Ooi Cheong Kheng v Sl Precision Tools & Dies Sdn. Bhd. (WA-22IP-48-06/2025)

SL PRECISION TOOLS & DIES SDN BHD [Company No.: 201201001187 [974711-H]]

STMICROELECTRONICS SDN BHD [Company No.: 197401000325 [17326-V]] … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (In respect of the dismissal of both the 1st Defendant's Application to Set Aside the Ex Parte Anton Piller Order (Enclosure 55) and the 2nd Defendant's Application to Set Aside the Ex Parte Anton Piller Order (Enclosure 50)) A. INTRODUCTION [1] These are my reasons for dismissing the 1st Defendant’s application to set aside the Ex Parte Anton Piller Order dated 2! !

10.07.2025 (Enclosure 19) (“the APO”) (Enclosure 55) and the 2nd Defendant’s application to set aside the APO (Enclosure 50). The APO was subsequently varied by consent on 1 August 2026. The Plaintiff’s substantive application for the Anton Piller Order was made under enclosure 6. [2] The Plaintiff, Ooi Cheong Kheng, commenced this action on 18.06.2025 against SL Precision Tools & Dies Sdn Bhd, the 1st Defendant, and STMicroelectronics Sdn Bhd, the 2nd Defendant. In essence, the Plaintiff’s action is founded on several causes of action, including breach of contract, utility innovation infringement, conspiracy to defraud, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and inducement of breach of contract. [3] Thereafter, on 10.07.2025, the Plaintiff obtained the APO on an ex parte basis. The APO was subsequently executed against the 2nd Defendant on or about 21.07.2025 at its premises located at P.O. Box 28, Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Agas, 84007 Muar, Johor. The execution was carried out by the Plaintiff’s representatives together with the supervising solicitors appointed under the APO. [4] The APO was later varied by consent at the first case management post-execution on 1 August 2025, pending any application by the Defendants to set it aside. Thereafter, the 2nd Defendant and 1st Defendant respectively filed their respective applications to set aside the APO by way of Enclosure 50 and Enclosure 55 respectively. 3! ! [5] Having carefully considered the written submissions of the parties, I dismissed both applications for setting aside. I now give the reasons for my decision. B. BACKGROUND FACTS [6] The background facts, taken from the pleadings and affidavit evidence, may be summarised as follows. [7] The Plaintiff is the patent owner and inventor of a utility innovation titled “Test Pin Structure” (Application No. UI2023003392) (“the said UI”), registered under Grant No. MY-204321-A, protected by Sections 17 and 32 of the Patents Act 1983, granting the Plaintiff exclusive rights to the same. The said UI functions to reduce surface scratches on chips by limiting the needle tip’s sliding distance through a counteracting pin structure. [8] On 08.06.2023, the Plaintiff entered into a Licensing Agreement (“the Agreement”) with the 1st Defendant whereby the Plaintiff granted exclusive rights to the 1st Defendant to sell and distribute the Licensed Product (being the product covered by the 321 UI) to the 2nd Defendant. The Agreement contained, inter alia, the following material clauses: a) Clause 4: An obligation on the 1st Defendant to notify the Plaintiff of any infringement of the Licensed Product; b) Clause 7(b): A requirement to permit the Plaintiff to distribute and sell the Licensed Product directly to the 1st Defendant's 4! ! customer upon the 1st Defendant's cessation of placing orders from the Plaintiff; c) Clause 7(c): A prohibition on the 1st Defendant manufacturing the Licensed Product without the Plaintiff's consent; d) Clause 8: A cure period of 21 days from notice of breach; and e) Clause 9: Confidentiality obligations. [9] The Plaintiff’s case is that 6 months after the execution of the Agreement, the 1st Defendant made orders with the Plaintiff for the Licensed Product. However, from approximately 18.01.2024, the order quantities dropped dramatically from 2,000 units to as little as 8 units and ultimately the 1st Defendant ceased to place orders altogether. [10] Vide the Plaintiff’s letter dated 5.7.2024, the Plaintiff insisted that information and/or details from the 1st Defendant pertaining to the quantity of pins delivered to the 2nd Defendant ought to be disclosed to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff again stated that, in the event the 1st Defendant ceased placing orders from the Plaintiff for the Licensed Product, the Plaintiff has the rights to seek alternatives to maintain the market presence of the said product. [11] In furtherance, the following letters between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant were exchanged: 5! ! a. The Plaintiff’s letter dated 29.7.2024 proposing a follow-up meeting and/or call on 7.8.2024 at 2:00 pm; b. The 1st Defendant’s letter dated 2.8.2024 proposing a follow-up meeting and/or call on 28.8.2024 at 2:00 pm; c. The Plaintiff’s letter dated 13.8.2024 proposing that the agenda of the meeting will concern, inter-alia, the objectives, sales performance, market analysis, intellectual property protection, development of strategic action plan and next steps to be taken by parties pertaining to the Licensed Product; d. The 1st Defendant’s letter dated 21.8.2024 stating their disagreement for the meeting to be recorded without consent whereby all meetings are to be conducted on a without prejudice basis. The 1st Defendant also stated their disagreement to discuss the sales performance, market analysis, intellectual property protection and development of strategic action plan pertaining to the Licensed Product, on the basis that the 1st Defendant is not obligated under the said agreement to provide such information to the Plaintiff; e. The 1st Defendant’s letter dated 26.8.2024 proposing to reschedule the meeting initially fixed on 28.8.2024 to 19.9.2024; f. The Plaintiff’s letter dated 3.9.2024 stating that: 6! ! i. The upcoming meeting ought to be recorded for transparency; ii. The proposed agendas are highly relevant to the collaboration between parties; iii. Based on the Plaintiff’s records (as of December 2023), the 1st Defendant has installed 6 machines with 48 sets of sockets at customer sites whereby the Plaintiff has supplied 5,000 replacement pins comprising of 2,500 inner pins and 2,500 outer pins; and iv. In light that 5,000 replacement pins would only cover approximately 3 months of usage of the 48 sets of sockets, the Plaintiff requested information on how many machines are currently operational and whether 5,000 replacement pins were sufficient for the 1st Defendant to meet its customers’ needs. g. The 1st Defendant’s letter dated 13.9.2024 reiterated their disagreement for the meeting to be recorded, and that information requested by the Plaintiff pertaining to (1) the life span of pins (2) the number of operating machines, is unknown and/or confidential in nature. [12]

30.

10.2023, 7.2.2024, 19.2.2024, 5.3.2024, 28.6.2024 between the Defendants, the Plaintiff discovered that the 1st Defendant managed to sell and/or distribute the Licensed Product independently to the 7! ! 2nd Defendant despite ceasing to place orders with the Plaintiff since January 2024. Thus, it raised strong suspicion that the 1st Defendant had themselves manufactured the Licensed Product and had breached Clause 7(c) of the said agreement. [13] Upon the 1st Defendant’s refusal to provide information and/or explanation to the Plaintiff in this regard, the Plaintiff had conducted investigation into the potential infringement of the Licensed Product by the Defendants, which was subsequently confirmed and substantiated by photographs and video. [14] In furtherance of the above, the Plaintiff further procured expert reports and opinions from three separate entities: a) Intellect Patent & Innovation Sdn Bhd's Report and Opinion dated 02.06.2025; b) Marks & Clerk Singapore LLP's Opinion dated 04.06.2025; and c) Adastra's Opinion dated 07.06.2025. [15] These opinions (collectively, "the Plaintiff's Opinions"), exhibited as OCK-9 in the Plaintiff's affidavit in support, supported the Plaintiff's contention that the products being supplied by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant fell within the scope of the claims of the 321 UI. [16] For the purposes of these applications, I deem it pertinent to summarize the essence of the reports upon which the Plaintiff relies: 8! ! ! Intellect Patent & Innovation Sdn Bhd’s Report and Opinion dated 2.6.2025:- “We refer to your instructions and the materials received pertaining to an alleged infringement of Malaysian Patent No. MY-204321-A titled "A Test Pin Structure." Based on the documentation and evidence provided, namely:

A detailed comparison chart between the patented test pin and the allegedly infringing product;

The granted Malaysian patent specification for MY-204321- A;

Photographic images of the alleged infringing article under magnification;

Video evidence demonstrating lateral movement of a conventional pin (without counteracting structure);

Video evidence demonstrating minimal lateral movement of the allegedly infringing product (with counteracting structure); We have conducted a detailed analysis of the claim structure, technical functionality, and visual features. It is our professional opinion that the accused product falls within the scope of Claim 1 of the Malaysian patent, and constitutes literal infringement. Every essential element as described in the claim is found in the infringing product. Even if minor structural differences are argued, the core technical principles and outcomes are substantially the same, indicating infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Accordingly, we advise that there are strong grounds to assert patent infringement. You may wish to consider issuing a Cease and Desist letter, and prepare for enforcement proceedings should the infringement persist. A full analysis is enclosed in the following report for your reference.” Marks & Clerk Singapore LLP’s Opinion dated 4.6.2025:- “Conclusion While a determination of infringement cannot be made without 9! ! viewing an actual article operating according to Features 7 and 8, the geometric arrangement of the allegedly infringing article shown in Figures 1, 2 and 4 strongly suggests it would, in fact, operate according to Features 7 and 8. Accordingly, it is my opinion that claim 1 of UI392 is likely to be infringed by an article according to Figures 1, 2 and 4, and the other such articles provided to me but not attached to this opinion.” Adastra’s Opinion dated 7.6.2025:- “8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION CONCLUSION: ❖ A thorough comparison of the allegedly infringing product against the claim has been conducted. Based on visual inspection and technical mapping, all structural elements of the asserted claim are present in the allegedly infringing product. Notably the elasticity of the first elastic pin, the second elastic pin, and counter-pin portion cannot be configured without physical verification. ❖ With regard to the functional limitations—specifically, the reduction of sliding distance and insertion of the needle tip into the chip—these appear to be prima facie present, based on the mechanical configuration. However, these functions are dynamic in nature and require operational testing or simulation for conclusive determination. ❖ Therefore, there exists a prima facie case of infringement, subject to further verification of the product’s material property and functional behaviour. ❖ The infringement status is best categorized as "Partially Confirmed", pending technical validation of the product’s material property and functional aspects.” [17] The Plaintiff averred that the 1st Defendant refused or failed to provide satisfactory explanations on these material queries as evidenced by the correspondence. By the Plaintiff’s letter dated 10.3.2025 to the 2nd Defendant, the Plaintiff stated that the 2nd Defendant’s product appears to have a similar embodiment to the Licensed Product. 10! ! [18] It was in these circumstances that the Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for the APO, which was granted on 10.07.2025. C. THE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS The 1st Defendant's Submission [19] The 1st Defendant's application to set aside (Enclosure 55) was premised on the following grounds:

The Plaintiff had failed to establish an extremely strong prima facie case against the 1st Defendant;

Specifically in relation to the alleged breach of contract, the 1st Defendant contended that it had not breached any of the clauses of the Agreement relied upon by the Plaintiff, and pointed to correspondence between the parties in which: i. The 1st Defendant denied manufacturing the Licensed Product on its own (letter dated 02.07.2024); ii. The Plaintiff appeared to acknowledge the 1st Defendant's explanations and even acknowledged that "market conditions can impact sales" (letter dated 05.07.2024); iii. The Plaintiff himself attempted to unilaterally terminate the Agreement on 30.09.2024 citing "lack of sales" and even welcomed future business with the 1st Defendant; 11! !

