Ong Tjoei Aik Harold v 1. ) Gan Siew Mui @ Gan Yook Hwa (MA-24NCvC-151-05/2026)

GAN SIEW MUI @ GAN YOOK HWA (F) (NRIC No. 431223-04-5076)

ONG LU YUAN (NRIC No. 751117-14-5121)

HOWARD ONG LU PENG (NRIC No. 720418-04-5069) ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (On the application for an injunction in Enclosure 5, heard ex parte)

INTRODUCTION [1] Before this Court is an application, made ex parte, for an interim injunction to restrain the First Defendant from transferring certain assets, and to restrain the Second and Third Defendants from transferring those assets, from dealing with their proceeds, or from procuring the First Defendant to do either. The application is contained in Enclosure 5. [2] The application is ancillary to the substantive Originating Summons at Enclosure 1, by which an inquiry under Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001 [Act 615] is sought to determine whether the First Defendant, who is the mother of the Plaintiff, the Second Defendant and the Third Defendant, is a mentally disordered person within the meaning of the Act and incapable of managing herself and her affairs. [3] The application has been brought on an urgent basis under a Certificate of Urgency at Enclosure 2. It is supported by the affidavit of the Plaintiff in Enclosure 3, the affidavit of the Plaintiff's wife in Enclosure 4, and the supplementary affidavit of the Plaintiff in Enclosure 6. The Defendants have had no notice of the application and have not been heard. [4] The real controversy at this stage is narrow. The question whether the First Defendant is in fact a mentally disordered person is not for determination today. That question is reserved to the statutory inquiry sought in the Originating Summons, in which the Defendants will have the right to be heard, where expert evidence will be received under section 54 of the Mental Health Act 2001, and where the Court will make findings of fact upon full evidence. [5] The questions for present determination concern only whether interim protective relief should be granted in advance of that inquiry, and if so on what terms. These questions raise three matters: first, whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant interim injunctive relief before any finding under section 52 of the Mental Health Act 2001; second, whether the threshold conditions for proceeding ex parte are satisfied on the affidavit evidence in Enclosures 3,4 and 6; and third, whether the discretion to grant interim relief should be exercised, and if so what relief is proportionate to the risks identified.

MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [6] The First Defendant is 83 years of age. She is the mother of the Plaintiff, the Second Defendant and the Third Defendant, all of whom are her sons. Until February 2026 she lived at her home in Taman Sentosa, Bukit Baru, Melaka, with a domestic helper from Indonesia. [7] Two letters from medical practitioners are exhibited to the Plaintiff's affidavit in Enclosure 3 at pages 146 and 147. The first is from Dr Chow Yok Wai, a Consultant Nephrologist and Internal Medicine specialist at Pantai Hospital Melaka, who records that the First Defendant has been under his care; that a right frontal intracranial tumour was diagnosed on 4 May 2021; that dementia was diagnosed and treatment commenced on 26 September 2023; and that her cognitive function, in particular in the areas of executive function, judgement, insight and decision-making capacity, is significantly impaired. The second is from Dr Toh Tsun Haw, a Consultant Neurologist at Pantai Hospital Melaka, who records that he has been treating the First Defendant since September 2024 for progressive gait impairment, dizziness, cognitive decline and parkinsonian symptoms; that MRI imaging shows cerebral atrophy with a stable right frontal meningioma; that she is being treated with Madopar (levodopa with benserazide), Ebixa (memantine) and amitriptyline; and that at her last review in September 2025 she continued to demonstrate mild shuffling gait, stooped posture, persistent dizziness, gait instability and intermittent shuffling on walking. [8] A WhatsApp message exchange dated 4 September 2023, exhibited at Enclosure 3 page 190, is between the Plaintiff's wife and the Second Defendant. In that exchange, the Plaintiff's wife informed the Second Defendant that the First Defendant had been diagnosed with dementia onset and that hallucinations had been observed. The Second Defendant's reply included the words "Clearly la. So repetitive". [9] On 17 May 2022 that is, before the September 2023 diagnosis the First Defendant executed a Last Will and Testament. The Plaintiff and the Second Defendant are named as executors. The Will, the existence and material terms of which are deposed to in Enclosure 3, identifies the intended beneficiary of each of the principal immovable properties. The family home was to be handed to the Plaintiff and thereafter to his son; the shop office known as Lot 401 was to be given to the Third Defendant; the shop office known as Lot 64 was to be given to the Third Defendant; the penthouse at Mont Kiara was to be given to the Second Defendant; the parking lot lands were to be managed by the Second Defendant with proceeds going to the grandchildren; and the halfshare in land at Mukim Machap was to be given to the Third Defendant. [10] Enclosure 3 records that, from March 2024 onwards, the immovable properties registered in the First Defendant's name were progressively transferred to the Second and Third Defendants. The relevant entries, each with a page reference to Enclosure 3 in support, are as follows. The Mont Kiara penthouse was transferred to the Second Defendant on 29 March 2024 (Enclosure 3, page 102). The shop office known as Lot 64 was transferred to the Second Defendant on 16 May 2024 (Enclosure 3, page 104). The family home was transferred to the Third Defendant on 10 March 2025 (Enclosure 3, page 107). The parking lot lands were transferred to the Second and Third Defendants jointly on 8 April 2026 (Enclosure 3, page 117). The shop office known as Lot 401 and the half-share at Mukim Machap remain registered in the First Defendant's name (Enclosure 3, pages 122 and following). [11] On a separate matter, Enclosure 3 at pages 149,151 and 152 records the following sequence concerning a Central Depository System account at the Singapore Exchange ("SGX") held in the First Defendant's name, holding shares of approximately Singapore Dollars 1.5 million in value. The Plaintiff was, at one stage, the named contact person for that account. In early May 2026 he discovered that he had been removed as contact person. On 11 May 2026 the Plaintiff's solicitors wrote to SGX informing it of the intended application and of the two medical letters referred to in paragraph 7 above. SGX has, in response, suspended the account. [12] The proximate circumstances giving rise to the present application are set out in Enclosure 3 at pages 45 to 50. In late February 2026, the First Defendant moved from her home to live with the Plaintiff. From March 2026, while the Plaintiff and his wife were abroad in Singapore and London, the First Defendant lived with the Second Defendant. On 20 April 2026, the Plaintiff was informed by the First Defendant's neighbour that the belongings in the family home were being cleared. The Plaintiff attended at the family home, observed the Second Defendant clearing the belongings, and followed the moving vehicles to a property of the Second Defendant. Enquiries into the title position of the First Defendant's immovable properties were then made by way of land searches, and the matters set out in paragraph 10 above came to be known to the Plaintiff in late April 2026 and early May 2026. The Originating Summons at Enclosure 1, the Notice of Application at Enclosure 5, the affidavits in support at Enclosures 3 and 4, and the supplementary affidavit at Enclosure 6 were filed on 18 May 2026. The application was certified urgent by the Certificate of Urgency in Enclosure 2. [13] Enclosure 6 exhibits, as Exhibit HO-1, a WhatsApp message exchange between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant in respect of arrangements for the First Defendant to be brought to live with the Plaintiff and his wife. Among the messages is one in which the First Defendant first agrees to be brought, then forgets that the Third Defendant is to visit and seeks to rearrange, then states that she will go to Kuala Lumpur with the Third Defendant. [14] The Defendants have had no notice of these proceedings. No affidavit in reply has been filed. The Court has, on this application, the evidence in Enclosures 3, 4 and 6 only.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [15] Four questions arise. (15.1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant interim injunctive relief in aid of an application under Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001 in advance of any inquiry or finding under section 52 of that Act. (15.2) Whether the threshold conditions for the grant of interim injunctive relief on an ex parte basis are satisfied on the affidavit evidence in Enclosures 3,4 and 6. This includes (i) whether the case is one of urgency within the meaning of Order 29 rule 1(2) of the Rules of Court 2012, and (ii) whether the duty of full and frank disclosure required of an applicant proceeding ex parte has been observed. (15.3) Whether the requirements for an interlocutory injunction, namely a serious issue to be tried, the inadequacy of damages, and the balance of convenience, are satisfied. (15.4) If interim relief is to be granted, the appropriate scope duration and conditions of such relief, including any undertaking as to damages.

