Pendakwa Raya v Andrew Tan Jun Yee (B-05(LB)-424-09/2017)

Andrew Tan Jun Yee, the Respondent, was charged in the High Court at Shah Alam, with three charges for trafficking in dangerous drugs. The Charges were as follows: First Charge [BA-45A-97-09/2015] “Bahawa kamu pada 10 Februari 2015, jam lebih kurang 4.00 petang, bertempat di hadapan kedai No. 23, Jalan USJ 2/2D, USJ 2, Subang Jaya, di dalam Daerah Petaling Jaya, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Cannabis seberat 220 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.” Second Charge [BA-45A-98-09/2015] “Bahawa kamu pada 10 Februari 2015, jam lebih kurang 4.50 petang, bertempat di alamat No. 4, Persiaran 4, Wangsa Baiduri, Jalan SS12, Subang Jaya, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Cannabis seberat 1344 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.” 3 Third Charge [BA-45A-99-09/2015] “Bahawa kamu pada 10 Februari 2015, jam lebih kurang 4.50 petang, bertempat di alamat No. 4, Persiaran 4, Wangsa Baiduri, Jalan SS12, Subang Jaya, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Cannabis seberat 250 gram dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”

At the end of the prosecution’s case the learned trial judge held that the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the Respondent on the Second and Third Charges. Hence, the Respondent was acquitted and discharged without his defence being called. There is no appeal against that decision.

However, the learned trial judge found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against the Respondent on the first charge. Thus, the Respondent was asked to enter his defence.

At the end of the defence’s case, the learned trial judge held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Respondent. The Respondent was acquitted and discharged.

Dissatisfied, the prosecution now appeals. Having heard the submissions and having carefully scrutinised the records of appeal we unanimously dismissed the appeal. We now give our reasons. 4

On 10.2.2015 at about 4.00 pm, acting on a tip off, one Inspector Mohd Syaipul Riza bin Abu (PW2) conducted an operation called “OPS TAPIS” in USJ2 area.

PW2 earlier received information to the effect that there will be a drug trafficking activity in the neighbourhood of USJ 2/2C area involving one Chinese male. PW2 and his team went to the said area and carried out a 15 minutes’ surveillance before a white Honda Civic approached the area.

The car then stopped in front of a dobby outlet. Whilst his team immediately blocked the car, PW2 approached the driver side and knocked on the window. He introduced himself and showed his authority card.

When the respondent opened the car’s door, PW2 saw the Respondent was wearing a brown sling bag with a brand name Louis Vuitton Paris (LV). PW2 ordered the Respondent to step out of the car and conducted a body search on him. Nothing incriminating was found.

According to PW2, the Respondent was still wearing the sling bag. He then ordered the Respondent to surrender the sling bag to him, which the Respondent did. When PW2 inspected the content of the sling bag, he found a translucent plastic bag with a “Green Earth” brand in which contained a compressed slabs of plant material 5 suspected to be cannabis, a bunch of keys and a remote of some kind. PW2 alleged that the Respondent seemed surprised with the finding.

The Respondent then lead PW2 and his team to his house at No. 4, Persiaran 4, Wangsa Baiduri, Jalan SS12, Subang Jaya, Petaling Jaya, Selangor as stated in the 2nd and 3rd charge.

The bunch of keys found in the sling bag was used to open the door of the house. Upon further inspection inside of the house, PW2 and his team found 2 more items suspected to be cannabis in two different places in the house.

The Respondent was then arrested and the said exhibits were sent to the Chemistry Department for analysis. Upon analysis by the chemist, Puan Suhana binti Ismail (PW3) the dried leaves in the exhibit P25B, P26A, P26B, P26C, P26D, P27A(I-II) with a net weight of 220 grams, 1344 grams and 250 grams respectively were found to be cannabis as defined in section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

As stated earlier, the learned trial judge found that there was a prima facie case against the Respondent on the first charge and he called the accused to enter his defence. For ease of reference the gist of the learned trial judge’s ground is produced as follows: - 6 “Melalui keterangan yang disampaikan oleh saksi-saksi khususnya SP2 dan SP5, fakta jelas menunjukkan bahawa tertuduh sememangnya mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang-barang kes dadah yang dijumpai dalam beg silang (P34) berdasarkan fakta:

Tertuduh ditangkap seorang diri ketika sedang berada dalam kereta Honda di tempat kejadian .

