Pendakwa Raya v AZIZAN BIN SAAD (KA-43-5-06/2026)

RIZAL BIN MAT ZAIN (NRIC NO: 770123-02-6157) --- RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Criminal Revision)

Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 2 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE REVISION [1] This revision application ("Revision Application") brings under judicial scrutiny an oral summary order of Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal ("DNAA") passed by the learned Sessions Court Judge 3 at Alor Setar on 9th June 2026 in Alor Setar Sessions Court Case No: KA-62D-272- 05/2026, which involved a single charge of drug possession brought by the Public Prosecutor ("Public Prosecutor") against the three Respondents, Azizan bin Saad, Mohd Hosmi bin Ali, and Rizal bin Mat Zain ("Respondents" or "Accused" in the court below). Brought pursuant to Section 323 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) ("CPC") and Section 31 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91) ("CJA 1964"), this Court sits in its revisionary and supervisory capacity to evaluate the correctness, legality, propriety, and regularity of the subordinate court's summary order. [2] The learned Sessions Court Judge ordered the summary discharge on a preliminary mention date, prior to the commencement of trial and without taking evidence from the prosecution. Proceeding upon a self-conceived preliminary objection, the subordinate court held that the charge preferred by the Public Prosecutor under Section 12(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Act 234) ("DDA 1952"), and punishable under Section 39A(2) of the same Act, was inherently defective, illegal, and prejudicial to the Respondents. The lower court identified the purported defect as the prosecution's decision to combine two distinct species of dangerous drugs— heroin (2.74 grams) and monoacetylmorphines (2.46 grams)—into a single count of possession representing an aggregate weight of 5.2 grams. The S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 3 lower court reasoned that aggregating separate substances under one count exposed the Respondents to the enhanced penal spectrum of Section 39A(2) of the DDA 1952. In the subordinate court's view, the prosecution was statutorily bound to separate the substances into two independent charges under Section 12(2) DDA, punishable under Section 39A(1) DDA, as the individual weight of each substance fell below the 5- gram threshold required to activate Section 39A(2). On this basis, the subordinate court summarily aborted the trial and granted a DNAA. [3] Sitting in its revisionary jurisdiction, this Court must determine whether the lower court's summary order constituted an impermissible usurpation of the Public Prosecutor's constitutional discretion under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, an erroneous construction of the DDA 1952, and a departure from binding appellate precedent. Additionally, this Court must evaluate the procedural sustainability of the prosecution's application for a joint trial of this drug possession charge with the related minor drug charge under Jitra Magistrate's Court Case No: KC-83D-1866-10/2025 under the same transaction doctrine.

THE FACTUAL MATRIX AND THE RELATED OFFENCES [4] To fully appreciate the legal issues that arise in this Revision Application, it is necessary to set out the factual background of the case in detail. On 13th October 2025, at approximately 1.50 pm, a team of police officers from the Narcotics Criminal Investigation Department ("NCID") of the Kubang Pasu District Police Headquarters conducted a raid on a house S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 4 located at Address No. 325, Simpang Empat Air Hitam, Mukim Jerlun, Ayer Hitam, Kedah. Upon entering the house, the police officers encountered and arrested the three Respondents: Azizan bin Saad, Mohd Hosmi bin Ali, and Rizal bin Mat Zain. A thorough search of the premises led to the discovery of a plastic packet on a table containing a mixture of white powder and compressed granular substances, as well as a separate bag containing a crystalline substance. [5] The seized substances were sent to the Department of Chemistry Malaysia for scientific analysis, which confirmed the following findings:

The white powder and compressed granular substances, weighing a gross weight of several grams, were analysed and found to contain a pure weight of 2.74 grams of heroin and 2.46 grams of monoacetylmorphines, which represents a total pure weight of 5.2 grams of heroin base.

The crystalline substance, weighing a pure weight of 21.81 grams, was confirmed to be methamphetamine, which is a dangerous drug listed under the First Schedule of the DDA 1952.

Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 5 THE SUBORDINATE COURT PROCEEDINGS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [6] Following the arrests, the three Respondents were initially produced in the Magistrate's Court of Jitra under tentative charges of drug trafficking. Specifically, they were charged under Case No: KC-81-143-10/2025 with an offense under Section 39B(1)(a) of the DDA 1952, which carried a mandatory death sentence or life imprisonment with whipping. They were also charged in the same Magistrate's Court under Case No: KC-83D- 1866-10/2025 with an offence of drug possession under Section 12(2) of the DDA 1952, punishable under Section 39A(2) of the DDA, for possessing the 21.81 grams of methamphetamine. [7] Upon the receipt of the formal chemical report from the chemist, the prosecution realised that the pure weight of the heroin and monoacetylmorphines combined did not meet the 15-gram threshold required to sustain a trafficking charge under Section 39B. Instead, the pure weight of the two substances combined was exactly 5.2 grams. Consequently, the prosecution acted in accordance with its statutory powers and reduced the main trafficking charge to a single count of drug possession under Section 12(2) of the DDA 1952, punishable under the enhanced penalty regime of Section 39A(2)(d) of the DDA, because the combined weight of heroin and monoacetylmorphines exceeded the 5-gram statutory limit. This newly reduced charge was registered in the Sessions Court of Alor Setar as Case No: KA-62D-272-05/2026. S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 6 [8] For the purpose of precision, the amended charge preferred against the Respondents read as follows: "Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 13/10/2025 jam lebih kurang 1.50 tengah hari di sebuah rumah di alamat No 325, Simpang Empat Air Hitam, Mukim Jerlun, dalam daerah Kubang Pasu, di dalam Negeri Kedah, didapati ada dalam pemilikan kamu dadah berbahaya iaitu Heroin dan Monoacetylmorphines seberat 5.2 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta 234) dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39A(2) Akta yang sama." [9] On 9th June 2026, the case was called for mention before the learned Sessions Court Judge 3 at Alor Setar. The Deputy Public Prosecutor made an oral application to amend the charge sheet by replacing the word "kawalan" (control) with the word "pemilikan" (possession) to ensure strict compliance with Section 12(2) of the DDA. The learned Sessions Court Judge allowed the amendment. However, immediately after allowing the amendment, the learned Judge suo motu raised an objection. Without hearing any argument on the merits, and despite the prosecution's readiness to proceed to trial, the learned Judge made a finding that the prosecution's act of combining two distinct dangerous drugs (heroin and monoacetylmorphines) into a single count of possession was illegal and highly prejudicial to the Respondents. S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 7 [10] On the basis of this finding, the learned Sessions Court Judge summarily ordered a Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (DNAA) under Section 173(g) of the CPC. Crucially, the subordinate court failed to provide any written grounds of judgment or legal reasoning to justify this summary order. The entire decision was recorded as a brief oral minute in the record of proceedings. Aggrieved by this summary discharge, the Public Prosecutor filed the present Revision Application (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) to reinstate the charge and proceed to trial.

THE SCOPE OF REVISIONARY AND SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION [11] The High Courts in Malaysia are clothed with extensive and non-negotiable revisionary and supervisory powers over all subordinate criminal courts. This jurisdiction is explicitly conferred by Section 323(1) of the CPC, which provides that a judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any subordinate criminal court for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of that subordinate court. Section 31 and Section 35(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ("CJA 1964") complement this statutory power by authorising the High Courts to issue orders and directions to subordinate courts as the administration of justice requires. [12] In exercising this revisionary power, the High Court must distinguish its role from that of an ordinary appellate court. A revision is not a backdoor appeal. Rather, it is a supervisory mechanism designed to ensure that S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 8 subordinate judiciaries act within the strict boundaries of their statutory powers, and to correct manifest errors of law that result in a miscarriage of justice. This distinction was authoritatively explained by Nordin Hassan JCA (now, FCJ) in the Court of Appeal decision in Public Prosecutor v. Abul Hassan Mohamed Rashid [2022] 9 CLJ 502, where the court dealt with the finality and limits of coordinate High Courts' jurisdictions. While one High Court Judge cannot overrule or review the decision of another High Court Judge of coordinate jurisdiction (as established in Lim Hung Wang & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 7 CLJ 318), the High Court has an absolute, independent duty to supervise and correct any illegality committed by subordinate courts. [13] In the present case, the complete absence of written judicial reasoning by the learned Sessions Court Judge represents a major procedural irregularity. Subordinate courts are legally bound to record their reasons for judicial orders, especially when taking the extreme step of summarily discharging accused persons before a trial. As the Supreme Court held in Public Prosecutor v. Zainuddin [1986] 2 MLJ 100, subordinate courts are creatures of statute and do not possess any inherent authority to truncate criminal proceedings or discharge an accused without hearing the prosecution's evidence, unless the charge is demonstrably groundless on its face. The failure of the Sessions Court to provide written reasons or to allow the prosecution to present its case represents a serious misdirection that demands the revisionary intervention of this Court.

Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 9 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 39A(2)(d) OF THE DDA 1952 [14] The first legal issue to be resolved is whether the plain language of Section 39A(2)(d) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 authorises the Public Prosecutor to aggregate the weights of heroin and monoacetylmorphines into a single count of drug possession. The learned Sessions Court Judge held that because heroin and monoacetylmorphines are listed as separate items in the First Schedule of the DDA, they represent two distinct species of dangerous drugs that cannot be combined in a single charge. With respect, this finding represents a fundamental failure to apply the elementary rules of statutory construction. [15] Section 39A of the DDA 1952 governs increased penalties where the subject matter of the offence is a prescribed amount of certain dangerous drugs. Section 39A(2) explicitly provides that every person found guilty of an offence against this Act, where the offence is not punishable with death, shall be punished with life imprisonment or a term of not less than five years, and with whipping of not less than ten strokes, where the subject matter of the offence is: "…

a total of 5 grammes or more in weight of heroin, morphine and monoacetylmorphines or a total of 5 grammes or more in weight of any two of the said dangerous drugs;…" [Emphasis added] S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 10 [16] The plain and literal language of paragraph (d) is grammatically unequivocal. The legislature's use of the conjunctive word "and" and the explicit phrase "a total of 5 grammes or more in weight of heroin, morphine and monoacetylmorphines" represents a clear statutory mandate. The statute does not say "5 grammes of heroin, 5 grammes of morphine, OR 5 grammes of monoacetylmorphines." It explicitly uses the word "total" and lists the three related substances together. This shows that the legislature intended to allow the weights of these closely related chemical substances to be added together to determine whether the 5-gram threshold for enhanced penalties has been met. This is a common-sense approach, as monoacetylmorphine is a direct chemical derivative and byproduct of heroin base. [17] This Court is bound by the principles of statutory construction set out by the Federal Court in Tebin Mostapa v. Hulba-Danyal Balia & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 561, where Vernon Ong Lam Kiat FCJ authoritatively established that when the statutory language is plain, clear, and unambiguous, the court must give effect to its ordinary grammatical meaning and has no power to read words in or out of the statute: "[30] ... First, in construing a statute, effect must be given to the object and intent of the Legislature... Where the words of a statute are unambiguous, plain and clear, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning... It is not the province of the court to add or subtract any word; the duty of the court is limited to interpreting the words used by the Legislature and it S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 11 has no power to fill the gaps disclosed. To do so would be to usurp the function of the legislature." [Emphasis added] [18] By holding that the prosecution was legally bound to separate heroin and monoacetylmorphines into two distinct charges under Section 39A(1), the learned Sessions Court Judge completely ignored the plain words of Section 39A(2)(d). The lower court's interpretation would render the word "total" and the conjunctive reference to the three substances in paragraph

entirely redundant. This violates the cardinal rule of construction that the legislature does not write redundant words, and that every word in a statute must be given its full effect. As the Federal Court held in Gan Joon Zin v. Fong Kui Lun & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 729, any attempt by a court to rewrite a clear statutory provision under the guise of interpretation or equity represents an impermissible act of judicial legislation and a usurpation of parliamentary power.

