Ovanti Ventures Sdn Bhd (Dahulu Dikenali Sebagai IOU Pay (Asia) Sdn Bhd) v ANGGUN DINAMIK HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL SDN BHD (WA-22NCC-228-05/2022)

ANGGUN DINAMIK HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.: 201801027102 [1289128-A])

WAN NOORIMIE AZURA BINTI WAN MOHAMAD

KUAN CHOON HSUING

EDWARD TAN TEE TONG

WANG ERN WEI

LIEW JWO (NRIC NO.: 771122-14-5319) …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 152) INTRODUCTION [1] Before the court is the 4th Defendant's application in Enclosure 152 dated 25.4.2025 seeking to strike out certain paragraphs in the Plaintiff's Reply to the 4th Defendant's Defence dated 4.9.2024. Specifically, the 4th Defendant seeks to strike out paragraphs 5(c)(i) to (v), 5(e)(i) to (xxiii), and 5(f)(i) to (xiv) (“the Questioned Paragraphs”) pursuant to Order 18, rule 19(1)(b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. [2] The application was heard on 10.7.2025 with oral submissions presented by counsel for both parties. [3] At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved judgment. Having considered the affidavits filed, written submissions, oral submissions, and all relevant authorities, on 29.7.2025 I allowed Enclosure 152. These are my full grounds. BACKGROUND FACTS [4] The Plaintiff, Ovanti Ventures Sdn Bhd, commenced this action against six defendants arising from two Business Investment Agreements (“BIAs”) entered into between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, Anggun Dinamik Holdings International Sdn Bhd. [5] The first BIA was executed on 6.10.2021 (“BIA 1”) and the second on 25.4.2022 (“BIA 2”). Under these agreements, the Plaintiff claims to have invested a total sum of RM3,500,000.00 with the 1st Defendant. The Plaintiff's claim centres on the specific disbursement of RM2,996,000.00

of his Defence. [20] Second, the Plaintiff contends that the 4th Defendant has introduced new matters of fact in his Defence by asserting affirmatively that he was merely an employee or agent, that he lacked decision-making power or influence, that he acted under the direction of Kenneth, and that he was wrongfully terminated. These are not mere denials but affirmative exculpatory facts introduced for the first time in the Defence. [21] Third, the Plaintiff argues that under Order 18, rule 8(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, a plaintiff is entitled to respond by way of reply when a defence introduces new matters of fact. The Questioned Paragraphs directly rebut the 4th Defendant's positive assertions by demonstrating that he played an active and deliberate role in the fraudulent scheme, that he was involved in repeated and patterned conduct consistent with intent, and that his termination was warranted. [22] Fourth, the Plaintiff submits that the reliefs sought in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim are not limited to matters concerning the BIAs. Certain reliefs, including those relating to breach of fiduciary duties, breach of trust, and conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, are general reliefs that do not make specific reference to the BIAs. [23] Fifth, the Plaintiff contends that the Questioned Paragraphs are relevant as similar fact evidence under sections 11(b), 14, and 15 of the Evidence Act 1950. They show a consistent pattern of conduct relevant to the 4th Defendant's role and intent in the distinct contractual fraud alleged in the present case. [24] Finally, the Plaintiff argues that this suit is factually and legally distinct from Suit 137. The present suit involves different causes of action, a different legal foundation centred on contractual breach and misuse of BIA investment funds, and a different pleading context. The findings made in Suit 137 should not automatically bar or render inadmissible the Questioned Paragraphs in the present suit, as each case must be determined on its own distinct merits. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT Whether the Questioned Paragraphs Depart from the Plaintiff's Original Claim [25] The first and most fundamental issue is whether the Questioned Paragraphs constitute a departure from or an expansion of the Plaintiff's original claim as pleaded in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. [26] The 4th Defendant submits that the Questioned Paragraphs introduce entirely new transactions and parties that were never mentioned in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. These allegations span over 23 pages and relate to four distinct matters involving STWD, NSAM-SEREM, Akay and Piminik, and Teppanyaki Properties. The 4th Defendant contends that if these matters were central to the Plaintiff's case, they could and should have been anticipated and included in the original pleading. [27] The Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the Questioned Paragraphs do not introduce new causes of action but merely provide particulars and context in response to new matters raised by the 4th Defendant in his Defence. The Plaintiff submits that the Re-Amended Statement of Claim already pleads fraud, breach of duty, and conspiracy, and the Questioned Paragraphs are tethered to these existing claims. [28] I begin by examining the scope and nature of the Plaintiff's pleaded case in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. The Plaintiff's claim centres fundamentally on the two BIAs entered into between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The particulars of the alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and conspiracy are all anchored to the execution and performance of BIA 1 and BIA 2. Paragraphs 59 to 87 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim set out the alleged fraudulent scheme, and all these allegations relate directly to how the BIAs were exploited to defraud the Plaintiff. [29] More tellingly, the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff in paragraph 93 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim are framed with reference to the BIAs. Reliefs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) relate specifically to the BIAs. The breach of letters of guarantee relates to guarantees given in connection with BIA 1. Even the claims for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of trust are particularised in the context of how the 4th Defendant caused the Plaintiff to enter into BIA 1 and BIA 2, and how he failed to conduct proper due diligence in relation to the BIAs. [30] Against this backdrop, I turn to examine the content of the Questioned Paragraphs. These paragraphs introduce extensive factual allegations about four separate and distinct transactions: the STWD transactions (which are the subject matter of Suit 137), the NSAM-SEREM joint venture, the Akay-Piminik JV (which is the subject matter of Suit 292), and the Teppanyaki Properties BIA. These matters were not pleaded, mentioned, or even alluded to in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. [31] The Questioned Paragraphs do not merely provide further particulars of facts already pleaded. They introduce entirely new transactions, new parties, new time periods, and new subject matter. Indeed, it is not disputed that some of these transactions involve funds disbursed from iSentric, a company which is not even a party to the present action. [32] The principle established in Mat bin Lim & Anor v Ho Yut Kam & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 13 is clear and unequivocal: a reply must not depart from the statement of claim, and the plaintiff must not set up in his reply a new cause of action which is not raised either on the writ or in the statement of claim. As Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) held, no pleading shall raise any new ground of claim or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same. [33] The critical question is whether these new factual allegations can properly be characterised as a “response” to the 4th Defendant's Defence, or whether they constitute an impermissible expansion of the Plaintiff's case. In my judgment, they fall into the latter category. [34] The critical question is whether these new factual allegations can properly be characterised as a “response” to the 4th Defendant's Defence, or whether they constitute an impermissible expansion of the Plaintiff's case. In my judgment, they fall into the latter category. [35] I accept that the 4th Defendant has pleaded certain positive matters in paragraphs 5(a) to (d) of his Defence. He has stated that he reported to Kenneth, that he lacked real powers or influence, and that he was wrongfully terminated. However, these assertions relate specifically to his role and involvement in relation to the transactions pleaded in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, namely the BIAs. [36] The Plaintiff's contention is that it is entitled to rebut these assertions by demonstrating a pattern of conduct through other transactions. However, this approach conflates two distinct concepts: (i) responding to new matters raised in a defence, and (ii) adducing evidence at trial to prove or disprove contested facts. [37] The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues in controversy between the parties. A reply is intended to answer new matters of defence, not to plead additional or alternative causes of action, or to introduce new factual matrices that were not part of the statement of claim. If a plaintiff wishes to expand its claim to include additional transactions or to allege fraud in relation to other dealings, the proper course is to seek leave to amend the statement of claim, not to introduce such matters through the backdoor of a reply. [38] In the present case, the Plaintiff has not merely responded to the 4th Defendant's assertions about his role and powers. Rather, the Plaintiff has introduced 23 pages of new factual allegations about entirely separate transactions with different parties, different dates, and different subject matter. This goes far beyond what is permissible in a reply. [39] I do not agree that the Plaintiff is entitled to rely on sections 11(b), 14, and 15 of the Evidence Act 1950 in this context. Those provisions of the Evidence Act 1950 deal with the admissibility of similar fact evidence at trial. They do not authorise a plaintiff to plead new and unrelated transactions in a reply to defence. The question of whether evidence of other transactions may be admissible at trial under the Evidence Act 1950 is separate and distinct from the question of whether such matters may properly be pleaded in a reply. [40] If the Plaintiff genuinely believes that evidence of these other transactions is relevant and admissible as similar fact evidence, it may seek to adduce such evidence at trial, subject to the court's ruling on admissibility at that stage. However, that does not mean that these matters must or should be pleaded in the reply. Indeed, the normal practice is that similar fact evidence need not be specifically pleaded, provided there is sufficient notice to the opposing party. [41] I find that the Questioned Paragraphs introduce new allegations of facts and claims that clearly depart from and expand upon the Plaintiff's original claim as pleaded in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. These new allegations were not anticipated by or responsive to anything