The Plaintiff's letter dated 26.06.2024 did not constitute a proper notice of breach under Clause 8 as it was characterised merely as "a friendly reminder";

The 1st Defendant submitted that there was no evidence of a grave danger that it would destroy evidence; and

The Plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts. The 2nd Defendant's Submission [20] The 2nd Defendant's application to set aside (Enclosure 50) was premised on the following grounds:

The Plaintiff relied solely on the cause of action for breach of contract to justify the APO, which cause of action did not even implicate the 2nd Defendant directly (the 2nd Defendant not being a party to the Agreement);

The Plaintiff's Opinions were not conclusive and the 2nd Defendant disputed the validity of the 321 UI;

There was no evidence of a real possibility that the 2nd Defendant would destroy, conceal, or dissipate documents or evidence. The letters dated 21.08.2024 and 13.09.2024 relied upon by the Plaintiff were communications between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant —not the 2nd Defendant, and hence 12! ! could not be attributed to or relied upon against the 2nd

The 2nd Defendant was not privy to the communications between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant;

The Plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts, including the state of corresponding utility innovations in other countries; and

The APO was draconian in nature and should only be granted in exceptional circumstances which the Plaintiff had failed to establish. The Plaintiff's Submission [21] The Plaintiff opposed both setting aside applications and contended as follows:

There was a strong (and extremely strong) prima facie case established on the totality of the evidence, supported by the Plaintiff's Opinions from three independent expert entities;

The Defendants' conduct particularly the dramatic cessation of orders followed by continued supply to the 2nd Defendant gave rise to a clear inference that the Licensed Product was being manufactured without the Plaintiff's consent, constituting both breach of the Agreement and infringement of the 321 UI; 13! !

The 1st Defendant's refusal to provide information and explanations evidenced a real possibility of destruction or concealment of evidence;

The Court is entitled to infer the real possibility of destruction of evidence from the circumstances, relying on the principles in Dunlop Holdings Ltd v Starvia Ltd [1982] Com LR 3 and the Malaysian cases of TT Dotcom Sdn Bhd v Low Wey Heng & Ors [2020] MLJU 1512 and N2N Connect Bhd & Ors v Chua

The Plaintiff had complied with the duty of full and frank disclosure. D. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES [22] Before addressing the merits of the Defendants' applications, I consider it necessary to set out the applicable legal framework governing Anton Piller Orders and applications to set aside the same. [23] An Anton Piller Order is an order requiring the defendant to permit the plaintiff to enter the defendant's premises for the purpose of inspecting, photographing, and removing into the custody of the plaintiff's solicitors, documents and materials which are relevant to the plaintiff's claim. It derives its name from the seminal English Court of Appeal decision in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55 (C.A.). 14! ! [24] It is of fundamental tenet that Anton Piller Orders should be applied ex-parte to prevent frustration by the opposing defendants. I find support for this proposition in the English case of Columbia Picture Industries Inc and others v Robinson and others [1986] 3 All ER 338 where Scott J (as he then was) held that: “There is, accordingly, no doubt at all but that Anton Piller orders have become established as part of the tools of the administration of justice in civil cases. It may be thought, as, I think, Lord Denning MR thought, that they play a part not unlike that played by search warrants in the area of crime and suspected crime. But the legitimate purposes of Anton Piller orders are clearly identified by the leading cases which have established the legitimacy of their use. One, and perhaps the most usual purpose, is to preserve evidence necessary for the plaintiffs’ case. Anton Piller orders are used to prevent a defendant, when warned of impending litigation, from destroying all documentary evidence in his possession which might, were it available, support the plaintiffs’ cause of action. Secondly, Anton Piller orders are often used in order to track to its source and obtain the possession of the master tape or master plate or blueprint by means of which reproductions in breach of copyright are being made. This purpose is, perhaps, no more than a subdivision of the first. It is implicit in the nature of Anton Piller orders that they should be applied for ex parte and dealt with by the courts in secrecy. In the Queen’s Bench Division applications for Anton Piller orders are heard in chambers. Secrecy is ensured. In this division applications are heard in court but it is customary for the court to sit in camera. Otherwise there is a risk that the defendant may become aware of the litigation and the 15! ! whole purpose of the Anton Piller procedure will be frustrated. Anton Piller orders and procedure have, therefore, these characteristics: no notice to the defendant of what is afoot, and secrecy. A third and, perhaps, the most significant feature of Anton Piller orders is that they are mandatory in form and are designed for immediate execution. The respondent to the order is required by the order to permit his premises to be entered and searched and, under most if not all orders, to permit the plaintiffs’ solicitors to remove into the solicitors’ custody articles covered by the order.” [ Underlined Emphasis Added] [25] I accept, as both Defendants have submitted, that an Anton Piller Order is a draconian remedy. It has been described as "one of the law's two 'nuclear' weapons" by Donaldson LJ in Bank Mellat v Nikpour [1985] FSR 87. In N-Visio Sdn Bhd v Horizon Multimedia Sdn Bhd [2009] MLJU 1249 (affirmed as N-Visio Sdn Bhd v Horizon Multimedia Sdn Bhd & Ors [2010] 3 CLJ 585), the High Court observed that an Anton Piller Order is "a very harsh and draconian order obtained against the defendant" and that "it is a heavy burden and the threshold for the applicant to satisfy the court in applying for an Anton Piller order is very high." [26] Because of its extraordinary and intrusive nature, the Anton Piller Order is granted only where exceptional circumstances warrant it, and the court must be satisfied that the stringent pre-conditions are met. 16! ! [27] Order 32 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012) allows for the setting aside of an ex parte order. [28] In determining the grounds to set aside an ex parte Anton Piller Order, it is thus useful to understand the nature and pre-conditions vis-à-vis the grant of an Anton Piller Order as non-fulfilment of any of these pre-conditions should warrant its setting aside. Extremely Strong prima facie case [29] The standard required for an Anton Piller Order is an "extremely strong prima facie case," which is a threshold higher than the "strong prima facie case" required for the grant of an ordinary interlocutory injunction. The case of Apparatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Ng Hock Chong & Anor [2006] 2 MLJ 61 elaborated on this threshold at paragraph 28: "[28] The plaintiff must show, in order to obtain an Anton Piller order, that there is a 'very strong prima facie case against the defendant'. To do this, the plaintiff must show that there is a valid cause of action and that judgment would be granted in favour of the plaintiff." [30] In N-Visio Sdn Bhd v Horizon Multimedia Sdn Bhd [2009] MLJU 1249, the High Court emphasised that because an Anton Pillar Order is usually obtained ex parte and executed without prior notice to the defendant, the applicant bears a heavy burden and must satisfy a high threshold before such relief will be granted. 17! ! [31] The principles arising from the case of N-Visio Sdn Bhd may be summarised as follows. First, the applicant must show an extremely strong prima facie case against the defendant. Secondly, the actual or potential damage to the applicant must be very serious. Thirdly, there must be clear evidence that the defendant has incriminating documents or items in its possession, together with a real possibility that such material may be destroyed before trial. The order is therefore intended to preserve evidence and prevent the frustration of justice, but because it may cause serious prejudice to the defendant and affect third parties, the courts will grant it only in exceptional circumstances. In N-Visio Sdn Bhd v Horizon Multimedia Sdn Bhd [2009] MLJU 1249 the High Court held as follows: “An Anton Piller order is a very harsh and draconian order obtained against the Defendant. It is a heavy burden and the threshold for the applicant to satisfy the court in applying for an Anton Piller order is very high. Because such an order is essentially unfair to the accused party, Anton Piller orders are only issued exceptionally, when- · There is an extremely strong prima facie case against the Defendant, · The damage, potential or actual, must be very serious for the applicant, and · There must be clear evidence that the Defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before the disposal of the main trial. Due to the very nature of the order which is to prevent the destruction or lost of material and relevant evidence, hence more often than not the court will be moved discreetly and speedily for an ex parte order without the knowledge of the Defendant. It would come as a surprise to the Defendant. 18! ! Mark S.W Hoyle in his book "The Mareva Injunction and related Orders" 3rd Edition at page 107 clearly explains the nature of Anton Piller as follows: “Anton Piller orders are potentially as far-reaching as mareva injunction and involve many potential difficulties, not only because of consequent interference with the rights of individuals and companies, but also because of the effect on third parties. Anton Piller orders can be described as a formidable ally in preserving evidence and preventing empty judgment. The anton piller order, designed to prevent the destruction of evidence and/or the subject matter of a dispute, is a mandatory order placing a heavy burden on a defendant. It usually comes as a surprise to the recipient of the order, and is only effective if it is planned and executed efficiently and discreetly. By its nature it can do great harm to a defendant, and the courts have always been careful to emphasize the extraordinary nature of the order." [32] Pertinent to note that the Court at the interlocutory stage is not expected to conduct a mini-trial. The Court must be satisfied, on the basis of the evidence placed before it, that the Plaintiff's case is so strong that it would be unjust to allow the risk of evidence destruction to materialise before the matter can be fully ventilated at trial. Real possibility of destruction of evidence [33] It is well established that, in assessing whether there is a real possibility that evidence may be destroyed, the Court is not confined to direct proof of an express threat to destroy evidence. The Court may draw the necessary inference from the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the defendant’s conduct, the character 19! ! of the material in the defendant’s possession, and whether the evidence is easily capable of concealment, removal, or destruction. [34] First, the applicant must show a real risk or real possibility of destruction, concealment, removal, or dissipation of evidence. Secondly, such risk may be inferred where the evidence shows that the defendant is engaged in conduct of a dishonest, nefarious, or incriminating nature, since direct evidence of an intention to destroy documents will rarely be available. Thirdly, in cases involving technical or digital evidence, the Court may take into account the ease with which evidence may be discreetly altered, concealed, copied, or deleted. Fourthly, the mere existence of commercial wrongdoing, contractual breaches, or ongoing disputes is insufficient by itself; there must be evidence from which a real possibility of destruction or concealment can properly be inferred. Fifthly, where there are less intrusive legal mechanisms available to preserve or obtain the evidence, the Court may refuse an Anton Piller order because of its draconian nature. In Dunlop Holdings Ltd v Starvia Ltd [1982] Com LR 3, the English Court of Appeal held: "Although in the original Anton Piller case there was clear evidence of the possibility that the evidence might be destroyed, it has certainly become customary to infer the probability of disappearance or destruction of evidence where it is clearly established on the evidence before the court that the defendant is engaged in a nefarious activity which renders it likely that he is an untrustworthy person. It is seldom that one can get cogent or actual evidence of a threat to destroy material 20! ! or documents, so it is necessary for it to be inferred from the evidence which is before the court." [35] This principle was adopted and applied by the Malaysian High Court in TT Dotcom Sdn Bhd v Low Wey Heng & Ors [2020] MLJU 1512 and N2N Connect Bhd & Ors v Chua Tiong Hoong & Ors [2023] MLJU 751. In TT Dotcom, the High Court took notice of the technical nature of the subject matter and held at paragraphs 72 to 76: "[72] From the facts and evidence of the case furnished by the Plaintiff, it can be seen that many technical maneuvers can discreetly be carried out without the knowledge of the service provider. Stemming from this fact, it can be inferred that concealment and possible destruction of evidence (crucial to prove the unauthorized connections link setup by the Defendants) is definitely a real possibility. [73] At all material times, the devices for connectivity (including the connection linkages) are within the control and possession of the Defendants. These devices indeed are further material evidence in proving the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants… [76] For the aforementioned reasons, this Court is of view that there is a real possibility that the Defendants may destroy the evidence that are within the possession and control of the Defendants that warrants the granting of the AP Orders." [36] In N2N Connect Bhd, the High Court at paragraph 14 drew the inference that evidence would likely be destroyed given the incriminating nature of the materials in the defendants' possession: 21! ! "[14] Based on the above findings, I came to the conclusion that –

