HOWARD ONG LU PENG (NRIC No. 720418-04-5069) ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF DECISION (Enclosure 14) A. INTRODUCTION [1] This is an application by the second and third defendants, by notice of application dated 2 June 2026 (Enclosure 14), to transfer this action from the High Court of Malaya at Melaka to the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur. [2] The action itself is an originating summons under Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001 (Enclosure 1). By it the plaintiff seeks principally, an order for an inquiry under section 52 of that Act into whether the first defendant his mother is a mentally disordered person incapable of managing herself and her affairs, together with consequential relief should she be so found, including the appointment of a committee of her estate under section 58 and a declaration avoiding certain dealings in her assets. [3] Enclosure 14 is brought under Order 57 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012, paragraph 12 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 read with sections 23 and 25 of that Act, and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The relief sought is confined to venue: an order transferring the proceedings to Kuala Lumpur, such directions as to the transfer as the Court thinks fit, and costs in the cause. [4] The application is interlocutory and procedural. It does not engage, and I do not in these grounds determine, any of the substantive questions raised by the originating summons. The single question before me is whether the proceedings ought to be transferred to Kuala Lumpur. [5] No affidavit in opposition has been filed. The position of the plaintiff and of the first defendant appears from correspondence exhibited to the supporting affidavit, to which I return below. B. THE HEARING ON 22 JUNE 2026 AND THE RESUMED HEARING ON 23 JUNE 2026 [6] When the application came on for hearing before me on 22 June. 2026, I raised two matters which required to be resolved before it could be determined. [7] The first is the mandate of the solicitors appearing for the first defendant. The first defendant is the very person whose mental capacity is the subject of the inquiry, and her non-objection to the transfer is conveyed to the Court only through her solicitors. Where the capacity of a party to manage herself and her affairs is itself in question, the authority of solicitors to act upon her instructions cannot be assumed; it must be established. I therefore required the first defendant's solicitors to satisfy the Court as to their mandate to act on her behalf. [8] The second is the plaintiff's non-objection. The plaintiff's letter of non-objection is dated 29 May 2026, whereas Enclosure 14 is dated 2 June 2026 and the affidavit in support of it (Enclosure 17) was affirmed on 12 June 2026. The plaintiff's non-objection therefore predates both the application and the grounds advanced in support of it, and cannot be taken as an informed response to the application as filed. [9] For these reasons I adjourned the hearing of Enclosure 14 to 23 June 2026 for those matters to be verified. [10] The matter resumed before me on 23 June 2026. As to the first matter, the first defendant's solicitors produced evidence of their mandate to act on her behalf, with which I am satisfied. Their authority to act for the first defendant, and thereby to convey her non-objection to the transfer, is accordingly established. As to the second matter, the plaintiff's continuing non-objection to the application as filed was confirmed by his solicitors' letter dated 22 June 2026 (Enclosure 21), to which I return below. C. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [12] The originating summons (Enclosure 1) was filed on 18 May 2026. It is supported by the affidavit in support of the plaintiff (Enclosure 3) and a further affidavit in support of the plaintiff's wife, Khoo Siew Lin (Enclosure 4). On the same day the plaintiff also filed an ex parte notice of application for an interim injunction (Enclosure 5), upon which an ex parte injunction was granted on 21 May 2026 (Enclosure 12). [13] On 3 June 2026, at an inter partes hearing at which the plaintiff, the first defendant, and the second and third defendants were each separately represented by counsel, the High Court at Melaka ordered that the injunction of 21 May 2026 continue on an ad interim basis, subject to stated variations, until the disposal of the inter partes hearing of Enclosure 5 or of any application to set it aside (Enclosure 16). In summary, the variations permit the withdrawal of the first defendant's funds, and where those are insufficient her fixed deposits, to meet her medical and living expenses should rental income prove inadequate, against an obligation on the second and third defendants to notify the plaintiff and to produce the relevant bills or receipts. The ad interim order remains in force. The inter partes injunction, and the substantive reliefs sought in the originating summons, remain to be heard. [14] The plaintiff and the second and third defendants are the three sons of the first defendant. For the purposes of these proceedings the plaintiff is the eldest son; the third defendant, Howard Ong Lu Peng, is the second son; and the second defendant, Ong Lu Yuan, is the youngest son. The first defendant is the subject of the inquiry sought, and is separately represented by her own solicitors, Messrs ChongSoo Partnership. [15] The assets identified in the annexure to the originating summons are located in several places. Of the six items of immovable property, five are situated in Melaka and one a penthouse at Mont Kiara is in Kuala Lumpur. Various bank and securities accounts are held in Melaka and in Singapore. The first defendant's attending doctors, named in the originating summons, practise at Pantai Hospital Melaka. [16] Enclosure 14 is supported by the first affidavit of the second and third defendants, affirmed by the third defendant on 12 June 2026 (Enclosure 17), the third defendant deposing that he is authorised by the second