Park Assist Asia Sdn Bhd v Justin Raj A/L Xavier Christi (WA-22IP-100-09/2025)

JUSTIN RAJ A/L XAVIER CHRISTI [NRIC No.: 840624-07-5185]

CHAN MAR WIN [NRIC No.: 880328-56-5477] … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 29 – Plaintiff's Notice of Application for Discovery) A. INTRODUCTION [1] Before this Court is the Plaintiff's Notice of Application filed via Enclosure 29 pursuant to Order 24 Rules 3, 7, 7A, 9 and 11 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC 2012") seeking orders for discovery, verification and inspection of two broad categories of documents, particularised in Schedule A to the Notice of Application, namely: 2! ! a. Part A – Copyright Documents: documents pertaining to Copyright Voluntary Notification No. CRAR2025C03780 and/or Application No. AR2025C03780 ("the Copyright Notification"); and b. Part B – Trademark Documents: documents pertaining to Trade Mark Application No. TM2020023384 ("the Trademark Application"). PART A - THE COPYRIGHT DOCUMENTS [2] The Plaintiff seeks discovery of ten (10) categories of documents relating to Copyright Notification. [3] For ease of reference, I set out below the documents sought by the Plaintiff under Part A of the Schedule: TABLE A Documents Requested 1. Application form(s) and/or Form CR-1 / CR-2 submitted to MyIPO

The notification by a representative Form CR-3 (if applicable)

The Statutory Declaration under the Copyright Act 1987 (Act 332) accompanying the said application 3! !

An electronic copy of the Copyright Work that was submitted together with the Statutory Declaration 5. Any Request Forms CR-4/CR-5/CR-6/CR- 7/CR-8/CR-9/CR-10 (if applicable)

All supporting documents and correspondences submitted in relation to the Copyright Voluntary Notification CRAR2025C03780 and/or Application No. AR2025C03780 7. Certificate of Copyright Voluntary Notification 8. Receipt(s) and payment record(s) of the said notification 9. Any communication records or correspondences between MyIPO and the Defendants or their representatives 10. Any such other documents that have been submitted to myIPO for the purposes of application/registration of Notification CRAR2025C03780 and/or Application No. AR2025C03780 that have not been mentioned expressly herein. PART B - THE TRADEMARK DOCUMENTS [4] The Plaintiff seeks discovery of eight (8) categories of documents relating to Trade Mark Application. 4! ! [5] For ease of reference, I set out below the documents sought by the Plaintiff under Part B of the Schedule: TABLE B Documents Requested 1.

TMA2A/TMA2B – Application for Registration of

Application for Registration of a Mark (Form

Certificate of Registration (Form TMJ4)

Receipt(s) and payment record(s) of the said registration 6. Statutory Declaration (SD) under the Trade Marks Act 1976 and Regulations 1997.

