the inescapable inference from the fact that the bag was so placed in relation to the appellant in the car as has been described can only be that he knew of the existence of the bag. From the fact that he allowed the bag to remain there while he was driving, the inescapable inference is that he willed the bag to be there in order to guard it and that therefore he was in custody and control of it. [37] In PP v. Foo Jua Eng [1965] CLJU 137; [1965] 1 LNS 137, Raja Azlan Shah J (as HRH then was) ruled that the conduct of the accused in trying to close the door on PW1 (police officer) and the physical proximity of the accused to the drugs proved the element of possession. [38] We are of the view that in the instant appeal, all the evidence adduced at the trial clearly gave rise to an inescapable inference that the accused had 'means rea possession' of the packages containing the cannabis. All the evidence gave rise to a strong inference that the accused was in possession with knowledge of the contents of the packages. At this point, there was no evidence to suggest otherwise. The known facts support such an inference.” [28] Selanjutnya, mengenai akses pula, tiada apa-apa keterangan yang menunjukkan terdapat pihak ketiga yang mempunyai akses kepada bilik tersebut semasa serbuan dilakukan. Jumlah dadah yang ditemui adalah besar dan banyak termasuk kelengkapan lain seperti sealer (ekshibit P23). Kesemuanya berada di dalam keadaan terbuka dan tidak tersembunyi. Mengikut SP2 barang-barang kes tersebut boleh dilihat dengan mata kasar. Maka dengan itu, jika sekali pun pemilik rumah tidak dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan tersebut atau terdapat dakwaan yang mengatakan bahawa ada orang lain mempunyai akses kepada rumah tersebut bukanlah suatu fakta yang mampu mengugat kekuatan keterangan kes pendakwaan seperti yang telah diterangkan di atas. [29] SP2 juga mengatakan semasa serbuan dilakukan, Murukan a/l Ramakrishnan dan tertuduh kelihatan takut, panik dan terkejut. Murukan a/l Ramakrishnan cuba menutup pintu dan pada masa yang sama, SP2 nampak tertuduh sedang duduk di atas lantai bilik utama tersebut dan setelah itu kedua-dua mereka berjaya ditangkap. Hasil siasatan lanjut oleh SP3 mengesahkan bahawa tertuduh adalah penghuni dan tinggal di rumah tersebut semasa kejadian. Keberadaan tertuduh di dalam bilik tersebut, tingkah laku mereka berdua sebelum tangkapan serta halangan yang dibuat oleh Murukan a/l Ramakrishnan untuk menafikan akses pihak polis ke dalam bilik tersebut jelas membuktikan bahawa mereka mempunyai jagaan atau kawalan, serta pengetahuan terhadap dadah-dadah berbahaya tersebut untuk tujuan pengedaran. [30] Menyentuh mengenai isu pengetahuan tertuduh terhadap dadah berbahaya yang dirampas, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Rahman bin Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337; [2007] 5 MLJ 1 memutuskan seperti yang berikut: "To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental element which must both be present before possession is made out. The accused must not only be so situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then in the absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend to deal with it as if it were my own and accordingly I am in possession of it. On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in a room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other people then the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shows such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it is found show such an intention." [31] Tingkah laku Murukan a/l Ramakrishnan dan tertuduh semasa tangkapan ini juga adalah relevan mengikut seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950. Hence, it is for the accused to explain his conduct and not for the court to offer one. [32] Seiringan dengan itu, di dalam kes Parlan Dadeh v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 717, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[38] In this case the reaction of the appellant in looking stunned or shocked upon being approached by the police is clearly admissible under s. 8 since it has a direct bearing on the fact in issue as the drugs found were tucked away in the front of the jeans worn by him. The explanation for his reaction must therefore be offered by he himself as required by s. 9. The court cannot, on its own, offer an explanation for his reaction. However, in his defence the appellant did not offer any explanation at all for his reaction upon being approached by the police. It can therefore be validly used as evidence against him. The inference to be drawn from the evidence of conduct of the appellant against the background of the other evidence is that he knew what he was carrying (see DPP v. Brooks [1974] 2 All ER 840). It follows that the stand taken by the appellant in relation to the evidence of conduct is not sustainable. Be that as it may, the evidence of conduct in this case is not very significant in view of the manner in which the appellant carried the drugs on his person from which it can reasonably be inferred that he had knowledge of the drugs in his possession (see the cases referred to earlier, and, in particular, Tunde Apatira & Ors v. PP [2001] 1 CLJ 381 and PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337).” [33] Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Badrulsham bin Baharom [1987] 1 LNS 72 [1987] CLJU 72, Lim Beng Choon H memutuskan seperti berikut: “It is appropriate at this stage for me to deal with two further points raised by the learned defence counsel in his submission. First, he drew the attention of this court to the fact that the accused did not put up a struggle or make any attempt to run away. The short answer to this point is that from the evidence I am satisfied that the accused had no opportunity to do so as he was suddenly surrounded by PW3 and PW5 before he could even begin to realize that he was in danger of being arrested. As he was caught red-handed with the dangerous drugs in his possession and he had knowledge of the said drugs, what else could he do apart from saying that there was nothing in the bag. In the present case, the prosecution had clearly established that the accused was in actual physical custody and control of P3 and its contents. From the totality of the evidence, the prosecution had also clearly established that the accused had the necessary knowledge of P6A-H and the nature of the dangerous drugs in question.” [34] Di dalam kes G Vasan Gunasegaran v. PP [2018] 1 LNS 1604, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Mohd Zawawi Salleh HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[26] It was clearly proved that the appellant was the sole occupant of WXV 8540 and was having the sole control of the vehicle from at about 4.00 p.m, until the time of his arrest whilst at the driver's seat inside the vehicle at about 5.20 p.m. by PW3 and his team. The keys and remote were recovered from the appellant. He was in physical proximity to the plastic bags containing the impugned