in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, and they relate to matters entirely separate from the BIAs which form the foundation of the Plaintiff's case. The Questioned Paragraphs constitute new causes of action that improperly depart from the original claim, which focuses on the BIAs between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant and the specific disbursement of RM2,996,000.00. Whether the Questioned Paragraphs are Scandalous, Frivolous, or Vexatious [42] The second issue is whether the Questioned Paragraphs are scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012. [43] The 4th Defendant submits that the Questioned Paragraphs are scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious because they are irrelevant to the original claim and unnecessary for the determination of the issues in the case. They relate to transactions that are the subject of separate proceedings in other suits and have no bearing on the reliefs sought in the present action. [44] The Plaintiff contends that the Questioned Paragraphs are not scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious. Rather, they illustrate the existence of a wider fraudulent scheme perpetrated against the Plaintiff and demonstrate the 4th Defendant's active and deliberate role in that scheme. The Plaintiff argues that this evidence is directly relevant to establishing the 4th Defendant's intent and knowledge. [45] The test for striking out pleadings as scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious is well-established. A pleading is scandalous if it contains irrelevant, abusive, or defamatory matter. It is frivolous if it is plainly and obviously unsustainable and discloses no reasonable cause of action. It is vexatious if it is made with the predominant purpose of annoying or embarrassing the opposing party rather than with the genuine intention of prosecuting a legitimate claim. [46] In the present case, the Questioned Paragraphs relate to transactions that are admittedly the subject of separate proceedings. The STWD transactions are being litigated in Suit 137, and the Akay-Piminik JV is being litigated in Suit 292. [47] The inclusion of these matters in the present suit serves no legitimate purpose and creates the potential for confusion, duplication of proceedings, and inconsistent findings. If the Plaintiff succeeds in its claims in Suit 137 and Suit 292, it may well be able to rely on those findings by way of issue estoppel in appropriate circumstances. However, it is not proper for the Plaintiff to seek to re-litigate the same matters in the present suit through the device of pleading them in a reply. [48] Furthermore, the Questioned Paragraphs introduce allegations about transactions involving funds disbursed by iSentric, which is not a party to the present action. This raises serious questions about the relevance and propriety of these allegations. If these transactions are truly material to the Plaintiff's case, iSentric should have been joined as a party or the claims should have been brought by iSentric itself. [49] I am satisfied that the Questioned Paragraphs are irrelevant to the Plaintiff's claim in the present action and are unnecessary for the fair determination of the issues between the parties. They will inevitably lead to a significant expansion of the scope of the trial, with parties being required to adduce evidence about transactions that have no direct bearing on the BIAs which form the foundation of the Plaintiff's case. [50] Accordingly, I find that the Questioned Paragraphs are frivolous and vexatious within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012. Whether the Questioned Paragraphs will Prejudice, Embarrass, or Delay the Fair Trial [51] The third issue is whether the retention of the Questioned Paragraphs will prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(c) of the Rules of Court 2012. [52] The 4th Defendant submits that allowing the Questioned Paragraphs to remain will inevitably prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of the action. The inclusion of 23 pages of new allegations relating to separate transactions will significantly expand the scope of the trial and the evidence required. It will necessitate extensive discovery and interrogatories on matters that are irrelevant to the core issues in the case. This will result in unnecessary delay and increased costs for all parties and for the court. [53] The Plaintiff argues that the Questioned Paragraphs are necessary for a fair trial because they provide essential context and demonstrate the 4th Defendant's fraudulent intent and conduct. Without this evidence, the Plaintiff would be deprived of the opportunity to present its full case and the court would not have a complete picture of the 4th Defendant's role in the alleged fraudulent scheme. [54] The inclusion of the Questioned Paragraphs will undoubtedly have a significant impact on the conduct of the trial. As noted earlier, these paragraphs span 23 pages and introduce allegations about four separate and distinct transactions involving multiple parties and entities. [55] If these allegations are allowed to stand, the parties will be required to engage in extensive discovery relating to the STWD transactions, the NSAM-SEREM joint venture, the Akay-Piminik JV, and the Teppanyaki Properties BIA. Witnesses will need to be called to give evidence about these transactions. Cross-examination will be required on matters that have no direct bearing on the BIAs which form the core of the Plaintiff's case. [56] This will inevitably lead to a significant expansion of the scope and duration of the trial. What should be a focused inquiry into whether