Pac Lease Berhad v Paragrene Land Berhad (Dahulunya Dikenali Sebagai Paragrene Land Sdn. Bhd.) (WA-22NCC-366-06/2025)

The Plaintiff P filed a notice of application dated 21.11.2025 in Enclosure 23 for summary judgment against the Defendants. Enclosure 23 is made under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012.

On 28.1.2026, I allowed Enclosure 23 and entered summary judgment against the Defendants. I was satisfied that the Defendants do not have a valid defence against P Here are my reasons. Background facts S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

Vide a letter of offer dated 15.10.2020 letter of offer , P, at the request of the 1st Defendant D1 , granted D1 a loan facility of RM loan facility . The loan facility was granted based on the terms and conditions contained in the letter of offer and a money lending agreement dated 17.11.2020 entered between P and the 1st Defendant money lending agreement .

Via a letter of guarantee dated 17.11.2020 guarantee , the 2nd to 4th Defendants D2 - D4 agreed to repay the outstanding amount owing by D1 to P under the loan facility. The law on summary judgment

Summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 may be granted where the issue is unarguable or not triable. Especially where the issue raised is solely a question of law or where the facts are clear and undisputed.

The Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 14 at 19 - 20; [1992] 1 MLJ 400 at 408 held : is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other in an affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable in itself, then the judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially in an O 14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue. S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw Where the issue raised is solely a question of law without reference to any facts or where the facts are clear and undisputed, the court should exercise its duty under O 14. If the legal point is understood and the court is satisfied that it is unarguable, the court is not prevented from granting summary judgment merely because

Not all issues raised are capable of being a triable issue. The Federal Court in Voo Min En & Ors v Leong Chung Fatt [1982] 2 MLJ 241 at 243 held : not enough for the respondent in answer to the to raise an issue, or any issue. He must, however, raise such issue as would require a trial in order to determine it. In other words, the issue raised must be an arguable issue. But where the issue raised is irrelevant and ineffective, or to use the words of Lord Greene, to what they prayed for in the summon - in -

Summary judgment should be granted in a case that ought not to go for trial. Especially one that involves construction of unsubstantial documents. And where no further facts could emerge which would throw any light upon the matter.

The Federal Court in Fadzil Mohamed Noor v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [1981] CLJ (Rep) 53 at 59 held : Bhd v Southern Cross Airways (M) Bhd [1971] 1 MLJ 168, I pointed out that in an O. 14 case, where it turned on the construction of few documents, and the Court was only concerned with what, in its judgment, was true construction, there could be no reason to go formally to trial where no further facts could emerge which would throw any light on the documents that had to be construed. We think we can safely apply that S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

In respect of the burden of proof, the onus is on the defendant to show that there are triable issues. The Federal Court in Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying (trading as KH Trading) & Anor [2006] 3 CLJ 544 at 551; [2006] 2 MLJ 685 held : [5] In an application under O. 14, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish the following conditions: that the defendant must have entered appearance; that the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; that the affidavit in support must comply with r. 2 of O. 14 in that it must verify the facts on which the claim is based and must state the deponent s belief that there is no defence to the claim. Once those conditions are fulfilled, the burden then shifts to the defendant to raise triable issues

Bearing the above principles in mind, I find the issues raised by the Defendants to be unarguable or not triable. I reject the bare assertions of the Defendants, which I consider to be ineffective and inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents. I am satisfied that this suit is a plain and obvious case that ought not to go to trial.

The Defendants canvassed the following issues, which they contend must be decided by trial. Namely :

Whether the Defendants failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the money lending agreement;

Whether D2 - D4 signed any letters of guarantee on behalf of D1;

Whether the Defendants received any notice of default from P; S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

Whether P is entitled to claim any sum of money from the Defendants.

However, I find that these issues do not raise any serious dispute of fact that cannot be decided on undisputed contemporary evidence or that calls for further investigation or viva voce evidence. P claim is a straightforward claim for monies due under the loan facility. Any challenge or issue can readily be resolved on the evidence and on settled principles of law. The Plaintiff has established a prima facie case

is in pursuance of the default by the Defendants under the loan facility granted by P to D1. Which was jointly and severally guaranteed by D2 - D4.