(ii) Tertuduh dilihat oleh SP2 dan SP5 sedang menyandang beg silang (P34) di mana terdapat dadah jenis cannabis seberat 220 gram di dalam beg tersebut.

(iii) Kunci rumah beserta remote juga dijumpai dalam beg silang (P34) dan tertuduh sendiri telah membawa SP2 dan pasukannya ke alamat No. 4, Persiaran 4, Wangsa Baiduri, Jalan SS12, Subang Jaya. Tertuduh membawa SP2 dan pasukannya ke sebuah bilik di tingkat atas rumah tersebut.

(iv) Pada masa kejadian, hanya tertuduh sahaja pada waktu itu. Melalui keterangan yang ditampilkan itu, jelas menunjukkan tertuduh sememangnya mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap beg silang (P34/ serta is kandungannya yang ketika itu disandangnya. Milikan terhadap dadah-dadah tersebut yang tersimpan di dalam beg silang (P34) tersebut tidak boleh dinafikan ianya milik tertuduh. Dadah tersebut disimpan di dalam beg silang yang sedang dipakainya. Hakikat ini diperkukuhkan melalui keterangan SP2 dan disokong oleh keterangan SP5. 7 At page 32 RA. Volume 1, the learned trial judge held that: KEDAPATAN MAHKAMAH “Setelah saya meneliti keterangan yang disampaikan melalui 7 orang saksi pendakwaan ini, meneliti kepada kedudukan kesemua 55 ekshibit yang dikemukakan itu, menimbangkan kepada penghujahan yang telah disampaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak, menimbangkan kes ini secara keseluruhannya, mengaplikasikan prinsip “maximum evaluation of all witnesses” sepenuhnya seperti yang ditetapkan di bawah undang-undang, dengan ini memutuskan bahawa di akhir kes pihak Pendakwaan ini, pihak Pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan wujudnya suatu kes yang “prima facie” sepertimana pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh bagi pertuduhan pertama sahaja. Lantas tertuduh diperintahkan membela diri terhadap pertuduhan pertama.” Defence Case [15] The Respondent gave evidence on oath. He also called one defence witness, PW2. The Respondent’s defence was that he worked in Nando’s Restaurant. Ezenwa Chukwunwike Victor (“Victor”) was his workmate. They have known each other for 5-6 months. Victor stayed at his house a week before his arrest. On 10.02.2015, Victor was with him in the car and it was Victor who brought the sling bag (P34). However, as soon as he parked the car at the opposite of the shop lot, Victor had suddenly thrown his sling bag to the front passenger’s car floor and bolted from the car. After Victor fled, he was approached by PW2 and his team. According to the Respondent, Victor was also arrested later that day. The sling bag (P34) was found by PW2 on the car floor on the front passenger seat 8 and not on the Respondent’s body. The Respondent denied that the sling bag ever belonged to him. Victor had access to the car, the house as well as the sling bag and Victor was never called to testify in court after his arrest. The Respondent called his sister as his witness (DW2). DW2, who also lives in the same house, testified that Victor was there for a week before the Respondent’s arrest. The Respondent also denied that he drove a white Honda Civic on that day. He testified that he drove a white Honda Accord and that the car was not his, but belongs to his family. Finding of Trial Judge at the end of defence’s case [16] The learned trial judge found that the Respondent has successfully raised reasonable doubts against the prosecution’s case. [17] Having evaluated the defence critically and carefully, the learned trial judge came to a finding that the accused’s defence of another person, namely, Victor was together with the accused in the car, was neither an afterthought nor an invention. The learned trial judge came to a finding that that defence is not merely a bare denial. This can be seen at the Record of Appeal, Volume 1 pages 42 to 45 which is reproduced below: “Melalui keterangan-keterangan yang