh kerana En Khor tidak disoal balas oleh peguamcara En Chuah. h) DC tidak mempertimbangkan keterangan dan pembelaan Pemohon bahawa Pemohon langsung tidak terlibat dalam pengendalian fail dan dokumen transaksi ini yang kesemuanya adalah dikendalikan oleh Cik Wong, iaitu bekas kerani Pemohon. 6 i) DC gagal mengambil kira bahawa dalam fail Pemohon, satu-satunya perjanjian jual beli adalah bertarikh 12.4.2013 dan tiada apa-apa dokumen atau surat dalam fail yang menunjukkan tarikh yang lain. j) DC gagal mempertimbangkan fakta bahawa Pemohon telah menyemak dengan anakguamnya, En Khor mengenai tarikh perjanjian jual beli dimana En Khor telah menunjukkan salinan perjanjiannya yang bertarikh 12.4.2013 maka tiada apa-apa dokumen atau surat yang mencadangkan atau menunjukkan tarikh perjanjian jual beli telah dipinda. k) DC telah terkhilaf apabila tidak menimbangkan pembelaan Pemohon bahawa beliau tidak menjawab atau membalas surat dan tuntutan En Chuah kerana beliau tabah bahawa salinan Perjanjian Jual Beli dalam fail bertarikh 12.4.2013 dan aduan dan tuntutan En Chuah adalah remeh dan sengaja menyusahkan memandangkan En Chuah juga belum membayar bahagian cukai pintu yang masih dihutangi kepada En Khor. l) DC telah terkhilaf apabila telah merujuk kepada surat daripada firma Pemohon kepada Tetuan Nadzifah, Sagunthala & Associates yang merujuk kepada perjanjian bertarikh 1.4.2013 tanpa mengambil kira pembelaan dan keterangan Pemohon yang telah mengatakan bahawa tiada apa-apa dokumen atau surat dalam fail Pemohon yang menunjukkan tarikh perjanjian jual beli adalah 1.4.2013. 7 m) DC gagal memperincikan tuduhan terhadap Pemohon sebelum pendengaran Aduan Tersebut. n) DC telah terkhilaf apabila membuat penemuan fakta dan liabiliti tanpa mengambil kira bahawa beban bukti untuk membuktikan salah laku dalam pendengaran Aduan Tersebut adalah pendengaran “quasi criminal” maka beban bukti adalah “beyond reasonable doubt” dimana DC langsung tidak menyatakan bahawa penemuan fakta dan liabiliti Pemohon adalah memenuhi beban “beyond reasonable doubt”. o) Laporan DC yang dikemukakan kepada Responden adalah luput, salah dan tidak terpakai kerana tempoh masa untuk DC mengemukakan Laporan DC telah tamat sejak bulan April 2016 dan DC hanya memohon untuk perlanjutan masa pada bulan Ogos 2016. p) DC telah terkhilaf apabila merujuk dan menggunapakai kesemua hujahan bertulis peguamcara En Chuah yang telah merujuk kepada laporan-laporan media yang tidak relevan dalam Aduan Tersebut dan amat memprejudiskan Pemohon dan sekaligus memesong pandangan DC dalam Aduan Tersebut.

32. Tambahnya, saya sesungguhnya percaya dan berkata Responden dalam membuat keputusan mengesahkan penemuan liabiliti dan hukuman seperti yang terdapat dalam Laporan DC, gagal berlaku adil terhadap saya dan langsung tidak memberi apa-apa pertimbangan untuk fakta-fakta berikut: 8 a) Responden telah berlaku tidak adil kerana langsung tidak menjawab atau membalas surat saya bertarikh 25.8.2016 bahawa Pemohon tiada menerima apa-apa maklum balas dari DC sejak daripada surat Pemohon kepada DC bertarikh 26.4.2016; b) Responden tidak mengambil kira bahawa prosiding pendengaran DC adalah separa jenayah (“quasi criminal”) maka penemuan DC tanpa mendengar keterangan saksi utama, Cik Wong adalah satu penemuan fakta yang tidak selamat, sangsi dan langsung tidak menepati tahap pembuktian melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (“beyond reasonable doubt”) yang diperlukan untuk kes separa jenayah; c) Responden telah terkhilaf apabila tidak mengambil kira bahawa DC telah membuat keputusan bahawa Pemohon telah salah laku/bersalah walaupun terdapat bukti kukuh yang menunjukkan yang sebaliknya; dan d) Responden telah terkhilaf apabila menerima Laporan DC yang telah membuat fakta secara “hearsay” dan tidak mematuhi peruntukkan-peruntukkan Akta Keterangan 1950.