Any communication records or correspondences between MyIPO and the Defendants and/or their representatives and/or the Plaintiff 8. Any such other documents that have been submitted to MyIPO for the purposes of application/registration of TM2020023384 that have not been mentioned expressly herein 5! ! [6] Discovery is sought as against the 1st Defendant, the 2nd Defendant and Perbadanan Harta Intelek Malaysia ("MyIPO"), the statutory custodian of intellectual property records. B. BACKGROUND FACTS [7] The Plaintiff, Park Assist Asia Sdn Bhd, is a company engaged in the business of car park management systems and parking guidance equipment. Since its incorporation on 25.02.2015, the Plaintiff alleges that it has used and promoted signage known as the "Park Assist Printed Signage" ("the Signage") in connection with its services and branding. [8] In October 2020, the Plaintiff then under the management of the 1st Defendant as its managing director filed an application for trademark protection of the Signage with MyIPO under Application No. TM2020023384. The application was filed through one Goh Hooi Peng, practising under "Goh Trademark PLT", as the Plaintiff's trademark agent at the time. [9] The Trademark Application was subsequently objected to by MyIPO and, by reason of the Plaintiff's failure to file an appeal within the prescribed time, attained the status of "deemed withdrawn". [10] On or about 19.02.2024, the 2nd Defendant a registered trademark agent practising through CKF Development Sdn Bhd ("CDSB") was appointed as the new trademark agent to take over conduct of the application from the previous agent. The 2nd Defendant's evidence is that his retainer was limited to advising on objections raised by 6! ! MyIPO and preparing an appeal should MyIPO reissue a notice of objection. Ultimately, MyIPO did not reissue any such notice, and the application remained "deemed withdrawn". [11] On 19.04.2024, the 2nd Defendant affirmed a statutory declaration in support of the Trademark Application. The contents of the said declaration (which the Plaintiff relies upon heavily) include acknowledgments that the Signage had been used extensively by the Plaintiff and was of importance to its operations. [12] The 1st Defendant was terminated as managing director on 16.12.2024, tendered his resignation as director on 17.12.2024, and was formally removed as director of the Plaintiff on 03.02.2025. [13] Subsequently, in or about 2025, the 1st Defendant lodged a copyright voluntary notification under the Copyright Act 1987 in respect of the Signage. The notification was issued under No. CRAR2025C03780, naming the 1st Defendant as creator and owner. The Plaintiff characterises this as the "Illegal Copyright Registration". [14] By a letter dated 23.07.2025 issued on the letterhead of "Mar Win & Co" (operated through CDSB), the Plaintiff and certain of its customers were notified, inter alia, that the Plaintiff was using the Signage without the 1st Defendant's authorisation. The 2nd Defendant's evidence is that the letter was issued solely upon the instructions of the 1st Defendant and in the ordinary course of business. 7! ! [15] The Plaintiff thereafter commenced the present suit, alleging, in summary: a. ownership of the Signage by the Plaintiff; b. breach of fiduciary duty by the 1st Defendant as managing director; c. misappropriation of the Signage via the Copyright Notification; d. in the alternative, that the 1st Defendant holds the Copyright Notification on trust for the Plaintiff; and e. malicious falsehood, unlawful interference with business, and conspiracy arising from the issuance and dissemination of the letter dated 23.07.2025. C. THE LAW ON DISCOVERY [16] The principles governing discovery under Order 24 of the ROC 2012 are well-settled. The starting point is Order 24 Rule 3, which permits discovery of documents which are or have been in the possession, custody or power of a party relating to "any matter in question" between the parties to the action. [17] In Yekambaran s/o Marimuthu v Malayawata Steel Berhad [1994] 2 CLJ 581, Edgar Joseph Jr J (later FCJ) laid down the three essential elements for an order for discovery: 8! ! "The essential elements for an order for discovery are threefold; namely, first there must be a 'document', secondly, the document must be 'relevant' and thirdly, the document must be or have been in the 'possession, custody or power' of the party against whom the order for discovery is sought." [18] These principles were affirmed by Low Hop Bing J (later FCJ) in Mahfar bin Alwee v Jejaka Megah Sdn Bhd & Anor [2007] 4 MLJ 175, where his Lordship emphasised that discovery is strictly confined to documents relevant to factual issues in dispute and is not available for collateral, speculative or extraneous matters. [19] The Court of Appeal in P.G. Doraisamy P. Gopal v Aminvestment Bank Berhad and Other Appeals [2026] CLJU 739 reiterated that: a. discovery is not granted as a matter of course; b. the applicant must demonstrate, with sufficient precision, that the documents sought are relevant, necessary for the fair disposal of the action, and within the possession, custody or power of the opposing party; and c. applications framed in general, sweeping or imprecise terms are liable to be refused as constituting an impermissible "fishing expedition". [20] It is also trite that the discovery process must not be used as a medium for fishing expedition. In Tanjung Rhu Land Sdn Bhd & 9! ! Ors v. Kauthar Venture Capital Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 768, the High Court held as follows: “31.7.4 the Defendant's requests lack specificity. The requests are extremely general in nature (i.e. all information/all documents / all communications) and the documents sought have no sufficient precision. Hence it is clear that Enc. 69 is a fishing expedition; an aimless trawling of an unlimited sea of documents, with fishing defined by this Court in Ho King Min & Anor v. Lee Meng Leng & Ors [2020] CLJU 1668; [2020] 1 LNS 1668 as follows: "[65] What is "fishing", a term often used in contesting a discovery action? Choo Han Teck JC (as he then was) explained in the High Court case of Thyssen Hunnebeck Singapore Pte Ltd v. TTJ Civil Engineering Pte Ltd [2003] 1 SLR 75, at paras 5-6, as follows: "5... I accept that in some cases the line between a reasonable possibility of finding such information and a fishing expedition is a fine one. Hence, a case must be considered on its own merits. It will be borne in mind that should it subsequently transpire that no relevant information was in fact found in the documents disclosed, that does not, in itself, mean that the request was a fishing expedition - a term that used to serve well, but has recently been showing signs of abuse. It must be remembered that the right and entitlement of the party concerned is to know and inspect the documents in the hands of the other. The relevancy of the connection of the documents to the claim is a broader form of relevancy than the relevancy of documents for the purposes of admitting them into evidence at trial. If that is thought to be a 'fishing expedition', then it is time to examine more closely what that term means. 10! ! 6 In my view, I would hold that a 'fishing expedition' in the context of discovery refers to the aimless trawling of an unlimited sea. Where, on the other hand, the party concerned knows a specific and identifiable spot into which he wishes to drop a line (or two), I would not regard that as a 'fishing expedition'. But I would myself prefer to approach such applications strictly on the basis of the broader relevancy test. That has the advantage of training one's focus directly on the matter at hand, and avoiding the distractions inherent in analogies - even one that has become a term of art, the 'fishing expedition', for example... (Emphasis added.)" [21] A fishing expedition occurs where an applicant makes a bare allegation and then seeks to ransack the opponent’s documents in the hope of making a case. In Wu Siying & 75 Ors v Malaysian Airline System Bhd & Ors [2016] 11 MLJ 549, the Court held: “[14] An explanation of what amounts to impermissible fishing is contained in the decision of the Federal Court of Australia, exercising its appellate jurisdiction, in WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 30 ALR 559: Though the power to require discovery be acknowledged, how should it be exercised? It depends upon the nature of the case and the stage of the proceedings at which the discovery is sought. In the present case, discovery is sought before there is a tittle of evidence to suggest that the Chairman did not have the requisite cause to believe which para 6 of the statement of claim would put in issue. Some assistance was sought to be derived from cases where discovery had been given to a party before he was required to give 11! ! particulars of his claim: cases such as Ross v Blake’s Motors [1951] 2 All ER 689, but in cases of that kind there is either an anterior relationship between the parties which entitles one to obtain information from the other, or sufficient is shown to ground a suspicion that the party applying for discovery has a good case proof of which is likely to be aided by discovery. This is not such a case. This is a case where a bare allegation is made by para 6 of the statement of claim and, the paragraph being denied, the applicant seeks to interrogate the Chairman and ransack his documents in the hope of making a case. That is mere fishing. As Smithers J said in Melbourne Home of Ford Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission, (5 TPC at p 35; ATPR at p 18,087: ‘In the absence of such evidence the proceeding is essentially speculative in nature. In such circumstances for the court to assist the applicants by making available to them the processes of interrogatories and discovery would be to assist them in an essentially fishing exercise and from this the court on established principles should refrain’. His Honour’s refusal of discovery was right and it ought not to be disturbed. (Emphasis added.)” [22] To these requirements must be added the test of necessity under Order 24 Rule 8, which provides that on the hearing of an application for discovery, the Court shall refuse to make an order if and so far, as it is of the opinion that discovery is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. [23] Order 24 rule 8 of the Rules of Court 2012: “Discovery to be ordered only if necessary (O. 24 r. 8) 12! ! On the hearing of an application for an order under rule 3, 7 or 7A, the Court, if satisfied that discovery is not necessary, or not necessary at that stage of the cause or matter, may dismiss or adjourn the application and shall in any case refuse to make such an order if and so far as it is of the opinion that discovery is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.” [Emphasis Added] [24] Order 24 rule 13(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 states: “Production to be ordered only if necessary (O. 24 r. 13)