due to the incriminating nature of the evidence which are likely to be found in the possession, custody and control of the Defendants, there exist likelihood of real risk that the evidence being destroyed, hidden or removed; and

(ii) due to the same nature of the business operated by N2N Group and that of the Defendants, there exist likelihood of copying and/or reproduction of the Confidential Information and Trade Secrets of the Plaintiffs for further or future use and the same may be stored or relocated by the Defendants to a third party not named in the proceedings as a measure to defeat the intent of the Orders sought, the Orders sought by the Plaintiffs must be granted for the preservation of the evidence…" [37] In assessing real possibility that the evidence may be destroyed, Court must be vary of speculative or exaggerated fears. In the case of Booker McConnell plc v Plascow [1985] RPC 425, it was held as follows: - “The phrase "a real possibility" is to be contrasted with the extravagant fears which seem to afflict all plaintiffs who have complaints of breach of confidence, breach of copyright or passing off. Where the production and delivery up of documents is in question, the courts have always proceeded, justifiably, on the basis that the overwhelming majority of people in this country will comply with the court's order, and that defendants will therefore comply with orders to, for example, produce and deliver up documents without it being necessary to empower the plaintiffs' solicitors to search the defendant's premises.” 22! ! [38] The same caution was expressed in Computerland Corp v Yew Seng Computers Pte Ltd [1991] 3 MLJ 201, where the Court held that alleged commercial wrongdoing, without more, does not justify an Anton Piller order. Thean J held in the case of Computerland Corp, as follows: “Reverting to the instant case, we are in agreement with the learned judge that the appellants on the evidence produced before the court were not entitled to the two Anton Piller orders which they had obtained. In the lengthy affidavit affirmed by Michael A McConnell on 16 May 1985, which was the affidavit relied upon in the application for the Anton Piller orders, there was no evidence that there was a ‘grave danger’ or ‘real possibility’ that the respondents would or might destroy any documents and other evidence in their possession. Nor did it show any dishonest conduct on the part of Tan or other director of the respondents in charge of the matter. It was evident that the parties were engaged in ongoing disputes for some years, and there was no suggestion that in relation to these disputes the respondents had at any stage destroyed or threatened to destroy any documents or records. In that affidavit, Michael A McConnell alleged breaches of the agreement by the respondents and in particular the respondents' underpayment of royalties, their under-reporting of sales, their failure to furnish accounts, and their refusal to allow the appellants' accountant access to the accounting records of the respondents or to allow an audit. All such breaches of the agreement are, as the learned judge said, not synonymous with dishonesty and are no indication of any intention on the part of the respondents to destroy any evidence and 23! ! thus frustrate the whole process of justice. The fact that the respondents had thus behaved wrongfully in their commercial relationship with the appellants, assuming that what was alleged by Michael A McConnell was substantially true, does not necessarily justify the granting of an Anton Piller order.” [Underlined Emphasis Added] [39] Likewise, in Arjunan & Ors v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-pekerja Ladang & Ors [1993] 1 MLJ 326, the Court held that an Anton Piller order is justified only where there is a real likelihood that evidence or property may be destroyed, dissipated, or removed if the order is not granted immediately. In the case of Arjunan & Ors, it was held as follows: “I am of the view that the instances where Anton Piller orders have been issued by the court are where there is a great possibility that certain evidence or property are about to be dissipated and if an Anton Piller order was not immediately issued, then there is great possibility that such evidence or property are going to be destroyed, dissipated or taken out of the court's jurisdiction. I consider that no such factors are present in this case that justified the issue of such an order. I considered that it is true, as submitted to me, that the matters required to be disclosed to the applicants are matters which the union is by statute required to preserved, such as minutes books and records of account which are open for inspection of members and I agree with the construction submitted before me by the defendants that if the plaintiffs had not tried to obtain them free of charge, for which they are not 24! ! so entitled, copies would have been provided by the defendants…” [40] More recently, in Tetuan Chee Hoe & Associates v Phan Yit Leng & Ors [2024] 8 MLJ 958, Roz Mawar JC (as she then was) held that where less draconian legal remedies are available, and there is no real danger of destruction, an Anton Piller order would be excessive. Her Ladyship held as follows: ! ! “[23] This court, in turn, considers the decision in Computerland Corp v Yew Seng Computers Pte Ltd [1991] 3 MLJ 201 where the order to discharge the Anton Piller orders granted prior was affirmed: There was no evidence that there was a ‘grave danger’ or ‘real possibility’ that the respondent would or might destroy any documents and other evidence in their possession. The evidence also did not show any dishonest conduct on the part of the respondent’s managing director or other directors in charge of the matter. The parties were engaged in ongoing disputes for some years, and there was no suggestion that in relation to these disputes the respondent had at any stage destroyed or threatened to destroy any documents or records. The alleged breaches of the agreement by the respondent in particular the underpayment of royalties, under-reporting of sales, failure to furnish accounts and refusal to allow access to the accounts or to allow an adult, are not synonymous with dishonesty and are no indication of any intention on the part of the respondents to destroy any evidence and thus frustrate the whole process of justice. The appellants in this action were seeking, inter alia, an account of all sales made by the respondents and so account of the royalties due to them. It was the respondents who would need to show that the appellants were not entitled to more royalties than the respondents had reported, and if the respondents could not produce the documents required the 25! ! court could and would rightly make every presumption in favour of the applicants. The draconian nature of the Anton Piller order cannot be over-emphasized and it should be granted only in exceptional circumstances. It is imperative that on every application of an Anton Piller order the party seeking it must satisfy the stringent requirements laid down in the Anton Piller case and the court must scrutinise with care the evidence produced, and must be very circumspect in granting such an order. The court has to balance ‘the plaintiff’s right to recover his property or to preserve evidence’ against ‘violation of the privacy of a defendant who has had no opportunity to put his side of the case’. Any such order should be granted if the court is satisfied that there is a real risk of justice being frustrated or thwarted. [24] … At p 205 in Computerland, the phrase ‘a real possibility’ was applied as: The phrase ‘a real possibility is to be contrasted with the extravagant fears which seem to afflict all plaintiffs who have complaints of breach of confidence, breach of copyright or passing off. Where the production and delivery up of documents is in question, the courts have always proceeded, justifiably, on the basis that the overwhelming majority of people in this country will comply with the court’s order, and that the defendants will therefore comply with orders to, for example, produce and deliver up documents without it being necessary to empower the plaintiff’s solicitors to search the defendant’s premises.” ! [Underlined Emphasis Added] Duty of full and frank disclosure [41] The duty of full and frank disclosure is a paramount obligation placed upon an applicant who obtains an order ex parte. As held in Pentamaster Instrumentation Sdn Bhd v QAV Technologies 26! ! Sdn Bhd & Ors [2017] 11 MLJ 233, failure to satisfy the threshold of full and frank disclosure may result in the setting aside of the APO. The test on “material facts” is laid down in paragraph 40(3) and (4) of Pentamaster Instrumentation Sdn Bhd (supra), as follows: “(3) in the Singapore Court of Appeal case of The Vasiliy Golovnin [2008] 4 SLR 994, at paras. 86 and 87, VK Rajah JA (the present Attorney-General of Singapore) held that:

a fact is material if the court should consider such a fact in the making of the decision in question; and

(ii) the test of materiality is an objective one;

on how material facts should be disclosed by a party who has applied for an ex parte injunction, I rely on The Vasiliy Golovnin, at paras. 91 and 94, as follows: The threshold of disclosure 91 It should also be pointed out that mere disclosure of material facts without more or devoid of the proper context is in itself plainly insufficient to constitute full and frank disclosure; the threshold of the disclosure to be met is also crucial. In this regard, we are referring specifically to the manner of disclosure that is required of a plaintiff making the ex parte application. In other words, we are concerned with how the material facts can best be presented to the court so as to ensure that the court receives the most complete and undistorted picture of the material facts, sufficient for its purpose of making an informed and fair decision on the outcome of the application, such that the threshold of full and frank disclosure can be meaningfully said to be crossed. ... 94 Thus, it is for the applicant’s counsel, in his or her presentation of the material facts, to draw the judge’s attention to the relevant papers, and it is not sufficient to produce exhibits which contain the papers if no specific reference is made to them; a failure to refer to material documents is a failure to disclose (Mark S W Hoyle, Freezing and Search Orders (Informa, 4th Ed, 2006) at para 27! !