defendant to affirm it on behalf of both. [17] The grounds advanced for the transfer, as stated in Enclosure 14 and in Enclosure 17, are these. The third defendant resides in Kuala Lumpur with his family. The first defendant is said to have recently moved to live with the third defendant and his family in Kuala Lumpur. The second defendant is said to spend most of his working days in the Klang Valley, residing in Kuala Lumpur during the working week on account of his employment at Sunway University in Petaling Jaya, and to return to Melaka mainly at weekends. [18] The third defendant further deposes, at paragraph 7 of Enclosure 17, that the solicitors for the plaintiff and the solicitors for the first defendant have each informed his solicitors that they do not object to the transfer. The English translation of that paragraph refers, evidently in error, to "Enclosure 12"; the Malay text affirmed by the deponent refers to Enclosure 14, which is the application in fact before the Court. Nothing turns on the slip. [19] That deposition is borne out by the correspondence exhibited as "OLP-1". By a letter dated 29 May 2026 the plaintiff's solicitors, Messrs Hafizah Nik Nazifah & Partners, state that the plaintiff has no objection to the matter being transferred to Kuala Lumpur. By a letter dated 8 June 2026 that is, after the inter partes hearing of 3 June 2026 the first defendant's solicitors, Messrs ChongSoo Partnership, confirm that they have no objection to the transfer application. [20] It follows that the residence of the third defendant in Kuala Lumpur, and the non-objection of the plaintiff and of the first defendant, are established on the affidavit and the exhibited correspondence. The assertion that the first defendant has recently moved to reside with the third defendant in Kuala Lumpur is a deposition of the third defendant; it is not contradicted, and the first defendant's solicitors do not dispute it. [21] I record that the circumstances of the first defendant's residence, the state of her mental capacity, and the propriety of the dealings in her assets are all matters in issue in the originating summons. Nothing in these grounds is to be taken as a finding upon any of them. D. THE ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION [22] The sole issue is whether, applying Order 57 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012, the proceedings can be more conveniently or fairly tried at Kuala Lumpur and ought to be transferred there. E. THE GOVERNING PROVISION [23] Order 57 rule 1(1) provides that where a Judge of the High Court is satisfied that proceedings in that Court can be more conveniently or fairly tried in some other Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, he may, on the application of any party, order their transfer to that other Court. [24] A transfer from one High Court to another High Court of coordinate jurisdiction falls within Order 57 rule 1(4)(a). Before making such an order, the Court is directed by rule 1(4) to consider whether the Court that is to hear the matter is at or nearest to the place where (A) the cause of action arose; (B) a defendant resides or has his place of business; (C) the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or are alleged to have occurred; (D) the disputed land is situated; or (E) for other reasons it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be transferred. [25] These considerations are not cumulative conditions; they are the matters to which the Court must direct its mind in deciding where the proceedings may more conveniently or fairly be tried. The power is discretionary, and is exercised by weighing the connecting factors as a whole against the standard set by rule 1(1). [26] Enclosure 14 also invokes the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and the inherent jurisdiction preserved by Order 92 rule 4. Where, as here, Order 57 rule 1 applies directly and furnishes the operative criteria, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to resort to the inherent jurisdiction. The application is properly determined under Order 57 rule 1. F. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION [27] The proceedings are an inquiry under Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001. They do not present a conventional cause of action, and the language of Order 57 rule 1(4) must be applied with that in mind. The gravamen of the matter is the mental capacity of the first defendant. The consequential reliefs the appointment of a committee, and the avoidance of dealings in her assets arise only if she is found to lack capacity. [28] Taking the considerations in rule 1(4) in turn. As to (A) and (C), the origin and the underlying facts of the matter have a substantial Melaka connection: the first defendant's family home is in Melaka, the onset of her condition is said to date from September 2023 when she lived there, and her attending doctors practise at Pantai Hospital Melaka. As to (D), the greater part of the immovable property identified in the originating summons is situated in Melaka. [29] Those considerations point towards Melaka. But their weight in the present matter is qualified. This is not a dispute about title to, or possession of, land, in which the situation of the property and the convenience of a view or of local witnesses might be decisive. The immovable property is relevant only to the consequential reliefs, and it will be proved, if it falls to be proved at all, by documents of title and records of dealing, which are equally available wherever the matter is heard. Likewise the evidence of the Melaka attending doctors can be received, and they can be interviewed by any court-appointed expert under section 54, without the venue of the inquiry being determinative. [30] As to (B), the residence of the defendants favours Kuala Lumpur. The third defendant resides there. The second defendant resides there during the working week. The first defendant is said to reside there now. Of the three defendants, none is shown to reside in Melaka otherwise than by reference to an address for