33. Saya amat terkilan dengan tindakan-tindakan DC dan/atau Responden yang telah merampas hak saya untuk mempraktis sebagai seorang peguam dimana dalam Laporan tersebut, Responden akan melucutkan hak saya untuk mempraktis sebagai peguam selama sebulan dan denda RM5,000.00. Maka, saya amat risau, bimbang dan dalam ketakutan akan masa hadapan dan kehidupan saya. 9 34. Saya juga ingin melaksanakan hak-hak saya untuk mendapat perlindungan yang sama rata dari segi undang-undang (“entitled to equal protection of the law”) seperti yang diperuntukkan dalam Artikel 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Sesungguhnya, saya telah ditindas secara opresif dan arbitari oleh Responden dan/atau DC tanpa mengambil kira lunas undang-undang yang sedia ada.”

5. On 8.2.2017, an application for leave to apply for judicial review was granted by Justice Yazid Mustafa.

6. It is clear from the statement in support of the judicial review application that the applicant is asserting to impugn the alleged decision of the Disciplinary Board dated 13.10.2016 and the report of the Disciplinary Committee dated 28.6.2016.

7. On 15.3.2017, the respondent filed an application to strike out the judicial review application under Order 18 rule 19 Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012) on the grounds that the decision of the respondent dated 13.10.2016 is not amenable to judicial review and in the circumstances, the applicant’s application for judicial review is premature and amounts to an attempt to short-circuit the statutory disciplinary and appellate process provided in the Legal Profession Act 1976 (LPA). The application was heard before Justice 10 Vazeer Alam bin Mydin Meera by which the learned High Court Judge allowed the application.

8. The applicant appealed against the decision and order of the High Court. The Factual Background 9. We commence by referring to the factual background of the application made to the High Court.

10. A complaint was lodged by Mr.Chuah Gek Lye (the Complainant) against the applicant (the Complaint).

11. In essence, the Complaint are as follows: -

(ii) The Complainant and his daughter entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 1.4.2013 (SPA) to sell the Property to Khor Hang Cheng and Khor Zhi Yang (Purchasers);

(iii) The Applicant acted as the solicitor for the Purchasers whilst the Complainant and his daughter were not represented in the transaction; 11

(iv) The Complainant alleged that the applicant had, without his knowledge and consent, amended or altered certain terms in the SPA;

(vi) The Complainant contended that the applicant had acted fraudulently.

12. On 16.2.2015, the Respondent pursuant to section 100 of the LPA appointed Samskrita Kemkumar Saviour Lopez a/l Gracian Lopez, Ng Thiang Tuan and Venugopal a/l Balan Mannadiar as members of the Disciplinary Committee to formally investigate into the Complaint.

13.

22. The Disciplinary Committee heard the Complaint on 15.7.2015,

9.2015, 28.10.2015, 8.1.2016 and 16.4.2016. It considered the statements of the complaints and heard from the applicant.

14. The Disciplinary Committee found the applicant guilty of dishonest and fraudulent conduct in breach of section 94(3)(c) of the LPA 1976 and guilty of conduct which is unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor under section 94(3)(o) of the LPA 1976. The Disciplinary Committee recommended that 12 the applicant be suspended from practice for 1 month and a fine of RM5,000.00 be imposed.

15. On 13.10.2016, the respondent considered the Disciplinary Committee’s report and affirmed the Disciplinary Committee’s finding on liability but disagreed with the punishment recommended against the applicant. Consequently, the respondent issued a notice dated 4.11.2016 to the applicant to appear on 9.12.2016 pursuant to section 103D(2) and (4) of the LPA with a view to enhance the punishment.

16. However, upon the request of the applicant, the hearing on 9.12.2016 before the respondent did not proceed. The hearing before the respondent was instead adjourned to 17.2.2017 and subsequently brought forward to 10.2.2017.

17. By a letter dated 8.2.2017, the applicant’s solicitor served on the respondent, amongst others, the judicial review application and the draft order dated 8.2.2017 whereby the High Court had granted the applicant leave to file the judicial review application and a stay of the disciplinary proceedings of the Complaint. 13 The Respondent’s Case for Striking Out 18. The position of the respondent is that the decision made on 13.10.2016 is not reviewable on the ground alleged by the applicant based on the following reasons:

(ii)

Pursuant to section 111 of the LPA 1976, there can be no action against the respondent for any act or thing done under the LPA 1976 as the applicant has not shown that the respondent had done anything in bad faith or with malice.

19. In these circumstances, the respondents contended that the application is an abuse process of the court and that there are no reasonable prospects of the applicant’s judicial review application to succeed.