The Defendants do not deny the following facts :

That D1 had executed the security documents to accept the loan facility from P;

That the loan facility had been disbursed to D1 on 25.11.2020, who then had enjoyed the benefit of the loan facility; and

solicitors sent the notice of demand cum termination dated 9.4.2025 notice of demand cum termination . S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

I find that D1 has defaulted on the letter of offer and the money lending agreement, and D2 - D4 have defaulted on the guarantee, when the Defendants failed to make payment of the outstanding sums to P. The default by the Defendants gave P the right to enter judgment against the Defendants.

I am satisfied that P has established its case against the Defendants. To wit, that the Defendants had breached the letter of offer, the money lending agreement and the guarantee.

It is my finding that :

The evidence shows that D1 has signed the security documents pertaining to the loan facility;

The evidence establishes that D2 - D4 have signed the guarantee;

The Defendants at all material times had knowledge of the letter of offer, the money lending agreement and the guarantee, together with their obligation to ensure payment is made to P in a timely manner;

The Defendants have benefitted from the loan facility granted by P;

notice of demand cum termination amounts to a breach of the letter of offer, the money lending agreement as well the guarantee; and S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

In such event of default, P is entitled to claim the total outstanding sums.

It therefore falls upon the Defendants to show why judgment should not be granted to P summarily. The Defendants failed to raise any triable issue

In opposing Enclosure 23 and in their statement of defence, the Defendants allege that :

The Defendants did not receive any letter of demand or reminder s.

There was no default under the letter of offer, the money lending agreement and the guarantee.

There is no outstanding amount due and payable by the Defendants to P.

The liability of D2 - D4 as guarantors to D1 cannot be sustained, as D1 is disputed.

P is not entitled to claim any alleged indebtedness, especially interest, from the Defendants on the purported principal sum, as D1 has made payment to P. S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

Nevertheless, P has successfully allegations as follows :

The Defendants do not have any bona fide defence nor any

At all material times, D2 - D4, being the guarantors of D1 for the loan facility, have acknowledged, read and understood the guarantee by signing the same and initialling on every page of the guarantee document. The guarantee signed by D2 - D4 have bound them to the terms and conditions of the loan facility.

Pursuant to the guarantee, D2 - D4 have joint and several liabilities with D1 in relation to the loan facility.

The notice of demand cum termination dated 9.4.2025 has been duly delivered to the Defendants by P s solicitor on 10.4.2025 via registered p - affidavit in support dated 20.11.2025 in Enclosure 24.

D1 has also executed a charge and annexure over D1 property. (See - dated 20.11.2025 in Enclosure 24).

In the absence of any proof of fraud or forgery, the Defendants have knowledge of the letter of offer, the money lending agreement and the guarantee, and are liable for the loan facility. S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

Till today, the Defendants still failed to pay the full debt owed to P. Such conduct by the Defendants show that they have defaulted on the terms of the letter of offer, the money lending agreement and the guarantee that were previously executed by them. Thus, P is entitled to claim the outstanding amount from the Defendants.

In Malayan Banking Bhd (formerly known as Maybank Finance Bhd ) v Boo Hock Soon @ Boo Choo Soon [2013] 2 MLJ 843; [2012] 1 LNS 971; [2013] 1 AMCR 19, the Court of Appeal held that it was not sufficient for the defendant to just raise an issue which is not triable. [18] It is not sufficient for the defendant to just raise an issue because the issue that is raised must be an arguable issue which requires a trial in order

Accordingly, a mere denial by the Defendants do not tantamount to a triable issue.

Here, the Defendants did not produce any documentary evidence to support their allegations. They failed to provide any evidence to support their assertion that the outstanding amount due and payable to P has been fully paid.

In contrast, P has provided detailed payment records in Exhibit CLKY - 6 of its affidavit in support dated 20.11.2025 in Enclosure 24. Which demonstrate that D1 failed to make full and timely payments under the money lending agreement. The payment history indicates that D1 payments were incomplete and delayed on multiple occasions, constituting a breach of the money lending agreement. S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

The evidence shows that D1 has defaulted on its payment obligations and this matter cannot be disputed. As such, there is no need for a trial as the facts are clear. P s claim is well supported by the documentary evidence.