5.18). Further, all material facts should be fairly stated in the affidavit, and it is not open to a plaintiff to say that it has fulfilled its duty to make full and frank disclosure because the relevant facts can be distilled somewhat from somewhere in the voluminous exhibits filed. In short, in the words of Bingham J in Siporex Trade SA v. Comdel Commodities Ltd [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 428 at 437, the applicant must “identify the crucial points for and against the application, and not rely on general statements and the mere exhibiting of numerous documents”.” [Underlined Emphasis Added] [42] Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the standard of full and frank disclosure must be applied with a sense of proportionality. As the Court of Appeal noted in Arthur Anderson & Co v Interfood Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 239, the duty requires the applicant to disclose all material facts known to him that might affect the Court's decision to grant the order. The duty does not require the applicant to disclose every conceivable fact or to anticipate every possible defence that the defendant might raise. What is required is good faith and the disclosure of matters that are material to the Court's exercise of its discretion. [43] The central issues before this Court, as distilled from the parties' submissions, are as follows:

Whether the Plaintiff has demonstrated an extremely strong prima facie case against the Defendants;

Whether there is a real possibility that the Defendants may destroy, conceal, or dissipate evidence; 28! !

Whether the damage, potential or actual, is sufficiently serious to the Plaintiff; and

Whether the Plaintiff made full and frank disclosure of all material facts when applying for the APO ex parte. [44] I shall address each of these issues in turn, dealing with the arguments raised by both Defendants as appropriate. I. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAS DEMONSTRATED AN EXTREMELY STRONG PRIMA FACIE CASE [45] The question for the Court is whether, on all the available evidence, the Plaintiff has in fact established an extremely strong prima facie case. [46] The Plaintiff's causes of action against the Defendants, as pleaded in the Statement of Claim (Enclosure 2) and as supported by the affidavit evidence, are:

Breach of contract against the 1st Defendant (premised on the Licensing Agreement dated 08.06.2023);

Utility innovation infringement (premised on Utility Innovation No. MY-204321-A, "321 UI") against both Defendants;

Conspiracy to defraud and/or injure the Plaintiff; 29! !

Unjust enrichment;

Liability to account as constructive trustees; and

Inducement of breach of contract. [47] The Plaintiff's primary contractual claim is founded upon the Licensing Agreement dated 08.06.2023 entered into between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The Plaintiff alleges breaches of clauses 4, 7(b), 7(c), 8, and 9 of the Licensing Agreement. [48] The 1st Defendant submitted that it has not breached any terms of the Agreement with the Plaintiff. Learned counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted that there was no breach of clause 4 because there was no infringement of the Plaintiff’s utility innovation, MY- 204321-A, in the first place. Accordingly, learned counsel submitted that there was no duty to notify the Plaintiff of any infringement arose. [49] Second, the 1st Defendant denied breaching clause 7(b). It maintains that it did not cease selling, marketing or distributing the Licensed Product to the 2nd Defendant. Rather, any lack of further orders was due to the 2nd Defendant’s own discretion as customer, which was beyond the 1st Defendant’s control. Learned counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted that this was communicated to the Plaintiff in the 1st Defendant’s letter dated 2.7.2024, and the Plaintiff acknowledged in his letter dated 5.7.2024 that market conditions could affect sales and that efforts had been made by the 1st Defendant. 30! ! [50] Third, the 1st Defendant denied breaching clause 7(c). Learned counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant never manufactured the Licensed Product on its own or outside the Agreement without the Plaintiff’s consent. This was also clarified in the 1st Defendant’s letter dated 2.7.2024, and acknowledged by the Plaintiff in his letter dated 5.7.2024. [51] Fourth, the 1st Defendant submitted that clause 8 is inapplicable because there was no breach of the Agreement requiring remedy. In any event, learned counsel highlighted that the Plaintiff’s letter dated 26.6.2024 did not amount to a notice of breach, as it merely reproduced clauses of the Agreement as a “friendly reminder” and sought information on the sales status of the Licensed Product. [52] Fifth, the 1st Defendant denied breaching clause 9 on confidentiality. Learned counsel submitted that clause 9 has no relevance to the present facts, particularly because the 1st Defendant was not at liberty to disclose confidential information belonging to the 2nd Defendant. [53] The 1st Defendant further relies on the Plaintiff’s own conduct. By letter dated 30.9.2024, the Plaintiff attempted to terminate the Agreement on the ground of “lack of sales,” not breach. The Plaintiff also expressed openness to future business with the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant challenged the termination by letter dated 4.10.2024 on the basis that there were no valid grounds for termination. The Plaintiff subsequently withdrew the termination by letter dated 6.11.2024 and confirmed that the Agreement would 31! ! continue in full force. Accordingly, the 1st Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff’s own correspondence shows that no breach of the Agreement was committed by the 1st Defendant. My Findings Claim against the 1st Defendant [54] The 1st Defendant has raised a number of defences to the breach of contract claim. I shall address each in turn, bearing in mind that at this stage I am conducting a prima facie assessment and not a final determination on the merits.

Clause 7(c) — Manufacturing the Licensed Product Without Consent [55] This is, in my judgment, the most significant of the alleged breaches. The Plaintiff's case is that the 1st Defendant manufactured the Licensed Product itself (or procured its manufacture) without the Plaintiff's consent, in violation of clause 7(c) of the Licensing Agreement. The Plaintiff relies on the following evidence:

After January 2024, the 1st Defendant ceased placing orders from the Plaintiff, and the order quantity dropped dramatically from 2,000 units to 8 units;

Despite this cessation of orders, the 1st Defendant continued to sell and distribute the Licensed Product to the 2nd Defendant, 32! ! who in turn distributed it to third parties (as evidenced at Exhibit OCK-6, Enclosure 5, page 120);

The Plaintiff conducted investigations and procured photographs and videos which, the Plaintiff says, prove that the 1st Defendant manufactured the Plaintiff's Licensed Product (Exhibit OCK-7, Enclosure 5, page 136); and

The 1st Defendant refused to provide explanations or information regarding the cessation of orders and how it continued to supply the 2nd Defendant (Exhibit OCK-5, Enclosure 5, pages 108-109). [56] The 1st Defendant relies on its letter dated 2.7.2024 in which it stated: "we stress that we have not manufactured any pins according to the UI Application on our own and/or outside of the said Agreement." The 1st Defendant further relies on the Plaintiff's letter dated 05.07.2024 in which the Plaintiff acknowledged: "I note your assurance that no pins have been manufactured without my consent. This clarification is appreciated and will be documented accordingly." [57] However, this exchange must be placed in its proper context. The Plaintiff's acknowledgment in July 2024 was, on its face, an acknowledgment of the 1st Defendant's assurance, not an acceptance of its truth. The Plaintiff's subsequent investigations which yielded photographic and video evidence were conducted precisely because the Plaintiff was not satisfied that the 1st Defendant's assurance was truthful. The sequence of events is telling. The 1st Defendant continued to supply the 2nd Defendant 33! ! with the Licensed Product although it had effectively stopped ordering from the Plaintiff despite denying manufacture. This leads to a clear and compelling inference that the Licensed Product was being procured or manufactured from somewhere other than the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s photographs and video footage directly support the proposition that the 1st Defendant manufactured the product itself. [58] The 1st Defendant has not offered any satisfactory explanation as to how it continued to supply the 2nd Defendant with the Licensed Product after ceasing to order from the Plaintiff. The suggestion that the 2nd Defendant simply stopped placing orders with the 1st Defendant does not account for the evidence that supply continued. This gap in the 1st Defendant's account significantly strengthens the Plaintiff's extremely strong prima facie case.

(ii) Clause 7(b) — Failure to Permit Direct Distribution [59] The 1st Defendant's position is that it has not ceased selling, marketing, or distributing the pins to the 2nd Defendant, but that the 2nd Defendant has not placed further orders. The 1st Defendant says that the customer makes the final call as to the placement of orders and that clause 7(b) is accordingly not triggered. [60] While there may be merit to the 1st Defendant's contractual interpretation as a matter to be resolved at trial, the Plaintiff's prima facie case on this point is not without foundation. The obligation under clause 7(b) appears, on its face, to be triggered upon cessation of orders and not upon cessation of the 1st Defendant's 34! ! efforts. Whether the 1st Defendant's interpretation is correct is a question of contractual construction that cannot be determined at this interlocutory stage. For the purposes of determining prima facie assessment, the Plaintiff's reading is at least reasonably arguable.

(iii) Clause 4 — Failure to Notify of Infringement [61] The 1st Defendant contended that there is no infringement of the Plaintiff's utility innovation to begin with, and hence no duty to notify arises. The 2nd Defendant similarly does not admit the validity of the 321 UI. [62] This argument, while relevant to the merits, does not in my view negate the extremely prima facie case at this stage. As I discuss above in relation to the utility innovation infringement claim, the Plaintiff has adduced expert evidence supporting the allegation of infringement. If infringement is established, the 1st Defendant's failure to notify would constitute a breach of clause 4. The validity of the underlying utility innovation and the question of infringement are matters to be determined at trial.