ditampilkan, adalah jelas beg LV P34 dan dadah yang dijumpai dalam beg tersebut (P25B) bukanlah dimiliki oleh SD1. Victor telah mencampakkan beg LV P34 tersebut ke tempat letak kaki penumpang hadapan sebaik sahaja beliau menyedari kehadiran pihak polis dan dia terus melarikan diri. Kejadian ini telah 9 berlaku sangat cepat dalam sekelip mata, di mana SD1 tidak sempat bertanya Victor apa yang berlaku. Sejurus kemudian, terdapat pihak polis telah menyerbu, membuka pintu kereta Honda Accord tersebut dan menarik SD1 keluar dari kereta. Keterangan menunjukkan beg LV P34 dan juga isi kandungannya bukan dimiliki oleh SD1 dan ia tidak dijumpai pada badan SD1. Ia dimiliki oleh Victor yang turut berada di dalam kereta Honda Accord yang dipandu SD1. Sebaliknya, beg LV P34 tersebut telah dijumpai oleh pihak polis berada di atas lantai di Bahagian tempat duduk penumpang hadapan. Keterangan juga menunjukkan kereta Honda Acord yang digunakan oleh SD1 pada hari kejadian adalah bercermin gelap di mana ianya tidak mungkin untuk sesiapa yang berada di luar kereta tersebut melihat keadaan di dalam kereta tersebut dengan jelas. Fakta ini juga turut disokong oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan sendiri seperti pegawai serbuan SP2 dan anggota tangkapan SP5 selain daripada SP6 dan SP7. Pada hari kejadian, tertuduh telah bersama-sama dengan seorang lelaki Nigeria yang dikatakan bernama Victor berada di dalam kereta Honda Accord tersebut. Victor ini telah melarikan diri dengan cara keluar daripada kereta tersebut sebaik sahaja menyedari kehadiran pihak polis di kawasan kejadian. SP2 dan SP5 tidak dapat melihat dan memastikan kewujudan Victor di tempat kejadian memandangkan kereta yang digunakan oleh SD1 pada masa itu adalah bercermin gelap. SD1 langsung tidak cuba untuk melarikan apabila serbuan dibuat oleh pihak polis. Tiada sebarang pergelutan berlaku antara SD1 dengan anggota serbuan. SD1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau terkejut apabila beliau diberitahu oleh pihak polis bahawa dalam beg LV P34 tersebut mengandungi dadah. Sesuatu yang jelas bahawa SD1 tidak mempunyai 10 pengetahuan bahawa terdapat barang di dalam beg LV P34 yang dicampak oleh Victor selepas beliau melarikan diri keluar dari kereta Honda Accord yang dipandu oleh tertuduh. Meneliti kepada pembelaan yang dikemukakan adalah sesuatu yang jelas bahawa pembelaan tertuduh ini adalah sesuatu yang sangat konsisten dan ianya bukan satu rekaan. Kesimpulannya, berdasarkan kepada keterangan bersumpah tertuduh, pihak pembelaan didapati telah Berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan.” [18] Accordingly, the case against the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt on the trafficking charge under section 39B(1)(a) of the Act. The learned trial judge then made the order of discharge and acquitted the Respondent of the charge at the end of the defence’s case. The Appeal by the Prosecution. [19] The learned DPP sought to attack the findings of the learned trial judge and canvassed five (5) grounds before us, as follows:

Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila membuat penilaian semula kes pendakwaan yang mana terdapatnya kes prima facie dan responden diarahkan untuk membela diri;

(ii) Yang Arif Hakim telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila membuat dapatan bahawa pembelaan responden bukan rekaan, penafian atau “afterthought” sedangkan keterangan saksi 11 pendakwaan SP2 (pegawai serbuan) kekal utuh iaitu hanya responden sahaja berada di kereta semasa ditahan;

(iii) Yang Arif Hakim telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila menerima kewujudan “Victor” yang merupakan suatu pembelaan fikiran semula (afterthought) kerana responden gagal untuk mengemukakan maklumat penuh berkenaan watak “Victor” sepertimana prinsip kes Teng Howe Sing v. PP (2009)3 CLJ 733.