If D1 indeed made all monthly instalment payments as alleged, the Defendants should have exhibited proof of payment, such as receipts or transfer slips in their affidavit in reply, which they failed to do. Furthermore, they have failed to challenge the statement of account in Exhibit CLKY - 6 Enclosure 24. No evidence was produced by them to dispute the amount owed.

In the premises to raise any triable issues. The outstanding amount owing to the Plaintiff is conclusive

As mentioned earlier, the Defendants failed to challenge the amount stated in the statement of account dated 21.5.2025 attached in Exhibit - of Enclosure 24. There are no particulars provided by the Defendants, except for merely denying the liability to pay such amount.

I consider that the said statement of account, which had not been challenged by the Defendants on grounds of manifest error by way of affidavit evidence, indebtedness to P. S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

I refer to clause 23 of the Letter of Guarantee, which reads :

Certificate of indebtedness Notwithstanding Clause 22 above, a certificate issued by you or your agents as to the monies for the time being due or owing to you from the Borrower(s) or any other person or party providing security to you as aforesaid or as to the liabilities of the Borrower(s) or such other person or party or any account settled or stated by or between you and the Borrower(s) or such other person or party or admitted by the Borrower(s) or such other person or party or on his / its / their behalf shall be binding upon the Guarantor(s) and shall be accepted by the Guarantor(s) as conclusive evidence against the Guarantor(s) that the amount appearing thereon is due or owing to you from the Borrower(s) or

Thus, a statement of account issued by P serves as conclusive In the absence of manifest error, the statement of account, which details the monies owing by D1, is treated as irrefutable proof of the debt.

With regard to the usage of a statement of account or a certificate of indebtedness, the Federal Court in Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying (trading as KH Trading) & Anor [2006] 3 CLJ 544 at 553 - 554; [2006] 2 MLJ 685 at 691 said : This observation appeared to have escaped the attention of the Court of Appeal in the present case. In the result, the Court of Appeal took the position that the conclusiveness of the certificate of indebtedness exh P3 was binding only upon the parties and that the court would still have to determine whether sufficient evidence had been adduced to prove quantum and the correctness of the amount claimed. With respect, such a proposition goes against the entrenched principles enunciated by Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as His Highness then was) in Citibank NA v Ooi Boon Leong & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 282 when he said, inter alia: We have often said in this court many a time that where the issues are clear and the matter of substance can be decided once and for all without going to trial there is no reason why the assistant registrar or the S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw judge in chambers, or, for that matter, this court shall not deal with the whole matter under the RSC O 14 procedure. In the present case, the guarantee contains a clause which enables the bank by producing a certificate of indebtedness by its officer to dispense with legal proof of the actual indebtedness for the indebtedness may be ascertained conclusively by a certificate. [11] The above dictum establishes firmly the conclusive nature and extent of a certificate of indebtedness. A certificate of indebtedness operates in the field of adjectival law. It excuses the plaintiff from adducing proof of debt. Such a certificate shifts the burden onto the defendant to disprove the amount claim

