Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara Malaysia v Leong Wei Kid (M-01(A)-740-11/2024)

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA IN PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO. M-01(A)-740-11/2024 BETWEEN 5 PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMATIAN, MALAYSIA … APPELLANT AND 10

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Jadual Kepada Akta Pengangkutan 1952 (Lampiran A): 165 c) Nama LEONG WEI KID (No. K/P Baru: 660803-04-5151) berketurunan Cina dan beragama Buddha didaftarkan sebagai "BAPA" di dalam sijil kelahiran baru kanak-kanak tersebut; 170 d) Nama FOO CHIEW HUEY (No. K/P Baru: 670913-04-5004) berketurunan Cina dan beragama Buddha didaftarkan sebagai "IBU" di dalam sijil kelahiran baru kanak-kanak tersebut; S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w e) Kos Permohonan Pengangkatan ini dibayar oleh Pemohon- 175 Pemohon; dan f) Pemohon-pemohon hendaklah menyerahkan semula Sijil Kelahiran Asal Leong Weng Onn (No. Daftar: CF 33336) yang dikeluarkan oleh JPN Wilayah Persekutuan (KL) pada 9hb 180 November 2009 dan dicabut pada 19hb Oktober 2022 kepada Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian.” The Third Birth Certificate Non-Citizen (Bukan Warganegara - Certificate Serial Number No C0569/2023) was issued on 185 24.08.2023 and stated R1 (Warganegara) as the father and R2 (Warganegara) as the mother of LWO. LWO's citizenship status remained as ‘Bukan Warganegara’. (IV) DECLARATION AND RELIEFS UNDER ARTICLE 14(1)(b) 190 AND S.1(e) AND 2(3) OF PART II, SECOND SCHEDULE FC: (Encl. 4 PDF 23-26): On 12.12.2023, the Respondents filed an Originating Summons (‘OS’) with intitulements that referred to, among others, Article 195 14(1)(b) and s.1(e) and 2(3) of Part II, Second Schedule FC for LWO to be registered as a citizen and other relevant orders. The reliefs prayed are as follows: “1. Satu deklarasi bahawa Leong Weng Onn (Sijil Kelahiran No. 200 Daftar: C0569/2023, No. Siri: 003783XA), seorang kanak-kanak (“LWO tersebut”) adalah seorang warganegara Malaysia melalui kuatkuasa undang-undang menurut kelahirannya dalam Persekutuan Malaysia selepas Hari Malaysia menurut Perkara S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 14(1)(b), dan Seksyen (1)(e) dan Seksyen 2(3) Bahagian Kedua 205

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Jadual Kedua Perlembagaan Persekutuan; 2. Satu deklarasi bahawa Sijil Kelahiran LWO tersebut yang ditandatangani (Sijil Kelahiran No. Daftar: C0569/2023, No. Siri: 003783XA) oleh Defendan yang mendaftarkan Anak tersebut 210 sebagai “bukan warganegara” merupakan satu pelanggaran hak LWO tersebut sebagai seorang warganegara Malaysia yang menyalahi undang-undang; 3. Satu Perintah bahawa Defendan hendaklah mengeluarkan 215 semula Sijil Kelahiran (Sijil Kelahiran No. Daftar: C0569/2023, No. Siri: 003783XA) kepada LWO tersebut dan mendaftarkan LWO tersebut sebagai seorang warganegara Malaysia dalam tempoh 14 hari dari tarikh penyampaian Perintah ini kepada Defendan. 220 4. Kos permohonan ini dibayar oleh Plaintif-Plaintif; 5. Perintah-perintah dan/atau relif-relif selanjutnya yang difikirkan patut dan sesuai dengan manfaat oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia 225 ini.” (C) DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT JUDGE [3] The LHCJ allowed the OS and made an order (Encl. 4, PDF 17) 230 as follows: “1. Leong Weng Onn (Sijil Kelahiran No. Daftar: C0569/2023, No. Siri: 003783XA), seorang kanak-kanak (“LWO tersebut”) adalah seorang warganegara Malaysia melalui kuatkuasa undang-undang menurut 235 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w kelahirannya dalam Persekutuan Malaysia selepas Hari Malaysia menurut Perkara 14(1)(b), dan Seksyen (1)(e) dan Seksyen 2(3) Bahagian Kedua Jadual Kedua Perlembagaan Persekutuan; 2. Sijil Kelahiran LWO tersebut yang ditandatangani (Sijil Kelahiran No. 240 Daftar: C0569/2023, No. Siri: 003783XA) oleh Defendan yang mendaftarkan Anak tersebut sebagai “bukan warganegara” merupakan satu pelanggaran hak LWO tersebut sebagai seorang warganegara Malaysia yang menyalahi undang-undang; 245 3. Defendan hendaklah mengeluarkan semula Sijil Kelahiran (Sijil Kelahiran No. Daftar: C0569/2023, No. Siri: 003783XA) kepada LWO tersebut dan mendaftarkan LWO tersebut sebagai seorang warganegara Malaysia dalam tempoh 14 hari dari Tarikh penyampaian Perintah ini ke atas Defendan; dan 250 4. Tiada perintah terhadap kos.” (D) GROUNDS OF APPEAL 255 [4] The Appellant filed 4 grounds of appeal in their Memorandum of Appeal (MOA), which we summarised as follows: i. LWO is not a Malaysian citizen by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b) read together with sections 1(e) and 2(3) 260 of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC. ii The LHCJ has erred in law and in fact, in allowing the application notwithstanding that the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis were not satisfied. 265 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w iii. An amendment under BDRA 1957 is not a revocation of citizenship. (E) OUR ANALYSIS AND THE EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 270 4.1 We find that the issues (i) and (ii) are related and therefore we will analyse them together: i. LWO IS NOT A MALAYSIAN CITIZEN BY OPERATION OF LAW UNDER ARTICLE 14(1)(b) READ TOGETHER 275 WITH SECTIONS 1(e) AND 2(3) OF PART II OF THE SECOND SCHEDULE OF THE FC. ii. THE LHCJ HAS ERRED IN LAW AND IN FACT, IN ALLOWING THE APPLICATION NOTWITHSTANDING 280 THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF JUS SOLI AND JUS SANGUINIS WERE NOT SATISFIED. 4.2 SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT IN A NUTSHELL 285 The appellant submitted that: (1) The law does not treat someone as “not born a citizen of any other country” simply because they did not acquire another citizenship within one year of birth. 290 (2) Article 14(1)(b) read with Section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule FC reflects two principles of acquiring S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w nationality, i.e., jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood). 