Orchard Circle Sdn Bhd v Lee Kim Kok (BA-22NCvC-212-05/2019)

LEE KIM KOK (No. K/P: 770322-10-5763)

CHIN WEI KIEN (No. K/P: 770330-10-5093)

ONG TAI SING (No. K/P: 720917-14-5427) (Berniaga rakan kongsi atas nama dan gaya Fortune Venture Management (No. Pendaftaran Perniagaan: 002276139-P) ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Plaintiff's claim is essentially for arrears of rental under a tenancy agreement and double rental arising from the Defendants’ 10/02/2026 14:10:55 BA-22NCvC-212-05/2019 Kand. 269 failure to deliver vacant possession after the termination of the tenancy agreement, involving of a piece of land in Kajang. The Plaintiff’s case [2] The salient facts giving rise to the present dispute are as follows. [3] On 26.11.2013, the Plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd Second Defendants (“D1” and “D2” respectively) acting on behalf of Fortune Venture Management (“FVM”) executed a Tenancy Agreement for the use of the land known as Kajang Putra between Lot 8620 and Lot 2630, Taman Putra Kajang, Kajang, Selangor (“the Demised Premises”). The tenancy was for a period of 3 years from 15.12.2013 until 14.12.2016. Monthly rental was agreed at RM 38,000.00. [4] The 3rd Defendant (“D3”) subsequently joined FVM as a partner on 13.1.2014. [5] Following the expiry of the Tenancy Agreement on 14.12.2016, the tenancy agreement was renewed in accordance with Section 8, First Schedule. However, there was no formal agreement drawn up. The rent was increased to RM43,700.00 with effect from 15.6.2017. [6] Throughout the duration of the period of tenancy, the Defendants did not make consistent payments of the rent due to the Plaintiff. Some of the monthly rents fell due. [7] Sometime in August 2018, D1 and D3 verbally informed the Plaintiff that they wished to terminate the tenancy relationship, and hand over the Demised Premises by the end of September 2018. The Plaintiff agreed to the Defendants’ proposal to terminate and confirmed its agreement by its letter dated 29.8.2018. The Plaintiff also informed inter alia, that the Defendants had to ensure that the Demised Premises is to be clean and free from any rubbish/debris a nd is to be restored to its original condition. [8] However, the Defendants failed to deliver vacant possession of the Demised Premises by the end of September 2018 as there was debris, tents, concrete slabs and rubbish found on the Demised Premises. [9] The Plaintiff claims that the failure constituted a breach to deliver vacant possession of the Demised Premises, as a result of the which the Plaintiff claims it is entitled to claim double rental with effect from 30.9.2018. [10] As at 30.9.2018, there were also outstanding rentals not paid by the Defenadants. The Plaintiff then issued invoices and statements of accounts to claim for the outstanding rentals, double rental, which included late payment interest at the rate of 1.5% per month. [11] The Defendants did not respond to the statements of accounts the Plaintiff issued to them, nor made payments as demanded. [12] On 11.03.2019, the Plaintiff's former solicitors issued a letter of demand to the Defendants for payment of the outstanding sum of RM1,428,572.62 calculated as at 19.2.2019. The sum comprised of double rental from October 2018, arrears of rental and late payment interest. The Defendants still failed, neglected and/or refused to make payments, which then prompted the filing of the present suit. [13] On 23.7.2021, the High Court allowed the Plaintiff's application for summary judgment and ordered that the Defendants, inter alia, deliver vacant possession of the Demised Premises to the Plaintiff within 14 days of the said judgment. [14]

RM593,431.29 in outstanding rental;

(ii) RM3,930,086.66 in double rental calculated from 30.9.2018 to 30.6.2022;

(iii) RM2,034,607.73 in late payment interest calculated at the rate of 1.5% on both the outstanding rental and double rental claim; and