the 4th Defendant breached his duties in relation to the BIAs will instead become a wide-ranging investigation into multiple unrelated transactions spanning several years. [57] The legal position is clear. As established in Knowles v Roberts (1888) 38 Ch D 263, pleadings which are unnecessary and tend to delay trial may be struck out. The Questioned Paragraphs fall squarely within this principle. [58] The potential for prejudice to the 4th Defendant is clear. He will be required to defend himself not only in relation to the BIAs (which are the subject of the Plaintiff's pleaded claim) but also in relation to three or four other separate transactions which were never mentioned in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. This amounts to trial by ambush and is fundamentally unfair. [59] Furthermore, there is a real risk of confusion and inconsistency if the same transactions are being litigated simultaneously in multiple suits. The court in the present suit may reach findings about the STWD transactions that are inconsistent with the findings of the court in Suit 137. Similarly, findings about the Akay-Piminik JV in the present suit may conflict with findings in Suit 292. [60] The Plaintiff's argument that these matters provide “essential context” is not persuasive. The Plaintiff has already pleaded extensive particulars of the alleged fraudulent scheme in paragraphs 59 to 87 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. Those particulars relate specifically to how the BIAs were exploited to defraud the Plaintiff. That is the claim that the 4th Defendant is required to meet. [61] If the Plaintiff truly believes that evidence of other transactions is relevant to prove the 4th Defendant's intent or state of mind, it may seek to adduce such evidence at trial (subject to the court's ruling on admissibility). However, that does not justify the inclusion of 23 pages of new factual allegations in the pleadings. [62] I find that the retention of the Questioned Paragraphs will significantly prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of the action. The 4th Defendant would be required to respond to entirely new allegations involving complex transactions that were never part of the original claim. Accordingly, the Questioned Paragraphs fall within Order 18, rule 19(1)(c) of the Rules of Court 2012 and ought to be struck out on this ground as well. Whether the Questioned Paragraphs Constitute an Abuse of Process [63] The fourth issue is whether the inclusion of the Questioned Paragraphs amounts to an abuse of the court's process within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(d) of the Rules of Court 2012. [64] The 4th Defendant submits that the Questioned Paragraphs constitute an abuse of process because they are an improper attempt to litigate in the present suit matters that are already the subject of separate proceedings in Suit 137 and Suit 292. This amounts to a backdoor attempt at consolidation and creates the risk of inconsistent findings. [65] The Plaintiff contends that there is no abuse of process. The present suit is distinct from Suit 137 and Suit 292 in terms of the parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought. The Questioned Paragraphs are used in the present suit not to revive struck-out claims but to show a consistent pattern of conduct relevant to the 4th Defendant's role and intent in the distinct contractual fraud alleged in the present case. [66] An abuse of process may be found where the court's procedures are used for a purpose or in a manner that is contrary to their intended function. This includes, among other things, attempts to re-litigate matters that have already been determined, attempts to circumvent procedural rules, and the bringing of proceedings for an improper or collateral purpose. [67] In the present case, the Plaintiff is seeking to introduce through a reply allegations about transactions that are the subject of separate proceedings. The STWD transactions are being litigated in Suit 137, and the Akay-Piminik JV transactions are being litigated in Suit 292. [68] Allowing these issues to be litigated in both the present suit as well as in Suit 137 and Suit 292 respectively creates an unacceptable risk of inconsistent findings and amounts to an abuse of process which is effectively a backdoor attempt at consolidation that circumvents established procedural boundaries. [69] If the Plaintiff succeeds in proving the STWD transactions in Suit 137, it will have a favourable finding that may be relied upon in appropriate circumstances. If it fails in Suit 137, it should not be permitted to re-litigate the same matters in the present suit. Allowing the Questioned Paragraphs to stand would enable the Plaintiff to have “two bites at the cherry” in relation to the same factual allegations. [70] Furthermore, there is a real risk that the court in the present suit may reach different findings about the STWD or Akay-Piminik JV transactions compared to the findings in Suit 137 or Suit 292. This would lead to inconsistent judgments and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [71] The Plaintiff argues that the present suit is “factually and legally distinct” from Suit 137 and Suit 292. However, this argument misses the point. The question is not whether the suits are identical in all respects, but whether the inclusion of the Questioned Paragraphs amounts to an improper duplication of proceedings. [72] I am satisfied that the inclusion of the Questioned Paragraphs constitutes an abuse of the court's process. The Plaintiff is improperly seeking to litigate in the present suit matters that are already the subject of separate proceedings. This