295 (3) To succeed under this provision, a person must prove that their birth occurred within the Federation, and at the time of birth, they did not acquire citizenship of any other country through the lineage of biological parents. 300 (4) Citing in support Than Siew Beng & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2017] 5 MLJ 662, CA that unanimously held that Article 14(1)(b) of the FC encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by: 305 (a) Jus soli, i.e. place of birth. (b) While para 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC (‘not born a citizen of any country’) 310 encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by jus sanguinis, i.e. by blood or lineage: “[23] Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by jus soli, i.e. place of 315 birth, while para 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution (‘not born a citizen of any country’) encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by jus sanguinis, i.e. by blood or lineage. 320 [24] Thus, it would appear that the second appellant would need to satisfy both the requirements of jus soli and jus S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w sanguinis to fulfil the requirements of art 14(1)(b) and para 1(e) of Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution (refer to Chin Kooi Nah (suing on behalf of 325 himself and as litigation representative to Chin Jia Nee, child) v Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia [2016] 7 MLJ 717). … 330 [27] The contentious issue is in respect of the requirement of jus sanguinis in para 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution, as expressed by the phrase, ‘who is not born a citizen of any country’. For this requirement, the material time to determine the 335 status of the second appellant’s lineage is at the time of his birth. … [35] A plain reading of para 1(e) ‘was not born a citizen of any 340 country’ refers to the relationship of the second appellant to his biological and lawful parents at the time of his birth. The only available documentary evidence, the second appellant’s birth certificate (‘exhibit TSB6’), contained no information about the biological parents and the relevant 345 particulars were endorsed with ‘Maklumat Tidak Di perolehi’.” (5) It was further argued that the determining point of time for acquisition of citizenship by operation of law under section 1 350 Part II Second Schedule of the FC lies in all the paragraphs (a) – (e) where it uses the words “at the time of the birth” and “born”. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (6) This is also in line with the legal principle laid down by the majority decision of the Federal Court in the case of CTEB & 355 Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 236, held as follows: “[194] Concluding my view and discussions, I am clear in my mind and reinforced in my view that the qualification of acquiring citizenship 360 by operation of law must be met at birth. And if the qualifications are not met, this court is not at liberty to add and subtract any other qualifications which the FC states otherwise.” (7) Based on the JPN's investigation: 365 (a) The Respondents admitted that LWO is not their biological son. (b) LWO was given to them by a cousin who has now 370 passed away. (c) They admitted that they gave false information regarding the biological parents of LWO in the registration of LWO’s birth. 375 (8) The LHCJ, in his grounds of judgment, accepted that: (a) The Respondents’ effort in making advertising as a sufficient effort to find the biological parents of LWO. 380 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (b) LWO had been in Malaysia all his life and had attended Sekolah Kebangsaan Cheng, Melaka. (c) The Respondents' empty statement that none, 385 including LWO's biological parents, had come forward and claimed LWO. (9) The Appellant asserted that: 390 (a) The LHCJ fell into error in accepting the Respondents’ assertions concerning LWO’s citizenship status and descent without sufficient evidential foundation. (b) In particular, the Appellant submits that the 395 advertisement relied upon by the Respondents was devoid of meaningful probative value, having been issued only some 14 years after LWO’s birth and only after the Appellant’s own investigations had already disclosed the true status of LWO. 400 (10) The Appellant further argues that the LHCJ reliance on the fact of LWO’s residence in Malaysia and attendance at school in Melaka is misplaced and legally irrelevant, as those circumstances were merely consequent upon the 405 issuance and use of the First Birth Certificate, which is alleged to have contained false information. Accordingly, the Appellant maintains that the Respondents’ case was S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w founded largely on bare assertions unsupported by cogent evidence. 410 (11) It was asserted that the LHCJ misdirected himself, in law and in fact: (a) In holding that the Appellant had failed to refute the 415 Respondents’ assertions. (b) It is argued that such a finding improperly shifted the evidential burden onto the Appellant, when, in truth, the burden remained throughout upon the 420 Respondents to establish LWO’s descent and corresponding entitlement to citizenship. (c) Consequently, the Respondents had failed to meet the required evidential threshold, and the LHCJ therefore 425 erred in treating the Appellant's absence of rebuttal as determinative. (12) It is argued that: 430 (a) The LHCJ’s acceptance of the Respondents’ positive assertion that LWO had never acquired the citizenship of any country other than Malaysia is unsustainable, where the very recognition of LWO’s Malaysian citizenship was allegedly procured or grounded on 435 false information. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (b) In the circumstances, the LHCJ erred both in its evaluation of the evidence and in its application of the legal principles governing proof of citizenship, and the LHCJ’s decision ought to be set aside. 