(iv) An order that the Defendants deliver to the Plaintiff letters of release / discharge from architects / consultants the Defendants engaged during the tenancy. [18] Relief (iv) arose from these facts. The Defendants engaged Adnan Yahaya Architect as their architects for the structures to be built on the Demised Premises for its bazaar business, and to submit the requisite building plans. The building plans were submitted in the Plaintiff’s name. [19] Upon termination of the tenancy, the Defendants did not issue any letters of release or discharge to the Plaintiff for the architects and consultants they engaged in respect of the Demised Premises. [20] The Plaintiffs contend that in order to engage new architects to proceed with the development plans for the Demised Premises, it is a requirement for the previous architect to produce letters of release or discharge. As the Defendants have failed to produce such a letter, it seeks this court to make an order for the production. The Defence case [21] The Defendants do not dispute the Tenancy Agreement dated 26.11.2013 entered into with the Plaintiff. The Defendants had intended to use the Demised Premises for a bazaar business. Pursuant thereto, it erected structures on the Demised Premises. [22] However, the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approval from the Kajang Municipal Council (“MPKJ”). The Defendants ceased its business registration on 12.11.2015. [23] Prior to FVM ceasing business, on 19.5.2014, D1, D2 and D3 incorporated Fortune Venture Management Sdn Bhd (“FVMSB”). FVMSB then applied for approval from MPKJ to operate the bazaar business. [24] When the Tenancy Agreement expired on 14.12.2016, the Defendants did not renew the tenancy. Instead, FVMSB took over the tenancy, and paid the rent directly to the Plaintiff. [25] The Defendants contend that even if FVM is found to have renewed the Tenancy Agreement, vacant possession of the Demised Premises was delivered to the Plaintiff by end of January 2019 when the Demised Premises had been duly cleaned up and cleared of debris. However, the Plaintiff had unreasonably refused to accept delivery of vacant possession. The Defendants are therefore not liable for double rental and late payment charges as claimed in these proceedings. Issues for determination [26] Based on the respective positions taken by the parties, the following issues fall to be determined by this court:

Was the tenancy renewed by the Defendants after its expiry on 14.12.2016;

(ii) Whether the Defendants are liable to pay the outstanding rent as claimed by the Plaintiff;

(iii) When was vacant possession delivered by the Defendants to the Plaintiff;

(iv) Consequent to the finding on issue (iii) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim double rental from 30.9.2018 until 30.6.2022;

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to late payment interest at 1.5% on all the amounts claimed; and

(vi) Whether the Defendants should be ordered to issue letters of release or discharge to the Plaintiff for the architects and consultants previously engaged by them. Analysis and decision Renewal of the tenancy after 14.12.2016 [27] To recapitulate, the Defendants contend there was no renewal of the tenancy after the expiration of the Tenancy Agreement. Their basis for so saying is because the conditions stipulated in the option to renew clause in the Tenancy Agreement were not complied with. Reference is made to clauses 7.3.1. and 3.3. of the agreement. Clause 7.3.1 provide for the tenant to give 2 months’ notice in writing prior to the expiration of the tenancy. Clause 3.3 stipulates that the security deposit for rent must be increased proportionately whenever rent is increased. [28] The abovementioned pre-requisites were not fulfilled. The Defendants did not give any such notice as stipulated to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff did not demand for a higher security deposit even after the alleged renewal of tenancy although the rent was increased. As these condition precedents for the renewal of the tenancy was not satisfied, the Plaintiff failed to prove that the tenancy was renewed. [29] The contention of the Defendants has no merit. The non-fulfillment of the condition precedent is a matter to be raised by the Plaintiff if the Defendants as a tenant, claim there was a renewal and the Plaintiff as a landlord, disputes it. It is not for the Defendants to raise it in a situation where the Plaintiff claims there was a renewal and the Defendant disputes it. [30] The case cited and relied on the Defendants do not support their position. I refer to the Federal Court case of Woo Min En & Ors v Leong Chung Fatt [1982] 2 MLJ 241. After stating the facts of the case, the court found as follows: When sued for the recovery of this floor the respondent stated in his statement of defence that a new lease for a further term of eight years commencing from January 16, 1981 was created in his favour as a result of an oral agreement on August 30, 1980 between him and Mr. Wong Phu Yin, who was then one of the owners of the demised premises. … It is also not disputed that according to clause 2 (3) of the lease the renewal is exercisable subject to the following three conditions, namely:—