20. In his Memorandum of Appeal, the applicant raised the following points: “1. Hakim bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa Mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa yang luas untuk mendengar permohonan untuk semakan Kehakiman walaupun terdapat peruntukan yang tidak membenarkan semakan kehakiman (‘ouster clause’). 14 2. Hakim Bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila mendapati permohonan Perayu untuk semakan Kehakiman adalah salah guna proses undang-undang tanpa mempertimbangkan bahawa pada 8.2.2017, Perayu telah mendapat kebenaran daripada Yang Arif Datuk Mohd Yazid bin Hj Mustafa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang sebelumnya untuk memfailkan permohonan semakan kehakiman maka perintah untuk membatalkan permohonan semakan kehakiman adalah aib dan defektif.

3. Hakim bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila mendapati permohonan Perayu untuk semakan kehakiman adalah satu salah guna proses undang-undang tanpa mempertimbangkan bahawa permohonan semakan kehakiman Perayu mempunyai asas dan isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah.

4. Hakim bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa terdapat isu-isu ketidakadilan dan kesilapan prosedur yang dibuat oleh Responden dan/atau Jawatankuasa Tatatertib (DC) seperti berikut: a) DC telah menamatkan pendengaran aduan tersebut tanpa memberi Perayu peluang untuk memanggil saksi utama, Cik Wong iaitu bekas staf dan kerani di firma Perayu untuk memberi keterangan mengenai tarikh-tarikh yang berbeza pada perjanjian jual beli yang merupakan subjek aduan tersebut; b) Dalam Laporan DC, DC telah terkhilaf apabila menyatakan bahawa saksi Perayu, En Khor tidak pernah hadir di mana- 15 mana hari pendengaran aduan tersebut sedangkan En Khor telah hadir pada hari pertama pendengaran dan telah menunjukkan Perjanjian Jual Beli beliau yang bertarikh 12.4.2013; c) Dalam Laporan DC, DC juga telah gagal mempertimbangkan kandungan surat akuan En Khor yang menyatakan bahawa Cik Wong telah berjanji untuk menolong beliau untuk memastikan bahawa tiada apa-apa faedah lewat akan dikenakan ke atas En Khor; d) Dalam Laporan DC, DC juga telah menyalahkan En Khor yang tidak dapat hadir untuk pendengaran manakala DC sendiri yang telah melapangkan tarikh 22.2.2016 yang telah ditetapkan untuk pendengaran aduan tersebut dimana En Khor sedia untuk hadir sebagai saksi untuk disoal balas; e) DC gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa atas keadaan sedemikian maka Perayu terpaksa memohon surat akuan daripada En Khor untuk memberi keterangan bagi pihak Perayu dan bukan seperti yang dinyatakan oleh DC dalam Laporan DC. f) DC juga gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa cadangan keterangan En Khor melalui surat akuan adalah dimaklumkan oleh pengerusi DC, En Kem kepada Perayu melalui emelnya bertarikh 30.3.2016 maka tidak terpulang kepada DC untuk menyatakan kandungan surat akuan tersebut tidak boleh diterima oleh kerana En Khor tidak disoal balas; 16 g) Responden telah belaku tidak adil kerana langsung tidak menjawab atau membalas surat Perayu bertarikh 25.8.2016 bahawa Perayu tiada menerima apa-apa maklum balas dari DC sejak daripada surat Perayu kepada DC bertarikh 26.4.2016; h) Responden tidak mengambil kira bahawa prosiding pendengaran DC adalah separa jenayah (“quasi criminal”) maka penemuan DC tanpa mendengar keterangan saksi utama, Cik Wong adalah satu penemuan fakta yang tidak selamat, sangsi dan langsung tidak menepati tahap pembuktian melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (“beyond reasonable doubt”) yang diperlukan untuk kes separa jenayah.

5. Hakim bijaksana telah tekhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila mendapati permohonan Perayu untuk semakan kehakiman adalah pramatang tanpa mempertimbangkan bahawa semakan kehakiman Perayu ini adalah hak Perayu berlandaskan isu-isu ketidakadilan dan kesilapan prosedur dalam proses DC dan Responden membuat keputusan mereka.” ISSUES

21. The issues for decision can be summarized as follows:

(ii) Whether it is an abuse of the process of the court to apply for judicial review proceedings when the Disciplinary Board has not made its decision.

22. We now turn to the learned High Court Judge reasons for deciding to allow the respondent’s claims to strike out the judicial review. He began by holding that the respondent’s decision dated 13.10.2016 is not a final decision and neither has the disciplinary proceedings come to an end.

23. The learned High Court Judge said: “[5] It is common ground that the respondent’s decision dated 13.10.2016 is not a final decision in so far as the disciplinary proceedings are concerned. Neither has the disciplinary proceedings come to an end. The respondent had via its decision of 13.10.2016 merely concurred with the findings of the Disciplinary Committee as regards the applicant’s guilt, i.e. in respect of dishonest and fraudulent conduct in breach of section 94(3)(c) of the Legal Profession Act 1976; and conduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor under section 94(3)(o) of the Legal Profession Act 1976. The respondent had disagreed with the Disciplinary Committee’s recommendations as to the punishment to be imposed, and this, the respondent has every right to do so under its powers in section 103D (2), (3) and (4) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 that provides:

(2) The Disciplinary Board may, in appropriate cases impose a greater or lesser penalty or punishment than is recommended by the Disciplinary Committee. 18

(3) Where the Disciplinary Board does not agree with the finding or recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board shall make such other orders it deems just.