is not a legitimate use of the reply pleading and amounts to an abuse of process within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(d) of the Rules of Court 2012. The Relevance of the Decision in Suit 137 and the Principle of Judicial Consistency [73] I now turn to address the relevance of this court's earlier Suit 137 Judgment, where similar paragraphs in the reply to defence were struck out on 10.10.2024. [74] The 4th Defendant relies heavily on the Suit 137 Judgment and submits that this court should follow the same approach adopted in that case. The factual matrix and legal issues in Suit 137 are substantially similar to those in the present case, and consistency in judicial decision-making requires that similar applications should be determined in the same manner. [75] The Plaintiff argues that the present suit is distinct from Suit 137 and that this court is not bound to follow the Suit 137 Judgment. Each case must be determined on its own facts, causes of action, and pleadings. The fact that similar paragraphs were struck out in Suit 137 does not automatically mean that the same result must follow in the present case. Moreover, the Plaintiff points out that the Suit 137 Judgment is now the subject of an appeal. [76] As a court of coordinate jurisdiction, I am not strictly bound by another decision of the High Court, even my own. However, there are sound reasons of comity and consistency why I should have regard to earlier decisions of this court on similar issues, particularly where those decisions were given after full argument and careful consideration. [77] I am bound by the principle of judicial consistency. In the Suit 137 Judgment, this court struck out substantially similar paragraphs for identical reasons to those that apply in the present case. The reasoning in that decision is directly applicable to the present case. [78] Like Suit 137, the present case involves a plaintiff seeking to introduce through a reply extensive allegations about transactions that were not pleaded in the statement of claim. Like Suit 137, these new allegations relate to matters that are the subject of separate proceedings in other suits. Like Suit 137, the inclusion of these allegations will significantly expand the scope of the trial and create the risk of inconsistency and confusion. [79] The Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the present case from Suit 137 on the basis that the present suit involves “different causes of action and legal foundation” centred on “contractual breach and misuse of BIA investment funds.” However, this distinction is not persuasive. The fundamental problem is the same in both cases: the Plaintiff is seeking to expand its case through a reply rather than through a proper amendment to the statement of claim. The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any compelling distinction that would justify departing from my decision in the Suit 137 Judgment. [80] The Plaintiff also points out that the Suit 137 Judgment has been appealed and that the appeal is pending before the Court of Appeal. Whilst this is correct, it does not affect the analysis in the present case. The decision in Suit 137 remained valid and binding at the point of my decision for Enclosure 152 and was not yet set aside by the Court of Appeal. Moreover, even if the Court of Appeal were to take a different view on the matter, that would not necessarily mean that the present application should be dismissed. Each case must be assessed on its own facts and circumstances. [81] I note parenthetically that after the hearing of the present application and after I reserved judgment, the Court of Appeal did in fact allow the appeal in Suit 137 on 24.11.2025. The Court of Appeal held that the paragraphs struck out by the High Court in Suit 137 fell within Order 18, rule 8(1)(a) and/or

of the Rules of Court 2012, and that the appellants were entitled to adduce similar fact evidence under sections 11(b), 14, and/or 15 of the Evidence Act 1950. However, this development occurred after the hearing of the present application and does not form part of the materials that were before me when I reserved judgment. These grounds of judgment reflect my analysis and reasoning as at the time of the decision on 29.7.2025. [82] Having considered the matter carefully, at the point of delivering the decision on 29.7.2025, I was of the view that my reasoning in the Suit 137 Judgment was sound and should be followed in the present case. The factual and legal issues are substantially similar, and there is no principled basis for reaching a different conclusion. The principle of judicial consistency requires that I follow the approach adopted in that decision. Whether a Reply was Necessary or Appropriate [83] Finally, I address the broader question of whether a reply was necessary or appropriate in the circumstances of this case. [84] The 4th Defendant submits that the matters raised in paragraphs 5(a) to (d) of the Defence did not require a reply. These paragraphs merely set out the 4th Defendant's position on his role and responsibilities, which is a matter of denial or traverse of the Plaintiff's allegations. Under Order 18, rule 14(2) and (4) of the Rules of Court 2012, there is an implied joinder of issue on the reply, which operates as a denial of every material allegation of fact made in the reply. [85] The Plaintiff argues that a reply was necessary because the 4th Defendant introduced new matters of fact in his Defence that required a response. The 4th Defendant did not merely deny the Plaintiff's allegations but set out a positive narrative portraying himself as a passive and innocent party. This entitled the Plaintiff