the respondent as the lessee has to give a written request for the renewal at least three months prior to the expiration of the lease;

he is not guilty of any breach or non-observance of any covenant contained in the lease; and

the appellants as lessor do not need the demised premises for their own use. It is clear that the respondent did not avail himself of the provision of this clause as at no time did he make any written request to renew the lease as required by the clause. The law on the question of the renewal of a lease is settled in that an action or a right to renew a lease is always treated by the law as a privilege which must be exercised strictly within the terms in which the option or the right is given, otherwise the option or the right is lost, West Country Cleaners (Falmouth) Ltd v Saly [1966] 3 All ER 210, 212. Since the respondent gave no written request as required by clause 2 (3) of the lease, there is thus no question of the lease being renewed at all. The alleged oral agreement, even if proved, could not renew the lease, because it is completely outside the purview of this clause. Further, unless and until this clause is amended or modified so as to include an oral agreement as a mode of renewal, the alleged oral agreement remains ineffective and irrelevant. [31] Contrary to the Defendants’ contention, there is documentary evidence establishing renewal of tenancy. Their conduct clearly evinced an intention to renew the tenancy. Firstly, the Defendants continued to pay rent for the Demised Premises. The Plaintiff issued receipts in respect of rental payments for January 2017 to August 2017. Secondly, the Defendants issued payment vouchers for rentals for August 2017, October 2017, November 2017 and even March 2018. Thirdly, the Defendants made submission to the local authorities for approvals for activities on the Demised Premises even after 14.12.2016 when the tenancy had allegedly expired. [32] In the light of the Defendants’ conduct, it is irrefutable that the tenancy was in fact renewed. [33] Further, I find the Defendants’ contention that upon the expiry of the Tenancy Agreement on 14.12.2016, FVMSB took over the tenancy, to be without merit. In support of their contention, the Defendants rely on the fact of rental payment by FVMSB to the Plaintiff. [34] I am of the view that the mere fact of payment is not evidence of a take over of the tenancy by FVMSB. There must first be evidence that the tenancy that FVMSB had entered into a tenancy agreement with the Plaintiff. [35] Although D3 was the partner of FVM and also the director of FVMSB, the commonality of personae in both entities alone does not prove take over of tenancy by FVMSB. In any event, clause 5.5.1 of the Tenancy Agreement requires the consent of the Plaintiff in the event of a novation of the Tenancy Agreement. [36] It also matters not a jot that FVMSB was the entity running the bazaar business on the Demised Premises. There must be cogent evidence that the Plaintiff had accepted FVMSB as the recognized tenant at the material time. There is none. [37] In the upshot, the fact of renewal can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. In my view, the evidence shows it is more likely than not that the tenancy was renewed. The Defendants did not sufficiently rebut by their evidence, that there was a take over by FVMSB. In the circumstances, I find that there was a renewal of tenancy by conduct, notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement between the parties. Claim for outstanding rental [38] In August 2018, D1 and D3 verbally informed the Plaintiff that they agree to terminate the Tenancy Agreement. The Plaintiff’s letter of 29.8.2018 to the Defendants confirmed the same. [39] In view of these documentary evidence, it cannot be disputed that both parties accepted the termination date to be 30.9.2018. [40] The Plaintiff’s claim for outstanding rentals as at 30.9.2018 for the sum of RM 593,431.29 comprises the following amounts as follows: No. Statement of Accounts Rental Period Amount (RM)

1.

31.12.2014 16.3.2014-

15.1.2015 76,000.00 2.

31.12.2015 16.1.2015-

15.1.2016 173,660.00 3.

31.12.2016 16.1.2016-

15.1.2017 141,360.00 4.

