Patrick Ho Chang v 1. ) Sun Life Malaysia Assurance Bhd (WA-22NCC-69-02/2022)

SUN LIFE MALAYSIA ASSURANCE BHD

SUN LIFE MALAYSIA TAKAFUL BERHAD (NO. SYARIKAT: 689263-M) … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 68) A.

This matter concerns an application by the Plaintiff’s former solicitor against the Plaintiff, seeking payment based on a Bill of Costs detailed in Enclosure 68. Both parties have filed written submissions in Enclosures 69 and 70, which I have taken into consideration. B.

In arriving at my decision, I was guided by the principles laid out under Order 59 Rule 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, Rule 11 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978, and authorities such as Farah Ahmed Naji Al-Sahhaf v Dr Lee Weng Seng & Ors [2022] MLJU 3674 and Alex Ting Kuang Kuo @ Ting Kuang Kuo v Credit Corp (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] 9 CLJ 352.

Upon a careful review of the Bill of Costs and supporting documents, I have allowed certain items while disallowing or reducing others. The decisions are as follows: Item 1: RM7,500 Item 2: RM10,000 Item 3: RM1,500 Item 4 & 5: RM 500 Item 6: RM 11,900 Item 7: RM 150 Item 8: RM 700 Item 9: RM 150 Item 10: RM 700 Item 11 – Item 20: RM 0 Item 21: RM 25,000 Item 22 - Item 31 & Item 33: RM 0 Item 32: RM 30,000

In determining these figures, I considered several factors. First, as regards to the disbursements, Items 11 to 20, 22 to 31, and 33 were denied entirely due to the lack of supporting evidence such as receipts or vouchers, in line with established case law. Nonetheless, I permitted RM500 for Items 4 and 5 related to telephone charges, despite the absence of receipts, as I found this to be a reasonable sum under the circumstances.

With respect to concerns of overlapping claims or double billing, I declined to allow Item 11, which sought RM30,000 for document review, because a related item (Item 2) had already been allowed RM10,000. This approach is consistent with Order 59 Rule 16(1)(g), which aims to prevent duplication of costs.

Item 1, concerning consultations or meetings with the client, was significantly reduced from RM30,000 to RM7,500. The rate per meeting was adjusted to a more modest sum of around RM500, which is within reasonable limits for routine engagements as in Lim Kien Seng & Anor v Lim Kai Hee & Ors [2019] MLJU 625. Similarly, for Items 7 to 10, which involve court attendances, I awarded modest amounts in accordance with prevailing guidelines for online or procedural attendances.

On the issue of getting-up fees (Item 32), although RM50,000 was claimed, I allowed RM30,000 after considering the absence of a full trial and balancing it with the preparatory work undertaken. This is in line with cases like Alex Ting Kuang Kuo and Chan Whye & Sons Contractors v Sarawak Shell Bhd, which awarded comparable amounts where litigation did not proceed to trial but still required substantial preparation.

Item 6, concerning 17 court attendances, was allowed at RM11,900, averaging RM700 per appearance. I found this amount to be justifiable and proportionate given the total number of attendances recorded.

In assessing the overall reasonableness of the sum awarded, I note that RM88,100 represents approximately 31% of the original claim. This is a reflection of the principle of proportionality, which I have applied alongside Rule 11 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978.

The solicitors (Palani Ammal & Co) further argued that the fees were agreed to by the Plaintiff via email, which they say gives rise to an implied agreement under Order 59 Rule 17(3). While the Plaintiff disputes the existence of any formal written agreement, the principles in Ng Kim Hoong v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan [2020] 8 MLJ 805 support the idea that even oral or implied consent can be valid for taxation purposes. I also applied Saw Woei Chin v Lim Seang Lee [2023] 8 CLJ 966, which emphasizes that solicitor-client costs must reflect the benefit conferred to the client. In this case, the solicitor played a significant role in advancing the litigation toward trial thus justifying their fees. C.

In conclusion, the items allowed were assessed with reference to reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality. Where appropriate, amounts were reduced or disallowed in accordance with Order 59 Rule 17(2). My decision in determining the reasonableness of the fees was also guided with Rule 11 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978. Dated 17th June 2025 (AIROL AMIRUL LIMIN) SENIOR ASSISTANT REGISTRAR HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION (MUAMALAT & ADMIRALTY)) KUALA LUMPUR COUNSEL (MESSRS CULAZ & ASSOC.) for the Plaintiff. (MESSRS PALANI AMMAL & CO.) for the Previous Solicitors.