Patimah Binti MD Kayos v 1. Vejian A/L Selvaraj (NA-A53KJ-45-02/2017)

SURENDRAN A/L A SELVARAJ …Defendan-Defendan

In this case, the plaintiff is the step-mother of one Mohamad Ma’arof bin Sadik Mohamad (“the first deceased”) and biological mother of one Alam Iqbal bin Shadik Mohamad (“the second deceased”). 2

On 22 May 2016 the two deceased were killed in a road accident involving the two defendants.

The plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself as the mother and dependant of the deceased.

On 15 March 2018, the learned Sessions Court Judge Ahmad Fairuz bin Mohd Puzi, after a full trial, found the first defendant liable at 80% and the first deceased at 20%.

In relation to quantum, this court had awarded (on 100% liability) RM6,000.00 for funeral expenses for both deceased and RM122,400.00 (RM1,200.00 x 8.5 x 12) for loss of dependancy in respect of the first deceased.

Aggrieved, the defendants filed an appeal against the above said decision: liability and quantum.

In the same notice, the defendants also appealed against the decision of this court dated 3 November 2017 dismissing the preliminary objection with regards the locus standi of the plaintiff as the step-mother of the first deceased to claim for loss of dependancy under section 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956. 3

Pending the outcome of the appeal to the High Court, the defendants filed Enclosure 13(a).

Enclosure 13(a) is an application by the defendants for the following reliefs which I reproduce herein in its original language for ease of reference:

Kesemua prosiding perlaksanaan untuk menguatkuasakan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Mac 2018 dan apa-apa prosiding seterusnya digantung sehingga penyelesaian muktamad rayuan yand difailkan Defendan-Defendan ke Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban dan di peringkat rayuan seterusnya (jika perlu) terhadap Penghakiman tersebut.

Syarikat Insuran Defendan-Defendan diberi kebenaran untuk menangguhkan pembayaran keseluruhan wang penghakiman tersebut kepada Plaintif sehingga selesai pendengaran kesemua prosiding rayuan yang difailkan oleh Defendan-Defendan di Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban dan di peringkat rayuan seterusnya (jika perlu).

Secara alternatif, Syarikat Insuran Defendan-Defendan membayar keseluruhan jumlah wang Penghakiman ke dalam Mahkamah untuk disimpan sehingga rayuan Defendan-Defendan di semua peringkat didengar dan diputuskan. 4

Sekiranya Perenggan 3 di atas tidak dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah, maka secara alternatifnya Syarikat Insurans Defendan-Defendan membayar keseluruhan atau 100% wang Penghakiman kepada Peguamcara Plaintif dan dipegang dan/atau disimpan oleh Peguamcara Plaintif sebagai ‘stakeholder” di dalam satu akaun simpanan tetap atau “interest bearing account” sehingga rayuan Defendan-Defendan di semua peringkat didengar dan diputuskan. Sekiranya rayuan pihak Defendan-Defendan dibenarkan, maka Peguamcara Plaintif bertanggungjawab memulangkan dan/atau mengembalikan keseluruhan dan/atau setakat jumlah yang diputuskan oleh mahkamah peringkat rayuan, wang penghakiman berkenaan kepada Defendan-Defendan beserta faedah dan “interest” yang diperolehi dan/atau dijana daripada simpanan dalam “interest bearing account” itu.. (“the Stay Application”) Legal principles on a stay of execution pending appeal

I will start with the principles on stay of execution.

The principles are trite. An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution and the successful party is not to be deprived of the fruits of his success. 5

However, this court might use its discretion and think it right to allow the stay application if the applicant can prove the existence of special circumstances or special grounds to justify it.

The requirement for the above said condition before a stay of execution of a judgment may be ordered has been settled by the Federal Court in Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Berhad [2004] 1 MLJ 257;[2003] 5 AMR 758(“Kosma”) from which the following principles can be extracted:

an appeal does not operate as a stay. It is a matter of discretion of the court;

a successful litigant ought not be deprived of an immediate harvest of the fruits of litigation;

however, where there exist ‘special circumstances’ in a case, a stay may quite properly be granted. This would depend on the facts of each case;

the fact that the outcome of a successful appeal might become nugatory if a stay is not granted is not a separate and distinct ground for the grant of a stay. Rather, it is a type of ‘special 6 circumstances’, perhaps the most common one, which could in many instances justify a stay.

merits of an appeal is not a ‘special circumstance’; and is in that sense irrelevant in a stay application. (see also Ang Sue Khoon v Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang [2016] 11 MLJ 516)

In view of the above said principles, I am now examining the affidavits filed by both parties. There are two:

Affidavit in support of the application affirmed by Mohd Shukry bin Zainal Abidin on 20 March 2018 (Enclosure 13(b)); and

Affidavit in Reply by the plaintiff affirmed by Nurhamizah binti Mohd Tahir on 20 April 2018 (Enclosure( )).