31.12.2017 16.1.2017-

15.1.2018 97,052.00 5.

30.9.2018 16.1.2018-

30.9.2018 105,359.29 TOTAL 593,431.29 [41] The Statement of Accounts which were issued to the Defendants expressly stipulate that “Any dispute on amounts to be notified within 7 days.” The Defendants did not raise any such dispute. The failure to deny or dispute statement of account when served with it estops the Defendants from disputing the debt. (See: Kgn Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pan Reliance Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 233 (Court of Appeal)). [42] It was also in evidence that invoices and numerous letters of demand from the Plaintiff’s solicitors were issued for outstanding rentals for various periods, for which the Plaintiff received no response. There was no explanation for the failure to respond, hence, there is no credible defence to the claim. [43] More importantly is the admission by D3 (who was DW2) that there were outstanding payments for rent. His version of the total amounts differed slightly from that claimed by the Plaintiff. In cross examination, D3 was shown the Statement of Accounts showing an amount of RM 593,431.29 was owing to the Plaintiff. He agreed to the amount but stated that it was due by FVMSB instead. Apart from D3’s assertion, no documentary evidence was tendered to substantiate his allegation. [44] Having found that the Defendants had renewed the tenancy, and rejected the claim of a take over by FVMSB, and in the light of D3’s admission, I find the Plaintiff to have proven the amount of RM 593,431.29 claimed for outstanding arrears as at 30.9.2018. [45] In respect of the claim for late payment interest on the arrears of rental, the Plaintiff seeks an interest rate of 1.5% to be imposed on the debt due. I note that this interest rate is not contractual but unilateral. The Plaintiff relies on s. 11 of the Civil Law Act 1956 as its basis to impose interest. In this regard, I am mindful of the fact that an award of pre-judgment interest is a discretionary exercise on the part of the court. It is usually awarded to compensate the Plaintiff for being deprived of the use of the monies prior to judgment. [46] However, the length of time taken for this case to be disposed of cannot be attributed to any fault on the part of the Defendants. The Plaintiff had earlier taken out a summary judgment application which was allowed, but on appeal was dismissed and its case was then remitted to the High Court for trial. In the intervening period before the trial, the Covid-19 situation had contributed somewhat to the delay in disposing of this case. I therefore decline to award any pre-judgment interest. Delivery of vacant possession by the Defendant [47] The Plaintiff contends that as the parties had agreed to terminate with effect from 30.9.2018, the Defendants were obliged to adhere to the timeline for delivery of vacant possession of Demised Premises by the end of September 2018. [48] The Plaintiff’s claim is that at all material times, the Defendants failed to deliver vacant possession as it had to restore the premises to its original state at the time the Tenancy Agreement was entered, which it failed to do. [49] The Plaintiff’s case for non-delivery of vacant possession is premised on the following evidence:

The photograph of the Demised Premises in October 2018 showed tents and other structures on the Iand;

(ii) The photograph of the Demised Premises on 13.12.2018 showed structures on the Iand;

(iii) The Google Earth image of 14.3.2019 showed structures on the Demised Premises; and