An order for the production of any documents for inspection or to the Court shall not be made under any of the foregoing rules unless the Court is of the opinion that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.” [Emphasis Added] [25] In Nguang Chan aka Nugang Chan Liquor Trader & Ors v Hai-O Enterprise Bhd & Ors [2009] 5 MLJ 40, the Court of Appeal emphasised that an order for production of documents will not be granted merely because the documents are relevant. The applicant must satisfy the Court that production is necessary either for the fair disposal of the matter or for saving costs. The Court held as follows: “[11] Under r 13(1) an order for the production of documents for inspection is not to be made unless the court is of opinion that such order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the case or matter or for saving costs. 13! ! It is for the party seeking production to satisfy the court that such production is necessary for the purpose specified in r 13(1) per Parker LJ in Dolling-Baker v. Marrett & Ors [1991] 2 All ER 890 and Ventouris v. Mountain[1991] 1 WLR 607. [12] And in considering the application the court should bear in mind the words of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Taylor v Anderton [1995] 1 WLR 447 at p 462 that ‘the purpose of the rule is to ensure that one party does not enjoy an advantage or suffer an unfair disadvantage in the litigation as the result of a document not being produced for inspection.’ … [24] There is one other matter which we cannot ignore and leave unsaid because it is fatal to the decision of the learned judge and vitiated the exercise of his discretion. It is this. He apparently misdirected himself in law when he misappreciated the issue before him. In his grounds of decision, the learned judge states that the issue for his determination was whether the discovery and production of the documents would fairly dispose of the case, save time of trial and cost of calling witnesses which be answered in the affirmative. [25] As stated earlier the real issue is compliance with r 13(1) which stipulates that discovery may only be ordered if the court is of opinion that such order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. The test is necessity not fairness and it is for the applicant to satisfy the court, see Dolling-Baker 's case and Ventouris v. Mountain. Because of that erroneous premise the learned judge appears to be more concerned with relevance and fairness and omitted to consider whether 14! ! and why it was necessary for the order to be made. The respondents also failed to provide any materials to satisfy the court of such necessity. [Emphasis added]” [26] The same principle was reiterated in the more recent Court of Appeal decision of Malaysia Debt Ventures Berhad v Platinum Techsolve Sdn Bhd & Ors [2020] MLJU 1421. Delivering the judgment of the Court, S. Nantha Balan JCA reviewed the relevant authorities and stressed that relevance and necessity are distinct requirements. His Lordship stated: “[198] Further, it is also imperative for the respondents to establish that the DSA is necessary. Relevance cannot be conflated with necessary, as what is relevant may not be necessary. [199] In our view, the question as to whether the document for which disclosure is sought is necessary is an important and we might, add pivotal component for the order of discovery under Order 24 Rule 7 ROC. Indeed, Order 24 Rule 8 ROC also makes it imperative that the Court to refuse discovery if it is satisfied that discovery was not necessary. [202] In our view, the proper approach to the question of whether discovery is “necessary” may be gleaned from the case of Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd and other applications [2004] SGHC 155; ; [2004] 4 SLR (R) 39 (“Bayerische”) where the High Court of Singapore at paragraph [37] stated as follows: “The ultimate test is whether discovery is necessary for disposing fairly of the proceedings or for saving costs. An assertion that the documents are relevant 15! ! will not be good enough. Equally, an assertion that the documents are necessary because they are relevant will not be enough.” [203] Further, in paragraph [38] of the judgment, the Singapore High Court had considered Order 24 Rule 7 which is pari. materia with our Order 24 Rule 8 and stated that: “The court is, by O.24 r.7, concerned with the discretion to refuse disclosure of a document unless the necessity for disclosure is clearly demonstrated.” [27] As to the test of relevance, I adopt the classic formulation of Brett LJ in Compagnie Financière du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co