(iv) Yang Arif Hakim telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila membuat dapatan beg LV (Ekshibit P34) yang dijumpai semasa responden ditahan bukan milik responden sebaliknya milik “Victor” sedangkan keterangan SP2 jelas dan kukuh menyatakan beg LV (Ekshibit P34) itu berada bersilang pada badan Responden semasa ditahan; dan

Yang Arif Hakim telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila menerima versi pembelaan yang seorang bernama “Victor” berada di dalam kereta Honda Civic yang dikepung oleh pihak polis sedangkan keterangan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan iaitu SP2 dan SP3 menunjukkan hanya responden sahaja ditahan sewaktu serbuan dibuat dan tiada individu lain di dalam kereta tersebut. Our Findings [20] The central issue in this instant appeal is whether the learned trial judge had correctly evaluated the whole of the evidence adduced by the prosecution as well as the Respondent during trial. 12 [21] It is trite law that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution throughout the trial to prove its case against the accused. That said it is also incumbent upon the trial court, as enjoined in section 182 A of the Criminal Procedure Code, to also carefully evaluate and re-evaluate the whole of the evidence of the prosecution in conjunction with the defence evidence, to determine two concomitant issues, first whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and whether a reasonable doubt has been raised as to the guilt of the accused. [22] In PP v. Bernadito L Alenjandro JR (2015) 1 LNS 1507 the position was explained as follows, which we agree: “We, therefore, find no merit in the argument that the trial judge made two inconsistent findings, one at the end of the prosecution case and another at the end of the defence case because it is trite that at the end of the defence case the trial judge must re-evaluate all the evidence of the Prosecution and Defence and ask himself whether the Prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt or as the case may be whether the Defence had cast a reasonable doubt on the Prosecution Case. [See Seow Hoong v. PP (2002) 1 LNS 338]. It is obvious that a finding made at the end of the Prosecution Case is not necessarily immutable because if this is so, it would not be necessary to re-evaluate all the evidence at the end of the Defence case and in so doing may make a finding which is at variance with an initial finding made at the question of inconsistency does not, therefore, arise.” [23] In the instant appeal, we are of the considered view that the trial judge had made a specific finding of facts based on the evidence adduced. We find that the learned trial judge had further evaluated the evidence of PW7. It is clear that the learned trial judge had tested 13 the evidence of the prosecution with that of the defence. In particular, the learned trial judge had come to a finding that the evidence of DW2 and PW7 taken together had supported and corroborated the evidence of the accused on the existence of Victor. Therefore, with respect, we are unable to agree with the submission that the learned trial judge had erred, when he decided that the defence of the accused, i.e. Victor was together in the car, was neither an afterthought nor an invention. And certainly, it cannot by any means be characterised as a bare denial. [24] We have carefully scrutinised the notes of proceeding and found that the accused had put forward by way of questions or suggestions to the prosecution’s case at the earliest stage on this aspect of the defence. This can be seen at:

Cross-examination of PW2 at RA, Colume 2(A) pages 54, 56, 57, 58 and 59, at RRT(1) pages 7 and 8;

(ii) Cross-examination of PW5 at RA, Volume 2(B) pages 96, 97, 98 and 99 at RRT(1) page 27;

(iii) Cross-examination of PW6 at RA, Volume 2(B), pages 115 and 120, at RRT(1) pages 33, 34 and 36i; and