(4) Before the Disciplinary Board makes an order that is likely to be adverse against an advocate and solicitor under subsection (2) or (3), it shall notify the advocate and solicitor of its intention to do so and give him a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [6] The respondent can make an order increasing the punishment recommended by the Disciplinary Committee only after the respondent has been given reasonable opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the respondent had given the applicant the requisite notice under section 103D(4) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 via its letter dated 4.11.2016; and had in fact given the applicant further time to make representation by adjourning, at the applicant’s request, the hearing fixed for 9.12.2016 to 17.2.2017, and subsequently brought it forward to 10.2.2017. [7] Now, these acts of the respondent are clearly within its statutory powers found in section 103D of the Legal Profession Act 1976. The applicant had lodged an objection to the respondent in respect of its decision of 13.10.2016. The respondent had fixed a date for hearing the applicant on his objections. However, even before the respondent could reasonably hear the matter of the applicant’s objection and make any appropriate order on the punishment to be meted out, the applicant has stolen a march and applied for judicial review to thwart the disciplinary proceedings by challenging the respondent’s decision made in the course of proceedings.” 19 24. It can be seen that the main reason which persuaded the learned High Court Judge to allow the striking out of the judicial review claim was the fact that the commencement of the judicial review proceeding was premature.

25. We have considered the parties’ submissions very carefully and taking all the circumstances in to account, we are not persuaded that the applicant’s claim at the material time was justified. Our reasons follows. The Relevant Statutory Provisions 26. The starting point for answering a challenge of the type brought by the applicant is a recollection of the key provisions in the LPA 1976 with regards to disciplinary proceedings.

27. The core primary legislation relating to the disciplinary proceedings is contained in section 93 to 103EB of the LPA 1976. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to refer to the following provisions:

(ii) Section 100B: Inquiry by the Disciplinary Committee 20

(iii) Section 100C: Findings and recommendations of Disciplinary Committee

(iv) Section 103D: Consideration by Disciplinary Board of the report of the Disciplinary Committee

(4) Before the Disciplinary Board makes an order that is likely to be adverse against an advocate and solicitor, it shall notify the advocate and solicitor concerned of its intention to do so and give him a reasonable opportunity to be heard by the Disciplinary Committee

28. The disciplinary process under the LPA should involves two stages: the inquiry stage before the Disciplinary Committee and the formal investigation stage by the Disciplinary Board.

29. Before we proceed to consider the issues, it is necessary that we set out the relevant provisions in the LPA relating to the inquiry by the Disciplinary Committee and the Disciplinary Board. 21 The Disciplinary Committee 30. Where any complaint on the conduct of an advocate and solicitors is referred to the Chairman of the Disciplinary Board under section 100(2) of the LPA, he shall constitute the Disciplinary Committee to inquire into the complaint or information.

31. It is important to note that the power of the inquiry committee is merely to investigate the complaint. It does not have to make any conclusion on misconduct or whether an offence was committed but simply to consider whether or not there is a prima facie case for formal investigation.

32. The Disciplinary Committee in cases such as the present case, do not make “decision”. They merely report to the Disciplinary Board in regards to a complaint. The Disciplinary Board 33.

Pursuant to section 103D of the LPA 1976, the Disciplinary Board shall consider the report of the Disciplinary Committee and may make an order affirming or rejecting the finding or recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee. 22 34. Before the Disciplinary Council makes an order, it shall notify the advocate and solicitor concern of its intention to do any so and give him a reasonable opportunity to be heard by the Disciplinary Council.

35. The applicant submitted that as a person aggrieved by the respondent’s decision dated 13.10.2016, he can avail himself of his statutory rights enshrined in section 103EA of the LPA to file for judicial review. The applicant maintains that the judicial review application is proper before this court and that it is not an abuse of the court’s process.

36. Section 103E of the LPA1976 provides:

(1) Any party aggrieved by any final order or decision made by the Disciplinary Board-

38. In support of his submissions, the applicant relied on the following grounds:

(ii) The respondent’s application to strike out the appellant’s judicial review is a collateral attack to set aside the leave order granted by the Court which resonates against Order 52 Rule 9 ROC

2012. 24

(iii) The wordings of Order 53 Rule 9 ROC 2012 is clear that any application to set aside any order of the Judge shall not be entertained but the aggrieved party can appeal to the Court of Appeal.