11 QBD 55, namely that a document is relevant if it may, either directly or indirectly, enable the party requiring it either to advance his own case or to damage the case of his adversary, or fairly lead to a train of inquiry which may have either of those two consequences. [28] As to the test for materiality, the Court in Yekambaran (supra) cited Bray on Discovery with approval: "… for the purpose of testing the materiality of the discovery to a particular issue… it is the case of the party seeking the discovery that must be assumed to be true, and not that of the party from whom the discovery is sought." [29] As regards discovery against a non-party (here, MyIPO), the principles set out by the High Court in Billion Prima Sdn Bhd & Anor v Nutech Co Ltd & Anor [2017] 10 MLJ 213 applies. The 16! ! applicant must specify or describe the documents sought with reasonable precision, identify their relevance, and demonstrate that disclosure is necessary either for disposing fairly of the matter or for saving costs. In Billion Prima Sdn Bhd & Anor v Nutech Co Ltd & Anor [2017] 10 MLJ 213, the High Court held that: “(a) the applicant’s affidavit in support of the discovery application against third party (‘supporting affidavit’) shall ‘specify or describe the documents in respect of which the order is sought’ (‘documents’) as required by O 24 r 7A(3)(b) of the RC.

the supporting affidavit shall ‘show, if practicable by reference to any pleading served’ that the Documents are ‘relevant to an issue arising or likely to arise out of the claim made’ (‘relevancy requirement’).

the supporting affidavit shall show that the ‘person against whom the order is sought is likely to have or have had (the documents) in his possession, custody or power’. This requirement under O 24 r 7A(3)(b) of the RC is different from O 24 r 3(1) of the RC and O 24 r 3(1) of the RHC which provide for discovery of documents ‘which are or have been in his possession, custody or power’. Such a wide application of O 24 r 7A(3)(b) of the RC to include third parties who are ‘likely’ to have or have had the documents in their possession, custody or power, may be justified on a purposive interpretation of O 24 r 7A of the RC (please see the above sub-paras 9(2) and (3));

as required under O 24 r 8 of the RC, an applicant bears the legal onus to satisfy the court that a discovery application against third party is necessary, either:

(i)to fairly dispose of the pending suit; or 17! !

(ii)to save costs.

the documents are not privileged and the third party can be compelled by an order under O 24 r 7A(5) of the RC to produce the documents. Order 24 r 7A(7)(b) of the RC allows a third party to claim privilege as a valid ground for not disclosing the documents — please see Ong Boon Hua, at para 38; and

according to O 24 r 7A(2) and (4) of the RC, the discovery application against third party and supporting affidavit shall be served:

(i)personally on the third party; and

(ii)on every party in the pending suit.” [30] The burden of establishing all three limbs – existence (or that the document has been), relevance and possession/custody/power rests at all times upon the applicant for discovery, in this case the Plaintiff. [31] The burden is on the Plaintiff to satisfy the Court that the documents sought are relevant and that their production is necessary for fair disposal. In Malaysia Debt Ventures Berhad (Supra), the Court confirmed that the applicant must show relevance and necessity: "[197] The situation in the present case is vastly different from the cases relied upon by the respondents which are all specific and peculiar to their own facts. In our view, a solicitor's work product eg, the DSA cannot be equated to a medical report (per Dr Noor Aini's case). We are satisfied that the cases relied upon by the learned Judge to justify disclosure of a draft document (DSA) are based on totally different factual circumstances. The present case in one where the 18! ! respondents have applied to obtain discovery of the DSA. Thus, the respondents bear the burden of establishing that the DSA is relevant for purposes of the Counterclaim. ... [204] As stated earlier, the burden was on the respondents to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the DSA is not just relevant but also that it is necessary for disposing the matter fairly and for saving of costs as well.". [Emphasis added] [32] Discovery is not granted in the abstract. The Court must first identify the "matters in question" in the action by reference to the pleadings, because relevance is to be tested against the pleaded issues, not against unparticularised allegations or speculative theories. [33] With respect to the 1st Defendant, the core issues joined on the pleadings are: a. whether the 1st Defendant is the original author and creator of the Signage; b. when the Signage was created – the 1st Defendant pleads it was created on 24.02.2015, one day before the Plaintiff was incorporated on 25.02.2015; c. whether the Signage was created in the course of a contract of service between the 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff, so as to engage section 26 of the Copyright Act 1987; 19! ! d. whether the 1st Defendant owed and breached fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff; e. whether the 1st Defendant holds the Copyright Notification on constructive trust for the Plaintiff; and f. whether the letter dated 23.07.2025 gave rise to malicious falsehood, unlawful interference with business, and/or conspiracy. [34] With respect to the 2nd Defendant, the core issues are: a. whether the 2nd Defendant dishonestly assisted in any breach of fiduciary duty by the 1st Defendant; b. whether the 2nd Defendant participated in any unlawful means conspiracy; and c. whether the 2nd Defendant is personally liable, given his asserted role as a director and registered trademark agent acting through CDSB. [35] It is against these pleaded issues that the relevance and necessity of each category of documents must be assessed. D. PARTIES POSITION [36] The Plaintiff's primary contentions are as follows: 20! !

The documents sought exist ipso facto, in that the registrations and applications were in fact made and processed. Neither the 1st Defendant nor MyIPO disputes the existence of the documents.

The documents are central to determining:

ownership of the Signage;

(ii) whether the registration of the Copyright Notification was procured in breach of fiduciary duty;

(iii) whether false or misleading representations were made to MyIPO; and

(iv) whether discrepancies exist between the trademark filings (which named the Plaintiff as proprietor) and the copyright filings (which named the 1st Defendant as creator and owner).

The 2nd Defendant and MyIPO do not dispute custody or possession. The 1st Defendant's denial is said to be a bare denial.

The Plaintiff asserts that the 1st Defendant has seized and removed the Plaintiff's books and records, leaving the Plaintiff without independent access to the documents in question. 21! !

Particular emphasis is placed on the statutory declarations filed in support of both registrations, said to be "crucial evidence" of the Defendants' state of mind and of alleged false representations.

The Plaintiff invites the Court to draw an adverse inference from the Defendants' resistance to discovery. [37] The 1st Defendant's submissions, while acknowledging that the documents largely exist, are directed at relevance, necessity and possession. In summary:

The pleaded route to ownership advanced by the Plaintiff turns on section 26 of the Copyright Act 1987 (creation in the course of employment), which engages historical questions of authorship, date of creation, and existence of any contract of service, none of which are illuminated by the post-2025 filing documents at MyIPO.

The Copyright Notification was effected after the 1st Defendant's removal as director, such that the administrative paper trail at MyIPO speaks neither to the 1st Defendant's authorship in 2015 nor to any fiduciary breach at the time of creation.

The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the documents are presently in the 1st Defendant's possession, custody or power. In this respect, a bare assertion that "he must have them" being insufficient as a matter of evidence. 22! !

The Plaintiff's categories, particularly the catch-all references to "any such other documents" and "all supporting documents and correspondences" are overbroad, unspecific and amount to a fishing expedition. [38] The 2nd Defendant's principal objections are:

Any documents related to the trademark agency work were generated by and would be in the possession of CDSB, not the 2nd Defendant personally. As a director acting bona fide within the scope of his authority, he is protected from personal liability for corporate acts.

The Plaintiff has not established that the documents are personally in the 2nd Defendant's hands.

The trademark documents relate to (i) a different intellectual property right (trademark, not copyright); (ii) a different year

(2020); and (iii) were filed by a different agent (Goh Hooi Peng). They have no bearing on the pleaded causes of action against the 2nd Defendant.

The categories sought offer no real probability of yielding information of substantial materiality to the pleaded claims.