440 (13) It was further pointed out by the Appellant that: (a) Although LWO met some conditions (born after Malaysia Day; born in the Federation), the 445 Respondents have failed the requirement to prove lineage to show LWO was not born a citizen of another country. (b) Without biological-parent information, it cannot be 450 determined whether LWO obtained another citizenship; determining parents’ citizenship is necessary before treating the child as stateless. (c) Section 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule FC 455 describes a presumption about timing: (i) Any citizenship acquired within 1 year after birth is treated as acquired at birth. 460 (ii) Further, Section 2(3) is irrelevant here because there is no evidence that LWO acquired any citizenship within one year. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (iii) Section 2(3) does not mean that failure to acquire 465 citizenship within one year automatically proves the person was “not born a citizen of any country”; interpreting it that way would improperly rewrite the Constitution. 470 (d) The fact that biological parents remain unidentified does not entitle LWO to maintain Malaysian citizenship: (i) Citizenship by operation of law is not automatic 475 by default. (ii) The Respondents must satisfy the preconditions under Article 14(1)(b) and s.1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule FC. 480 (iii) A mere assertion is insufficient to meet the burden of proving biological parent identity/citizenship. 485 (iv) The citizenship status of at least one biological parent at the time of birth was not obtained/proven, JPN’s issuance of a birth certificate stating Bukan Warganegara is said to be correct, and LWO is not entitled to Malaysian 490 citizenship. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (14) In reply to paragraphs 20-22 of the Respondents submission, that had cited in support Chew Kah Yee v. Regional Registrar of Births and Deaths Sabah & Ors 495 [2021] 1 LNS 1529, where the Respondents submitted that because it is hard to prove a negative (being born a citizen), the court should look at which party is actually capable of getting the evidence. The Appellant submitted: 500 (a) This case is not at all applicable because it involves the issue of illegitimate children, where there is no evidence to show that both parents are legally married. (b) Tan Soo Yin v Registrar-General of Births and 505 Deaths, Malaysia, Civil Appeal No: W-01(A)-548- 10/2020, CA held that a claimant cannot be declared “stateless” under s.1(e) to gain automatic citizenship if their biological parents remain unidentified. Proving a person is stateless must be done positively based on 510 concrete ancestry facts, not on mere speculation or the absence of information. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN A NUTSHELL 515 4.3 The Respondents submitted that: (1) It is an undisputed fact that the Respondents' application is premised upon Article 14(1)(b) of the FC, read together S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w with s.1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC. 520 Based on these provisions of the FC, a person: (a) was born within the Federation of Malaysia; (b) was born after Malaysia Day, viz, 16.09.1963; and 525 (c) was not born a citizen of any other country; is a Malaysian citizen by operation of law. 530 (2) In support, the Respondents cited: (a) In Lim Jen Hsian & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [201BJ 6 MLJ 548, where it was held that for the second 535 appellant to successfully claim citizenship under Article 14(1)(b) read together with s.1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC, they must satisfy two concurrent legal concepts: 540 (i) Jus Soli (Right of the Soil): Citizenship acquired by virtue of being born in the territory. (ii) Jus Sanguinis (Right of Blood): 545 Citizenship acquired through the nationality or citizenship of the parents. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (b) Than Siew Beng & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors (supra) held: 550 "[23] Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by jus soli, i.e., place of birth; while para 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution ('not born a citizen of any country’) encapsulates the 555 requirement of citizenship by jus sanguinis, i.e., by blood or lineage. [24] Thus, it would appear that the second appellant would need to satisfy both the requirements of jus 560 soli and jus sanguinis in order to fulfil the requirements of art 14(1)(b) and para 1(e) of Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution ... [29] It is a well-established principle of law that 'he who 565 asserts must prove'. The burden of proof is on the appellants to establish a prima facie case on the balance of probabilities that the second appellant was not born a citizen of any country...” 570 (3) In the present appeal, it is not in dispute that LWO, who was born in Metro Medical Centre, Klang, Selangor, was born within the Federation of Malaysia; born on 26.10.2009, after Malaysia Day. The Respondents submitted that the first 2 requirements of Article 14(1)b) 575 and s.1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w have been met. The only issue in dispute is whether LWO was "born a citizen of any country". (4) The requirement of jus soli, which refers to the "right of 580 soil", means that the person must be born within the Federation of Malaysia. In support, they rely on the decision of CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors (supra), it was held: 585 "[53] To draw out what I consider is the correct interpretation, it is my view that we must first understand and appreciate the concepts of jus soli and jus sanguinis, which concepts all parties during the hearing accepted as being applicable to 590 this appeal… [55] To reiterate the above passage, jus soli encapsulates the notion that a person is entitled to citizenship purely on the basis of the place where he is born, irrespective of the 595 citizenship of his parents. Thus. if immigrant non-citizen parents from one country give birth to their child in