(iv) Clauses 8 and 9 [63] The 1st Defendant argued that clause 8 (the cure period) was not triggered because there was no breach to remedy, and that clause 9 (confidentiality) is inapplicable. I note that the 1st Defendant's argument on clause 8 is entirely parasitic on its denial of the underlying breaches. Given my finding that the Plaintiff has a extremely strong prima facie case on the underlying breaches, the 35! ! clause 8 argument does not assist the 1st Defendant at this stage. As for clause 9, this is a matter to be explored at trial and does not materially affect the current assessment.

The Plaintiff's Letter of 30.09.2024 [64] The 1st Defendant also placed great weight on the Plaintiff’s letter dated 30.09.2024, where the Plaintiff purportedly sought to terminate the Licensing Agreement on the ground of “lack of sales” and showed interest in future business. The 1st Defendant argued that this letter nullified the Plaintiff’s claim of breach. [65] I am not satisfied that this letter, in and of itself, destroys the Plaintiff's extremely strong prima facie case. The letter should be read in the context of the entire correspondence and the Plaintiff's evolving understanding of the situation. The Plaintiff’s subsequent investigation, the Plaintiff states, revealed evidence of unlawful manufacture. It is not uncommon for a party’s understanding of the facts to change over time, particularly where the opposing party has been less! than forthcoming with information. The letter of 30.09.2024 does not constitute an admission that there was no breach; at its highest, it reflects the Plaintiff's state of knowledge at that particular time. Claim against the 2nd Defendant [66] Learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff’s assertion that he has an extremely strong prima facie case for 36! ! breach of contract against the 2nd Defendant does not hold water owing to the following reasons: a) At all material times, the 2nd Defendant was never a contracting party to the Licensing Agreement and had no knowledge of the material terms of the Licensing Agreement. Since the 2nd Defendant is not a party to the Licensing Agreement, it can never be argued that there is an existence of a valid contract between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant. Learned counsel added that any attempts to impute the 2nd Defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the terms of the Licensing Agreement through the purported letter dated 10.03.2025 issued by the Plaintiff to the 2nd Defendant is insufficient to overcome the threshold of the doctrine of privity of contract. b) As for the said letter of 10.3.2025, if the contents of the said letter are perused, the said letter only informed the 2nd Defendant of the presence of the test pins that allegedly infringe the claim of the Plaintiff’s 321 UI. There does not appear to be any broadening of issue in the said follow-up letter. Further, it is clear from the perusal of these letters that no request or demand for any documents were made in these letters. According to learned counsel it is thus misleading for the Plaintiff to now place undue reliance on the said letter and the said follow up letter to impart some form of knowledge or contractual obligation on the part of the 2nd Defendant in order to advance his claim for breach of contract against the 2nd Defendant. 37! ! [67] Learned counsel submitted that even if the Plaintiff’s other causes of action pleaded in the SOC are to be considered, the Plaintiff would still not able to satisfy the threshold of “an extremely strong prima facie case” against the 2nd Defendant for the following reasons: a) The question of infringement and/or validity of a patent or utility innovation must be assessed from the perspective of a person ordinarily skilled in the art (“POSITA”). In Kingtime International Ltd & Anor v Petrofac E&C Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 1840, Wong Kian Kheong J, as His Lordship then was, held that the expert view of a POSITA is relevant in determining, among others, the proper construction of the patent claims, sufficiency of disclosure, novelty, inventive step, and whether the patent claim has been infringed under sections 58 and 36 of the Patents Act 1983. b) In the present case, the Plaintiff relies on the opinions exhibited in Exhibit OCK-9 of the Plaintiff’s AIS (“the Plaintiff’s Opinions”) in support of the alleged infringement of the 321 UI by the 2nd Defendant. However, the Plaintiff’s Opinions are not conclusive on the issue of infringement and the Plaintiff’s own evidence demonstrates that further physical verification and technical analysis are required before any finding of infringement can be made. [68] In respect of the Plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd Defendant for conspiracy to defraud and or injure the Plaintiff, learned counsel for 38! ! the 2nd Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the necessary elements of conspiracy to defraud and/or injure the Plaintiff by unlawful means against the 2nd Defendant. On the contrary, the available facts suggest that there was no combination or concerted effort between the 1st and 2nd Defendants to injure the Plaintiff. [69] Second, the 1st Defendant was, like all other vendors of the 2nd Defendant, subject to the 2nd Defendant’s General Terms and Conditions of Purchase of Goods and/or Services. In particular, clause 10.2 of the General Terms and Conditions provides that the seller agrees to defend, indemnify and hold the 2nd Defendant harmless against any claim or action for infringement of a third-party intellectual property right, including all costs incurred in defending such claim. [70] In those circumstances, it would be illogical for the 1st Defendant to conspire with the 2nd Defendant to infringe the Plaintiff’s 321 UI, as doing so would expose the 1st Defendant to further liability, losses and damages under clause 10.2 of the General Terms and Conditions. Accordingly, learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff has not established an extremely strong prima facie case of conspiracy against the 2nd Defendant. [71] The Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment on the other hand is premised on the assumption that infringement has been established. In essence, the Plaintiff alleges that the 2nd Defendant was enriched by reason of the 2nd Defendant’s alleged infringing acts. Learned counsel submitted that apart from this bare allegation, 39! ! the Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to show how the 2nd Defendant was enriched or how it derived substantial profits from the alleged use of the Plaintiff’s Licensed Products. This is particularly significant given that there were defects in the initial batch of test pins supplied by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant. [72] Further, learned counsel added that, the Plaintiff has neither pleaded nor adduced evidence to establish a necessary element of unjust enrichment, namely that there is no defence available to extinguish or reduce the 2nd Defendant’s liability to make restitution. Accordingly, it is learned counsel’s position that the Plaintiff’s failure to make full and frank disclosure of those material facts undermines its claim and prevents it from establishing an extremely strong prima facie case of unjust enrichment against the 2nd Defendant. [73] Further thereto, learned counsel also submitted that the Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence in the Plaintiff’s AIS to satisfy the legal requirements for a constructive trust claim against the 2nd Defendant. [74] Having carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant, I now set out my analysis and findings on the claim against the 2nd Defendant. [75] I accept the 2nd Defendant's submission on the issue of privity of contract. The authorities of!Suwiri Sdn Bhd v Government of the State of Sabah [2008] 1 MLJ 743 is the authority for the proposition that only parties to a contract have enforceable rights and 40! ! obligations under that contract, and Malaysian law provides no statutory exception to this doctrine. [76] In the Federal Court case of Suwiri the then Chief Justice, Ahmad Fairuz held that “the doctrine of privity of contract is that as a general rule, a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations on strangers to it, i.e. parties who are not parties to it”. Based on the entrenched doctrine of privity of contract, since the 2nd Defendant is not a party to the Licensing Agreement, it can never be argued that there is an existence of a valid contract between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant. [77] I also make reference to the case of HTJ Development Sdn Bhd v DMZ Synergy Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] MLJU 1611, where it was held at paragraph 74 as follows: “And so it would seem that Abdul Malik Ishal JCA, who postulated (per Razshah’s case in 2010) that the doctrine of privity of contract is not universally accepted, had somewhat accepted (per Boustead Naval Shipyard’s case in 2015) that the doctrine of privity of contract is here to stay and that only parties to the contract have enforceable rights and obligations under the contract. Thus, having regard to the discussion on this topic, it is quite unarguable that the doctrine of privity of contract is very much a fossilized part of Malaysian law of contract” [78] In Casmet Sdn Bhd v Otis Elevator Company (M) Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 560, Wong Kian Kheong J, as His Lordship then was, reaffirmed the doctrine of privity of contract under Malaysian law. His 41! ! Lordship held that the Contracts Act 1950 does not provide any exception to the doctrine, and that Parliament has not enacted any legislation creating a statutory right for a third party to enforce a contract. [79] His Lordship also referred to the earlier decision in Pancaran Gayabina Sdn Bhd v Chew Yong See [2015] 3 AMR 480, where it was held that a person who has provided valid consideration under section 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950 cannot enforce a contract if that person is not a party to the contract. Unlike jurisdictions such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom, Malaysia has no equivalent legislation to the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 or the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which confer enforcement rights on certain third parties. Accordingly, unless and until Parliament amends the Contracts Act 1950 or enacts legislation creating an exception, the doctrine of privity of contract remains applicable in Malaysia. As such, a non-party to a contract generally has no right to enforce that contract, even if the contract may confer a benefit on that person. [80] It is undisputed that the Licensing Agreement dated 8.6.2023 was entered into between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant was not a signatory to the Licensing Agreement. While the 2nd Defendant is referred to in Recital B of the Licensing Agreement, a mere reference in a recital does not, without more, make a party a contracting party with enforceable obligations under the agreement. Similarly, the letter dated 10.3.2025 addressed by the Plaintiff to the 2nd Defendant, while it may put the 2nd Defendant on notice of the Plaintiff's claims, does not and cannot 42! ! create a contractual relationship between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant, nor does it impose contractual obligations upon the 2nd Defendant. Knowledge of a contract's existence is fundamentally distinct from being a party to that contract. [81] I therefore find that the Plaintiff has not established an extremely strong prima facie case against the 2nd Defendant on the cause of action for breach of contract. The doctrine of privity of contract is a complete answer to this particular cause of action insofar as it is directed against the 2nd Defendant. [82] However, I must consider whether the Plaintiff's case against the 2nd Defendant can be sustained on the other pleaded causes of action, namely, utility innovation infringement, conspiracy to defraud, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust which are not dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant. [83] As I have highlighted earlier, the Plaintiff has adduced three expert reports and opinions (Exhibit OCK-9) from Intellect Patent & Innovation Sdn Bhd, Marks & Clerk Singapore LLP, and Adastra, all of which identify substantial correspondence between the features of the products being supplied to the 2nd Defendant and the claims of the Plaintiff's 321 UI. I note the 2nd Defendant's submission that the Plaintiff's expert opinions contain caveats and are not conclusive, particularly the statements that a complete infringement determination would require physical verification and experimental analysis of a sample product. 43! ! [84] However, at this interlocutory stage, the court is not required to conduct a full trial on the merits. The standard is whether the Plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficiently strong prima facie case. The expert opinions, while containing the qualifications one would expect from responsible experts who have not yet had the opportunity to physically examine the products, nonetheless identify prima facie infringement on the basis of the information available. [85] The very fact that the experts recommend physical verification underscores the importance of the Anton Piller Order in preserving the physical evidence necessary for a complete determination at trial. Under sections 58 and 36 of the Patents Act 1983, infringement consists of making, importing, offering for sale, selling, or using a product falling within the scope of protection of the patent without the owner's agreement. The evidence before this court including the purchase orders (Enclosures 33 and 34), the photographs and videos (Exhibit OCK-7), and the expert opinions raises an extremely strong prima facie case that products falling within the scope of the 321 UI are being manufactured by the 1st Defendant and supplied to and used by the 2nd Defendant without the Plaintiff's agreement. The 2nd Defendant, as the end-user of the allegedly infringing products, may potentially be liable for "using" such products within the meaning of section 36(3)(a)(i) of the Patents Act 1983. [86] The evidence before the court demonstrates a pattern of conduct from which a extremely strong prima facie inference of conspiracy may be drawn. The cessation of orders by the 1st Defendant from 18.1.2024 onwards, coupled with the continued supply of the Licensed Product by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant as 44! ! evidenced by the purchase orders (Enclosures 33 and 34), and the 1st Defendant's repeated refusal to provide any explanation or information (Exhibit OCK-5, letters dated 21.8.2024 and 13.9.2024), taken together, raise a very strong prima facie case that the Defendants may have acted in concert to deprive the Plaintiff of the benefits to which the Plaintiff is entitled under the Licensing Agreement and under the Plaintiff's intellectual property rights. [87] While the 2nd Defendant may not be a party to the Licensing Agreement, the tort of conspiracy does not require a contractual relationship between the parties. It requires a combination or agreement between two or more parties to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means, with the intention of causing damage to the plaintiff. [88] The Plaintiff has put forward evidence suggesting that the 2nd Defendant continued to receive and use the Licensed Product after the 1st Defendant ceased placing orders with the Plaintiff. If the 1st Defendant manufactured the Licensed Product without the Plaintiff's authorisation and supplied it to the 2nd Defendant, the 2nd Defendant may have been enriched at the Plaintiff's expense without lawful basis. This cause of action does not depend on privity of contract. [89] In summary, while I accept that the Plaintiff has not established an extremely strong prima facie case against the 2nd Defendant on the cause of action for breach of contract by reason of the doctrine of privity of contract, the Plaintiff's case against the 2nd Defendant is not confined to breach of contract. When the totality of the evidence 45! ! is considered, including the evidence of continued supply of the Licensed Product to the 2nd Defendant notwithstanding the cessation of orders from the Plaintiff, the expert opinions supporting a prima facie case of utility innovation infringement, the pattern of conduct giving rise to an inference of conspiracy and the potential for unjust enrichment. the repeated refusal of the 1st Defendant to provide information, gives rise to an extremely strong prima facie case against the 2nd Defendant on the causes of action for utility innovation infringement, conspiracy to defraud, and unjust enrichment, which do not require privity of contract. II. WHETHER THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF DESTRUCTION, CONCEALMENT, OR DISSIPATION OF EVIDENCE [90] The third pre-condition for an Anton Piller Order requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the Defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before the disposal of the main trial. As noted in Dunlop Holdings Ltd v Starvia Ltd [1982] Com LR 3, cited with approval in N2N Connect Bhd & Ors v Chua Tiong Hoong & Ors [2023] MLJU 751: "Although in the original Anton Piller case there was clear evidence of the possibility that the evidence might be destroyed, it has certainly become customary to infer the probability of disappearance or destruction of evidence where it is clearly established on the evidence before the court that the Defendant is engaged in a nefarious activity which renders it likely that he is an untrustworthy person. It is seldom that one can get cogent or actual evidence of a threat to destroy material 46! ! or documents, so it is necessary for it to be inferred from the evidence which is before the court." [91] This principle is significant and reflects a practical reality that is parties who intend to destroy evidence rarely announce that intention in advance. The Court in appropriate cases, obliged to draw inferences from the totality of the circumstances. My Findings [92] In relation to the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiff relies on the following to establish the risk of evidence destruction:

