Pac Lease Berhad v Inspira Jaya Sdn. Bhd. (Dahulunya Dikenali Sebagai Tujuan Bena Sdn. Bhd.) (WA-22NCC-440-07/2025)

INSPIRA JAYA SDN BHD (Formerly Known as Tujuan Bena Sdn Bhd) [Company No.: 202201011575 (1457272-M)]

GREGORY AMOS YOON PENG SUM [NRIC No.: 750227-14-5603]

WAN NASIR BIN WAN MUSTAFHA [NRIC No.: 750425-03-5931]

YONG PENG YUEN [NRIC No.: 670223-10-6615]

IHAA CAPITAL SDN BHD [Company No.: 201401009422 (1085500-M)] •

PARAGRENE LAND BERHAD [Company No.: 199601027709 / 400061-H] …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 7)

This is an application by the Plaintiff, PAC Lease Berhad, for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012.

The Plaintiff says the case is plain. It sees no triable issues. The Defendants disagree. As is the case in matters such as this, I must separate the wheat from the chaff. Is there a defence worthy of trial, or are words and phrases dressed up as a mirage to divert the matter to a full trial?

The Plaintiff is a licensed financier. Its business is to provide loans. This is carried out within the statutory framework of the Moneylenders Act 1951. The 1st Defendant is a private limited company. It was the Plaintiff’s customer. It obtained financing facilities from the Plaintiff. The 2nd to 6th Defendants stood as guarantors to the financing facilities granted to the 1st Defendant

On 15 March 2023, by a Letter of Offer, the Plaintiff agreed to extend financing facilities to the 1st Defendant. It was a substantial • 3 commercial arrangement. Twelve separate Money Lending Agreements were formalised (“the Agreements”). All dated 19 June

Each governed a term loan facility. The sums ranged from hundreds of thousands to millions of ringgit.

The Agreements contained the usual terms. Each Agreement incurred instalment repayments. Delay in payment attracts late payment interest of 8%. In the event the instalments were not paid, a Notice of Default will be issued. The Agreements were liable to be terminated. The Plaintiff will then be entitled to claim the whole balance outstanding.

As security for the financing facilities extended to the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant executed specific debentures over the properties of the 1st Defendant. A total of 310 pieces of leasehold land were furnished as security. Charges were created over these land.

A Letter of Guarantee of even date was also executed by the Plaintiff with the rest of the Defendants (“the Guarantee”). The guarantors guaranteed the repayment by the 1st Defendant failing which a claim will be made against them for the sum due and owing from the 1st Defendant. The Guarantee has a principal debtor clause. It simply means that on default of the Agreement by the 1st Defendant, the guarantors are deemed to be principal debtors. It also contains a conclusive evidence clause.

All these documents were duly stamped. Chargeable duties were paid. Copies of the documents were furnished to the Defendants. A letter of acknowledgement was executed to confirm receipt. •

The money was duly disbursed. The 1st Defendant defaulted on the repayments. Letters of demand and termination swiftly followed. The Agreements were terminated. A writ was issued followed by the present application for summary judgment.

The Plaintiff asserts that the 1st Defendant fell into default. Payments became erratic. Instalments were incomplete. Some were late. Some were not made at all. The payment history, as exhibited in the Affidavit in Support of the application, tells a story not of punctual performance but of persistent delay.

The Plaintiff claims substantial outstanding sums under each of the twelve facilities, totalling several million ringgit. These are not figures plucked from the air. They are set out in statements of account exhibited in the affidavit in support sworn by a senior manager of the Plaintiff, in charge of collection and recovery.

On 14 April 2025, the Plaintiff issued a Notice of Demand and Termination through its solicitors. It was sent the next day by registered post and as well as A.R. registered post. Proof of service is exhibited. There is nary a whisper of response to the notices.

The Plaintiff’s position is simple. It says that there is a default and the debt is proven by documents. The defence is nothing more than a bare denial. •

The Plaintiff points out that the Defendants have neither shown proof of repayments nor challenged the statements of account. In short, the documentary trail of the Plaintiff stands unrebutted.

The Plaintiff says the Defendants knew exactly what they were signing. They read the documents. They understood them. They signed them. In short, they bound themselves.

The Defendants take a different view. They say that they have paid and there is no default. They also say the notices sent by the Plaintiff’s solicitors were never received. They deny signing the guarantees. They deny the debentures created.

On this basis, the Defendants argue that several triable issues arise. These are on whether default truly occurred, whether the guarantees are genuine, whether the notices were properly served and whether any sum is due at all.

They relied on The Pacific Bank Bhd v Chan Chin Aun & Ors [1993] 1 CLJ 242, Amoda Sdn Bhd v Luxury Home Concept Sdn Bhd [2000] 6 CLJ 369, and Imatera Digital Image Services Sdn Bhd v Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia [2014] 1 LNS 1157, submitting that credibility is in issue and that such matters can only be tested viva voce in a full trial. They wish to speak and their witnesses heard. • 6

Order 14 is certainly a sharp sword. It cuts swiftly. But it must not be wielded blindly. It is meant to strike down sham defences, not to silence genuine ones.

The principles governing summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 are well-settled and admit of no controversy. The Federal Court said so plainly in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400. The jurisdiction is intended to strike out sham defences, not to stifle genuine ones. It is a powerful procedural tool, but one that must be exercised with care. The Court must scrutinise the affidavit evidence to determine whether the defence is genuine or merely illusory. It is therefore insufficient for a defendant to merely raise an issue in name; the issue must be real, substantial, and deserving of trial.

