Ooi Vin Shen v Pendakwa Raya (BA-44-158-11/2025)

Ooi Vin Shen, Pemohon, telah memfailkan permohonan melalui Notis Usul bertarikh 4.11.2025 untuk memohoan perintah, antara lainnya, hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) ditangguhkan pelaksanaannya sehinggalah rayuan Pemohon ke Mahkamah Tinggi diputuska.

Bagi tujuan tersebut, Pemohon telah memfailkan kertas kaua berikut:

Notis Usul;

Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Dea Ching Yung pada 4.11.2025; dan

Afidavit Lanjutan yang diikrarkan Dea Ching Yung pada 14.11.2025.

Setelah mendengar hujahan kedua-dua belah pihak dan meneliti hujahan-hujahan bertulis kedua-dua belah pihak peguam, Mahkamah memutuskan untuk menolak permohonan Pemohon.

Terkilan dengan keputusan Mahkamah ini, Pemohon telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan.

Berikut adalah alasan penghakiman Mahkamah atas keputusan tersebut.

Pertuduhan terhadap Pemohon di Mahkamah Sesyen untuk kes No. FA-62JSK-103-11/2023 (Suit 103") and FA-83-15906/2024 ("Suit 159") untuk kesalahan di bawah seksyen 376(1) and 384 of the Kanun Keseksaan. Pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut adalah seperti berikut: Suit 103 “Bahawa kamu pada bulan Mac 2023 di The Heritage, Taman Sungai Besi Indah, Seri Kembangan, dalam Daerah Petaling, dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah merogol seorang kanak-kanak perempuan bernama Yap Juxin (No KPT: 081230-16-0120) yang berumur 14 tahun 3 bulan sewaktu kejadian. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 376(1) Kanun Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama.” Suit 159 “Bahawa kamu antara Bulan Mei 2023 hingga Bulan November 2023, di The Heritage, Taman Sungai Besi Indah, Seri Kembangan, dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah didapati melakukan pemerasan terhadap penama: Yap Juxin, KPT: 081230-16-0120 dengan meminta penama tersebut membayar wang sebanyak RM2,300/-. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 384 Kanun Keseksaan.”

Di akhir kes pembelaan, HMS mensabitkan Pemohon atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan berkenaan. Hukuman yang dijatuhkan adalah seperti berikut:

Suit 103: 10 tahun penjara dan 1 sebatan rotan; dan

Suit 159: 1 tahun penjara dan 1 sebatan rotan. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG MENGENAI PERMOHONAN PENGGANTUNGAN PELAKSANAAN

Bidangkuasa Mahkamah untuk membenarkan penggantungan pelaksanaan adalah sepertimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 311 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah yang dibaca bersama seksyen 57 dan seksyen 89 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964.

Untuk Mahkamah ini menggunakan budibicaranya membenarkan permohonan ini, Pemohon hendaklah menunjukkan keadaan khas/istimewa (special circumstances) sebagai justifikasi untuk Mahkamah menggunakan budi bicaranya membenarkan permohonan Pemohon. Rujuk Re Kwan Wah Yip & Anor [1954] MLJ 146; Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2004] 1 MLJ 497 dan KWK (A CHILD) v PP [2003] 4 CLJ

51.

Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (supra) telah memberikan panduan kepada Mahkamah untuk mempertimbangkan permohonan berkenaan dengan mempertimbangkan alasan-alasan seperti berikut: “Accordingly based on the foregoing cases the principles of law expounded as guidelines in the exercise of discretion when considering an application for bail pending appeal may be briefly summarized thus: a. that the presumption of innocence is no longer a factor to consider; b. that the factors to consider differ from that of pre-conviction application for bail; c. that attendance in court is only a minor consideration; d. that the time lapse before the appeal can be determined in relation to the length of sentence imposed is a relevant factor. But there is no general rule to say that an applicant with short custodial sentence should be automatically given bail. In appropriate cases bail may be refused even if it means that the sentence will be served before the appeal is heard; e. that it is crucial for an applicant to show the presence of exceptional circumstances which would drive the court to conclude that justice can only be done if bail is granted; f. that where reliance is placed on proposed grounds of appeal, they must be prima facie very strong or extraordinarily high prospect of success; g. that public confidence in the administration of justice requires that judgment should be enforced, hence a person convicted of a serious offence, particularly a repeated offender, should be denied bail; h. that an appellate court should not be put in an awkward situation of having to return a convict upon dismissal of his appeal to prison to serve his sentence when his circumstances might have drastically changed while he is out on bail. Or he might have created a situation whereby it will be difficult to return him to prison upon dismissal of his appeal and thus frustrate justice; and i. that by making bail readily available after conviction it will encourage the proliferation of unmeritorious appeals.”