The letters dated 21.08.2024 and 13.09.2024 (Exhibit OCK-5, pages 106 and 108 of the Plaintiff's AIS), in which the 1st Defendant refused to provide explanations and information regarding:

The lifespan of the pins;

(ii) The number of operating machines;

(iii) Whether the 5,000 replacement pins were sufficient to meet the 1st Defendant's customer requirements; and

(iv) Why orders had ceased yet the 1st Defendant was still able to continue selling and distributing to the 2nd Defendant; 47! !

The overall pattern of evasiveness and refusal to cooperate in the provision of information;

The nature of the documents and materials sought, including manufacturing records, sales records, and technical documents which are within the exclusive possession and control of the 1st Defendant and which could readily be destroyed, altered, or concealed. [93] In my judgment I find that the 1st Defendant's persistent refusal and evasiveness in providing basic information about the continued supply of the Licensed Product in circumstances where such information was readily available to it and where the Plaintiff had a legitimate contractual interest in obtaining it gives rise to a reasonable inference that the 1st Defendant had something to hide. Where a party refuses to explain how it continued to supply a product without ordering from its licensed source, the inference of concealment is both natural and compelling. [94] I further note the nature of the evidence at risk. Manufacturing records, sales documents, correspondence, and technical specifications are all capable of being easily destroyed, deleted, or altered, particularly in a modern business environment where records are increasingly held in electronic form. The 1st Defendant, as a manufacturing entity, has the practical capability to destroy or alter such evidence at short notice. 48! ! [95] Taking these factors together, I am satisfied that there is a real possibility that the 1st Defendant would destroy, conceal, or dissipate evidence relevant to the Plaintiff's claims. [96] Learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff failed to discharge his legal onus to prove that there is a ‘real risk’ or ‘real possibility’ of destruction or concealment of evidence by the 2nd Defendant owing to the following reasons: a) The 2nd Defendant serves a large customer base across various industries. There is therefore no reason or motive for the 2nd Defendant to destroy the alleged test pins as this would significantly disrupt the operations of the 2nd Defendant, which may result in the 2nd Defendant’s inability to fulfil its customers’ orders and further losses. b) As for the purchase orders, there is also no reason for the 2nd Defendant to destroy these purchase orders as the 2nd Defendant, like any other duly locally incorporated companies, is legally obliged to retain these purchase orders for auditing, accounting or tax purposes. c) There are less draconian means other than the APO (such as the usual discovery application) which are available to the Plaintiff in order for him to obtain and/or preserve the evidence for the purposes of the trial. 49! ! [97] Learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant submitted that the only premise in support of the Plaintiff’s allegation that there is a real risk or possibility that the 2nd Defendant would destroy the evidence at hand would be the 2nd Defendant’s purported refusal to respond to the said letter dated 10.03.2025. Learned counsel submitted that such a premise is clearly devoid of merits. [98] It is the 2nd Defendant’s position that the letter dated 10.3.2025 had merely informed the 2nd Defendant of the presence of the test pins that allegedly infringe the claim of the Plaintiff’s 321 UI. To this end, learned counsel submitted that no request or demands for any documents were made in the said letter. As for the purported follow-up letter dated 15.04.2025, there appears to be no broadening of the issues as ordinarily highlighted in earlier letter of 10.3.2025. As such, it is the 2nd Defendant’s stance that the Plaintiff ought to not be allowed to place undue reliance on these letters to allege that the 2nd Defendant had acted dishonestly or there is an intention on the part of the 2nd Defendant to conceal, destroy or dissipate any evidence at hand. [99] Based on the foregoing, learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant submitted that all the Plaintiff has shown is merely an “extravagant fear”, which, should not be equated with a “real possibility” of destruction or concealment of evidence by the 2nd Defendant. [100] I have considered the 2nd Defendant’s contention on this point and with respect, I find this argument, misconceived. 50! ! [101] First, the nature of the evidence in the 2nd Defendant's possession is critical. The 2nd Defendant, as the recipient and end-user of the allegedly infringing products, holds evidence of the products received, their specifications, quantities, dates of receipt, correspondence with the 1st Defendant regarding procurement, and records of onward distribution to third parties. This evidence is in my considered view essential to the Plaintiff's claims for both utility innovation infringement and conspiracy. It is within the exclusive control of the 2nd Defendant and could readily be destroyed or concealed. [102] Second, the Court is entitled to draw inferences from the overall circumstances. As the English Court of Appeal observed in Dunlop Holdings Ltd v Starvia Ltd (supra), it is seldom that one can get cogent or actual evidence of a threat to destroy material, and it is therefore necessary for it to be inferred from the evidence before the Court. The relevant circumstances here include:

The 2nd Defendant continued to receive the Licensed Product from the 1st Defendant after the 1st Defendant ceased ordering from the Plaintiff. In my considered view this is a circumstance that, if the Plaintiff's case is correct, means the 2nd Defendant was in receipt of unlawfully manufactured or procured products;

The 2nd Defendant is a large multinational corporation with sophisticated document management systems, meaning that evidence could be efficiently purged or relocated if the 2nd Defendant were so minded; 51! !