THE PRECEDENTIAL FORCE OF ABD TALIB BIN BAKRI [2020] [19] The learned Sessions Court Judge's decision is not only contrary to the plain text of the DDA 1952, but also constitutes a direct departure from binding appellate precedent. The precise issue of whether the prosecution should or could combine heroin and monoacetylmorphines into a single count of possession was authoritatively resolved by the Court of Appeal in the case of Abd Talib bin Bakri lwn Pendakwa Raya [2020] 3 MLJ 777. S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 12 [20] In Abd Talib bin Bakri [2020], the appellant had been prosecuted and convicted on two separate charges of drug possession: the first charge involved 24.01 grams of heroin, and the second charge involved 5.18 grams of monoacetylmorphines. Both substances had been recovered from the same plastic packets during a single raid. On appeal, the Court of Appeal raised a serious constitutional concern regarding the split prosecution. Delivering the judgment of the court, Kamardin Hashim JCA observed on page 785: "[10] Setelah menyemak rekod rayuan, kami mendapati bahawa dadah berbahaya yang menjadi hal perkara dalam pertuduhan pilihan pertama adalah dadah berbahaya jenis heroin dan hal perkara dalam pertuduhan kedua adalah dadah berbahaya jenis monoacetylmorphines berada dalam kumpulan dadah berbahaya yang sama iaitu 'heroin base'. Oleh itu, kami telah menimbulkan persoalan mengapakah dua jenis dadah berbahaya tersebut... adalah ditemui dari dalam satu paket plastik berwarna perak... sewajarnya pertuduhan pilihan pertama merangkumi campuran kedua-dua jenis dadah berbahaya tersebut sepertimana kebiasaan yang dilakukan oleh pihak pendakwaan dalam kes-kes lain. Perkara ini boleh dilakukan melalui peruntukan di bawah seksyen 39A(2)(d) Akta." [Emphasis added] [21] The Court of Appeal went on to explain the crucial legal rationale behind this recommendation. Under Section 37 of the DDA 1952, the prosecution of an accused on two separate counts of possession for S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 13 substances recovered from the same transaction triggers separate, independent statutory double-presumptions of possession and knowledge. Applying multiple sets of double-presumptions to the same transaction represents an unfair compounding of penal liabilities, which violates the accused person's fundamental right to equality and a fair trial under Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. The Court of Appeal stated at paragraph 11: "Jika ini tidak dilakukan oleh pihak pendakwa, adalah dikhawatiri bahawa telah berlakunya suatu pencabulan terhadap hak kesamarataan sepertimana yang termaktub di bawah perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan..." [Emphasis added] [22] The ratio decidendi of Abd Talib bin Bakri [2020] is clear, absolute, and binding on all subordinate courts. Far from being "prejudicial" or "illegal," the act of combining heroin and monoacetylmorphines into a single count of possession under Section 39A(2)(d) is the exact, legally approved method recommended by the Court of Appeal to protect the constitutional rights of the accused. By declaring this combined charge to be illegal and prejudicial, the learned Sessions Court Judge acted in direct opposition to binding judicial precedent. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, subordinate courts do not have the liberty to disregard, distinguish, or refine appellate rulings that are directly on point. The lower court's failure to follow and apply Abd Talib bin Bakri [2020] represents a grave error of law that must be reversed.

Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 14 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS [23] The third legal issue to be addressed is the constitutional boundary between executive prosecutorial discretion and judicial intervention. Under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, the Attorney General (who also acts as the Public Prosecutor under Section 376(1) of the CPC) is vested with absolute, wide, and unfettered discretion to institute, conduct, or discontinue any criminal proceedings for any offence. This constitutional mandate is the cornerstone of the criminal justice system in Malaysia, establishing a clear separation of powers between the executive branch (which prosecutes crimes) and the judicial branch (which adjudicates them). [24] This principle of absolute prosecutorial discretion was authoritatively affirmed by the then Federal Court in the landmark case of Long bin Samad & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152, where Suffian LP held on page 158: "In our view, this clause from the supreme law clearly gives the Attorney General very wide discretion over the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions. Not only may he institute and conduct any proceeding for an offence, he may also discontinue criminal proceedings that he has instituted and the courts cannot compel him to institute any criminal proceeding which he does not wish to institute or to go on with any S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 15 criminal proceeding which he has decided to discontinue." [Emphasis added] [25] The absolute nature of this discretion means that the courts have no power to interfere with, dictate, or direct how the Public Prosecutor should frame a charge, provided the charge preferred is valid and complies with the written law. It is the exclusive constitutional prerogative of the Public Prosecutor to decide whether to charge an accused person with a single aggregated count under Section 39A(2)(d), or to proceed with separate charges. The subordinate courts cannot step into the arena of prosecution and strike down a valid charge merely because the presiding judge believes, on a subjective or hypothetical basis, that a different combination of charges would be more "equitable" or "fair" to the accused. [26] In the present case, by summarily discharging the Respondents on a mention date because he disagreed with the framing of the charge, the learned Sessions Court Judge directly encroached upon the executive province of the Public Prosecutor. The lower court's action represents a flagrant violation of Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and a breach of the doctrine of separation of powers. The courts are gatekeepers of legality, not directors of prosecution. Once a valid charge that complies with the text of the DDA 1952 is preferred, the trial court is bound to proceed to hear the evidence and determine the case on its merits. It has absolutely no power to abort the proceedings at the outset on the basis of a self-created procedural objection.

Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 16 SUBORDINATE COURTS' LACK OF INHERENT JURISDICTION [27] In support of this Revision Application, the learned deputy public prosecutor for the Applicant forcefully submitted that the subordinate court acted completely without jurisdiction in ordering a summary discharge on a mention date. This Court agrees. There appears to be a persistent misdirection among some subordinate court judges that they possess an "inherent power" or "inherent jurisdiction" to strike out or dismiss criminal charges at any stage of proceedings if they perceive some form of prejudice or abuse of process. Sitting in revision, this Court must firmly and unequivocally dismantle this erroneous notion. Subordinate courts in Malaysia—including Sessions Courts and Magistrates' Courts—are statutory bodies created by Parliament under the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (Act 92). Unlike the superior courts (the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Federal Court), which are established under the Federal Constitution and possess inherent powers to prevent abuse of their processes, subordinate courts possess no inherent jurisdiction whatsoever. [28] This fundamental principle was settled by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision in Karpal Singh & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 MLJ 544. Dealing with a preliminary application to strike out criminal charges in a Magistrate's Court, Abdul Hamid Omar LP held on page 548: "Our view is that the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction is hardly applicable in the subordinate courts but the High Court may invoke such prerogative powers in rare instances where it is S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 17 right to do justice to the accused... The inherent power apparently cannot be invoked to override an express provision of law or when there is another remedy available.” [Emphasis added] [29] The Supreme Court went on to explain the strict procedural boundaries governing subordinate courts under the CPC. Section 173 of the CPC outlines the exhaustive, mandatory procedure to be observed by Magistrates and Sessions Court Judges in summary trials. There is no provision anywhere in the CPC that allows a subordinate court to strike out or discharge a charge on a preliminary mention date, except under the narrow exception of Section 173(g), which allows a court to discharge an accused if it considers the charge to be "groundless." A charge is only groundless if, on its face, the facts alleged do not disclose any offence known to law. In the present case, the charge of drug possession under Section 12(2) and Section 39A(2)(d) of the DDA was perfectly valid, clear, and disclosed a serious statutory offence. It was definitely not "groundless." [30] This Court accepts the Applicant’s submission that, applying the principles in Karpal Singh [1991], the learned Sessions Court Judge lacked both statutory authority and inherent jurisdiction to grant a summary DNAA on a mention date. If the Respondents believed that the charge was prejudicial or that the statutory double-presumptions were being unfairly applied, their proper remedy was to raise these arguments as a matter of defence during a full trial on the merits, or to apply to the High Court for a revision. By acting suo motu to strike down the charge, the learned S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 18 Sessions Court Judge acted completely outside his statutory jurisdiction, rendering the summary order of DNAA null, void, and ultra vires.

JOINT TRIAL AND THE "SAME TRANSACTION" DOCTRINE [31] Having established that the drug possession charge under Case No: KA-62D-272-05/2026 must be reinstated and remitted for trial, this Court must now address the prosecution's application to hold a joint trial of this charge with the related minor drug charge currently registered under Jitra Magistrate's Court Case No: KC-83D-1866-10/2025. The prosecution contends that both offences were committed in the course of the "same transaction," thereby satisfying the statutory criteria for a joint trial under Section 170 of the CPC. [32] Section 170 of the CPC provides that when more persons than one are accused of different offences committed in the "same transaction," they may be charged and tried together or separately as the court thinks fit. The term "same transaction" is not defined in the CPC. However, judicial precedent has established a clear, multi-pronged legal test to determine whether different offences are part of the same transaction. As the then Federal Court held in Long bin Samad [1974], the primary factors to be considered are:

Proximity of time;

Proximity or unity of place;

Continuity of action; and

Community of purpose or design. [33] In applying the four-fold test laid down in Long bin Samad [1974] —