39. The issue of whether a judicial review application may be struck out under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 after leave has been granted was raised for the first time in the applicant’s written submission in this appeal. This issue was not raised before the learned High Court Judge neither was it included by the applicant in his Memorandum of Appeal.

40. An appeal court will not allow an appellant to argue a ground that has not been pleaded in its memorandum as a matter of essential justice to the court below and to the respondent who would have defended a judgment of the High Court on an unpleaded grounds of appeal (See Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd v Waldorf & Windsor Joint Management Body [2014] 3 MLJ 467; Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 719; Joo Seng Trading Co v Commercial Importers and Distributors Sdn Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 128; Century Land Resources Sdn Bhd v Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd [2004] 4 CLJ 793 and Minister of Energy, Water and Communication & Anor v Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Ors [2013] 1 MLJ 61). 25 41. Therefore, we are of the view that the applicant is precluded from raising this point for the first time in this appeal.

42. Be that as if may, we will consider the applicant’s submission on this issue. It is clear from the wordings of O 53 r 3(1) and (2) that the application for leave is only ex parte which means that the respondent does not have a right of appearance. The proper procedure for the respondent to file the application would be only when the court has granted ex parte leave to the applicant and that order is extracted and served on them. It is the service of the ex parte order together with the cause papers on the respondent that makes the respondent parties to the proceedings. It follows that the respondent can only file the application after leave to commence judicial review proceeding was granted by the Court. Therefore, the learned High Court Judge has not erred in law when he allowed the respondent’s application to strike out the applicant’s judiciary review application after leave has been granted. PREMATURE DECISION

43. The applicant further submitted that the learned High Court Judge had fallen into error by striking out the judicial review application and holding that 26 the application is premature, and abuse of the court process and that there is another appropriate remedy for the applicant.

44. In support of his submission, the applicant relied on the following authorities: QSR Brands Berhad v Suruhanjaya Sekuriti & Anor [2006] 3 MLJ 164 and Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 1 MLRA 611.

45. The respondent submitted to the contrary. The respondent’s submissions included the following points:

(ii) the appellant has a right of appeal to the High Court pursuant to section 103E of LPA 1976 in respect of any decision made by the respondent in affecting the appellant. Thus, the appellant’s remedy, if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the respondent dated 13.10.2016, is to wait for the respondent to make an order under section 103D of the LPA 1976 after hearing the appellant on the issue of enhancement of punishment and then to file an appeal to the High Court pursuant to section 103E of the LPA 1976; 27

(iii) In any event, there can be no action against the respondent for any act or thing done under the LPA as the appellant has not shown that the respondent had done anything in bad faith or with malice (section 111 of the LPA).

46. The applicant’s claim in this judicial review proceedings is concerned with the alleged infringement of his right under the LPA. Order 53 Rule 2(4) of the ROC 2012 provides that any person who is adversely affected by the decision in relation to the exercise of the public authority or someone shall be entitled to make the application for certiorari.

47. It is a principle which remains a good and trite law that certiorari will lie to quash a decision which has already been made by a public authority in excess or abuse of jurisdiction or contrary to the rules of natural justice or where there is an error of law on the face of the decision of the public authority (see Malaysian Court Practice (2007 Desk Ed) at p 670). For a decision to be quashed on judicial review or susceptible to the court’s reviewing powers, there must first be a decision by a decision maker, and that decision must affect the aggrieved party by either altering the rights or obligations or depriving him of the benefits which he has been permitted to enjoy. (See Members of the Commission of Enquiry on the Video Clip Recording of Images of A Person Purported to be an Advocate and 28 Solicitor Speaking on Telephone on Matters of Appointment of Judges v Tun Dato’ Seri Ahmad Fairuz bin Dato’ Sheikh Abdul Halim [2011] 6 MLJ 490; Council of Civil Service Unions and others v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935).

48. Clearly, the law we apprehend, is that, apart from requiring the applicant to make the application for judicial review with sufficient promptitude and to show that they were adversely affected by the decision of the public authority communicated to them, there must first be shown that a requisite decision by the appellant as a public authority had been made before the application could come within the bounds of Order 53 of the ROC

2012. It is therefore not open for the appellant to argue and for this court to hold, based on this principle, that certiorari will not lie to quash a decision if no such decision has been made by a public authority. This was the decisive or important point at issue that was canvassed before this court. (See Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Mudah.my Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 197)

49. In this present case, the argument turns upon whether the “decision” of the respondent wherein it had in its meeting held on 13.10.2016, agreed with the findings and decision of the Disciplinary Committee as regards the appellant’s conduct was a “decision”. 29 50. The application characterized the Disciplinary Board’s decision as being “a decision” under section 103D of the LPA

51. We have considered the parties submissions very carefully and taking all circumstances into account, we are not persuaded that the applicant’s application for judicial review at the material time was justified.