The 2nd Defendant's very denial of knowledge of the Licensing Agreement, while potentially relevant to the merits, also means that the 2nd Defendant may have had no reason to preserve documents that it did not consider relevant until confronted with legal proceedings;

The nature of the proceedings involving allegations of infringement of intellectual property rights is precisely the type of case in which Anton Piller Orders are most commonly and appropriately granted, because the evidence of infringement is often uniquely within the defendant's possession and is susceptible to destruction. [103] I am also guided by the approach taken in TT Dotcom Sdn Bhd v Low Wey Heng & Ors [2020] MLJU 1512, where the Court made an inference of the possibility of evidence destruction based on the fact that the evidence was within the exclusive control of the defendants and that the nature of the alleged wrongdoing made it likely that the defendants would seek to conceal their activities. The same reasoning applies with equal force here. [104] Third, the fact that the communications relied upon by the Plaintiff were between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant does not preclude the drawing of inferences about the 2nd Defendant's conduct. Where two defendants are alleged to have acted in concert as is the case here, where conspiracy is pleaded the conduct of one may illuminate the likely conduct of the other. If the 1st Defendant was evasive and uncooperative in providing information, it is reasonable to infer that the 2nd Defendant, as the alleged co-conspirator and 52! ! the party in receipt of the unlawfully supplied products, would similarly be reluctant to preserve or disclose evidence that might reveal its involvement. [105] I also take into account the observation of the Court in N2N Connect (supra), at paragraph [14]: "due to the incriminating nature of the evidence which are likely to be found in the possession, custody and control of the Defendants, there exist likelihood of real risk that the evidence being destroyed, hidden or removed." [106] In the present case, the evidence in the 2nd Defendant's possession including records of the products received, their specifications, and the terms on which they were procured is of a potentially incriminating nature if the Plaintiff's claims are correct. The risk of destruction or concealment is therefore real and not merely speculative. [107] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has demonstrated a real possibility that the 2nd Defendant may destroy, conceal, or dissipate evidence relevant to the Plaintiff's claims. III. WHETHER THE DAMAGE IS SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS [108] The Plaintiff's case involves the alleged unauthorised manufacture and supply of his patented Licensed Product, the diversion of revenue that should have accrued to him under the Licensing Agreement, and the systematic deprivation of his intellectual 53! ! property rights. The commercial damage to the Plaintiff is, on the evidence, very serious. The Plaintiff invested in the development of the utility innovation, secured registration thereof, and entered into a licensing arrangement to commercialise it. The alleged conduct of the Defendants, if proven, would have effectively stripped the Plaintiff of the fruits of his innovation and rendered his intellectual property rights worthless. [109] I am satisfied that the damage, both actual and potential, is very serious for the Plaintiff. This pre-condition is met. IV. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF MADE FULL AND FRANK DISCLOSURE [110] It is well established that an applicant for an ex parte order owes a duty of full and frank disclosure to the Court. This duty requires the applicant to disclose all material facts of which he is aware or ought to be aware, including facts that are unfavourable to his case. The rationale for this duty is that in ex parte proceedings, the absent party has no opportunity to present its case, and the Court must therefore be able to rely on the applicant to present a balanced and complete picture. [111] As the Court of Appeal held in Arthur Anderson & Co v Interfood Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 MLJ 239, one of the basic requirements to be satisfied by an applicant for an Anton Piller Order at the ex parte stage is that "the applicant is required to make a full and frank disclosure." In Pentamaster Instrumentation Sdn Bhd v QAV 54! ! Technologies Sdn Bhd & Ors [2017] 11 MLJ 233, Wong Kian Kheong JC (as His Lordship then was) held that failure to satisfy the threshold of full and frank disclosure would result in the setting aside of the Anton Piller Order. This Court accepts and applies these principles. [112] However, the duty of full and frank disclosure, while critically important, must be applied with a measure of proportionality and common sense. It does not require the applicant to disclose every conceivable fact, however tangential or immaterial. What is required is the disclosure of facts that are material that is, facts which, if known to the Court at the ex parte stage, might reasonably have affected the Court's decision whether to grant the order. The test is one of materiality, not exhaustiveness. As Lord Denning MR observed in Neigel v Lonsdale (Trading) Ltd [1981] FSR 48, the duty extends to disclosing matters which the applicant knows or ought to know might be relevant, but does not require perfection. [113] Furthermore, it is well established that not every failure of disclosure will warrant the setting aside of an ex parte order. The Court retains a discretion. Where the non-disclosure is innocent and not of a character that would have affected the Court's decision, the Court may decline to set aside the order. Conversely, where the non-disclosure is deliberate and concerns a matter of central importance, the Court will ordinarily set aside the order as a matter of principle, even if the order might otherwise have been granted on the merits. The exercise of this discretion requires the Court to weigh all the circumstances, including the gravity of the non- 55! ! disclosure, whether it was innocent or deliberate, and the overall justice of the case. [114] Learned counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted that the salient details of the correspondences and the material communications between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant constitute material facts which reveal the following: - a) The Plaintiff has been untruthful in its allegation that the 1st Defendant has been suppressing information. To the contrary: i) The Defendant had indeed responded and/or provided information requested by the Plaintiff at least via its letters dated 02.07.2024, 13.09.2025, 25.10.2024 as well as email dated 27.12.2024; ii) The Plaintiff has never complained about the extent of information given by the Plaintiff and in fact agreed that the information sought after was confidential; iii) The Plaintiff was requesting for information that was either unknown to the 1st Defendant or that did not belong to the 1st Defendant; iv) The 1st Defendant had agreed to conduct a further meeting with the Plaintiff which the Plaintiff himself ultimately cancelled without rescheduling the same. 56! ! v) The Plaintiff had purported to wrongfully terminate the Agreement but subsequently withdrew his attempt. vi) The Plaintiff has never raised any particulars whatsoever regarding any infringement or breach to the 1st Defendant. Even in the Plaintiff’s wrongful attempt to terminate the said Agreement, the Plaintiff was solely driven by the lack of sales. [115] The timeline of the correspondences between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant prior to the filing of this suit is deduced hereunder. The intent and purport of these communications between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant is the subject matter of my discussion in the later part of my judgement. The correspondences have been aptly captured in the 1st Defendant’s written submissions in the following manner: The 1st Defendant has reproduced the entire and complete correspondence between the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant as exhibited in Exhibit A-9 and summarised as follows:- a) In an email dated 09.06.2024 by the Plaintiff (page 176 of AISD1), the Plaintiff has asked the representative of the 1st Defendant 3 questions as follows:- “1. How many socket set already running? What model?

What is the pin [life] span?

What is a coming [usage] target?” b) In a letter dated 26.06.2024 by the Plaintiff (page 177 of AISD1), the Plaintiff complained about the lack of orders:- 57! ! “I have not seen any orders from your company for the Licensed Product since January 2024… As a friendly reminder, the agreement states that the Licensee purchases the Licensed Product from the Licensor… Clause 7(c) also clarifies that manufacturing the product yourselves is prohibited without my written consent. Finally, Clause 7(b) delineate that if you decide to stop selling, marketing, or distributing the Licensed Product, I have the right to directly sell it to your existing customers… ” c) In a letter dated 02.07.2024 by the 1st Defendant (pages 178 to 180 of AISD1), the 1st Defendant referred to the Plaintiff’s email dated 09.06.2024 and the Plaintiff’s letter dated 26.06.2024 and explained, amongst other things, that:- i) The Plaintiff’s question 1 involved confidential information and was in any event unrelated to the supply of pins under the Agreement; ii) The 1st Defendant did not have the information sought by the Plaintiff’s questions 2 and 3; iii) The 1st Defendant however disclosed the number of pins that have been supplied to the 2nd Defendant; iv) The 1st Defendant disclosed that no orders were received from ST Philippines; v) The 1st Defendant stated that no unauthorized production of the Licensed Products had taken place; vi) The 1st Defendant stated that marketing efforts for the Licensed Product was still ongoing but no orders were placed. The relevant excerpts can be seen as follows:- “A. In response to your Email dated 09.06.2024 (hereinafter “said Email”) i) With regards to questions 1, 2, and 3, in your said Email, kindly take note that these questions fall outside the scope of the Agreement dated 08.06.2023 (hereinafter the “said Agreement”)… 58! ! ii) With regard to your question 1, as it involves information that is confidential as well as being unrelated to the supply of pins under the said Agreement, we are not at liberty to disclose the same. iii) Furthermore, we do not have the information pertaining to your questions 2 and 3 as these have not been disclosed to us by our customer. iv)What we are able to disclose however is the total number of pins that we have delivered to ST Muar being 19,600 pins. v) As for ST Philippines, we wish to point out that this also falls outside of the said Agreement. But in any event, no orders were received from ST Philippines for pins according to the UI Application. B. In response to your Letter dated 26.06.2024 (hereinafter the “said Letter”) i) Firstly, regarding your reference to clause 7(c) of the said Agreement, we stress that we have not manufactured any pins according to the UI Application on our own and/or outside of the said Agreement. We view this reference very seriously as if it is improperly framed, it would be unjustifiably defamatory towards our business. ii) Regarding your reference to clause 7(b) of the said Agreement, we have not ceased selling, marketing, or distributing the pins to ST Muar. However, ST Muar has not placed further orders for pins according to the UI Application. We trust that you understand that ultimately, the customer makes the final call as to the placement of orders. iii) We wish to stress that as the lack of orders has not been due to the lack of effort on our part, clause 7(b) of the said Agreement would not come into operation. In any event, we also wish to point out that as the said Agreement is strictly limited to ST Muar, any operation of clause 7(b) of the said Agreement (which is denied) would not apply to our entire customer base as alleged in your said Letter.” 59! ! We have not manufactured any pins according to the UI Application without your consent and as such, any express or implied statements to this effect would be unjustifiably defamatory…” d) In a letter dated 05.07.2024 by the Plaintiff (pages 181 and 182 of AISD1), the Plaintiff has acknowledged that the information sought after was indeed confidential, that efforts were made by the 1st Defendant, and that market conditions was a factor:- “I understand your position on maintaining the confidentiality of certain information and will respect your boundaries on this matter… d) I note your assurance that no pins have been manufactured without my consent. This clarification is appreciated and will be documented accordingly. e) I am aware that market conditions can impact sales and that efforts have been made on your part… Please let me know a convenient time for a follow-up meeting or call to discuss these matters further…” e) In a letter dated 02.08.2024 by the 1st Defendant (page 184 of AISD1), the 1st Defendant had indeed agreed to meet with the Plaintiff:- “…We would suggest to have a follow-up meeting or call on 28th August 2024 at 2.00pm…” f) In a letter dated 13.08.2024 by the Plaintiff (pages 185 and 186 of AISD1), the Plaintiff had attempted to control the agenda for the intended meeting:- “…Thank you for getting back to me. I am also looking forward to the follow up meeting (scheduled on 28 August 2024 @2pm). 60! ! I would like to suggest a meeting via Zoom Video Conference, any discussion during the meeting will be recorded. If you have no further comment, I will send you an invitation containing the meeting ID: 837 0758 8818 and password: bEtWb2 via email on 13th August 2024. Meeting Agenda as below:

Introduction and Meeting Objectives • Outline the purpose of the meeting: to assess the performance of the Patent License Agreement and develop strategies to address the current sales situation.

