The said doctrine as applied to the High Court Judge was explained by the Federal Court in Dalip Bhagwan Singh v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 1. Peh Swee Chin FCJ, speaking for the Federal Court, said: “The doctrine of stare decisis or the rule of judicial precedent dictates that a court other than the highest court is obliged generally to follow the decisions of the courts at a higher or the same level in the court structure subject to certain exceptions affecting especially the Court of Appeal. The said exceptions are as decided in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd [1944] KB 718. The part of the decision in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane in regard to the said exceptions to the rule of judicial precedent ought to be accepted by us as part of the common law applicable by virtue of Civil Law Act 1956, vide its s.3. To recap, the relevant ratio decidendi in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane’s case is that there are 3 exceptions to the general rule that the Court of Appeal is bound by its own decisions or by decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction such as the Court of Exchequer Chamber. The three exceptions are first, a decision of Court of Appeal given per incuriam need not be followed, secondly, when faced with a conflict of past decisions of Court of Appeal, or a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, it may choose which to follow irrespective of whether either of the conflicting decisions is an earlier case or a later one, thirdly, it ought not to follow its own previous decision when it is expressly or by necessary implication overruled by the House of Lords, or it cannot stand with a decision of the House of Lords. There are of course further possible S/N ix3t5D7zWUi39cyidg9Cwg exceptions in addition to the three exceptions in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane when there may be cases the circumstances of which cry out for such new exceptions so long as they are inconsistent with the 3 exceptions in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane. A few words need to be said about a decision of Court of Appeal made per incuriam as mentioned above. The words “per incuriam” are to be interpreted narrowly to mean as per Sir Raymond Evershed, MR in Morelle v. Wakeling [1955] 2 QB 379, 406 as a “decision given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding in the court concerned so that in such cases, some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found on that account to be demonstrably wrong.” It should be borne in mind the year of the Morelle’s case is 1955 whereas s. 3 of the Civil Law Act was enacted in 1956. The ratio in Morelle’s case is also part of the common law applicable to us. In this connection, it is interesting to refer to Cassell & Co. v. Broome [1972] AC 1027, 1054. It was held that courts in the lower tiers below the Court of Appeal could not rely on the per incuriam rule applied by the Court of Appeal for itself, but could choose between two conflicting decisions. We may add that they may choose, whatever the dates of the conflicting decisions, as such dates do not matter to the Court of Appeal itself. … If the House of Lords, and by analogy, the Federal Court, departs from its previous decision when it is right to do so in the circumstances set out above, then also by necessary implication, its decision represents the present state of the law. When two decisions of the Federal Court conflict, on a point of law, the later decision therefore, for the same reasons, prevails over the earlier decision.” S/N ix3t5D7zWUi39cyidg9Cwg