52.

Pursuant to section 103D(4) of the LPA, it was Parliament’s intention that an advocate and solicitor be given the right to make a representation before the Disciplinary Board. Such representation should have been taken into account before the procedure for punishment is finalized, and it is only at the end of this process that the Disciplinary Board must make a decision with respects to the nature of the punishment to be imposed.

53. It is our considered opinion that an advocate and solicitor, who is dissatisfied with any decision of the Disciplinary Board should in the first instance make representation after receiving notice under section 103D(4) from the Disciplinary Board. Therefore, the applicant should avail himself of the right to make representations under section 103D(4) before commencing judicial review proceeding against the respondent. 30 54. Protections for the applicant are provided under section 103D(4) of the LPA. It must be emphasized that at that stage, the applicant was not in a position to allege that his right has been infringed until the Disciplinary Board make a decision under section 94.

55.

Pursuant to section 103D(4) where a Notice is issued to an advocate and solicitor, the Disciplinary Board must carry out a review of the nature of the punishment to be imposed on the advocate and solicitor. If the punishment imposed does not lead to an outcome satisfactory to an advocate and solicitor, then he may appeal to the High Court against the said finding of liability and the punishment.

56. In our opinion, the applicant had a right, which it has not yet been exercised. The applicant should avail himself of the representation before the Disciplinary Board and then await the outcome of his representation to decide whether there are at that stage ground for judicial review. It is an abuse of the proceeding of the court to avoid the safeguard provided by section 103(D) of the LPA.

57. In Chin Mee Keong & Ors v Persuruhjaya Sukan [2007] 6 MLJ 193 the facts are as follows, the appellants on their own, and on behalf of the Malaysia Taekwando Association (MTA) had applied under O 53 r 3(2) of the 31 Rules of High Court ('the RHC') a judicial review application, for an order that they be granted leave to apply for an order of certiorari, to remove a show cause letter dated 15 April 2005 and to quash the order of revocation of registration of the appellants' association. The Association was until 6 May 2005 a registered sports body pursuant to s 18 of the Sports Development Act 1997 ('the Act') but, on 6 May 2005, it became an unregistered and unincorporated sports body with no legal personality. This order of revocation of registration, dated 6 May 2005 was issued by the respondent under s 20 of the Act. The order of revocation of registration came about as the Sports Commissioner had directed the MTA to amend its three constitutions, to allow voting rights to clubs, a power of direction which was disputed by the appellants. MTA did not give in, resulting in the respondent deregistering the MTA. MTA could have appealed to the Minister of Sports against the decision of the respondent under s 21(1)(a) of the Act. However MTA alleged that the Minister had made various 'uncontradicted, unretracted and unchallenged press statements' showing the Minister's prejudice and prejudgment. A preliminary objection was also raised in the High court that the appellants had no locus standi to make this application as the applicants were not authorized persons to sue for and on behalf of MTA. The High Court dismissed the application principally on the ground that the judicial 32 review application was premature as the appellants had an alternative remedy under s 21(1)(c)of Act to appeal to the Minister. The High Court stressed that it was premature to judge the Minister for being bias, prejudiced and had prejudged the issue when she had not even heard the appeal.

58. The authorities reveal that the element of conclusiveness must be present before a “decision” can be found to occur. (See M & W Zander (M) Sdn Bhd v Director General of Inland Revenue [2005] 6 CLJ 336; R v St Lawrence’s Hospital, Caterham Statutory Visitors, ex p Pritchard [1953] 1 WLR 1158; Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Mudah. my Sdn Bhd (supra))

59. We do not think that the Disciplinary Board’s action on 14.11.2010, informing the applicant, can be properly characterized as a “decision” within the meaning of section 103D of the LPA 1976. What was involved was not a decision which was final. A decision to affirm the finding on liability but disagreeing with the punishment recommended by the Disciplinary Committee to be imposed on the application in our view is not a “decision”. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the Disciplinary Committee’s decision is not binding on the Disciplinary Board. 33 60. Therefore, we are of the view that the commencement of the judicial review proceedings was premature given the applicant’s failure to take the clear alternative step of making representations to the Disciplinary Board under section 103D(4) of the LPA which provides that before the Disciplinary Board makes an order that is likely to be adverse against an advocate and solicitor under subsection (2) or (3), it shall notify the advocate and solicitor of its intention to do so and give him a reasonable opportunity to be heard. In our view, section 103D(4) of the LPA provides an appropriate remedy which the applicant should exhaust before commencing the judicial review proceedings.