The omnibus references to "any" and "all" documents are impermissibly broad. 23! ! [39] MyIPO’s position is that it does not dispute custodianship of the documents within its statutory remit. Its position is essentially neutral, subject to the Court being satisfied that the requirements of Order 24, particularly relevance and necessity, are met before any production order is made. E. MY FINDINGS [40] I begin by stating that the Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each of the three limbs of the Yekambaran test in respect of each category of documents and in respect of each party against whom discovery is sought. A failure on any single limb is fatal to the application as to that category and that party. [41] I also remind myself that the Court must apply Order 24 Rule 8 stringently in that discovery shall be refused if and so far as it is not necessary either for the fair disposal of the action or for saving costs. [42] I am satisfied that the documents sought, broadly speaking, exist, or have existed. The very fact of the Copyright Notification (No. CRAR2025C03780) and the Trademark Application (No. TM2020023384) having been processed by MyIPO is sufficient prima facie evidence of the existence of the underlying application papers, statutory declarations, correspondence and payment records. [43] However, the existence limb cannot be equated with the possession, custody or power limb. The fact that a document exists, or once existed, does not establish that it is currently in the 24! ! possession, custody or power of a particular respondent to a discovery application. That is a separate question to which I now turn. [44] As against MyIPO, there is, properly, no dispute that the documents within MyIPO's statutory remit are in its custody. The first limb is therefore satisfied as against MyIPO for documents within Schedule A which fall within its custodial role. [45] As against the 1st Defendant on the other hand, I find that the Plaintiff has established, at least on a prima facie basis, that copies of the copyright application documents, the statutory declaration affirmed for the purposes of the Copyright Notification, the certificate of voluntary notification, and any correspondence with MyIPO regarding the same, are or were within the 1st Defendant's possession, custody or power. The 1st Defendant was, on the face of the records, the applicant for the Copyright Notification, and it is a reasonable inference that an applicant for a copyright notification will be in possession of the documents he himself submitted. The 1st Defendant's denial in Enclosure 33 is, on this narrow point, properly characterised as a bare denial. [46] The position is otherwise in respect of the trademark documents (Part B) as against the 1st Defendant. The Trademark Application was filed in 2020 through Goh Hooi Peng, well before the appointment of the 2nd Defendant/CDSB in 2024. The Plaintiff has not led evidence to show that the 1st Defendant personally retained copies of those 2020 filings such as to bring them within his "possession, custody or power" today. 25! ! [47] I accept the 2nd Defendant's submission that any documents he handled in his capacity as a registered trademark agent were handled through, and would be retained by, CDSB – a separate legal person. The Plaintiff has not pleaded or established any basis upon which the corporate veil of CDSB ought to be lifted, nor has the Plaintiff joined CDSB as a defendant in these proceedings. The Plaintiff's assertion that the 2nd Defendant personally has custody of the documents is unsupported by any evidence in Enclosure 30 or Enclosure 39. [48] However, the statutory declaration affirmed personally by the 2nd Defendant on 19.04.2024 stands on a different footing. That document was personally affirmed by him and is referred to in the pleadings. To the limited extent that the 2nd Defendant retains a personal copy of his own statutory declaration, it can properly be said to be within his power. [49] I turn now to the critical question of relevance, tested against the pleaded issues, my findings are as follows:

Part A – The Copyright Documents [50] The Plaintiff's pleaded route to ownership via section 26 of the Copyright Act 1987 turns on:

authorship of the Signage;

(ii) the date of creation of the Signage; and 26! !

(iii) the existence of a contract of service or employment relationship at the time of creation. [51] None of these historical questions is meaningfully advanced or refuted by the administrative documents lodged at MyIPO in 2025 such as receipts, payment records, blank forms (CR-4 to CR-10) and routine correspondence. The mere fact that the 1st Defendant submitted a copyright voluntary notification in 2025 cannot logically illuminate whether he created the Signage in 2015 or whether he did so under a contract of service. [52] However, certain documents within Part A have a distinct evidentiary character. In particular:

the CR-1 application form;

(ii) the statutory declaration accompanying the copyright application; and

(iii) the electronic copy of the work submitted with the application, are documents in which the 1st Defendant has made or adopted representations about authorship, date of creation, and ownership of the Signage. Those representations are squarely relevant to:

the Plaintiff's pleaded case that the registration was wrongful and/or procured by false representation; 27! !

the alternative pleaded case of constructive trust;

the alleged breach of fiduciary duty (in that the timing and content of declarations made shortly after removal as director are part of the factual matrix); and

the malicious falsehood and unlawful interference claims, the operative letter of 23.07.2025 having been founded upon the very copyright registration recorded in those documents. [53] The certificate of voluntary notification is itself the corpus of the Plaintiff's claim and is plainly relevant. [54] By contrast, the categories framed as "any communication records or correspondences", "all supporting documents and correspondences submitted", "any such other documents", "CR-3 if applicable" and "CR-4 to CR-10 if applicable" are framed in language so wide and so open-ended that they are, in my judgment, the very paradigm of the impermissible "fishing expedition". These categories:

do not identify any specific document with reasonable precision;

sweep in routine administrative correspondence, internal MyIPO processing notes, payment records and receipts which have no bearing on the issues of authorship, employment relationship, or fiduciary duty; 28! !

are framed in language ("if applicable", "any such other") which expressly invites the production of documents whose very relevance is unknown to the Plaintiff at the time of the application; and

appear designed to enable the Plaintiff to comb through whatever may be on the MyIPO file in the hope of finding something of use. [55] The Plaintiff's stated rationale is that the documents will help "determine whether the registration was done illegally" or "substantiate alleged false and misleading representations" . In my considered view this is, with respect, circular. The Plaintiff cannot, on a discovery application, rely upon the very assertion of illegality which is unparticularised in the pleadings as the basis for trawling MyIPO's file in search of evidence of that illegality. As stated by Brett LJ in Compagnie Financière du Pacifique (supra), and as reiterated in the Malaysian authorities, the relevance test, although wide, is not unlimited. Pertinent to note that it must still be anchored to issues that have been properly pleaded. [56] Receipts and payment records stand in a particularly weak position. The Plaintiff has not articulated any pleaded issue to which the identity of the person who paid the MyIPO filing fees, or the date and mode of such payment, can be said to be relevant. The fact that the 1st Defendant paid for, or did not pay for, the filing of his own copyright notification can hardly be said to advance or damage 29! ! either side's case on authorship, employment or fiduciary duty in any meaningful way.