a country which adopts the principle of only jus soli, the child is automatically a citizen of that country by the fact of his birth there. Jus sanguinis, on the other hand, looks only to the 600 parents' citizenship status, irrespective of where the child was born. So long as the parent (sometimes the father only, and other times either parent) is a citizen, the child is automatically entitled to 'inherit' that parent's citizenship status… 605 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w [56] Looking at the citizenship scheme and structure of the FC as a whole, it is my interpretation that the framers of the FC intended that the conferral of citizenship be crafted as widely as possible to enable all relevant 12 persons at the time of 610 formation of Malaya and later Malaysia the right to be conferred citizenship by operation of law." (5) Therefore, it was submitted that: 615 (a) Concerning jus sanguinis, as decided by the authority above, LWO is only required to establish a prima facie case on the balance of probabilities that he was "not born a citizen of any country". 620 (b) Loh Mun Hoe & Ors v Pendaftar Kelahiran dan Kematian & Ors [2022] 1 LNS 851, held that the only avenue left for the applicants would be under Article 14(b) read together with s.1(e) Part II, Second Schedule of the FC. 625 (c) The conditions precedent under this provision are that the applicants were born after Malaysia Day, born within the Federation, and were not born a citizen of any country. 630 (d) The learned Senior Federal Counsel (‘SFC’) conceded that the first two conditions are met, but not the condition “not born a citizen of any country,” which, according to the learned SFC, encapsulates 635 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w the requirement of jus sanguinis, has not been met by the applicants. (e) In the circumstances, it was argued that upon the Respondents establishing a prima facie case, the 640 burden then shifts to the appellant to prove that the applicant was born a citizen of a foreign country. (6) The Respondents further submitted that s.2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC provides 645 that a person is to be treated as having at birth any citizenship which he acquires within one year after birth. In the present case, however, it is abundantly clear that LWO has been a Malaysian citizen all his life until the Appellant revoked it when LWO attained 650 the age of 12, following investigations carried out by the Appellant in response to LWO's application for an identity card. (7) Therefore, it was submitted that: 655 (a) Since the sole link to the biological parents of LWO is severed, forcing the Respondents to prove LWO’s parents' identities is an impossible standard. (b) Therefore, based on the assertion that LWO 660 holds no other citizenship, he should be granted Malaysian citizenship by operation of law. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (c) Hence, the positive assertion made that LWO has never acquired any citizenship other than 665 the citizenship of Malaysia is not inherently incredible or inherently improbable. (8) Apart from a bare denial against the Respondents' positive assertion, no evidence was forthcoming 670 from the Appellant that LWO was born a citizen of any foreign country, despite the means and power of the Appellant as an integral part of the Ministry of Home Affairs to conduct appropriate investigations to ascertain the truth. The Appellant did not credibly 675 contradict the Respondents' positive assertion, thereby failing to disprove the Respondents' prima facie case that LWO was "not born a citizen of any country". 680 (9) Based on the facts and the law as alluded to above, the Respondents submitted that the LHCJ has not erred in law or in fact to allow the Respondents' application. 685 OUR ANALYSIS AND THE EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE [5] We refer to the relevant legal provisions: (i) Article 14(1)(b) FC provides: 690 “Citizenship by operation of law S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 14(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the following persons are citizens by operation of law, that is to say: …. 695 (b) every person born on or after Malaysia Day and having any of the qualifications specified in Part II of the Second Schedule.” (ii) Section 1(e), Part II of the Second Schedule FC states the 700 following: “CITIZENSHIP BY OPERATION OF LAW OF PERSONS BORN ON OR AFTER MALAYSIA DAY 705 1. Subject to the provisions of this Part III of this Constitution, the following persons born on or after Malaysia Day are citizens by operation of law, that is to say: … 710 (e) every person born within the Federation who is not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph.” (iii) Section 2(3) Part II of the Second Schedule FC states 715 the following: “(3) For the purposes of paragraph (e) of section 1, a person is to be treated as having at birth any citizenship which he acquires within one year afterwards by virtue of any 720 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w provisions corresponding to paragraph (c) of that section or otherwise.” [6] Concerning s.2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule FC: 725 6.1 We find that this legal principle is well established, and we do not wish to elaborate any further to ascertain whether the Respondents have discharged the burden that LWO was ‘not born a citizen of any country’. 