The grounds of application of Enclosure 13(a) are set out in Enclosure 13(b) in particular paragraph(s) 10, 11 and 13(a). In the affidavit, it was deposed that: 7

Saya sesungguhnya percaya bahawa berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan lisan dan dokumentari yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan dan juga berdasarkan hujahan bertulis yang difailkan beserta dengan nas-nas kes yang dirujuk dalam hujahan itu, Defendan-Defendan mempunyai alasan bermerit, isu dan “special circumstances” untuk pertimbangan di peringkat rayuan termasuklah juga isu dan/atau persoalan undang-undang berkenaan definisi dan/atau tafsiran Ibu Bapa di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 7(11) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956, yang mana adalah penting untuk didengar dan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban kerana ianya turut melibatkan isu sama ada Plaintif itu sendiri sebagai Ibu Tiri mempunyai hak, kepentingan dan Locus Standi untuk menuntut gantirugi kehilangan tanggungan akibat kematian simati Mohamad Ma’arof tersebut.

Saya sesungguhnya percaya bahawa Syarikat Penanggung Insurans Defendan akan menghadapi kerugian yang tidak dapat digantikan (“irreparable damage”) jika Penghakiman Mahkamah ini dilaksanakan sebelum rayuan Defendan-Defendan tersebut didengar, dibicarakan dan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan/atau di peringkat rayuan yang seterusnya (sekiranya perlu). …. Namun sekiranya keseluruhan jumlah gantirugi tersebut dibayar kepada Plaintif adalah berkemungkinan tinggi Plaintif akan mengguna atau membelanjakan wang penghakiman berkenaan. Jika rayuan Defendan-Defendan tersebut dibenarkan, Plaintif berkemungkinan besar tidak akan berkemampuan dari segi kewangan, berupaya membayar balik dan/atau mengembalikan wang penghakiman tersebut kepada Syarikat Penanggung Insurans Defendan, terutamanya di dalam kes ini jumlah wang penghakiman yang terlibat adalah besar iaitu RM102,720.00 tidak termasuk faedah dan kos (berdasarkan liabiliti 80% terhadap Defendan Pertama). 8 13(a) Saya dimaklumkan oleh Defendan-Defendan dan Syarikat Penanggung Insurans Defendan-Defendan bahawa rayuan Defendan-Defendan ini akan sia-sia (nugatory) jika permohonan ini tidak dibenarkan. Defendan-Defendan membuat permohonan penggantungan pelaksanaan penghakiman bagi menjamin, memastikan dan mengimbangi hak-hak serta kepentingan Defendan-Defendan.

In resisting the application, on behalf of the plaintiff it was affirmed that: 5) Alasan-Alasan yang diberikan dalam Notis Permohonan dan Afidavit Sokongan Peguamcara Defendan adalah tidak relevan dan tidak sama sekali berjumlah kepada keadaan khas (special circumstances) 6) Alasan bahawa Plaintif tidak berkemampuan sekiranya Defendan berjaya dalam rayuan dalam Mahkamah Tinggi merupakan satu anggapan dan spekulasi sahaja. Application of Legal principles

The substantial question now to be posed is: what special reasons in this case to warrant a stay of execution?

Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be special under the circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excells in some way that which is usual or common (per Raja Azlan 9 Shah J (as the Majesty then was) in Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86).

In this present case, the defendants (which is inclusive of the insurans company) had expressed their anxiety in paragraphs 10, 11 and 13(a) as to whether the plaintiff is capable of meeting the claim if she should be unsuccessful before the High Court. This is the most common special circumstance (see Rosengrens Ltd v Safe Deposit Centres Ltd [1984] Lexis Citation 219).

However, evidence ought to have been adduced in support of such concern. There is no way for this court to grant a stay as a matter of course.

The court has an absolute and unfettered discretion as to the granting or refusing a stay, and as to the terms upon which it will grant it, and will, as a rule, only grant it if there are special circumstances, which must be deposed to on affidavit unless the application is made at the hearing (a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, (3rd Ed), Vol 16, para 51 at p 35 referred by Raja Azlan Shah (as the Majesty then was) in Leong Poh Shee’s case, supra. [Empasis is added] (See also The ‘Yin Shen’: Lai Lai Yin v ‘Yih Shen’, Owners of and other person interested [1986] 2 MLJ 65 where the learned judge had too 10 emphasized the importance to show from the affidavit the special circumstances to enable the court to grant a saty of execution.

The insurance company might have difficulty to recover the money back in some cases. But, in this present case, the ground relied on by the defendant is nothing more than ‘fear of losing’. There is not even an allegation, what more evidence that the plaintiff is not in a financial position to repay the defendant if she need be. This is not part of special circumstances which warrant a stay.

It is incumbent upon the defendant in this case to show from the affidavit and not from the written submissions the special circumstances to enable this court to grant a stay of execution. This court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory.

Again there is no evidence which had been deposed on affidavit which would enable this court to find that if a stay is granted the appeal if successful would become nugatory. 11

With that in hand, I dismiss Enclosure 13(a) with costs at RM1,500.00. Dated this 22 May 2018 t.t.

Mr Param Sundram for the Plaintiff (Messrs Param Sundram & Co)

Mr Mohd Shukry bin Zainal Abidin for the Defendant (Messrs C.K. Lim & Co)