Part B – The Trademark Documents [57] Part B of Schedule A seeks all documents pertaining to the 2020 Trademark Application filed under No. TM2020023384. The Plaintiff's primary contention is that the 2nd Defendant's statutory declaration of 19.04.2024 affirmed in support of the Trademark Application acknowledges the Plaintiff's ownership of the Signage and is therefore inconsistent with, and probative against, the 1st Defendant's later 2025 copyright claim. [58] I accept, on the relevance limb, that the statutory declaration of 19.04.2024 is a document of genuine evidentiary significance. It contains, on the Plaintiff's case, an admission against interest by the 2nd Defendant (acting as the Plaintiff's authorised representative) which directly bears on:

the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to who owned the Signage as at April 2024; and

the consistency or otherwise of the 1st Defendant's subsequent assertion of personal authorship and ownership in the 2025 copyright filing. [59] To that limited extent, the statutory declaration of 19.04.2024 is relevant and discoverable. However, it bears emphasising that: 30! !

The statutory declaration was concerned with trade mark proprietorship, which can vest in a corporate entity by adoption, use and registration, independently of the question of who authored the underlying artistic work for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1987. The probative weight of the declaration is therefore a matter for trial;

the original trademark application was filed in 2020 through Goh Hooi Peng, a different agent altogether. There is no evidential basis to conclude that the 2020 filing documents are within the possession, custody or power of either the 1st Defendant or the 2nd Defendant personally; and

the 2nd Defendant's involvement only commenced in 2024 and was limited in scope to attempting to revive an application that had already attained "deemed withdrawn" status. [60] Beyond the statutory declaration of 19.04.2024 and the formal documents constituting the Trademark Application itself (such as the application form, the entry on the Register and any responses filed to MyIPO objections), the remaining categories under Part B covering "all correspondences", "all supporting documents", "receipts and payment records" and similar omnibus descriptions fall foul of the same overbreadth criticism set out above. [61] Order 24 Rule 8 of the ROC 2012 imposes a mandatory check upon the Court: discovery shall be refused if it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or for saving costs. 31! ! [62] In the present case, three considerations point against blanket discovery:

MyIPO is the statutory custodian of the records concerning both registrations. The Plaintiff has separately, and properly, sought discovery against MyIPO. MyIPO does not, in substance, oppose disclosure of documents lawfully within its custody, subject to the Court's order. Where the documents can be obtained from a neutral statutory custodian, the necessity of compelling the same documents from a private party is significantly reduced;

Some of the documents sought are in the public domain or are documents which the Plaintiff itself ought to possess, having (on its own case) instructed the Trademark Application in 2020 and having been the named applicant. The Plaintiff's complaint of having lost access to its own records, cannot expand the proper limits of discovery against another party; and

The central issues of authorship and date of creation in 2015 are not capable of being resolved by the MyIPO paper trail. They will be determined at trial by reference to such evidence as the parties choose to lead, including oral testimony and contemporaneous 2015 documents (if any). [63] To the extent that the Plaintiff invites the Court to draw an adverse inference from the Defendants' resistance to the application, I decline to do so. A party is entitled, as of right, to resist a discovery 32! ! application which it considers to be overbroad, irrelevant or oppressive, and the exercise of that right cannot be converted into evidence against the party at this interlocutory stage. [64] The 2nd Defendant submitted that any discovery sought against him is misconceived because the relevant documents were, if anything, held by CDSB, a separate legal entity which has not been joined as a defendant. [65] I accept that the corporate distinctness of CDSB to be a relevant consideration. The 2nd Defendant has been sued personally on a pleaded case of dishonest assistance, conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty. Discovery against him must therefore be confined to documents within his personal possession, custody or power. The Plaintiff cannot, through the device of discovery against the 2nd Defendant personally, indirectly compel production of documents held by CDSB without joining CDSB as a party or invoking the proper procedure for third-party discovery against CDSB. [66] The 2nd Defendant is, however, the affiant of the statutory declaration of 19.04.2024. To the extent that he retains a personal copy of that declaration, it is properly discoverable from him. [67] Discovery against MyIPO is governed by Order 24 Rule 7A of the ROC 2012 and the principles set out in Billion Prima (supra). The applicant must:

specify or describe the documents sought with reasonable precision; 33! !