I echo the following remarks of the High Court in Southern Finance Bhd v Sun City Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2006] 7 CLJ 464 at 474 - 477, 484 : High case authorities argued by competent advocates and decided by eminent judges have consistently established certain well settled principles to guide the courts in determining, after having studied the affidavit evidence and heard arguments, whether leave to defend should be allowed. It is ever so often in the practice or administration of law that a competent advocate or a perceptive judge could display his or her innate, uncluttered, beautiful mind. I shall here set out the guiding principles. 6) If the defendant has, by his conduct, lulled the plaintiff into the belief that there is no real dispute on the claim, such as, where there is an absence of dispute for a significant period of time, on the amount alleged in the letter of demand to be due, or as to the acceptance of the goods, then he is estopped from denying the particular amount claimed or the fact alleged. See Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 4 CLJ 283; and KGN Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pan Reliance Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 CLJ 611. I am completely ad idem with the views of the Court of Appeal in KGN Jaya - speaking through Gopal Sri Ram JCA - on the untenable conduct of the defendant, in the following language: When asked why his client had kept silent for a rather long period of time, and did not do anything until the letter before action was received. We trust that we will be forgiven if we are unable to detect the logic in this response. S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw We are of the view that it would be a travesty of justice if we were to undisputed facts of this case admit of the conclusion that the respondent was, by the conduct of the appellant, lulled into the belief that the appellant had no challenge to the accounts, leave alone the legal relationship between the parties. To put it another way, the appellant, by its silence coupled with the other circumstances of the case, encouraged the respondent to believe that it intended to raise no challenge to the existence of a prior legal relations between the parties or to the figure which the account showed as owing by it. Having done so, it ought not to be permitted to now contend otherwise. It follows that it does not, therefore, lie in the mouth of the appellant to so. An examination of the facts leads us to this conclusion. The legal basis upon which such a conclusion may be sustained is well-settled and is now beyond question. See Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. 7) A welter of authorities emanating from all levels of our courts and courts in England, Singapore and Australia have constantly entrenched the principle that a clause in the loan agreement which, due to the dictates of commerce, provide that a certificate of indebtedness is conclusive evidence of both liability and the amount of the debt, should be accorded its intended effect unless fraud or manifest error on the face of (as he then was) had this illuminating rationale to his decision when he said: The s has arisen simply because of the dictates of commerce, and has been supported by the assumption that money institutions, which are themselves closely regulated by the law, are completely honest and reliable. In Bache & Co (London) Led v. Banque Vernes et Commerciale 440: I would on add this: this commercial practice (of inserting bankers or brokers who insert them are known to be honest and reliable men of business who are most unlikely to make a mistake. Their standing is so high that their word is to be trusted. So S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw much so that a notice of default given by a bank or a broker must be honoured. It ranks as equivalent to, if not higher than, the certificate of an arbitrator or engineer in a building contract. As we have repeatedly held, such a certificate must be honoured, leaving any cross-claims to be settled later by an arbitrator. So if a banker or broker gives a notice of , leaving any cross-claims by the customer to be adjusted in separate proceedings. What is significant is that, in the absence of fraud or obvious error on the face of it, a conclusive of both the liability and the amount of the debt [30] In postlude, I take this occasion to make the following observation. The courts should not too readily find triable issues in cases which concern loans to borrowers from banks and other financial institutions. If such institutions are obliged to wait for a lengthy period of many years - that a full trial and appeal process would often entail - in order to recover loans made to borrowers, then commercial investments from such institutions in this country would be adversely affected, not to mention the cash flow problems that they would encounter. It would be prudent for courts, when dealing with applications for summary judgments in such cases, to apply, in appropriate cases, the estoppel and the finality - of - certificate - of - indebtedness principles as Conclusion

In the premises, it is evident that the allegations by the Defendants are merely bare unsubstantiated denials in their attempt to evade their liabilities under the letter of offer, the money lending agreement and the guarantee.

This is a plain and obvious case to be disposed of summarily as there are no bona fide triable issues. I therefor application in Enclosure 23. S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw

I awarded interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5 % per annum from the date of judgment until full settlement. I awarded costs of RM 8,000 to P. Dated 16 February 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Tan Hong Kait and Amani Syafiqah binti Abdul Malik (Messrs. Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis) for the Plaintiff Lesley - Ann Yong (Messrs. Nandrajog) for the Defendants Case reference 1. Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 14 2. Voo Min En & Ors v Leong Chung Fatt [1982] 2 MLJ 241 3. Fadzil Mohamed Noor v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [1981] CLJ (Rep) 53 4. Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying (trading as KH Trading) & Anor [2006] 3 CLJ 544 5. Soon @ Boo Choo Soon [2013] 2 MLJ 843; [2012] 1 LNS 971; [2013] 1 AMCR 19 6. Southern Finance Bhd v Sun City Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2006] 7 CLJ 464 Legislation reference 1. Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 S/N 2dM7PyFx30kvFFymbtEFw