730 6.2 We find that the LHCJ has failed to examine the facts and evidence of the case as disclosed in the affidavits filed. We find that there was no comprehensive appreciation of the evidence by the LHCJ and application of the applicable law. 735 [7] This court in Than Siew Beng & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors (supra) held that: 7.1 As a matter of law, any person seeking to rely on Art. 14(1)(b) read with section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC 740 to establish citizenship by operation of law would have to establish the requirements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis. The court had explained that: “[23] Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution encapsulates the 745 requirement of citizenship by jus soli, i.e. place of birth; while para 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution (‘not born a citizen of any country’) encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by jus sanguinis, i.e. by blood or lineage.” S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 750 7.2 This court further held that the burden was on the appellants to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the second appellant “was not born a citizen of any country”. As the identity and citizenship status of the biological parents were unknown, this court held that it was not possible to determine the second 755 appellant's lineage. 7.3 This court held that the absence of such evidence was fatal to the claim because the requirement in section 1(e) could not be satisfied without proof that the child was not born a citizen of 760 another country. It held that for this reason, the second appellant had not fulfilled the requirement to be a citizen by operation of law within the meaning of section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC. 765 [8] Lim Jen Hsian & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2017] 8 CLJ 412, observed that: “[27] Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by jus soli, i.e., by the place of birth; while 770 s. 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution (“not born a citizen of any country”) encapsulates the requirement of citizenship by jus sanguinis, i.e., by blood or lineage. [28] Thus, it would appear that the second appellant would need to 775 satisfy both the requirements of jus soli and jus sanguinis in order to fulfil the requirements of art. 14(1)(b) and s. 1(e) of Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w [29] The doctrines of jus soli and jus sanguinis were explained in the case of Singh v. Commonwealth of Australia [2004] HCA 43, 780 which was referred to in the case of Chin Kooi Nah v. Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian Malaysia (supra) at p. 764 (CLJ); p. 747 (MLJ) as follows: By the late nineteenth century, international law recognised 785 two well-established rules for acquiring nationality by birth: jus soli and jus sanguinis (the Australian Legal Dictionary (1997) defines jus soli to mean: a right acquired by virtue of the soil or place of birth. Under this right, the nationality of a person is determined by the place of birth rather than 790 parentage. Nationality is conferred by the state in which the birth takes place and defines jus sanguinis to mean: a right of blood. Aright acquired by virtue of lineage. Under this right, the nationality of a person is determined by the nationality of their parents, irrespective of the place of birth.” 795 [9] In the foregoing circumstances, it would appear that the Respondents would need to satisfy both the requirements of jus soli and jus sanguinis to fulfil the requirements of Art. 14(1)(b) and s.1(e) of Part II, Second Schedule of the FC. 800 [10] In determining whether the Respondents have discharged the burden that LWO was 'not born a citizen of any country', we have examined the facts and evidence as disclosed in the affidavits filed. We refer to the affidavits and the relevant paragraph as follows: 805 10.1 Affidavit by the Respondents affirmed on 12.12.2023 (Encl. RR PDF pg. 7-14) averred at paragraph 17 as follows: S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w “5. Kami selanjutnya menyatakan bahawa kami telah mengangkat anak kami, Leong Weng Onn ("LWO"), secara sah melalui Perintah 810 Mahkamah bertarikh 23.2.2023 yang diperolehi melalui Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Melaka Saman Pemula No.: MA-34-4-11/2022 ("Perintah Pengangkatan tersebut"). 6. Kami menyatakan bahawa LWO tersebut telah dilahirkan di Metro 815 Medical Centre Klang Selangor pada 26.10.2009 di mana LWO terse but pada asaInya telah didaftarkan sebagai anak kami dan merupakan warganegara Malaysia. … 820 17. Kami telah dinasihati oleh peguamcara kami dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa: - (a) LWO tersebut telah dilahirkan di dalam Persekutuan selepas Hari Malaysia; 825 (b) LWO tersebut pada asaInya telah didaftarkan sebagai warganegara Malaysia sehingga Sijil Kelahiran Pertama LWO tersebut dirampas pada tahun 2021 apabila LWO tersebut berumur lebih kurang 12 tahun; 830 (b) la adalah mustahil dari segi undang-undang untuk LWO tersebut memperolehi kewarganegaraan mana-mana negara lain dalam tempoh 1 tahun selepas kelahirannya; dan 835 (d) Oleh yang demikian, LWO tersebut adalah seorang warganegara Malaysia mengikut kuatkuasa: S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 10.2 Affidavit by the Appellant affirmed on 02.02.2024 (Encl. 5 RR 840 pg. 15-26) averred as follows: “10. Merujuk kepada Perenggan 7 Afidavit Sokongan tersebut, saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa saya menafikan bahawa terdapat sebarang permohonan pengangkatan Leong Weng Onn 845 dibuat setakat pengeluaran Ekshibit LWO-3 yang dirujuk dalam Afidavit Sokongan tersebut (bersamaan dengan Ekshibit ZBM-5 Afidavit Jawapan ini). Selanjutnya, saya sesungguhnya menyatakan seperti berikut: 850 10.1 Permohonan untuk menjadikan Leong Weng Onn sebagai anak angkat adalah tidak berkaitan dengan pengeluaran Eksibit LWO-3 Afidavit Sokongan tersebut kerana Pemohon-Pemohon secara suci hati dianggap sebagai ibu bapa yang sah kepada Leong Weng Onn berdasarkan maklumat ibu 855 bapa yang palsu yang diberikan oleh mereka dalam Eksibit LWO-3 Afidavit Sokongan tersebut. 