to respond by way of reply. [86] It is well-established that a reply is only appropriate where the defence raises new matters that were not and could not have been anticipated from the statement of claim. A reply should not be used to introduce new causes of action, to plead new facts that should have been in the statement of claim, or to improve upon the statement of claim. [87] In the present case, I accept that the 4th Defendant has pleaded certain positive matters in paragraphs 5(a) to (d) of his Defence. However, these matters relate to his role and responsibilities within the company structure, which are matters that the Plaintiff could and should have anticipated when framing its statement of claim. [88] If the Plaintiff wished to allege that the 4th Defendant had real power and influence notwithstanding any reporting lines to the 3rd Defendant, Kenneth, it should have pleaded this in the statement of claim. If the Plaintiff wished to allege that the 4th Defendant was rightly terminated for misconduct, it should have pleaded this as well. These are not new matters arising from the Defence; they are responses to anticipated defences that should have been dealt with in the statement of claim itself. [89] More fundamentally, even if a reply was appropriate in principle, the content of the reply must be confined to answering the specific matters raised in the defence. As I have explained earlier, the Questioned Paragraphs go far beyond answering the matters raised in paragraphs 5(a) to

of the Defence. They introduce 23 pages of new factual allegations about entirely separate transactions. [90] In my judgment, whilst some limited reply may have been appropriate to address the specific assertions made by the 4th Defendant in his Defence, the Questioned Paragraphs go far beyond what is permissible in a reply. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [91] For all the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the Questioned Paragraphs ought to be struck out. Specifically, I find that: a) The Questioned Paragraphs introduce new allegations of facts and claims that clearly depart from and expand upon the Plaintiff's original claim as pleaded in the Re- Amended Statement of Claim. They constitute new causes of action that improperly depart from the original claim, which focuses on the BIAs between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant and the specific disbursement of RM2,996,000.00. The principle established in Mat bin Lim & Anor v Ho Yut Kam & Anor is clear: a reply must not depart from the statement of claim and cannot set up new causes of action that ought to have been included in the original pleading; b) The Questioned Paragraphs are frivolous and vexatious within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012, in that they are irrelevant to the Plaintiff's claim and unnecessary for the fair determination of the issues in the case. They introduce matters irrelevant to the core BIA-related issues, involving different entities and funding sources including iSentric, which is not even a party to this action; c) The retention of the Questioned Paragraphs will significantly prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of the action within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(c) of the Rules of Court 2012. As established in Knowles v Roberts, pleadings which are unnecessary and tend to delay trial may be struck out. The 4th Defendant would be required to respond to entirely new allegations involving complex transactions that were never part of the original claim; d) The inclusion of the Questioned Paragraphs constitutes an abuse of the court's process within the meaning of Order 18, rule 19(1)(d) of the Rules of Court 2012, in that they amount to an improper attempt to litigate matters that are the subject of separate proceedings in other suits. Allowing these issues to be litigated in both this suit and separately in Suits 137 and 292 creates an unacceptable risk of inconsistent findings and amounts to an abuse of process which is effectively a backdoor attempt at consolidation that circumvents established procedural boundaries; e) I am bound by the principle of judicial consistency, having previously struck out substantially similar paragraphs in Suit 137 for identical reasons. The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any compelling distinction that would justify departing from that precedent. [92] If the Plaintiff genuinely believes that evidence of the transactions mentioned in the Questioned Paragraphs is relevant and admissible as similar fact evidence, it may seek to adduce such evidence at trial, subject to the court's ruling on admissibility at that stage. However, such matters should not be pleaded in the reply. [93] If the Plaintiff wishes to expand its claim to include allegations about these other transactions as substantive causes of action, the proper course is to seek leave to amend the Re-Amended Statement of Claim. However, any such application would need to be considered carefully in light of the fact that some of these matters are already the subject of separate proceedings. [94] Accordingly, I make the following orders: a) Paragraphs 5(c)(i) to (v), 5(e)(i) to (xxiii), and 5(f)(i) to

(xiv) in the Plaintiff's Reply to the 4th Defendant's Defence dated 4.9.2024 [Enclosure 92] are struck out; b) The Plaintiff shall pay costs to the 4th Defendant fixed at RM5,000.00, subject to allocatur. 19 January 2026 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Muzalifah Shabudin and Nur Fathin Farrisya (Messrs Cecil Abraham & Partners) For the 4th Defendant: Ung Zhee Laine and Jeane Lee Yi Jin (Messrs. Lim Kian Leong & Co)