the determination of any title or interest by operation of law. In other words, a chargor who is able to demonstrate that the charge, the enforcement of which is sought, is defeasible upon one or more of the grounds specified under sub-ss (2) and (4)(b) above will be held to have established cause to the contrary under s 256(3). … Secondly, a chargor may show cause to the contrary within s 256(3) of the Code by demonstrating that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale. For example, failure on the part of the chargee to prove the making of a demand or service upon the chargor of a notice in Form 16D would constitute cause to the contrary. So too, where the notice demands sum not lawfully due from the chargee. … Thirdly, a chargor may defeat an application for an order for sale by demonstrating that its grant would be contrary to some rule of law or equity. [16] In Low Lee Lian, the Federal Court further emphasized—and this should be kept in mind—that when a chargee enforces a statutory charge against the chargor under section 256 of the National Land Code, the proceedings are undertaken in rem. The Decision of this Court [17] This Court takes cognizance of the point that its primary duty in this Originating Summons application is to determine if indeed the Defendant has succeeded or failed to meet the requisite legal test of what amounts to a cause to the contrary. This Court is merely concerned with the very narrow question of whether the material produced here by the chargor constitutes cause to the contrary. [18] The issue of the indefeasibility or otherwise of the said charge in this case does not arise. Hence, the questions to be addressed is further narrowed to the remaining two categories of “cause to the contrary” as laid down in Low Lee Lian. [19] The Federal Court cited Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd v Meng Kuang Properties Bhd [1991] 2 CLJ Rep 467; [1991] 2 MLJ 283; [1990] 3 MLRH 255, on failure to serve a notice or proper notice as an example of a cause to the contrary within the meaning of the second of three categories of cases and Murugappa Chettiar v Letchumanan Chettiar [1938] CLJU 43; [1939] MLJ 296; [1938] 1 MLRH 205 as a case demonstrating a cause to the contrary within the meaning of the third category. The apex court further observed that “the decision of the former Federal Court in Public Finance Bhd v Narayanasamy [1971] CLJU 107; [1971] 2 MLJ 32; [1971] 1 MLRA 540 and that of Eusoff Chin J (now Chief Justice of the Federal Court) in Overseas Chinese Banking Corp Ltd v Lee Tan Hwa & Anor [1989] 2 CLJ 198; [1989] 1 MLJ 261; [1988] 2 MLRH 38 are illustrative of cases that fall within the principle in Murugappa Chettiar's case”. [20] Returning to our present case, there was the allegation of increases in the interest rate for the loan facility. In Low Lee Lian, the Federal Court did allude to the example of an increase in interest. It is apposite that the following passage from Low Lee Lian be reproduced. Although each case turns upon its own facts, we propose to consider, by way of illustration only, the usual kind of case with which this court has been faced on numerous occasions. An application under s 256 is opposed by the chargor on the ground that the chargee has acted in breach of contract, eg by not releasing moneys due under the loan agreement or by increasing the rate of interest without proper notice or by not giving any proper account of the sums paid by the borrower. A judge faced with such complaints will merely say that they do not, on a proper reading of s 256(3) and the authorities which have considered the section, constitute cause to the contrary. He will not, and ought not to, enter upon a discussion of the question whether any or all of these complaints have or are devoid of any merit. Much confusion and difficulty has been occasioned in this area of the law by a failure on the part of those concerned with the task of dealing with applications under s 256 to properly appreciate their true role assigned to them by Parliament. [21] Does this dispel the Defendant’s case of satisfying this Court of the existence of cause to the contrary? [22] It must be emphasized that the present application involves allegations pertaining to violations of numerous provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951. This Court agrees with the Plaintiff that “forum ini juga bukan satu forum yang sesuai untuk pihak-pihak membentangkan perkara ini kerana ini adalah Mahkamah Halang Tebus dan bukannya Mahkamah Sivil untuk membincangkan perkara tersebut:”, that is, this Court should not be concerned with the issue pertaining to the validity and enforceability or otherwise of the Moneylending Agreement. And the Defendant agreed with this point (see paragraph [2] above). [23] Low Lee Lian supports the proposition outlined in the preceding paragraph, where the apex court has said in no uncertain terms that a Judge hearing an application such as the present Originating Summons “will not, and ought not to, enter upon a discussion of the question whether any or all of these complaints have or are devoid of any merit”. [24] Based on the authority of Low Lee Lian and the factual matrix on this case, this Court is obliged to allow the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff in Enclosure 1. [25] Having considered the overall circumstances of this application, this Court makes no order as to costs. Dated: 25 January, 2025 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Chuah Chen Yean for the Plaintiff (Messrs. Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis) Manpal Singh Sacdev a/l Manjit Singh and Gary Au Kar Meng for the Defendant (Messrs. Manjit Singh Sachdev Mohammad Radzi & Partners)