demonstrate the relevance of those documents to the matters in question;

demonstrate that production is necessary for the fair disposal of the matter or for saving costs; and

show that the documents are or are likely to be in MyIPO's possession, custody or power. [68] Applying the principles propounded in Billion Prima, in my judgement the application against MyIPO succeeds in part. MyIPO is, as the statutory custodian, the most appropriate respondent for the documents which I have held to be relevant and necessary, namely the documents constituting the substantive registration record for both filing, i.e. the application forms, statutory declarations, the work submitted, the certificate of voluntary notification, and any substantive submissions made by or on behalf of the applicants in response to objections raised by MyIPO. [69] Section 10 of the Trademark Act clearly stipulates that “The Director General of the Corporation shall be the Register of Trademarks and have the control of the Trademarks Office.” [70] “Corporation” is defined as MyIPO in section 3 of the Trademark Act. [71] Likewise, section 5 of the Copyright Act contains a similar provision where it provides that “The Director General of the Corporation shall be the Controller of Copyright.” Again, Corporation is defined as MyIPO in section 3 of the Copyright Act. 34! ! [72] In the premises, I agree with learned counsel for the Plaintiff that MyIPO, as the body responsible for maintaining and keeping the respective registers, is in possession, custody, or power of the relevant records and may properly be ordered to produce the same before this Honourable Court. [73] MyIPO is, in any event, bound to comply with such order as this Court may make, and is best placed to produce the documents in an authenticated form. [74] Having applied the necessity requirement under Order 24 Rule 8, and having regard to the principles against fishing expedition, my conclusions on each category are tabulated below: Part A – Copyright Documents Item Category

CR-1 application form Granted as against the 1st Defendant and

(ii) CR-3 (if applicable) Granted as against MyIPO only (limited to documents actually filed)

(iii) Statutory declaration accompanying the application Granted as against the 1st Defendant and

(iv) Electronic copy of the copyright work submitted Granted as against the 1st Defendant and 35! !

CR-4 to CR-10 (if applicable) Refused — overbroad and speculative

(vi) All supporting documents and correspondences submitted in relation to the notification Refused as framed — overbroad. Granted only to the limited extent of any substantive submissions made to MyIPO in response to objections (if any)

(vii) Certificate of voluntary notification Granted as against the 1st Defendant and

(viii) Receipts and payment records Refused — irrelevant to pleaded issues

(ix) Any communication records or correspondences between MyIPO and the Defendants or their representatives, and "any such other documents" Refused — impermissible fishing expedition Part B – Trademark Documents Item Category

Trade Mark Application Form (TM2020023384) Granted as against MyIPO only

(ii) Statutory declaration affirmed by the 2nd Defendant on 19.04.2024 Granted as against the 2nd Defendant and MyIPO

(iii) Any substantive submissions in response to MyIPO objections Granted as against MyIPO only 36! !

(iv) All other supporting documents and correspondence Refused — overbroad

Receipts and payment records Refused — irrelevant

(vi) "Any such other documents" / catch-all categories Refused — fishing expedition [75] As against the 2nd Defendant personally, discovery is limited strictly to the statutory declaration affirmed by him on 19.04.2024, and any document personally generated, signed or affirmed by him in his individual capacity in connection with the matter. No order is made requiring the 2nd Defendant to produce documents held by CDSB as a separate legal entity. [76] As against the 1st Defendant, the discovery order is confined to the specific copyright application documents identified above which, on the available evidence, were submitted by or on behalf of the 1st Defendant in procuring the Copyright Notification under No. CRAR2025C03780. [77] As against MyIPO, the discovery order is made within the scope of MyIPO's statutory custodianship and subject to any redaction necessary to comply with applicable statutory duties of confidentiality, if any. [78] The application has succeeded in part and failed in part. In the exercise of my discretion under Order 59 of the ROC 2012, and 37! ! having regard to the fact that the Plaintiff secured production of the truly material documents (the application forms, statutory declarations and the deposited work) but failed in respect of the broader fishing-expedition categories, I consider that the fair order is one of costs in the cause as between the Plaintiff and each of the 1st and 2nd Defendants. There shall be no order as to costs against MyIPO, which adopted an appropriately neutral position. F. CONCLUSION [79] For the reasons set out above, the Plaintiff's Notice of Application dated 30.01.2026 (Enclosure 29) is allowed in part and dismissed in part, in the terms set out above. Dated this day of 14th May 2026. -Sgd-EDWIN PARAMJOTHY MICHAEL MUNIANDY JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER COMMERCIAL DIVISION (NCC 7) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 38! ! Counsel: For the Plaintiff : Sandra Tan (Messrs. Mak LK & Co) For the 1st Defendant : Ranjit Kaur and Elyna Nabila Madeonus (Messrs. A S Dhaliwal) For the 2nd Defendant : Tan Yan Hong and Iman Nur Syauqeena (Messrs. Tang Hong & Lock)