It is incumbent upon the Court to refer to the most celebrated case of Chan Pean Leon v PP [1956] MLJ 237, regarding possession, where Thompson J said: BA-45A-97-08/2024, BA- 45A-96-08/2024, BA-45-35-08/2024, BA-45-36-08/2024 & BA-45D-1-08/2024 13 "Possession" itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in Stephen's Digest (9th Edition, page 304):- "A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need." To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental element which must both be present before possession is made out. OKT2 must not only be so situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then in the absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend to deal with it as if it were my own and accordingly I am in possession of it. On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in a room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other people then the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the BA-45A-97-08/2024, BA- 45A-96-08/2024, BA-45-35-08/2024, BA-45-36-08/2024 & BA-45D-1-08/2024 14 inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shows such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it is found show such an intention. It may be found in a locked room to which I hold the key or it may be found in a drawer mixed up with my own belongings or it may be found, as occurred in a recent case, in a box under my bed. The possible circumstances cannot be set out exhaustively and it is impossible to lay down any general rule on the point. But there must be something in the evidence to satisfy the Court that the person who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as his own had the intention of doing so. It is true that in prosecutions under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance a lack of evidence in this connection may be made good by the statutory presumptions contained in that Ordinance. But there are no such presumptions in the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance nor are there any such presumptions in relation to possession of stolen property. Once possession is proved then before OKT2 person can be convicted it is necessary in addition to prove mens rea. And for this purpose as was pointed out by Gordon-Smith Ag. C.J. in the case of Toh Ah Loh and Mak Thim v. Rex [1948] 1 LNS 72; [1949] MLJ 54, supra, it is necessary to prove that the person in possession knows the nature of the thing possessed. BA-45A-97-08/2024, BA- 45A-96-08/2024, BA-45-35-08/2024, BA-45-36-08/2024 & BA-45D-1-08/2024 15 If the thing, as in Toh's case, is in a box which itself is in the possession of OKT2 it must be proved that he knew what was in the box. If, as in Lee's case, it was a lottery document it must be proved that he knew it was a lottery document. Here again knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Again the possible variety of circumstances which will support such an inference is infinite. There may be something in OKT2's behaviour that shows knowledge, or the nature of the thing may be so obvious that it is possible to say "he must have known what it was" or, again in cases under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, there may be a statutory presumption which fills a gap in the evidence."