proximity of time, (b) proximity or unity of place, (c) continuity of action, and (d) community of purpose — this Court observes that both the Alor Setar Sessions Court Case No: KA-62D-272-05/2026 and the Jitra Magistrate's Court Case No: KC-83D-1866-10/2025 arise from the exact same raid conducted on 13th October 2025 at approximately 1.50 pm at No. 325, Simpang Empat Air Hitam. There is perfect temporal and physical proximity here, with zero gap in time or location. The continuity of action and community of purpose are fully established as all drug exhibits were seized during the same physical transaction from the exact same Respondents. [34] The drug possession offences are completely bound together as parts of a single, continuous transaction during the police raid. Where different offences arise from the same transaction and are bound by a common, continuing design, the law mandates they be tried together rather than in a split fashion, as supported by Amrita Lal Hazra v. Emperor (1915) ILR 42 Cal 957 and Jaafar bin Ali v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 4 MLJ 281. Separating these trials between the Magistrate's Court in Jitra and the Sessions Court in Alor Setar would result in a substantial duplication of S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 20 evidence, the calling of identical Narcotics Criminal Investigation Department raiding officers and chemists and run a real risk of conflicting factual findings by different courts. [35] This Court must explicitly clarify that the observations made herein regarding the "same transaction" doctrine are strictly confined to evaluating the procedural sustainability of a joint trial under Section 170 of the CPC. Nothing in this judgment should be construed as a finding of fact, an expression of opinion, or a judicial determination on the truth, weight, or admissibility of the prosecution's allegations against the Respondents in both the main weight-aggregated charge and the Jitra minor charge. The prosecution remains fully burdened to prove every statutory element of the respective charges beyond a reasonable doubt during the trial on the merits, and the learned Sessions Court Judge shall determine all factual and legal issues afresh, entirely unencumbered by the preliminary observations contained in this Revision Application.

CONCLUDING ORDERS AND DIRECTIONS [36] For the comprehensive statutory, procedural, and constitutional reasons set out in detail above, this Court finds that the Revision Application preferred by the Public Prosecutor is highly meritorious, and that the summary order of DNAA passed by the subordinate court was fundamentally illegal, irregular, and contrary to law. Sitting in its revisionary and supervisory capacity under Section 323 of the CPC, this Court hereby makes the following formal orders: S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 21 a) This Revision Application by the Public Prosecutor is allowed in its entirety. b) The summary order of Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (DNAA) passed by the Alor Setar Sessions Court 3 on 9th June 2026 in Case No: KA-62D-272-05/2026 is hereby quashed, vacated, and set aside. c) The original charge against the three Respondents —Azizan bin Saad, Mohd Hosmi bin Ali, and Rizal bin Mat Zain—under Section 12(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, and punishable under Section 39A(2)(d) of the same Act, is reinstated in its entirety without any amendment or modification. d) Case No: KA-62D-272-05/2026 is hereby revived under its original registration number and remitted to the Alor Setar Sessions Court for an immediate, expeditious trial on the merits. e) Pursuant to Section 170 and Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the minor prosecution against the three Respondents under Jitra Magistrate's Court Case No: KC-83D- 1866-10/2025 is hereby transferred to the Alor Setar Sessions Court 3, to be tried jointly with reinstated Case No: KA-62D-272- 05/2026 before the same learned Sessions Court Judge. S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 22 [37] This Court directs that the parties shall appear before the Alor Setar Sessions Court on the next available mention date, to be fixed within seven

days from the date of this order, for the purpose of scheduling the joint trial. The Sessions Court is directed to proceed with the joint trial with all reasonable dispatch, in strict compliance with the criminal procedure and the guidelines set out herein. Dated: 27th July, 2026 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- YA. Dr. Hj. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Solicitor for the Applicant : Khairul Anuar bin Abd Halim & Muhammad Fahmi bin Kamaluddin Deputy Public Prosecutors Solicitor for the Respondents : Unrepresented S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q High Court of Malaya (Alor Setar) — Criminal Revision No: KA-43-5-06/2026 Grounds of Judgment (Semakan Jenayah No: KA-43-5-06/2026) | Page 23 Table of Authorities Cases Abd Talib bin Bakri lwn Pendakwa Raya [2020] 3 MLJ 777 Amrita Lal Hazra v. Emperor (1915) ILR 42 Cal 957 Gan Joon Zin v. Fong Kui Lun & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 729 Jaafar bin Ali v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 4 MLJ 281; [1998] 4 CLJ 327 Karpal Singh & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 MLJ 544 Lim Hung Wang & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 7 CLJ 318 Long bin Samad & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152 Public Prosecutor v. Abul Hassan Mohamed Rashid [2022] 9 CLJ 502 Public Prosecutor v. Zainuddin [1986] 2 MLJ 100 Tebin Mostapa v. Hulba-Danyal Balia & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 561 Statutes Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91) Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Act 234) Federal Constitution Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (Act 92) S/N KhvoH6wgWkmeStNllFv/Q