(iv) Cross-examination of PW7 at RA Volume 2(B), pages 138 and 143 at RRT(1) page 45, 46. [25] We also find that the accused in his defence has has not wavered in his evidence on the ownership of the LV Bag, P34. He 14 maintained at all times that the LV Bag did not belong to him and he did not have any knowledge as to the existence of the drugs in P34. (see Sepideh Golrokhfar Abdollah v. PP (2016) 3 CLJ 895). [26] We noted from the record of proceedings when DW2 gave evidence, neither her testimony nor her credibility was seriously challenged. This showed that DW2 was credible and her evidence was correctly accepted by the learned trial judge. [27] At this juncture, it is germane that we refer to the oral evidence of DW2 as follows: “Examination-in-chief of DW2 Sekarang kita terus kepada tarikh 10.02.2015, tarikh adik kamu Andrew ditangkap. Lebih kurang pukul 3.00 petang, adakah kamu melihat adik kamu Andrew di rumah? Ada. Masa itu apa yang berlaku? Masa itu adik saya datang tanya saya untuk gunakan kereta Honda Accord dan Victor minta tumpang kereta untuk keluar. Adakah adik kamu keluar bersama Victor pada hari itu: [RA, Volume 2(C), pg 198] Adakah adik kamu keluar dengan Victor itu dalam kereta Honda Accord? 15 Ada. [RRT(1), pg 55] Apakah keadaan cermin kereta itu? Tinted gelap [RA, Volume 2(C), pg 199] Kamu beritahu kereta bertinted gelap. Soalan saya jika seorang itu berada di luar kereta pada siang hari, boleh Nampak ke dalam atau tidak? Tak mungkin, sebab ia memang gelap. [RA, Volume 2(C), pg 200] Q: Kamu beritahu adik kamu Andrew dia telah beritahu nak keluar jumpa dengan Ah Chong, dan Victor telah ikut bersama. Ada kamu nampak Andrew keluar dari rumah dan duduk dalam kereta dan bersama Victor dan beredar, ada kamu nampak pada hari itu? Adakah kamu Nampak adik kamu Andrew bawa apa-apa beg bersama dengan dia? Dia tidak ada bawa. Macam mana dengan Victor, ada dia bawa apa-apa benda? Dia ada bawa sling bag jenama LV. Q. Warna apa? Brown colour. 16 Kalau saya tunjuk satu beg itu boleh kamu camkan? Sila lihat beg P34 ini, adakah ini beg yang kamu maksudkan Victor bawa? YA [RA, Volume 2(C), pg 201 & 202] Re-examination of SD2 Beg P34 itu, adakah kamu lihat adik kamu pegang itu beg? Tidak pernah. Boleh beritahu Mahkamah, ada kamu Nampak Victor ikut adik kamu menaiki Honda Accord masa dia keluar pada hari itu? A: Ya, saya Nampak. [RA, Volume 2(C), pg 210] [28] In our view, the learned trial judge is accordingly correct in relying on the DW2’s aforesaid testimony as being credible, consistent and she was unshaken by the cross examination. [29] As regard the character of Victor, it is apparent that the Respondent had mentioned right after he was arrested by PW2. The Respondent informed PW2 that the LV Bag, P34 did not belong to him but it was Victor’s and Victor had run away. 17 [30] The Respondent also mentioned “Victor” to the investigating officer PW7 which eventually lead to the arrest of Victor. This fact was admitted by PW7 and established from the arrest report of Victor, (P53). [31] In this connection, PW 7 testified, at Pg 17 and 18, RRT(2), as follows: Berapa tangkapan sebelum pertuduhan? Tangkapan pengadu 1, tangkapan saya sendiri