61. Thus, the learned High Court Judge was correct in his finding that the act of the respondent was clearly within its statutory powers found in section 103D of the LPA 1976. The applicant had lodged an objection to the respondent in respect of its decision of 13.10.2016. The respondent had fixed a date for hearing the appellant on his objections. However, even before the respondent could reasonably hear the matter of the appellant’s objection and make any appropriate order on the punishment to be meted out, to borrow the words of the learned High Court Judge, the applicant has stolen a march and applied for judicial review to thwart the disciplinary 34 proceedings by challenging the respondent’s decision made in the course of the proceedings.

62. Based on the above reasons, we are in agreement with the learned High Court Judge, in holding that, to allow the actions to proceed would be an abuse of the process of the Court. Alternative Remedy 63. It is a well established principle that judicial review is a remedy of last resort, to which recourse should normally be held only where there is no available alternative remedy (See: Lai Cheng Choeng v Sowaratnam [1983] 2 MLJ 113; Iskandar Coast Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2019] 5 MLJ 236; Ketua Pengarah Kastam dan Eksais v CoachMalaysia Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 716; Bintulu Lumber Development Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2020] MLJU 59). Parliament is likely to have intended that an aggrieved person who wished to challenge the decision of the Disciplinary Board should first exercise his right to make representations under section 103D(4) of the LPA (See: R (on the application of Archer) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2020] All ER 7116 (followed). 35 64. We will refer to Fales LJ discussion in the case of R (On the application of Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2017] EWCA Civ 1716 of the “suitable alternative remedy principle” which is relevant to the present case: “[55] In my view, the principle is based on the fact that judicial review in the High Court is ordinarily a remedy of last resort, to ensure that the rule of law is respected where no other procedure is suitable to achieve that objective. However, since it is a matter of discretion for the court, where it is clear that a public authority is acting in defiance of the rule of law, the High Court will be prepared to exercise its jurisdiction then and there without waiting for some other remedial process to take its course. Also, in considering what should be taken to qualify as a suitable alternative remedy, the court should have regard to the provision which Parliament has made to cater for the usual sort of case in terms of the procedures and remedies which have been established to deal with it. If Parliament has made it clear by its legislation that a particular sort of procedure or remedy is in its view appropriate to deal with a standard case, the court should be slow to conclude in its discretion that the public interest is so pressing that it ought to intervene to exercise its judicial review function along with or instead of that statutory procedure. But of course it is possible that instances of unlawfulness will arise which are not of that standard description, in which case the availability of such a statutory procedure will be less significant as a factor. [56] Treating judicial review in ordinary circumstances as a remedy of last resort fulfils a number of objectives. It ensures the courts give priority to statutory procedures as laid down by Parliament, respecting 36 Parliament’s judgment about what procedures are appropriate for particular contexts. It avoids expensive duplication of the effort which may be required if two sets of procedures are followed in relation to the same underlying subject matter. It minimizes the potential for judicial review to be used to disrupt the smooth operation of statutory procedures which may be adequate to meet the justice of the case. It promotes proportionate allocation of judicial resources for dispute resolution and saves the High Court from undue pressure of work so that it remains available to provide speedy relief in other judicial review cases in fulfilment of its role as protector of the rule of law, where its intervention really is required.”

65. In Mohd Karim Bin Abas & Ors v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Hal Ehwal Kesatuan Sekerja [2013] 4 MLJ 420 this court held that: “(a) it is trite that judicial review is nothing but a potent and effective procedural device within the armoury of the High Court to supervise and control the decision making process of public bodies or like to ensure that they act within the spirit and powers of the Federal Constitution and/of statutes and if necessary to restrain the decision maker from acting in excess and/or abuse of power. This process is also used to check and arrest executive excesses and encroachment (see Chong Chung Moi @ Christine Chong v The Government of the State of Sabah & Ors [2007] 5 MLJ 441). The court's themselves have placed various restrictions to control exodus of complaints against public bodies by busy bodies and alike, or where the complaint is premature or trivial or misconceived as in the instant case. The development of the law in this area of 37 jurisprudence will clearly show that the goal post for obtaining the relief has often been molded from time to time and is not seen as a static concept. If judicial fetters are employed, it is only for the purpose of stopping busy bodies or premature claims, who ultimately cannot be given any form of relief and from disturbing the courts and the workings of the government and public bodies. And no one case is binding on another for court’s intervention when the issue relates to fundamental guarantees and/or public interest as a whole. It all depends on the factual matrix of the case, public interest and urgency for the court’s intervention even though there may be room to argue that intervention may be premature.”

66. This Court in Mohd Karim dismissed the appellant’s appeal in limine on the ground that it was frivolous, vexatious and abuse of the court process, inter alia, on the ground that no reason was given why appeal mechanism provided under the Act has not been complied with.

67. In our view, the act of the Disciplinary Board vide notice dated 4.11.2016 is itself not a reviewable decision but a step in the process which will ultimately lead to a decision which is reviewable after the Disciplinary Board imposed the punishment under section 94.