Selain itu, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes PP v. Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Hj Razak [2019] 6 CLJ 561, telah memutuskan mengenai pemakaian prinsip undang-undang sepertimana diputuskan di dalam kes Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Koperasi Serbaguna Makmur Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 1; [2004] 1 MLJ 257 bahawa kedudukan undang-undang mengenai permohonan penggantungan pelaksanaan untuk kes-kes rayuan sivil adalah juga terpakai kepada prosiding jenayah.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan juga telah memutuskan bahawa prinsip undang-undang mengenai keadaan khas dan “nugatoriness” adalah terpakai sepertimana diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Dato’ Sri Anwar Ibrahim (supra) yang memutuskan seperti berikut: "[82] At the end of the day, the court is free to adopt either approach be it the special circumstances approach or the nugatory approach, depending on the facts or circumstances of the case. The appellant has to show a valid reason or cause acceptable to us in order to justify our exercise of discretion for stay in favour of the appellant pending the hearing of the proposed appeal to the Federal Court. Regrettably the appellant failed to do so. [83] On the principles of stay, it is ideal to read the following authorities:- a. Ming Ann Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 CLJ 380, CA; b. Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 1, FC; and c. Walter Pathrose Gomez & Ors v. Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd [2005] 7 CLJ 385, HC. [85] We venture to say that judges can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions; and that judges must take into account the fact and the reality that they have a duty to sit in any case and they are not obliged to recuse themselves. [88] All these must be taken into account as the background scenario, in determining whether to allow the stay. It must be emphasised that the seriousness of the offence which the appellant is currently facing is a relevant factor for refusing to grant the stay.

Peguam Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa terdapat keadaan khas bersandarkan kepada alasan berikut: a. Masalah kesihatan Pemohon – kes Firdaus Rizal Abdul Manan v PP [2025] CLJU 1526 dan PP v Dato' Balwant Singh [2002] 4 CLJ 155. b. Permohonan penggantungan atas kesalahan yang sama yang dibenarkan Mahkamah – PP v Shari Abd Wahad [1993] 4 CLJ 279; Nor Afizal Azizan v PP [2012] 6 CLJ 370; dan PP v Ronney Kurus [2022] CLJU 3131. c. Pemohon mempunyai rayuan bermerit kerana alasan rayuan yang dikemukakan adalah persoalan undang-undang yang rumit dan komples.

Mahkamah ini mendapati alasan pokok permohonan penggantungan pelaksanaan hukuman oleh Pemohon adalah bersandarkan dua alasan pokok iaitu:

Keadaan Kesihatan Pemohon.

Terdapat persoalan undang-undang yang bermerit berhubung rayuan Pemohon.

Persoalan yang harus Mahkamah ini tentukan adalah sama ada alasan pokok tersebut adalah suatu keadaan khas yang mewajarkan Mahkamah menggunakan budi bicaranya membenarkan permohonan ini.

Bagi menjawab isu ini, haruslah diberikan perhatian Pemohon tidak melampirkan laporan kesihatan bagi menyokong hujahannya. Ia hanyalah pernyataan yang dibuat di dalam Afidavit sokongan Pemohon sahaja bahawa beliau mengalami masalah kemurungan yang kritikal yang menjejaskan mental Pemohon. Rujuk perenggan 17 hujahan.

Oleh itu, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa Pemohon gagal memberikan alasan bermerit untuk menunjukkan suatu keadaan khas yang mewajarkan Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan ini atas alasan tersebut.

Manakala bagi alasan kedua bahawa terdapat persoalan undang-undang di dalam rayuan Pemohon, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Muhammad Ra’abilshah Samzali [2024] CLJU 1518 yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan permohonan penggantungan pelaksanaan Pemohon kerana terdapat persoalan undang-undang yang kompleks untuk diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dan tidak ada bantahan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

Dalam kes tersebut permohonan penggantungan pelaksanaan dibuat untuk menggantungkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang telah memutuskan hukuman penjara lima (5) tahun.

Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman telah menolak permohonan tersebut. Pemohon telah memfailkan Notis Usul di Mahkamah Rayuan. Salah satu asas permohonan pemohon ialah terdapat persoalan undang-undang rumit yang harus diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dan permohonan tersebut tidak dibantah oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya.

Berdasarkan kepada alasan tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan permohonan pemohon. Namun, fakta di dalam kes yang dirujuk amatlah berbeza. Mahkamah ini berpandangan persoalan undang-undang yang dikatakan oleh peguam Pemohon merupakan persoalan undang-undang bermerit bukannya isu undang-undang yang rumit dan kompleks. Malahan ia adalah isu undang-undang biasa (typical) dibangkitkan bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 376 Kanun Keseksaan.

Sehubungan itu, mengambil pendekatan yang sama sepertimana diputuskan oleh Augustine Paul HMR (ketika itu) yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Section 57 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 provides that an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution though the court has a discretion to grant a stay. As the grant of a stay is only an exception to the general rule there must be special or exceptional circumstances before the discretion can be exercised in favour of an applicant. In commenting on proof of special circumstances Murray, Brooking and Vincent JJ said in Re Clarkson (1986) VR 583 at pp. 584-585: In our view there is no difference between the approach of those who have spoken in terms of very exceptional circumstances and those who have referred only to special or exceptional circumstances. If the principle that special or exceptional circumstances must be shown to warrant admitting a prisoner to bail pending appeal is regarded as meaning only that the applicant bears a burden and must put forward, as justifying the grant of bail, something that is not present in most or all cases, then the statement of principle has failed adequately to convey the practice of the court and the principle on which it acts. It is probably for this reason that judges have on occasions expressed the requirement as one of ‘very’ exceptional circumstances. The adverb reflects the difficulty of persuading the court that the circumstances put forward as special or exceptional are strong enough to overcome the powerful considerations of a general character which militate against the grant of bail pending appeal. So strong are these considerations that it has been said that extreme caution must be exercised before bail is granted: R v. Giordano (1982) 31 Page 4 of 6 ; Muhammad Nur Afiq bin Zulkipli lwn Pendakwa Raya [2021] MLJU 1867 SASR 241; Re Maher (unreported, Full Court of Queensland, 18 November 1985). Indeed in England the Court of Appeal has gone so far as to say that the application will succeed only if the court is driven to the conclusion that justice can only be done by the granting of bail: R v. Watton (1978) 68 Cr App R 293, at p.297. The powerful considerations, relating principally, but not exclusively, to the public interest, which will ordinarily induce the court to refuse bail pending appeal have been examined in recent pronouncements of the Full Courts of South Australia and Queensland in Giordano’s Case and Maher’s Case and by Brennan J in Chamberlain v. R (No.1) [1983] 153 CLR 514; 46 ALR 608, see further the observations of Sugarman J in R v. Southgate (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 44, where his Honour referred to the appellant’s guilt as established by the verdict of a jury in what must be taken, until the contrary was shown, to have been a trial properly conducted and without error of law. ... The factors that may constitute special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay of execution after conviction are well settled (see, for example, Re Kwan Wah Yip & Anor

MLJ 146; Ganesan v. PP (1983) 2 MLJ 369; Yusof bin Mohamed v. PP (1995) 3 MLJ 66; Ralph v. PP (1972) 1 MLJ 242). They can be enumerated as follows: (a) the gravity or otherwise of the offence; (b) the length of the term of imprisonment; in comparison with the length of time which is likely to take for the appeal to be heard; (c) whether there are difficult points of law involved; (d) whether the accused is a first offender or has previous convictions; (e) whether the accused would become involved again in another offence whilst at liberty; and (f) whether the security imposed will ensure the attendance of the appellant before the Appellate Court.” KESIMPULAN

Berdasarkan kepada di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan untuk menolak permohonan pernggantungan pelaksanaan Pemohon. Bertarikh: Sgd (Y.A. DR HAZLINA BINTI HUSSAIN) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR Peguam bagi pihak Pemohon: Mr. Ho Cheng En Mr. Loi Yap Loong @ Jackie Peguam bagi pihak Responden: Puan Izalina binti Abdullah