In summary judgment applications, the legal burden operates in two stages. First, the Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Defendant to show a bona fide, triable issue. This position has been consistently reaffirmed by the appellate courts.

In Chen Heng Ping & Ors v Intradagang Merchant Bankers (M) Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 363 (CA), the Court of Appeal held in clear terms: “Denials in a defence do not constitute evidence. They are challenges to the other side to show proof. In the present case • 7 the guarantors do not appear to have produced any evidence to rebut the bank’s claim.”

The Court of Appeal made it plain that a Defendant who merely denies liability without producing supporting evidence does not cross the threshold required to resist summary judgment. (see also: Malayan Banking Bhd (formerly known as Mayban Finance Bhd) v Boo Hock Soon & Ors [2013] 2 MLJ 843 (CA)).

In other words, the defence must not only allege a dispute but must particularise and support that dispute with credible evidence. Anything less is mere window-dressing.

In the course of hearing before me, the Defendant confirmed that the Plaintiff has complied with the procedural requirements governing the summary judgment regime. I then asked the Defendants to submit on the defences warranting the matter proceeding to trial.

The Defendants assert that all instalments were paid. This is their central plank. However, this assertion stands unsupported by any documentary evidence. There is not a single shred of evidence of receipts, bank transfer slips or contemporaneous records of payment.

In stark contrast, the Plaintiff exhibited detailed payment records which demonstrate repeated late payments and incomplete instalments. These are primary business records that were contemporaneously generated. •

The Defendants did not challenge the authenticity of these records. They did not dispute specific entries. They did not offer an alternative computation. All they simply said and wished the Court to believe was that they paid.

A bare assertion of payment, without proof, is not a defence. Applying Chen Heng Ping, their denial is legally insufficient. It does not raise a triable issue.

The Defendants next contend that they never received any Notice of Default. This assertion is directly contradicted by the documentary evidence.

The Plaintiff exhibited registered post tracking records confirming delivery. These are evidence of service of the Notice of Demand and Termination dated 14 April 2025.

The Defendants did not deny the addresses used. They did not dispute the postal records. They did not suggest misdelivery. They merely said that they did not receive.

I find that such denial cannot stand against objective documentary proof. One cannot shut one’s eyes and then say one saw nothing. The law does not permit such selective blindness. I therefore find that service has been duly proven.

The 2nd to 6th Defendants deny signing the guarantees and debenture. This is a serious allegation, amounting to an implied plea of forgery. •

Notwithstanding such grave allegation, the Defendants took no steps whatsoever to support it. There is no forensic handwriting analysis sought, no police report lodged and no contemporaneous protest against the documents.

On the contrary, the Plaintiff exhibited the executed and duly stamped guarantee agreements and specific debenture. The signatures appear clearly on the execution pages.

The law is clear. A party who alleges forgery must prove it. A mere denial is not enough. This is precisely what Chen Heng Ping condemns.

The Defendants further assert that no sum is due. Once again, this is said without evidence. There is no challenge whatsoever on the Statements of Account, the computation of sums, the contractual interest calculation and the existence of conclusive evidence clauses.

In Hong Leong Bank Berhad v BTS Buildtrade Supply Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] 7 MLJ 377, the High Court held: “When there is a conclusive evidence clause, the plaintiff’s statement of account is correct and conclusive evidence of the indebtedness owed by the defendant.”

The Court further held that such statements are binding unless fraud or manifest error is shown. No such allegation is made here. Neither is there such evidence adduced. The Defendants have therefore • 10 failed to discharge their burden under Malayan Banking Bhd case. They have not explained why the indebtedness is disputed. They have simply denied it. Such denial, unsupported by any objective evidence, does not raise a triable issue.

The Defendants’ rebuttal affidavit is economical. It contains no supporting contemporaneous documents whatsoever. It is heavy on rhetoric and extremely feeble on facts. It is pointless to merely allege a dispute without particularising and supporting that dispute with credible evidence.

I have evaluated all affidavits and submissions. I find that the Plaintiff has established a clear prima facie case warranting the exercise of discretion in favour of summary judgment. The Defendants have raised no bona fide triable issue that warrants a trial. This is a classic case for which Order 14 was designed. Justice does not require a trial where there is nothing real to try. •

The Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment against all Defendants was allowed with costs. Dated the 18th day of January 2026 -sgd- ……………………………………………………………………… MUHAMMAD ADAM @ EDWARD BIN ABDULLAH Judicial Commissioner High Court (Commercial Division NCC 4) High Court of Kuala Lumpur In the Federal Territory, Malaysia Counsel for the Plaintiff : Tan Hong Kait Together with Amani Syafiqah binti Abdul Malik Messrs. Sidek, Teoh, Wong & Dennis Counsel for the Defendants : Lesley-Ann Yong Messrs. Nandrajog • 12

The Pacific Bank Bhd v Chan Chin Aun & Ors [1993] 1 CLJ 242 2. Amoda Sdn Bhd v Luxury Home Concept Sdn Bhd [2000] 6 CLJ 369 3. Imatera Digital Image Services Sdn Bhd v Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia [2014] 1 LNS 1157 4. Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400 5. Chen Heng Ping & Ors v Intradagang Merchant Bankers (M) Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 363 (CA)

Malayan Banking Bhd (formerly known as Mayban Finance Bhd) v

Hong Leong Bank Berhad v BTS Buildtrade Supply Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] 7 MLJ 377

Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 2. Moneylenders Act 1951 .