drugs. All these factors, taken together, showed that the appellant could have dealt with the impugned drugs, though he was not the owner of the vehicle. For the same reason, the appellant was thus also having custody or control of the two plastic bags containing the said drugs. drugs (see PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif (supra); Parlan Dadeh v. PP [2008] 6 MLJ 19; Khairuddin Hassan v. PP [2010] 6 MLJ 145 and Aedy Osman v. PP [2011] 1 CLJ 273). [27] The presence of the two plastic bags inside the vehicle which were under the exclusive control of the appellant at the material time, and the fact that he needed to guard the plastic bags, must necessarily give rise to a strong inference that the appellant had the requisite knowledge that the two plastic bags contained the said drugs. As said by the Federal Court in PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif (supra): …again knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it can be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Again, the possible variety of circumstances which will support such an inference is infinite... [28] The fact that the plastic bags were found hidden in the secret compartment would not assist the appellant to negate such an inference (see Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR 633 and PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif (supra)). From the oral evidence of PW3 and the photographs, it could be seen that the red coloured plastic was sticking out from the black coloured lid. The contrast of red accent against the neutral background is easily perceived, thus making the presence of plastic bags more noticeable. From the evidence of PW3, it is clear that little effort was required to uncover what was hidden in the secret compartment.” [35] Mahkamah Rayuan didalam kes Harvinder Singh a/l Joginder Singh v. PP and Another Appeal [2018] 6 CLJ 307 dalam membuat dapatan mengenai pengetahuan mengenai dadah berbahaya yang dijumpai di bahagian kaki penumpang bahagian hadapan kenderaan yang dipandu oleh perayu di dalam kes tersebut telah menegaskan seperti berikut: "[59] It is apparent that the accused was solely in control of the motorcar from the time he borrowed the motorcar from SP4 at about 6.30pm, until the time of his arrest whilst at the driver's seat inside the motorcar at about 9pm by SP8 and his team (according to SP4; or from 8.30pm/8.40pm to 9pm according to the accused). By reason of the same, he was thus also having in his custody or control the two plastic bags containing the said drugs placed at the footrest of the front passenger seat - see PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337; Parlan Dadeh v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 717; [2008] 6 MLJ 19; Khairuddin Hassan v. PP [2010] 1 CLJ 833; [2010] 6 MLJ 145; and Aedy Osman v. PP [2011] 1 CLJ 273. The presence of the two plastic bags inside the motorcar which was under the exclusive control and use by the accused at the material time, must necessarily give rise to a strong inference that the accused had the requisite knowledge that the two plastic bags contained the said drugs. As said by the Federal Court in PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif (supra) ".... again, knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it can be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Again, the possible variety of circumstances which will support such an inference is infinite... … [62] Even if the accused's possession of the said motorcar was only for about 20 minutes as contended by the defence and picked up by the learned trial judge (from between 8.30pm or 8.40pm when he took the car from SP4 to 9pm when he was arrested by SP8), the accused still has all the time in the world to pick up the said drugs along the way before his arrest. 20 minutes is not a short time though. Only the accused has the answer where he went to after picking up the motorcar from SP4 up to the time of his arrest by SP8. The law does not require SP8 to follow the accused from the moment the accused left SP4's house to make up a case against him. The law neither requires the police witnesses to physically witness the accused picking up the said two plastic bags along his journey to fasten culpability upon him." [Penekanan diberikan] [36] Di dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2010] 1 MLJ 741, 745, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh James Foong HMP (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[4] First, he contended that the High Court and the Court of Appeal had failed to consider the contemporaneous conduct of the appellant in not trying to escape or putting up a struggle with the police when confronted by PW5 and his men or attempting to disassociate or discard the backpack containing the dangerous drugs. Such conduct, if considered by the courts below, could infer that the appellant had no knowledge of the said drugs in the backpack. [5] It is our view that in order to draw a favourable inference from the appellant’s contemporaneous conduct, his action or inaction must be examined in the light of the situation at the material time. The area where the appellant was confronted by PW5 was the arrival gate of an incoming flight in the KLIA. This was the only exit point where passengers disembarking the plane can enter the KLIA terminal. It is common knowledge that the area was tight and restricted with hardly any room for the appellant to make a successful escape even if he had tried. From here the appellant was then taken by PW5 and his men to PW5’s office in the KLIA. The approximate walking distance was 600– 800 metres. Here again the appellant’s chances of a quick getaway were minimal since he was escorted and was within the restricted vicinity of the KLIA building. And, if the appellant were to attempt to throw away or disassociate himself with the backpack during this entire duration described it would evidently be noticeable. Of course, since the drugs were so cunningly concealed, there could be no necessity to take such drastic actions which may attract instant suspicion. So, against these circumstances, the appellant’s docile conduct throughout the period described could not have inferred an absence of knowledge of the said drugs. For this reason there is no misdirection by the courts below.” [37] Di dalam kes Samundee Devan a/l Muthu Kerishnan v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 CLJ 269; [2010] 2 MLJ 607 Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “We are also of the view that the contemporaneous conduct of the appellant in attempting to run away when PW7 identified himself as 'police' is relevant and admissible pursuant to s. 8 of the Evidence Act 1950 under the circumstances of the instant appeal. Such conduct is of course not to be taken in isolation but together with all the other circumstances of the case. That would be the correct approach to circumstantial evidence (see Chan Chwen Kong v. Public Prosecutor [1962] CLJU 22; [1962] MLJ 307)." [penekanan ditambah]