68. In this present case, the applicant has a right of appeal to the High Court pursuant to Section 103E of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (LPA 1976) in respect of any decision made by the respondent in affecting the applicant. 38 Thus, the applicant’s remedy, if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the respondent date 13.10.2016, is to wait for the respondent to make an order under Section 103D of the LPA 1976 after hearing the applicant on the issue of enhancement of punishment and then to file an appeal to the High Court pursuant to Section 103E of the LPA 1976. In this circumstance, the applicant’s application for judicial review is premature and amounts to an attempt to short-circuit the statutory disciplinary and appellate process provided in the LPA 1976.

69. It is relevant to note that on 3.6.2014, section 103EA of the LPA 1976 was amended as follows:

(1) Where a party is aggrieved by any decision, order, ruling or direction of the Disciplinary Committee or the Disciplinary Board, other than a final order or decision made by the Disciplinary Board referred to in section 103e, the aggrieved party may file an objection in writing in respect of any such decision, order, ruling or direction with the Disciplinary Committee or Disciplinary Board, as the case may be, within fourteen days of being duly notified of the decision, order, ruling or direction.

(2) Where the objection raised is in respect of the composition or participation of any member of the Disciplinary Committee or the Disciplinary Board, as the case may be, in meetings, proceedings or inquiries before the Disciplinary Committee or 39 Disciplinary Board, the procedures to deal with the objection shall be as set out in the rules made under this Part.

(3) After the objection referred to in subsection (2) has been dealt with, the Disciplinary Committee or the Disciplinary Board, as the case may be, shall proceed with the inquiry or proceeding until its completion.

(4) Where the objection raised is not related to matters referred to in subsection (2), the Disciplinary Committee or Disciplinary Board, as the case may be-

(5) Where the inquiry or proceeding referred to in subsection (3) and paragraph (4)(b)-

(6) The order or decision of the Disciplinary Board under paragraph

(5)(b) shall be suspended from coming into effect for thirty days from the date of the order or decision or to such further time as the Court may allow to enable an aggrieved party to apply to the Court for a review.

(7) If an aggrieved party does not apply for review, the order or decision of the Disciplinary Board shall take effect immediately upon the expiration of the period of thirty days.

(8) Nothing in this section shall preclude an aggrieved party from raising any objections under this section as grounds of appeal in any appeal he may file under section 103E.

70. It is important to note that the saving provisions in section 21(4) and

(5) of the Legal Profession Act (Amendment) Act 2012 (LPA 2012), which amended the LPA 1976 and introduced section 103EA provides that the principal Act then prevailing shall continue to apply. The saving provisions states as follows:

(4) Where on the date of coming into operation of this Act, disciplinary proceedings that were pending before the Disciplinary Board, the proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the principal Act to those proceedings immediately before the date of coming into operation of this Act and the Disciplinary Board may make such order or decision as it could have made under the authority vested 41 in it under the principal Act immediately before the date of coming into operation of this Act.

(5) Any written application or complaint concerning the conduct of any advocate and solicitor or any pupil referred to the Disciplinary Board before the date of coming into operation of this Act shall be dealt with under the provisions of the principal Act applicable to the disciplinary proceedings immediately before the date of coming into operation of this Act.

71. The principal Act as it stood before the coming into force of section 103EA is provided in section 103E(2) of LPA 1976 as follows:

(2) There shall be no judicial review against any decision or order made by the Disciplinary Board.

72. Hence, from the reading of the then section 103E (2) of the LPA, it seems clear that the law as it then stood precluded the applicant from moving the respondent’s decision of 13.10.2016 into this court for judicial review.

73. Therefore, we should not intervene at this stage until the Disciplinary Board has considered the form of punishment to be imposed on the applicant under section 94 of the LPA. Accordingly, this appeal should be dismissed, but without prejudice to such further application as the applicant may desire 42 to make in the light of the proceedings taken and the orders to be made by the Disciplinary Board. CONCLUSION

74. Given the applicant’s failure to take the clear step of making representations under section 103D(4) of the LPA, we are of the view that the application for judicial review is premature. Therefore it would be an abuse of the court process for the court to hear the judicial review application when the Disciplinary Board has not concluded its decision. We, therefore, dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs and affirmed the High Court order. Dated 17 July 2020 Signed HANIPAH BINTI FARIKULLAH Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya 43 Counsel/Solicitors: For the Appellant: Ong Keh Keong Messrs Ong Partnership Suite B-06-12, 6th Floor Plaza Mont Kiara No. 2, Jalan Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent: Hoi Jack S’ng (Andrea Chew Mei Yng with him) Messrs Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill Aras 6 Menara 1 Dutamas Solaris Dutamas No. 1, Jalan Dutamas 1 50480 Kuala Lumpur