Review of Sales Performance • Presentation by Mr Ooi on total orders from SL Precision since the inception of the Agreement (e.g., revenue, units sold, market share) • Analysis of sales trends and identification of key performance indicators (KPIs) • Discussion on the impact of the sales decline on both parties

Market Analysis and Competitive Landscape • Comprehensive assessment of the market for patented goods • Identification of key market trends and competitive pressures • Analysis of the competitive landscape, including competitor activities and market share

Intellectual Property (IP) Protection and Enforcement • Review of the current IP protection strategy • Assessment of the risk of IP infringement and counterfeiting • Discussion of potential enforcement actions to protect intellectual property rights

Development of Strategic Action Plan • Identification of root causes for the sales decline • Development of strategies to address the sales slump and enhance market penetration 61! ! • Creation of a detailed action plan outlining responsibilities and timelines

Next Steps and Follow-up • Summary of key decisions and action items • Establishment of a communication plan for progress updates • Scheduling of follow-up meetings as necessary g) In a letter dated 21.08.2024 by the 1st Defendant (page 188 of AISD1), the 1st Defendant responded that many items of the agenda fell outside the scope of the Agreement:- “Furthermore, we regret to inform you we do not agree to discuss about items NO. 2, 3 & 4 in the meeting agenda as they fall out of the Exclusive Patent License Agreement Dated 8 June 2023. As item NO. 5 also falls outside the Exclusive Patent License Agreement Dated 8 June 2023, we are not obligated to provide an update to IO Technology.” h) In a letter dated 26.08.2024 by the 1st Defendant (page 189 of AISD1), the 1st Defendant had to reschedule the meeting due to unforeseen matters:- “We regret to inform you that we are unable to attend the meeting (scheduled on 28th August 2024 at 2pm) due to some unforeseen circumstances. However, we will suggest to reschedule the meeting to September 19th 2024 at 2pm. I will send you an invitation containing the meeting ID: 810 9414 7705 and passcode: 7bQ57g for our meeting on 19th September 2024 at 2pm.” i) In a letter dated 03.09.2024 by the Plaintiff (page 191 of AISD1), the Plaintiff ignored the fact that his purported agenda was outside the scope of the Agreement and attempted to ask for information that was confidential and/or unknown to the 1st Defendant again:- “Regarding the agenda, we believe the proposed topics are highly relevant to our current collaboration and the 62! ! challenges the market is presenting. However, we remain open to any additional topics you wish to propose, provided they align with our existing agreement. We would like to reiterate our commitment to addressing the current challenges and ensuring the successful implementation of the agreement. Based on our records as of December 2023, SL Precision Tools & Dies Sdn. Bhd. has installed a total of 6 machines with 48 sets of sockets at customer sites. Additionally, we have supplied 5,000 replacement pins (2,500 inner pins and 2,500 outer pins). We are keen to gather your feedback and insights regarding the performance of the Licensed Product and the outcome of these installations. We are particularly interested in understanding how many machines are currently operational and whether the 5,000 replacement pins have been sufficient to meet customer needs. Given that 5,000 pins would only cover approximately three months of usage for 48 sets of sockets, we are concerned about the long-term sustainability of the current situation…” j) In a letter dated 13.09.2024 by the 1st Defendant (page 192 of AISD1), the 1st Defendant again reiterated that the information requested was confidential and unknown to the 1st Defendant (which was already acknowledged by the Plaintiff previously):- “As per our previous communications, we have made it clear that information regarding the life span of pins as well as the number of operating machines are either unknown to us or confidential in nature.” k) In an email dated 18.09.2024 by the Plaintiff (page 193 of AISD1), the Plaintiff himself cancelled the meeting without providing a rescheduled date:- “We can’t attend tomorrow 19-09-24 zoom meeting, we request to postpone, will update the meeting date.” 63! ! l) Despite this, the Plaintiff then sent another query via email dated 10.12.2024 (page 201 of AISD1) asking for information regarding the balance inventory of the 1st Defendant:- “Good day. We would like to know more, we have not received any orders from you yet. I wonder if the items you ordered before are sold out? We are very much looking forward to receiving your valuable order in the near future.” m) The 1st Defendant proceeded to disclose the requested information via email dated 27.12.2024 (page 202 of AISD1) regarding the balance inventory:- “As of now, we still have about 3500 pins in stock and 200 pins scrap with quality issue.” n) Furthermore, the Plaintiff is fully aware that quality issues have been previously raised regarding the pins supplied by the Plaintiff before. For instance, this can be seen via Whatsapp dated 23.11.2023 (pages 168 to 172 of AISD1) where various issues of broken pins, bent pins, and melting pins were raised to the Plaintiff (and such issues even resulted to other trials being halted):- i) Issues of broken pins can be seen at page 170 of AISD1 - “Pin broken and swap with spare socket…SL to get the socket with pin broken from Lingling to perform analysis – Not keeping the broken pin”; ii) Issues of bending pins can be seen at page 171 of AISD1 – “To provide details of assembly issue found during first returned to SL for pin bend checking – SL team”; iii) Putting on hold of other trials can be seen at page 171 of AISD1 – “UR59 M4841: Under the single socket trial, temporary hold” iv) Issues of melting and bent pins can also be seen at page 172 of AISD1 – “Pin melt / pin bend issue. a. SL to provide analysis (date, pin location, quantity of pin changed, frequency, etc.)” The Plaintiff has also failed to mention that the Plaintiff attempted to terminate the Agreement via a letter dated 30.09.2024 (page 195 of AISD1). It can be seen that the Plaintiff did not raise any issues of infringement or breach, but rather was only driven by the lack of 64! ! sales. The Plaintiff even welcomed future orders from the 1st Defendant:- “This letter serves as a formal notification of our intent to terminate the Patent License Agreement dated 8 June 2023,. This termination is effective immediately. Despite our best efforts to collaborate and achieve mutual success under the agreement, the ongoing lack of sales activity continuously for 9 months period (since January until to-date) the Licensed Product has significantly impacted our business. We have made numerous attempts to address this situation through open communication and negotiation, but unfortunately, we have not been able to achieve the desired results. While the agreement is being terminated, we remain open to future business opportunities with SL Precision Tools & Dies Sdn. Bhd.. We welcome any inquiries or orders for the Licensed Product. Until any new order or future collaboration is in place, SL Precision Tools & Dies Sdn. Bhd. is required to cease all marketing, sales, distribution, and technical services related to the Licensed Product with respect to ST Microelectronics Sdn. Bhd.” The 1st Defendant replied the Plaintiff via a letter dated 04.10.2024 (pages 196 and 197 of AISD1) stating that the termination would be wrongful as there were no valid grounds for such termination. The 1st Defendant however proposed terms for a mutual termination instead:- “(a) As known to you, we have previously stated in our letter dated 02.07.2024 that no breach has been committed by us in relation to the said Agreement. To this, you have via your own letter dated 05.07.2024 agreed with our said position.

On this basis, your purported termination of the said Agreement via your letter dated 30.09.2024 is without any basis and is not pursuant to any of the termination clauses in the said Agreement. As such, we are unfortunately forced to regard your purported termination as wrongful.

However, we are open to resolving this matter amicably. On a strictly without prejudice basis, we are willing to agree to a 65! ! mutual termination of the said Agreement on the following terms:- …” In a letter dated 11.10.2024 by the Plaintiff (page 198 of AISD1), the Plaintiff then responded in a contradictory manner (claiming that the Agreement was terminated but still continued to be in force). The Plaintiff also requested for more information regarding the pins supplied to the 2nd Defendant:- “…After careful consideration, I respectfully decline the terms proposed in your letter for mutual termination, as I believe they do not align with our interests. My decision to terminate the agreement, as outlined in our letter of 30 September 2024, stands.

not material, in the sense that they would not reasonably have affected this Court's decision at the ex parte stage; 78! !

(ii) matters that are apparent from the documents that were in fact exhibited by the Plaintiff;

(iii) matters that go to the merits of the dispute and are more properly to be determined at trial; or

(iv) in the case of the EPO and JPO proceedings, of some marginal relevance but not of such weight as to have altered this Court's decision, and in any event not the product of any deliberate concealment. [143] As stated in!Tetuan Chee Hoe & Associates v Phan Yit Leng & Ors [2024] 8 MLJ 958, the issuance of cease-and-desist letters clearly showed unauthorised conduct on the part of the defendants, and the possession and usage of information by the defendants was detrimental to the plaintiff. Similarly in the present case, the Plaintiff's correspondence, the cessation of orders, the continued supply to the 2nd Defendant, the refusal to cooperate, and the three independent expert opinions, taken together, present a sufficiently strong prima facie case that warranted the grant of the APO notwithstanding the alleged non-disclosures. [144] For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff did not breach the duty of full and frank disclosure in any manner that would warrant the setting aside of the APO. The 2nd Defendant's application to set aside the APO on the ground of non-disclosure is accordingly dismissed. 79! ! V. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS [145] For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders:

The 1st Defendant's application (Enclosure 55) to set aside the Anton Piller Order (Enclosure 19) is dismissed with costs of RM 5,000.00.

The 2nd Defendant's application (Enclosure 50) to set aside the Anton Piller Order (Enclosure 19) is dismissed with costs of RM 5,000.00. Dated this day of 28th April 2026. -Sgd-EDWIN PARAMJOTHY MICHAEL MUNIANDY JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER COMMERCIAL DIVISION (NCC 7) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 80! ! Counsel: For the Plaintiff : Henry Poh Jun Yang (Messrs. Jeevapartnership) For the 1st Defendant : Joel Lim and Lam Shin Yin (Messrs. Joel & Mei) For the 2nd Defendant : Indran Shanmuganathan together with Yap Khai Jian, Michelle Loi and Ng Ying Chia (Messrs. Shearn Delamore & Co)