The Mental Health Act 2001 [Act 615] [16] Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001 [Act 615] (sections 51 to 75) creates the statutory mechanism by which the High Court inquires into whether a person alleged to be mentally disordered is in fact so, and, on a finding to that effect, makes orders for the management of that person and that person's estate. [17] Section 52(1) empowers the Court, on the application of a relative or other interested person, to direct an inquiry to ascertain whether the person alleged to be mentally disordered is incapable of managing himself and his affairs. Section 52(2) provides that the order may also contain directions for inquiries concerning the nature of the property of the alleged mentally disordered person, the persons who are his relatives, the period during which he has been mentally disordered, and such other questions as the Court deems proper. Section 54 authorises the Court to direct that a medical practitioner be given access to the person for the purposes of examination and the preparation of a report. Section 58 provides for the appointment of a committee of the estate or of the person upon a finding under section 52. The expression mentally disordered person is defined in section 2 of the Act. Sections 59, 62 and 63 confer further powers exercisable consequent upon a finding of mental disorder. [18] Three points are to be noted on the structure of Part X. First, the section 52 inquiry is the gateway to the substantive findings on capacity. Second, the consequential powers in sections 58, 59, 62 and 63 are exercisable only after the inquiry has resulted in a finding that the person is mentally disordered and incapable of managing himself and his affairs. Third, Part X does not itself expressly confer a power to make interim protective orders in advance of the section 52 inquiry. The source of any such power, where it exists, is therefore not Part X itself but the more general jurisdiction of the Court.

The Court's interim jurisdiction [19] The High Court is invested with the power to grant interim injunctive relief by a combination of: section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 [Act 137], which confirms that preventive relief by way of injunction may be granted; paragraph 6 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91], which expressly empowers the High Court to provide for the interim preservation of property by sale or by injunction, and which has been recognised as a source of the Mareva and asset-preservation jurisdiction in Zainal Abidin bin Haji Abdul Rahman v Century Hotel Sdn Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 260 (Federal Court); Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012, which provides the procedural framework for the grant of interim injunctions; and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court preserved by Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012 [20] Order 29 rule 1(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 provides that an application for the grant of an injunction may be made by any party to a cause or matter before or after the trial of the cause or matter, whether or not a claim for the injunction was included in that party's writ, counterclaim or third party notice. Rule 1(2) provides that the application may be made by notice of application supported by affidavit, and that where the case is one of urgency the application may be made ex parte. [21] Rule 1(2A) prescribes the content of the affidavit in support of an ex parte application. The affidavit must disclose: (a) the facts giving rise to the claim; (b) the facts giving rise to the application for an injunction; (c) the facts relied on to justify the application ex parte, including details of any notice given to the other party or, if notice has not been given, the reason for not giving notice; (d) any answer by the defendant (or which he is likely to assert) to the claim or application; (e) any facts which may lead the Court not to grant the application ex parte or at all; (f) any similar application made to another Judge and the order made on that application; and (g) the precise relief sought. [22] Rule 1(2B) provides that an ex parte interim injunction, unless earlier revoked or set aside, automatically lapses at the end of twenty-one days from the date on which it is granted. The operation of rule 1(2B) was considered by the Court of Appeal in Rih Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Tanjung Tuan Hotel Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 MLJ 1 (Court of Appeal). It was held that the twenty-one day period is computed by excluding the day on which the order was made; that an ex parte injunction cannot be extended beyond the twenty-one days; but that, where the application cannot be heard inter partes before the expiry of the period, the High Court retains jurisdiction to grant a fresh ad interim injunction pending the inter partes hearing, that fresh order being a fresh exercise of discretion and not an extension of the lapsed ex parte order. Rule 1(2BA) requires that an ex parte injunction be served on the other party within seven days of the order, and that a date for the inter partes hearing be fixed within fourteen days of the order.