(iv) The photographs of the Demised Premises as at 13.5.2019 showed debris and rubbish on the Demised Premises. [50] The defence c a s e o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s t h a t the Plaintiff had agreed to allow them an extension of time to deliver vacant possession of the Demised Premises to the end of January 2019, and they met the timeline for delivery of vacant possession of the Demised Premises. [51] On the evidence, I find on a balance of probabilities that vacant possession was delivered by end of January 2019. A company named Prihatin Service was engaged to purchase the tents which were erected on the Demised Premises. Prihatin Service assisted in cleaning and restoring the land to its original state of a vacant land. [52] DW1, the representative of Prihatin Services was subpoenaed to testify. He testified that Prihatin Services issued a receipt for the amount of RM 32,500.00. The amount was in respect of the purchase of the tent structures, and the services of cleaning the debris on the Demised Premises were rendered free of charge, as stated in the receipt. [53] Upon completion of the cleanup, DW1 took photographs and videos of the work done, which were adduced in the Bundle of Agreed Documents and referred to at the trial. [54] When asked as to when the cleanup work was completed, he categorically stated it to be before the Chinese New Year. In 2019, Chinese New Year fell on 5.2.2019. [55] DW3, the MPKJ officer who inspected the Demised Premises before giving the closure approval, also testified for the defence. He confirmed that an inspection was conducted around February 2019 and no rubbish, structures nor bazaar tents were found on the Demised Premises at the material time. He was referred to a letter issued by MPKJ dated 29.3.2019 to FVMSB and he explained that it pertained to the approval to cease bazaar operations. He further stated that the approval was given only after MPKJ was satisfied that the stipulated conditions for ceasing operations must first be satisfied. In this instance, an inspection was done in February 2019, after the expected bazaar closure in January. No structures nor debris were found during the inspection. [56] I am of the view that the evidence of DW1 and DW3, being independent witnesses establishes on a balance of probabilities that by the end of January 2019, the Demised Premises were restored to its original state and vacant possession delivered. Having done the restoration works, DW2 then personally delivered a letter to the Plaintiff’s office on 31.1.2019. [57] The Plaintiff’s evidence to dispute the allegation of vacant possession are the Google Earth photographs taken in March 2019 and May 2019. I find that this evidence viewed against that of the defence, is less probable. It is not disputed that the Demised Premises is a piece of open land, unfenced and easily accessible to the public. The presence of rubbish and debris as seen in the photographs, even if it is true, admits of other possibilities; and not necessarily as a result of the Defendants’ failure to restore the land. Claim for double rental [58] The Plaintiff’s claim for double rental arises from the Defendants’ failure to deliver vacant possession of the Demised Premises as required. Double rental is calculated at the sum of RM 87,400.00 from the month of October 2018 until 30.6.2022 (when vacant possession was deemed delivered), totaling RM 3,930,086.66. [59] As the Demised Premises had in fact been restored to its original state and vacant possession delivered by the letter informing the Plaintiff of the delivery on 31.1.2019, the claim for double rental does not arise. [60] Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, I shall deal with the legal arguments advanced by the parties in respect of the claim for double rental. [61] The Plaintiff’s claim is founded upon section 28(4) of the Civil Law Act 1956 which provides:

(1)…

(2)…

(3)…

(a) Every tenant holding over after the determination of his tenancy shall be chargeable, at the option of his landlord, with double the amount of his rent until possession is given up by him or with double the value during the period of detention of the land or premises so detained, whether notice to that effect has been given or not. [62] The critical fact to prove by the Plaintiffs is that the Defendants were holding over after 30.9.2018 by refusing to give up possession. [63] The Plaintiff referred to the Federal Court case of Rohasassets Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Wisma Perkasa Sdn Bhd) v Weatherford (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2020] 1 MLJ 557 which defined the meaning of holding over as follows: [62] Going by the meaning given to the words ‘holding over’, it does not seem to matter if the word ‘wilful’ is there in s 28(4)(a) or otherwise, for holding over simply means an act of continuing to be in occupation of the premises after the expiry of the tenancy. What matters is the reason for the holding over. [63] Learned counsel for the respondents referred us to the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Lee Wah Bank Ltd v Afro-Asia Shipping Co (Pte) Ltd [1992] 1 SLR(R) 740 where it was held that the expression ‘holding over’ in s 19(4) of the Singapore Civil Law Act which is in pari materia with s 28(4)(a) of our Civil Law Act requires an intention on the part of the tenant to refuse to deliver up the demised premises with the knowledge that he has no right to remain in possession. [64] The words ‘until possession is given up by him’ in s 28(4)(a) of the Civil Law Act is not without significance when read together with the right of the [2020] 1 MLJ 557 at 576landlord to charge double rent. It contemplates a situation where the tenant refuses to deliver up vacant possession without any just cause or valid reason after the expiry of the tenancy. [64] In the context of the present case, it can hardly be said that the Defendants conduct falls within the meaning of holding over in Rohasassets (supra) case. Instead, I find the Defendants had no intention to continue in occupation and acted to give up possession by end of January 2019 after it had restored the Demised Premises by cleaning up the land. [65] In any event, I find merit in the Defendants contention that even if it can be said that they failed to restore the land to the satisfaction of the Plaintiff, the failure does not constitute holding over. This contention is supported by the following decisions of the Court of Appeal as follows:

In Presto Supermarkets (Subang) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Attic Holdings Sdn Bhd [2024] 3 MLJ 892 it was held, [53] Having handed over the keys on 14 July 2015, Presto was as a matter of fact, not in ‘occupation’ of the premises and thus they could not be ‘holding over’ as per s 28(4) of the Civil Law Act 1956. This is underscored and augmented by the fact that Attic had already claimed for rentals and service charges for the same period per para 14 of the statement of claim, which was allowed. The claim for double rental per paras 22–23 of the statement of claim is clearly overlapping with and is subsumed in the claim for rentals in para 14 of the statement of claim. To put it tersely, Presto’s failure to reinstate the premises after having handed over vacant possession to Attic, although they promised to do so and asked for extension of time to do so, cannot be equated with their being in occupation of the premises. What Attic was seeking to do (wrongly in our view) was to claim double rental on a contractual provision in the TA (cl 12.6.1), the effect of which is that Presto is ‘deemed’ to be holding over (in occupation) for purposes of a claim for double rental under s 28(4) of the Civil Law Act 1956. The appeal is to that extent allowed and the order of the High Court in allowing a sum of RM266,120.69 being the double rent from 14 July 2015 until 23 November 2015 is set aside.

(ii) In Parkwell Departmental Store Sdn Bhd v ICSD Ventures Sdn Bhd. [2021] 1 MLJ 60 it was held, [33] The respondent had, subsequent to the hand over, by letter dated 9 December 2014 unilaterally requested the appellant to carry out further restoration works at the demised premises, works that were never identified during the joint inspection on 22 November 2014. The appellant argues that this cannot be the basis for the respondent to claim that vacant possession of the premises had not been delivered. [34] We agree that the stand taken by the respondent is unreasonable. If at all the premises had not been restored to its original condition when handing over, then pursuant to cl 9.15 of the tenancy agreement the respondent ‘shall be at liberty to carry out such restoration and the costs and expenses thereof shall be borne by the Tenant and payable to the Landlord upon demand’. The respondent did not avail itself of this right. … [35] The other clause referred to by the learned judicial commissioner in making this award of double rental is cl 9.18. Now, cl 9.18 is the holding over clause, i.e. if the appellant as tenant without the consent of the respondent as landlord holds over and continues to occupy the demised premises beyond the expiration of the term, then the appellant would be liable to pay double rental. It is clear from the evidence that there is no holding over by the appellant. The appellant had vacated the premises and handed over the keys on or before 25 November 2014, as agreed. The appellant cannot then, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be in occupation of the demised premises and holding over after that date. The mere fact that the respondent had belatedly, ie after the appellant had vacated the premises, unilaterally identified further restoration works to be done on the premises, mean that until these works are done the appellant is deemed to still be in occupation and holding over. That does not make sense at all. To hold as such would be highly unjust and prejudicial to the appellant. [66] The authorities have therefore clearly held that a claim for double rental cannot be premised on the mere failure to restore the premises to its original condition. [67] The legal position enunciated in the above cases makes even greater sense when the Plaintiff has a contractual remedy available under the Tenancy Agreement. Pursuant to clause 7(b) of the First Schedule to the Tenancy Agreement, a sum of RM 19,000.00 was paid to the Plaintiff as deposit for removal of debris. Clauses 3.4 and 5.4.2 of the Tenancy Agreement allows the Plaintiff to utilize the deposit in the event the Demised Premises was found to be in an unsatisfactory condition upon termination of the tenancy. It was in evidence that the Plaintiff continued to keep the deposit. To my mind, where the Plaintiff has a remedy, it is unreasonable for the Plaintiff to claim that vacant possession was not delivered merely because it was not satisfied with the condition of the Demised Premises at the time of delivery. [68] To conclude on the issue of double rental, I find that there is no basis to the Plaintiff’s claim that vacant possession was never delivered, but deemed delivered when the Plaintiff sought to enforce a Writ of Possession and site inspection was done on 30.6.2022. [69] The Whatsapp messages exchanged between the representative of the Plaintiff and D1 reflected the Defendants’ concern that the Demised Premises is exposed, and third parties could easily dirty it. D1 even suggested for the Demised Premises to be fenced up, to avoid making the Defendants responsible after the Demised Premises was cleared. This goes to show that the Defendants were working towards delivery of vacant possession. It is therefore unreasonable for the Plaintiff to contend that vacant possession was not delivered until more than 3 years later when the Plaintiff executed the Writ of Possession. [70] The agreed date for delivery of vacant possession was first agreed to be 30.9.2018. However, D3 in his evidence explained that parties had a meeting to discuss the termination date and actions to be taken by the Defendants. D3 said he informed the Plaintiff’s representative that the hawkers on the Demised Premises required time until December 2018 to vacate. Upon them leaving the premises, he needed another 2 months to remove structures, temporary toilets, and temporary garbage bins on the land. [71] There was no evidence to rebut the testimony of D3, in the form of oral or documentary evidence. In view of this, I find that in all likelihood, the Plaintiff agreed to allow an extension of time for the Defendants to undertake the restoration works which was eventually completed on 30.1.2019. [72] However, the period of occupation from October 2018 to end of January 2019 must be taken to be an extension of the tenancy period for which the Defendants ought to pay rental. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff is to be allowed a claim for monthly rental for the period from 1.10.2018 to 30.1.2019. It is not disputed that the rent after the tenancy was renewed was RM 43,700.00. Letter of release from the Defendants’ consultants [73] The Defendants engaged Messrs. Adnan Yahaya Architect for the structures to be built on the Demised Premises, and to submit building plans under the Plaintiff’s name to MPKJ. As the operations of the bazaar has now ceased on the Demised Premises, the Plaintiff requires the production of the letters of release to enable it to proceed with the development plans it has for the Demised Premises. [74] The Plaintiff therefore seeks an order for the Defendants to provide the letters of release from the consultants engaged for works on the Demised Premises. It contends that the order is pursuant to the requirement of MPKJ and the Architect Rules 1996. [75] I find the order sought for to be without merit. Firstly, there was no evidence produced of any such requirement by MPKJ. Secondly, having examined the relevant provisions referred to, I am of the view that the responsibility of securing the letter of release lies with the Plaintiff or the architect engaged by it for any development plans it may have. The new architects can then communicate with Messrs. Adnan Yahaya Architect for the letters of release. More significantly, in the numerous letters of demand sent to the Defendants, the letters of release were never requested for. Conclusion [76] Premised on the findings and reasons as aforementioned, the Plaintiff’s claim is partially allowed. I make the following orders:

The Defendants are to pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM 593,431.29 being outstanding rentals;

(ii) The Defendants are to pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM 174,800.00 being rental from 1.10.2018 to 30.1.2019 when vacant possession was eventually delivered to the Plaintiff;

(iii) Interest at the rate of 5% on the amounts (i) and (ii) from the date of judgment until realization;

(iv) The Defendants are to pay the Plaintiff costs of RM 20,000.00. Dated: 9th February 2026 -sgd-Alice Loke Yee Ching Judge High Court Shah Alam Counsels for Plaintiff: Mr. Gregory Das (Ms. Chong Jen Hui together with him) Messrs Steven Thiru Counsels for Defendants: Ms Boo Yang Huay (Mr. Tan Pean Khoon and Ms. Liau Pin Chun together with her) YH Boo & Partners