service. [31] The consideration of greatest weight in this matter falls under (E). The first defendant is the very person whose mental capacity is to be examined. If an inquiry is ordered under section 52 her attendance may be required, and a personal examination under section 54 must be conducted wherever she is. On the unchallenged evidence she now resides in Kuala Lumpur. Her personal examination, and any attendance, can be arranged more conveniently, and with less disturbance to a person of her age and condition, in the place where she lives. [32] A further matter requires consideration. The High Court at Melaka is already seised of the substantive dispute, and has, on an inter partes basis, granted and continued injunctive relief protecting the first defendant's assets. The inter partes hearing of the plaintiff's injunction application (Enclosure 5), and any application to set the injunction aside, remain to be heard. There is, as a general matter, a value in proceedings remaining with the court already familiar with their interlocutory history. [33] That consideration does not outweigh the factors favouring transfer. The ad interim order is interlocutory and protective; it is not a final determination, and it continues in force notwithstanding a change of registry. The inter partes injunction, and any application to set it aside, can be heard as effectively at Kuala Lumpur as at Melaka. The orderly course, indeed, favours transfer: the inquiry, the injunction, and the leave stage of the originating summons may then be managed and heard together in the one registry that in which the first defendant resides and to which most of the parties are connected. The prior seisin of the Melaka court is therefore a factor of weight, but it is not decisive. [34] To this is added the position of the parties. The plaintiff commenced this action in Melaka, and it was open to him to resist a change of forum. He does not. By the letter of 29 May 2026 his solicitors confirm that he does not object. The first defendant's solicitors, by the letter of 8 June 2026, likewise confirm no objection. The application is, in substance, unopposed. [35] On the morning of the hearing the Court received a further letter from the plaintiff's solicitors, Messrs Hafizah Nik Nazifah & Partners, dated 22 June 2026 (Enclosure 21), again stating that the plaintiff has no objection to the application in Enclosure 14. [36] The absence of opposition is a material consideration, but it is not, of itself, decisive. Venue under Order 57 rule 1 is not a matter that the parties may settle between themselves; the Court retains an independent discretion and must be satisfied that transfer accords with the more convenient or fairer trial of the proceedings. I do not therefore rest the decision on consent alone, but upon the connecting factors considered above, of which the non-objection of the parties forms part. [37] I have considered whether the particular character of this matter calls for caution before acting on the parties' positions. The first defendant is alleged to be vulnerable, and she is said to reside with the third defendant, who is one of the applicants for transfer and one of those whose dealings with her assets are impugned in the originating summons. Where the very subject of a capacity inquiry is said to be in the care of a party seeking a procedural advantage, the Court should not act uncritically upon an expression of that party's, or of that person's, consent. [38] That concern, on examination, does not stand in the way of transfer, for several reasons. First, the party whose interest is adverse to the second and third defendants the plaintiff independently does not object, and it was he who selected Melaka in the first place. Secondly, the first defendant is separately and independently represented: her own solicitors appeared at the inter partes hearing of 3 June 2026, and it was after that hearing, by the letter of 8 June 2026, that they confirmed her non-objection, so that her position is a considered one taken on independent advice and not merely an echo of the applicants'. Thirdly, her interests are presently secured by the subsisting ad interim injunction, which restrains dealings with her assets save on the limited and supervised terms permitted by Enclosure 16, and which travels with the proceedings on transfer. Fourthly, and in any event, the transfer is of venue only: whether the first defendant lacks capacity, and whether her assets were improperly dealt with, will be determined on their merits in whichever registry the matter proceeds, with every party at liberty to be heard. A change of registry confers no forensic advantage upon the second and third defendants in those determinations. [39] For completeness, the application is regular in form. It is made by a party, by notice of application, within the existing proceedings, as Order 57 rule 1(1) contemplates, and it is supported by affidavit. No procedural objection arises. [40] Weighing the considerations in Order 57 rule 1(4) as a whole, the factors connecting the matter to Melaka the location of most of the immovable property, the Melaka origin of the first defendant's condition and treatment, and the prior seisin of the Melaka court are real but, for the reasons given, carry reduced weight in an inquiry of this kind. The factors connecting the matter to Kuala Lumpur the residence there of the defendants, and in particular of the first defendant, whose personal examination lies at the centre of the inquiry are the more substantial, and they are reinforced by the unopposed and independently-advised position of the parties. [41] In my judgment the proceedings can be more conveniently and fairly tried at Kuala Lumpur within the meaning of Order 57 rule 1(1), and it is in the interests of justice, within rule 1(4)(E), that they be transferred there. G. CONCLUSION [42] For the reasons given in Section F, I am satisfied that, on the connecting factors, the proceedings can be more conveniently and fairly tried at Kuala Lumpur. H. ORDERS OF THE COURT [43] Accordingly, I make the following orders: