tindakan Plaintif adalah menindas dan menekan Defendan. Penilaian dan Dapatan Mahkamah [10] Mahkamah ini merujuk keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi Georgetown, Pulau Pinang, YA Anand Ponnudurai menganalisa peruntukan seksyen 256 Kanun Tanah Negara dalam kes RHB Bank Berhad v. Siow Kok Yong And Anor [2024] CLJU 2743 seperti yang berikut: “It is trite that pursuant to Sections 256 and 257 of the National Land Code 1965, the Plaintiff is entitled to dispose of the said lands by way of public auction and not otherwise. [15] In this respect, reference is made to the case of Mashudan Kamar & Ors v. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad [2023] 1 LNS 1709 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[21] In United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v. Chong Bun Sun and another application [1994] 2 BLJ 252; [1994] 2 MLJ 221 it was remarked emphatically that: “it is the view of this court that in an application for an order for sale under s. 256, the court must make an order for sale, and such sale must be by way of a public auction and not otherwise”. In Keng Soon Finance Bhd v. MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor, Lord Oliver speaking of the powers of the court in an application for sale of the charged property under s. 256, observed (at p 460): Section 256(3) of the National Land Code is mandatory. The court “shall” order a sale unless it is satisfied of the existence of ‘cause to the contrary’. Granted that these words have been construed in Malaysia as justifying the withholding of an order where to make one would be contrary to some rule of law or equity, they clearly cannot extend to enabling the court to refuse relief simply because it feels sorry for the borrower or because it regards the lender as arrogant, boorish on unmannerly. [17] As to what constitutes cause to the contrary, it is apt that I refer to the locus classicus case of Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77 where “cause to the contrary” [18] It can be seen that the case of Low Lee Lian (supra) provides for three categories of cause to the contrary as follows: a. if a chargor was able to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the indefeasibility doctrine in Section 340 NLC 1965; b. if a chargor could demonstrate that the chargee had failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale; and c. if a chargor could demonstrate that the grant of an order for sale would be contrary to some rule of law or equity.”. [11] Prinsip undang-undang dalam prosiding halang tebus adalah mantap sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Amanah Raya Capital Sdn Bhd v Fawzia bt Othman [2014] MLJU 339 iaitu − “[8] The principles of law which can be gleaned from the above quoted cases are that firstly in an application under s 256 of the NLC a chargee does not commence an action but merely enforces its statutory rights as a chargee against a chargor in default. By doing so, the chargee is enforcing his rights against the chargor by way of a proceedings in rem. Secondly, a chargee may claim the monies lent and/or facilities granted to the borrower from the borrower or from the chargor who may not be the borrower. The chargee is given the options to pursue other remedies provided by the law successively, concurrently or simultaneously. [9]