The substantive test for the grant of interim injunctive relief [23] The principles by reference to which an interlocutory injunction is granted in this jurisdiction are those stated by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, as received into Malaysian law and applied by the Court of Appeal in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193. The Court must be satisfied that there is a serious issue or bona fide serious question to be tried; that damages would not be an adequate remedy if relief were refused; and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction. The Court must, in addition, weigh the harm that the grant of an injunction would produce against the harm that would result from its refusal.

The ex parte threshold and the duty of full and frank disclosure [24] The grant of injunctive relief without notice imposes upon the applicant a duty of full and frank disclosure of all material facts, including matters that would or might tell against the grant of the relief sought. The duty was authoritatively stated by the High Court in Pathma D/O Naganather & Anor v Nivedita D/O Naganather (No 1) [2002] 6 MLJ 361. Abdul Malik Ishak J there explained that the applicant must disclose all material facts whether favourable or adverse, and that the consequences of a failure to disclose, while discretionary, ordinarily include the discharge of any order obtained. The English origin of the duty in R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, Ex parte Princess Edmond de Polignac [1917] 1 KB 486 has long been received as part of the law of this jurisdiction. [25] The duty of disclosure under Order 29 rule 1(2A) of the Rules of Court 2012 is, on its face, a procedural codification of the same principle. The two are best read together: the substantive duty stated in Pathma gives content to the seven heads of disclosure prescribed by rule 1(2A).

Jurisdiction to grant interim relief in advance of the section 52 inquiry [26] The first issue is jurisdictional. No inquiry under section 52 of the Mental Health Act 2001 has yet been ordered. No finding of mental disorder has been made. The Defendants are not before the Court. The question is whether this Court has the power, at this stage, to grant interim injunctive relief in respect of property registered in or said to be derived from the First Defendant. [27] The position taken on the application is that the power is derived from section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950, paragraph 6 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012, and the inherent jurisdiction preserved by Order 92 rule 4 of those Rules. The Mental Health Act 2001 is invoked as the subject-matter of the substantive Originating Summons, but the interim power is sought from the general law. [28] That analysis is correct. The consequential powers in sections 58, 59, 62 and 63 of the Mental Health Act 2001 are, as I have noted in paragraph 18 above, exercisable only after a finding under section 52. Those provisions cannot themselves be the source of an interim order made in advance of a finding. The source must be the general jurisdiction of the High Court. Paragraph 6 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 expressly empowers the Court to provide for the interim preservation of property, and was recognised in Zainal Abidin as the source of the Mareva and asset-preservation jurisdiction. Section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 confirms the availability of preventive injunctive relief. Order 29 supplies the procedural framework. The inherent jurisdiction preserved by Order 92 rule 4 is the residual basis on which the Court may make such order as is necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of its process. [29] The exercise of that jurisdiction at this preliminary stage is in aid of, and not in derogation from, the protective purpose of Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001. If the assets in respect of which the Originating Summons is brought were to be dissipated before the section 52 inquiry could be conducted, the inquiry would be deprived of practical purpose so far as the protection of the estate is concerned. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to grant interim relief in support of the Part X process. [30] The jurisdiction is, however, to be exercised with caution. No finding of incapacity has been made. The interim relief sought is, in substance, an order which restrains the use of property otherwise registered in the name of the persons against whom it is directed. The First Defendant is presumed to have capacity until the contrary is found at the section 52 inquiry. The Second and Third Defendants are presumed to hold what is registered in their names. The interim jurisdiction must operate within these presumptions and must not pre-empt the substantive determination.

Whether the case is one of urgency justifying ex parte relief [31] The second issue is whether the case is one of urgency within the meaning of Order 29 rule 1(2) of the Rules of Court 2012. Urgency in this context is not measured by the gravity of the underlying allegation. It is measured by whether the giving of notice to the other party would defeat the purpose of the application or expose the property in question to imminent further risk. [32] Three matters in the affidavit evidence speak to that question. The first is the incident of 20 April 2026, deposed to at Enclosure 3 pages 45 to 50. On that day, the Plaintiff personally observed the Second Defendant clearing the belongings from the family home, was given an explanation that was inconsistent with what he then witnessed, and followed the moving vehicles to a property of the Second Defendant. That is not a generalised assertion of risk. It is a dated, witnessed incident of asset removal by one of the persons against whom the relief is sought. [33] The second is the Singapore Exchange sequence at Enclosure 3 pages 149,151 and 152. The Plaintiff was, at one stage, the named contact person on the SGX account holding shares of approximately Singapore Dollars 1.5 million. He was removed in early May 2026, without notification to him, and without explanation. After his solicitors wrote to SGX on 11 May 2026 informing it of the intended application, SGX itself imposed a suspension. The risk to those shares is not, on this evidence, a hypothetical risk. It is one which has materialised within the fortnight preceding the application and which a regulated foreign securities exchange has itself recognised as requiring protective measures. [34] The third is the dated sequence of registered transfers set out in paragraph 10 above, the most recent of which (the parking lot lands on 8 April 2026) is six weeks before the filing of the application. That transfer occurred after the First Defendant had ceased to live in her own home and while she was, on the affidavit evidence, in the household of the Second Defendant. [35] It was capable of being said that the broader course of conduct began in March 2024 and is therefore not new. That is a true observation, but it does not displace the urgency analysis. The earlier transfers were not known to the Plaintiff until the land searches were conducted in late April 2026, as deposed to in Enclosure 3 at pages 50 and following. Once known, the conduct presents as a continuing course; the question is whether further dissipation is imminent. The Singapore Exchange sequence and the 20 April 2026 incident, taken together, demonstrate that further dealings including dealings within a foreign jurisdiction and in respect of high-value movable assets were occurring or were attempted within the days and weeks immediately preceding the application. If notice were given to the Second and Third Defendants, there is a rational basis on the affidavit evidence to apprehend that the assets in respect of which the Plaintiff seeks relief, in particular the Singapore-held assets and the contents of the safe deposit boxes, may be dealt with before any inter partes hearing can take place. [36] Two qualifications must be entered. First, the Second and Third Defendants are known family members at known addresses in Melaka and Kuala Lumpur. They are not absconding parties. Where the persons against whom relief is sought are not evading the jurisdiction, the audi alteram partem principle assumes particular weight, and the case for proceeding ex parte must be tested with greater rigour than in the case of an absent or fugitive respondent. Second, the immovable properties in Malaysia are now registered in the names of the Second and Third Defendants, and any further transfer to a third party would itself require registration. The land registries provide a measure of structural protection in respect of the immovables which is not available in respect of the movable assets held abroad. [37] Taking these matters together, the urgency requirement of Order 29 rule 1(2) is satisfied in respect of the Singapore-held assets, the safe deposit box contents, and the Malaysian Central Depository System account at RHB Investment Bank Berhad, all of which are movable, capable of rapid dissipation, and, in the case of the Singapore assets, already the subject of unexplained dealings within the fortnight before the application. The urgency requirement is not, in my judgement, satisfied to the same degree in respect of the immovable properties, where the structural protection of the National Land Code 1965 [Act 56 of 1965] limits the risk of an immediate and irrecoverable transfer to a third party.

Full and frank disclosure [38] The third question is whether the duty of full and frank disclosure under Order 29 rule 1(2A) of the Rules of Court 2012 has been observed. The duty is well stated in Pathma at paragraphs 22 to 28 of the judgment of Abdul Malik Ishak J, and is reinforced by the codified seven heads of disclosure in rule 1(2A). [39] The Plaintiff has, in Enclosure 3, deposed at some length to the underlying facts, the medical evidence, the registered position of each immovable property, the asset list, the family relationships, and the proximate events of April and May 2026. The matters of disclosure that bear most directly on the ex parte assessment are addressed: the chronological gap between the earlier transfers and the application is explained by reference to the late April 2026 discovery (Enclosure 3 pages 45 to 50); the basis for proceeding without notice is set out (the proximity of the SGX events of early to mid-May 2026 and the 20 April 2026 incident); and the Will of 17 May 2022, which fixes certain dispositions in the Second and Third Defendants' favour, is disclosed (Enclosure 3, deposed to in connection with the asset list and the family arrangements). The seven heads of disclosure required by rule 1(2A) are accordingly addressed. [40] Two matters require further consideration. The first is that the Plaintiff is himself a joint holder with the First Defendant and his wife in respect of certain fixed deposits identified in the asset list at Enclosure 3. That joint-holding position is disclosed on the face of the asset list. The second is that the First Defendant executed a Will on 17 May 2022 under which certain assets including the Mont Kiara penthouse are intended to pass to the Second Defendant. The Mont Kiara penthouse was, however, transferred to the Second Defendant on 29 March 2024, that is, during her lifetime. The fact that the Will would, on the First Defendant's death, give the same asset to the same person does not render the lifetime transfer unobjectionable. The lifetime transfer requires the lifetime capacity of the transferor. The disclosure of the Will is therefore both a matter discharging the rule 1(2A) duty and a relevant evidential aid in the assessment of capacity. Both matters are disclosed on the face of the affidavit evidence. [41] I therefore conclude that the duty of full and frank disclosure has been observed to the standard required for the grant of ex parte relief, subject always to the Defendants' right to demonstrate, at the inter partes hearing, that further material was not disclosed and that the order should be discharged on that basis.

Whether there is a serious issue to be tried [42] The serious-issue limb under Keet Gerald asks whether there is a bona fide serious question to be tried. The threshold is low. The question is whether the case is more than frivolous or vexatious. [43] Three serious questions arise on the affidavit evidence and require determination at the section 52 inquiry and any consequential proceedings. First, whether the First Defendant has, since 26 September 2023, suffered from a mental disorder within the meaning of section 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001 such that she is incapable of managing herself and her affairs. The exhibited letters of Dr Chow Yok Wai and Dr Toh Tsun Haw at Enclosure 3 pages 146 and 147 raise that question in concrete clinical form. Second, whether the immovable property transfers effected after 26 September 2023 — in particular those of 29 March 2024 (Mont Kiara), 16 May 2024 (Lot 64), 10 March 2025 (family home) and 8 April 2026 (parking lots) — are vulnerable to challenge by reason of incapacity, undue influence, or other vitiating factor. Third, whether the Second and Third Defendants procured or benefited from any of those transfers in circumstances giving rise to a remedy in equity. The WhatsApp exchange of 4 September 2023 between the Plaintiff's wife and the Second Defendant, in which the Second Defendant himself acknowledges the dementia diagnosis on or about the date it was made, is material to the second and third of these questions. [44] These are not questions which the Court can or should resolve on affidavit alone, and certainly not at an ex parte hearing. They are properly the subject-matter of the section 52 inquiry and of any consequential proceedings under section 58. For present purposes it is sufficient that they are serious questions to be tried. They plainly are.

Adequacy of damages [45] Damages would not be an adequate remedy for the harm against which the interim relief is sought. As to the immovable properties, the doctrine of indefeasibility under section 340 of the National Land Code [Act 56 of 1965] would, in the event of a bona fide onward transfer to a third party purchaser for value without notice, render recovery exceedingly difficult: see Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 (Federal Court) on the operation of section 340 and the requirements of indefeasibility. As to the movable assets the Singapore Exchange shares, the safe deposit box contents, the fixed deposits in various names, and the funds in foreign accounts the dissipation of those assets into the general financial system would in practical terms prevent any subsequent restitution. Damages are not an adequate remedy in either case.

Balance of convenience [46] The balance of convenience is to be assessed by weighing the prejudice to each party of granting or refusing relief. On the present record, the prejudice from refusing all relief is that the First Defendant's estate may be reduced by further transactions in the period between today's hearing and the inter partes return. The prejudice from granting relief at least in the limited form set out in the orders below is confined: the relief does not require any positive act of the Defendants, does not impair the day-to-day affairs of the Second or Third Defendants, and does not engage their own assets save in their capacity as transferees or joint holders. It requires only that no further dispositions be made in respect of specified items until the inter partes hearing. [47] Weighed in that way, the balance of convenience favours the grant of relief in respect of the assets identified in paragraph 37 above that is, the Singapore-held assets, the safe deposit box contents, and the Malaysian Central Depository System account at RHB Investment Bank Berhad. In respect of the immovable properties, where the structural protection of the National Land Code already operates against immediate alienation, a more limited form of relief is appropriate: namely a requirement that prior written notice be given of any intended further dealing.

Scope and duration of the order [48] The scope of the order is to be calibrated to the risk identified. Three principles guide that calibration on the present record. First, the order should be confined to assets in respect of which there is a genuine and demonstrated risk of dissipation in the period before the inter partes hearing. Second, the order should be the minimum interference necessary to preserve the position. Third, the order must accommodate the operation of Order 29 rule 1(2B) and rule 1(2BA) of the Rules of Court 2012, the consequences of which were stated in Rih Services. [49] Applying those principles, the order today restrains the Second and Third Defendants, and any party acting under their authority, from disposing of, transferring, charging, encumbering, or otherwise dealing with: (i) the shares and funds held under the First Defendant's Central Depository System account at the Singapore Exchange numbered 1681-1693-1816 at OCBC Securities Private Limited and Philip Securities Pte Ltd; (ii) the funds held in the First Defendant's joint account at Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited numbered 658826300001 and at DBS Bank numbered 018531-3-031; (iii) the funds held in the First Defendant's accounts at Citibank Singapore Limited identified at paragraph 4.8(h) of the Plaintiff's affidavit at Enclosure 3; (iv) the funds and shares held under the First Defendant's Central Depository System account at RHB Investment Bank Berhad numbered 087-026-00877-9159; and (v) the contents of the safe deposit boxes at Public Bank Berhad Jalan Laksamana (Box No. 78) and RHB Islamic Bank Berhad (MLK00641D). [50] In addition, the Second and Third Defendants are to give the Plaintiff not less than seventy-two hours' prior written notice of any intended further transfer, charge, encumbrance, mortgage, sale or other disposition of any of the immovable properties referred to in paragraph 10 above. That requirement is the minimum protection appropriate to the structural position of the immovable properties and avoids the disproportion of a full freezing order over land already registered in the Defendants' names. [51] The order is granted upon the Plaintiff's undertaking through counsel to abide by any order this Court may make as to damages should it later be found that this order has caused loss to any party which the Plaintiff ought to compensate. The order takes effect from the time of pronouncement and, in accordance with Order 29 rule 1(2B) of the Rules of Court 2012 and Rih Services, will automatically lapse at the end of twenty-one days from the date of grant, the date of grant being excluded in the computation. The Plaintiff is to serve the order, together with the sealed Originating Summons, the Notice of Application at Enclosure 5, and the supporting affidavits at Enclosures 3, 4 and 6, on each of the Defendants within seven days, in accordance with Order 29 rule 1(2BA). An inter partes hearing is fixed within fourteen days from the date of this order in accordance with that rule.

CONCLUSION [52] The application succeeds in part. The Court has jurisdiction to grant interim protective relief in support of the Part X process, and the conditions for proceeding ex parte are satisfied in respect of the movable foreign-held assets and the safe deposit box contents identified above. The substantive limbs under Keet Gerald are satisfied. The discretion is to be exercised in a manner proportionate to the risk demonstrated on the affidavit evidence and respectful of the Defendants' right to be heard at the inter partes hearing. [53] Nothing in this judgment is to be read as a finding on the substantive question of the First Defendant's capacity, the validity of the impugned transfers, or the position of any Defendant in the substantive proceedings. Those matters are reserved to the section 52 inquiry and to such consequential proceedings as the Court may order under sections 58 and following of the Mental Health Act 2001.