10.2 Permohonan untuk menjadikan Leong Weng Onn sebagai anak angkat hanya timbul dan berkaitan apabila Eksibit 860 ZBM-13 dikeluarkan kerana secara undang-undang, Pemohon-Pemohon tidak lagi menjadi ibu bapa yang sah kepada Leong Weng Onn. 10.3 Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa Pemohon- 865 Pemohon hanya membuat permohonan untuk pengangkatan Leong Weng Onn setelah ZBM-13 dikeluarkan, iaitu sekitar bulan November 2023 dan permohonan tersebut telah dibenarkan sebagaimana Eksibit S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w LWO-2 Afidavit Sokongan tersebut. Selanjutnya, saya 870 mengulangi perenggan 8 Afidavit Jawapan ini. 10.4 Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa setelah Permohonan Pengangkatan Leong Weng Onn tersebut dibenarkan Mahkamah, satu Daftar Kelahiran yang baru 875 telah dikeluarkan atas nombor C0569/2023 yang mengandungi maklumat Pemohon-Pemohon sebagai ibu bapa Leong Weng Onn. Namun begitu, status kewarganegaraan Leong Weng Onn masih dikekalkan sebagai "bukan warganegara". 880 [Sesalinan Sah Daftar Kelahiran bernombor C0569/2023 dikemukakan dan ditandakan sebagai ekshibit "SYA-131] 10.5 Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa daftar kelahiran merupakan satu dokumen yang menunjukkan kelahiran 885 berlaku di Malaysia dan bukan dokumen yang memberikan kewarganegaraan kepada seorang kanak-kanak yang dilahirkan di Malaysia. [11] We observed: 890 11.1 Even though the Respondents who brought LWO up are Malaysian citizens, they are not LWO's biological parents. 11.2 We find that the evidence before this court undeniably reveals 895 that the biological parents of LWO are unknown to the Respondents. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 11.3 LWO does not qualify for citizenship by operation of law under s.1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the FC, as the identity 900 of his lawful and biological parents remains unknown: (1) Since citizenship by lineage (jus sanguinis) depends upon proof of a legal blood relationship to a parent possessing the requisite citizenship status, the absence of any 905 evidence as to LWO’s parentage makes it impossible to establish that connection. (2) It follows that LWO has failed to satisfy the requirements for citizenship by operation of law within the meaning of 910 s.1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the FC. 11.4 Where the identity of LWO’s lawful and biological parents cannot be ascertained, his lineage likewise cannot be determined to entitle him to citizenship by lineage jus sanguinis. 915 11.5 Accordingly, we find there is merit in this ground of appeal, and we are satisfied that the LHCJ had misdirected himself on the facts and in law. 920 [12] We find that: 12.1 The application to adopt LWO is not related to the issuance of the First Birth Certificate, as the Appellant acted in good faith, and the Respondents were taken as the legal parents of LWO 925 on the false parental information provided by them. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 12.2 The LHCJ erred by accepting the Respondents’ claim about LWO’s citizenship and descent without adequate supporting evidence. Specifically, the advertisement the Respondents relied on lacks genuine probative value, as it was published 14 930 years after LWO’s birth and only after the appellant’s own investigations had uncovered LWO’s true status. 12.3 Furthermore, we find that the Respondents’ reliance on LWO living in Malaysia and attending school in Melaka is legally 935 irrelevant; these circumstances only occurred because of the First Birth Certificate, which allegedly contained false information. Therefore, we agree with the Appellant that the Respondents’ case relies primarily on bare assertions without cogent evidence. 940 [13] In the circumstances: 13.1 We disagree with the LHCJ’s findings, and we find that LWO is not a Malaysian citizen by operation of law under Article 945 14(1)(b) read together with sections 1(e) and 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC. 13.2 The LHCJ has erred in law and in fact, in allowing the Respondents’ application notwithstanding that the principles of 950 jus soli and jus sanguinis were not satisfied. iii. AN AMENDMENT UNDER BDRA 1957 IS NOT A REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS IN A NUTSHELL 955 [14] The core issue stems from the discovery that LWO’s birth registration contained false parental information. The Appellant argues that the LHCJ erred in fact and law by ruling that LWO's citizenship was wrongfully "revoked" and by misapplying statutory 960 provisions governing register corrections. [15] The Appellant argued that the LHCJ erred in finding: (1) That LWO's citizenship was revoked solely under s.27(3) 965 of BDRA 1957 to effect the changes in the Second Birth Certificate. (2) Relied on Parliamentary records (Hansard) to state that birth certificate amendments are legally permitted only for 970 clerical or technical errors. (3) Noted a discrepancy where a "Certificate of Correction" recorded LWO’s status as "Tidak ditentukan," while the Second Birth Certificate recorded "Bukan Warganegara." 975 Due to this doubt, the LHCJ granted the benefit of the doubt to the Respondents, restoring the "Warganegara" status from the First Birth Certificate. (4) The Respondents filled out the correction application 980 without full knowledge of its nature. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (5) The Appellant asserts that LWO’s citizenship was never legally "revoked." Instead, LWO was never genuinely entitled to citizenship in the first place because the status was originally granted on the basis of entirely false 985 parental information provided by the Respondents. (6) The LHCJ misunderstood the scope of the law regarding corrections. S.27(2) BDRA 1957 handles minor technical or clerical errors, while s.27(3) BDRA 1957 explicitly 990 empowers the JPN to correct broader factual or material errors. (7) The Appellant is legally mandated under s.28 of BDRA 1957 to ensure all information in the Birth Register is 995 accurate and authentic. (8) The LHCJ relied on the case of Tan Lee Heng, which restricted birth certificate changes strictly to clerical errors using a 2006 Hansard citation: 1000 (a) The Appellant argues this was an error because the court in Tan Lee Heng failed to consider s.27(3) BDRA 1957 regarding material/factual errors. 1005 (b) The Hansard quotation used was completely out of context, as it originally pertained to a specific parliamentary question involving the religious status of three Indian siblings. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (c) Unlike Tan Lee Heng, the Respondents here had 1010 full knowledge of the JPN investigation and voluntarily applied for the correction. (9) The Appellant contends that the LHCJ's "benefit of the doubt" ruling was simplistic and ignored strict 1015 constitutional thresholds: (a) To be granted citizenship by operation of law, LWO must strictly satisfy the eligibility criteria under Article 14(1)(b), read together with s.1(e) and s.2(3) 1020 of Part II of the Second Schedule of the FC. (b) In the present appeal, because the Respondents concealed LWO’s true identity for 14 years and failed to locate the biological parents, LWO's true 1025 lineage remains unknown, meaning these constitutional requirements have not been met and prays that this appeal is allowed. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN A NUTSHELL 1030 [16] In the present appeal, LWO has been a Malaysian citizen his entire life, until it was revoked when he was around 13 years old. As such, it would be legally impossible for LWO to have acquired the citizenship of any other country since his birth, or within 1 year after 1035 his birth. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w [17] The Respondents argued: (1) They have limited means, power, and opportunities for 1040 knowledge of the biological parents of LWO. (2) As admitted by the Respondents during the investigation, LWO was brought to them by R1's cousin, who passed away on 17.10.2020. 1045 (3) As a result of the investigation, which led to the revocation of LWO citizenship: (a) The Respondents have made every effort to locate the 1050 biological parents of LWO, including advertising in the Chinese daily ‘Sinchew Edisi Metro’ on 24.01.2023 when the Respondents were applying for the adoption of LWO. (b) In the present case, the Respondents do not know the 1055 identity of LWO's biological mother. (c) It is also pertinent to note that in the present case, the only person who might have had any information about LWO's biological mother has passed away before the 1060 investigation leading to the revocation of LWO's citizenship had even commenced. (4) The Respondents' means and opportunities of knowledge of the biological mother of LWO are thus completely 1065 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w different from those of the applicants in the Than Siew Beng case: (a) It would therefore be illogical to expect the Respondents in the present case to meet the same evidential burden as 1070 the applicants in Than Siew Beng. (b) At this juncture, the Respondents submitted that in a citizenship application made under Article 14 of the FC, as long as one meets the criteria therein, the citizenship 1075 by operation of law is almost automatic and does not require any exercise of discretion by the relevant authorities. OUR ANALYSIS AND THE EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 1080 [18] In the present case, the citizenship status of LWO was changed from Malaysian citizen to non-citizen via the issuance of the New Birth Certificate: 1085 (1) The Respondents submit that the amended birth certificate of LWO under section 27(3) BDRA 1957 is tantamount to deprivation of LWO's citizenship and argued that the BDRA 1957 has no application whatsoever in determining or revoking citizenship. 1090 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (2) The Respondents submit that the Appellant's action of amending the citizenship status in LWO's birth certificate is tainted with an error of law. 1095 [19] The LHCJ at paragraph 17 to 35 has explained that the scope of s.27(3) BDRA 1957 and opined that LWO should be recognised as a Malaysian citizen by operation of law because: (1) He was not born a citizen of any other country, and it is 1100 legally impossible for him to have acquired external citizenship. (2) The main evidentiary obstacle faced was when the only person with information regarding the biological parents 1105 passed away in October 2020. (3) Because this vital witness died before the citizenship investigation began, the Respondents have no way to trace or prove the biological parents' identities. 1110 (4) Relying on established legal precedents (Loh Mun Hoe and Tan Jun Yan), the LHCJ agrees that a formal affidavit asserting that LWO holds no other citizenship, and that demanding further proof under these circumstances is an 1115 impossible and unreasonable standard. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (5) Since the only link to the biological parents is dead, the case rests on the positive assertion that LWO is otherwise stateless, qualifying him for Malaysian citizenship. 1120 [20] We disagree with the LHCJ's finding because, under the BDRA 1957, the Parliament clearly anticipated that informants might make mistakes or provide false information on a birth certificate. Section 27(3) BDRA 1957 outlines the exact process for correcting the birth 1125 register, as follows: “27. Correction of errors and alteration in the register (1)… (2)… (3) Any error of fact or substance in any register may be corrected 1130 by the Registrar General upon payment of the prescribed fee and upon production by the person requiring such error to be corrected of statutory declaration setting forth the nature of the error and the facts of the case, and made by two persons required by this Act to give information concerning the birth, still-birth or death with reference to 1135 which the error has been made, or in default of such persons then by two credible persons having knowledge to the satisfaction of the Registrar General of the truth of the case. The Registrar General may, if he is satisfied of the facts stated in the statutory declaration, cause such entry to be certified, and the day, the month, and the year when such correction 1140 is made to be added thereto. (4)….” (Emphasis added) 20.1 Based on the above, s.27(3) BDRA 1957 allows the amendment to be made in the event of any factual or substantive error. 