ORDERS OF THE COURT [54] Upon the Plaintiff's undertaking through counsel to abide by any order the Court may make as to damages, the Court orders that: (54.1) Until the further order of this Court at the inter partes hearing of Enclosure 5, the Second and Third Defendants, whether by themselves or by their agents or nominees, are restrained from disposing of, transferring, charging, encumbering, or otherwise dealing with, and from causing the First Defendant to dispose of, transfer, charge, encumber, or otherwise deal with: (a) the shares and funds held under the First Defendant's Central Depository System account at the Singapore Exchange numbered 1681-1693-1816 at OCBC Securities Private Limited and Philip Securities Pte Ltd; (b) the funds held in the First Defendant's joint account at Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited numbered 658826300001; (c) the funds held in the First Defendant's joint account at DBS Bank numbered 018531-3-031; (d) the funds held in the First Defendant's accounts at Citibank Singapore Limited as set out in paragraph 4.8(h) of the Plaintiff's affidavit at Enclosure 3; (e) the funds and shares held under the First Defendant's Central Depository System account at RHB Investment Bank Berhad numbered 026-00877-9159; and (f) the contents of the safe deposit boxes held in the First Defendant's name at Public Bank Berhad Jalan Laksamana (Box No. 78) and Islamic Bank Berhad (MLK00641D). (54.2) The Second and Third Defendants shall give the Plaintiff not less than seventy-two hours' prior written notice of any intended transfer, charge, encumbrance, mortgage, sale or other disposition of any of the following immovable properties: (a) the family home at No.26C, Taman Sentosa, Bukit Baru, 75150 Melaka (held under Geran Hakmilik 6216 Lot 63 and Geran Hakmilik 6215 Lot 62); (b) the shop office at No. 595 Jalan Melaka Raya 10 (held under Geran Hakmilik PN 2178 Lot 401); (c) the shop office at No. 191 Taman Melaka Raya (held under Geran Hakmilik PN 27598 Lot 64); (d) the penthouse Unit B16-2, Mont Kiara Sophia Condominium (held under Hakmilik Strata Berdaftar Geran 45267/M2/16/203); (e) the parking lots held under Geran Hakmilik 8443 Lot 46 and Geran Hakmilik 11231 Lot 44; and (f) the half-share in Geran Hakmilik GM636 Lot 4087, Mukim Machap, Alor Gajah. (54.3) The Plaintiff shall, within seven days of the date of this order, serve a sealed copy of the Originating Summons (Enclosure 1), the Notice of Application (Enclosure 5), the affidavits in support (Enclosures 3, 4 and 6), and a sealed copy of this Judgment, on each of the First, Second and Third Defendants at the addresses set out in the Originating Summons. (54.4) The application in Enclosure 5 shall be heard inter partes on a date to be fixed by the Registrar, such date to be not later than fourteen days from the date of this order. The Defendants are at liberty to file affidavits in reply not less than five days before the date so fixed. (54.5) The orders at 54.1 and 54.2 above shall, unless earlier revoked, set aside or extended by further order, lapse automatically at the end of twenty-one days from the date of this order, computed by excluding the date of this order, in accordance with Order 29 rule 1(2B) of the Rules of Court 2012. (54.6) Liberty to apply, including liberty to the Plaintiff to apply on notice for further interim relief, and liberty to the Defendants on entry of appearance to apply to vary or set aside any part of this order on notice to the Plaintiff. (54.7) Costs of Enclosure 5 are reserved to the inter partes hearing. Dated 21 May 2026 (YA Dato' Sri Raja Segaran A.L S. Krishnan) (Judicial Commisioner) High Court Of Malaya Malacca High Court (MELAKA) Lawyer For Plaintiff : Encik Surendra Ananth a/I Anandaraju Bersama Puan Hafizah binti Sani dan Cik Nur Hazwani binti Hilmi Tetuan Hafizah Nik Nazifah & Partners Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 58-1, Jalan BPM 2, Taman Bukit Piatu Mutiara, 75150 Melaka.