1145 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 20.2 Section 28 BDRA 1957 outlines the duty of the Appellant to procure registration for any birth, still-birth, or death as follows: "28. Duty of the Superintendent Registrar to procure Registration 1150 (1) Notwithstanding any omission to report or to furnish information as to any birth, still-birth or death within the time required by the preceding provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Superintendent - Registrar and the Registrar to procure by all 1155 means in their power the best and most accurate information respecting any birth, still-birth or death which may have occurred within their registration areas and to cause particulars of the same to be recorded (so far as is practicable) in the manner prescribed. 1160 (2) It shall be the duty of every police officer, penghulu and headman to obtain information of every birth, still-birth and death within his respective area and also information respecting the lawful father and the mother of every child born in his area and respecting the occupier of any house in his area in which any birth, still-birth or 1165 death may have taken place and to give notice thereof to the Registrar. (3) Any police officer, penghulu or headman who has in his possession any such information and wilfully neglects or omits to disclose the 1170 same to the Registrar shall be guilty of an offence and be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty ringgit." 20.3 In the present case, we find that the LHCJ’s finding that the Appellant's action of amending the citizenship status in LWO's 1175 birth certificates is tainted with error of law is devoid of merit for the following reasons: S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w (1) The Appellant was acting pursuant to express powers under the BDRA 1957. The Appellant had amended the register of birth by correcting false information provided by 1180 the Respondents, namely, that they were parents of LWO when LWO was not born to them. (2) Since the status of the biological parents was not known, the Appellant had to carry out an inquiry under Section 1185 37B (1) of the BDRA 1957 to ascertain whether the qualifications of citizenship by operation of law were fulfilled or not fulfilled. (3) After the investigation, the Appellant found that LWO did 1190 not qualify to be a citizen by operation of law and proceeded to correct the register of births and reissued the birth certificate as required under s.14 of the BDRA 1957. 1195 (4) The LHCJ noted a discrepancy between the "Certificate of Correction," which listed LWO’s status as "Tidak ditentukan," and the Second Birth Certificate, which stated "Bukan Warganegara." Resolving this inconsistency in favour of the Respondents, the LHCJ restored the original 1200 "Warganegara" status from the First Birth Certificate. However, we find that the principle of the "benefit of the doubt" is inapplicable here, as the Respondents themselves gave the ambiguity. It was their own misrepresentation that initially misled the Appellant into 1205 S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w registering the child's citizenship status as "Warganegara." As such, the Respondents cannot be allowed to benefit from their own misrepresentation. (5) The issuance of a certificate of birth is only provided under 1210 the BDRA 1957 and nowhere else, not even in the FC. It is the Appellant's duty to keep and maintain an accurate register of births and issue birth certificates with correct information. 1215 [21] We refer to Leow Fook Keong v Pendaftar Besar bagi Kelahiran dan Kematian Malaysia, Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara Malaysia & Anor [2022] 1 CLJ 23; [2022] 1 MLJ 39, the appellant, being the child’s father, procured a DNA test and obtained a High Court declaration confirming his biological paternity: 1220 (1) He then commenced proceedings to compel the Registrar of Births and Deaths to register him as the child’s father. (2) The Federal Court held that the National Registration 1225 Department is under a statutory duty to record the particulars of the natural father of an illegitimate child, where the evidence is available. (3) Where the relevant facts are undisputed, to correct, 1230 amend, or update its records accordingly. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w We apply this principle in the present appeal. Considering the uncertainty surrounding the identity and status of LWO’s biological parents, the Appellant was required to investigate under section 37B 1235 (1) of the BDRA 1957. [22] We find that: (1) Following the investigation, the Appellant correctly 1240 concluded that LWO did not qualify for citizenship by operation of law and thereafter proceeded to correct the register of births and reissue the birth certificate pursuant to s.14 of the BDRA 1957. 1245 (2) A certificate of birth is issued only under the BDRA 1957 and not under the FC. (3) It is therefore the Appellant’s statutory duty to keep and maintain an accurate register of births and to issue birth 1250 certificates containing correct particulars. 22.1 Based on the above observations, we agree with the Appellant’s arguments and hold that correcting a birth register under sections 27(3) and 28 of the BDRA 1957 is legally permitted; 1255 therefore, this action cannot be interpreted as a revocation of citizenship. S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w 22.2 Consequently, we find merit in this ground of appeal and conclude that the LHCJ misdirected himself on both the facts 1260 and the law. F. CONCLUSION [23] Unless and until the Respondents adduce evidence establishing LWO’s lineage and the citizenship status of his biological parents at 1265 the material time, the constitutional requirement of jus sanguinis remains unsatisfied. It follows that LWO cannot be recognised as a Malaysian citizen by operation of law. For these reasons, we allowed the appeal and set aside the LHCJ's decision. We made no order as to costs. 1270 Dated 10.06.2026 1275 Hayatul Akmal Abdul Aziz Judge Court of Appeal 1280 Counsels: For the Appellant: Izzatul Nawwarah binti Idrus and Norafiah Binti Saini State Legal Advisor's Office, Melaka 1285 For the Respondents: Choo Wei Sern Messrs Sern & Lee S/N bUq3hXh8GEyyZ03bdtAA0w