Siapa nama tangkapan? Saya perlu tengok repot. Rujuk repot? Victor. Bila buat tangkapan? 19/2/2015 nombor repot Bandar Sunway 1682/15. Warganegara? Negeria. Kamu tangkap sendiri? 18 Di mana? Restoran Borneo Rainforest Café. Apa berlaku dengan tangkapan ini? Dia dapat bond jamin polis bawah 49C Mahkamah PJ untuk dijadikan saksi Pendakwaan. [RRT(2), pg 17 & 18] When Cross-examination PW7 stated as follows: Kamu ada buat satu lagi tangkapan dan laporan polis P53 telah ditandakan. Mengikut keterangan kamu, tangkapan ini lelaki Nigeria ada kena-mengena dengan kes kita hari ini, setuju? Ya, setuju. [RA, Volume 2(B), pg141] Setuju, kamu telah membuat siasatan dan tangkapan ini kerana semasa kamu soal siasat Tertuduh, Tertuduh telah memberitahu semua barang kes dadah dalam kes ini bukan kepunyaan beliau tetapi kepunyaan Victor lelaki Nigeria? Dia ada beritahu semua dadah ini bukan kepunyaan dia tetapi kepunyaan Victor. Setuju. Bagaimana kamu telah dapat menangkap lelaki Nigeria ini 9 hari kemudian? Melalui handphone OKT. Q: Apa maksud kamu? 19 Hasil soal siasat, dia telah mendedahkan nama itu. Saya telah siasat samada wujud atau tidak lelaki ini. Saya cuba order barang dengan dia menggunakan phone ini, lelaki Nigeria itu setuju untuk hantar barang ini ke Sunway. [RA, Volume 2(B), pg142] Semasa kamu telah tangkap lelaki Nigeria ini, kamu telah minta OKT camkan lelaki ini? Ya, saya mengambil gambar dengan menggunakan telefon bimbit dan saya suruh OKT camkan. [RA,Volume 2(B), pg 143] Adakah buat siasatan sama ada betul telefon bimbit OKT yang ada nombor tangkapan Victor, telefon Victor ada terima panggilan daripada OKT? Bila kamu rampas kedua-dua handphone terutama telefon bimbit lelaki Nigeria, memang sms itu wujud? Setuju. [RRT(1), pg 45] Setuju kerana memang laki Nigeria ini wujud seperti diberitahu oleh OKT dan beliau telah ditangkap, beliau adalah seorang saksi yang amat penting dalam kes ini? … Di mana lelaki Nigeria ini sekarang? Sejak dapat arahan DPP untuk jadikan saksi utama, dia dapat bon 49C. Lepas itu, saya tukar, digantikan dengan Inspektor Suhairi. [RRT(1), pg 46] 20 [32] From the evidence above, it clearly shows that there is no doubt that Victor exists. In short it is not made up by the accused. Hence, the learned trial judge cannot now be said to have erred when he considered the major role played by Victor and subsequently invoked the presumption under section 144(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the prosecution for failing to produce or offer Victor to the defence. [33] Further, we find that there were two material contradictions within the prosecution’s case. According to PW2, the car involved in this case was a Honda Civic. This was supported by PW5. Examination-in-chief of PW2 Kereta jenis apa? Honda Civic warna putih. [RA, Volume 2(A), pg 18] Cross-examination of PW2 Saya cadangkan kereta yang kamu tangkap OKT bukan kereta jenis Honda Civic? Tidak setuju. Kamu pasti? [RA, Volume 2(A),pg 55] 21 Cross-examination of PW5 Kamu lihat sebab kereta itu adalah Honda Civic? That is your main reason? [RRT(1), pg 27] Saya cadangkan kereta itu bukan kereta Honda Civic? Saya tidak setuju [RA, Volume2(A), pg 97] [34] However, PW7 admitted that a Honda Accord was given to him but not Honda Civic. On the other hand, both PW6 and DW2 stated that they had a Honda Accord and not a Honda Civic. The Respondent’s own evidence was that he drove Honda Accord. Examination-in-chief of PW6 Ada keterangan dari polis mengatakan, anak Puan kena tangkap dalam kereta Honda Civic warna putih no. pendaftaran WA8258S. Puan tahu tak ini kereta siapa? Honda Accord itu adalah kereta saya. [RA, Volume 2(A), pg112] 22 Cross-examination of PW6 Pada bulan Februari, keluarga kamu ada 2 kereta itu kereta Honda Accord dan satu lagi Proton Wira ini, setuju? Ya, setuju. [RA, Volume 2(A), pg 114] Setuju, kereta kamu Andrew pakai pagi itu, adalah jenis Honda Accord dan bukan Honda Civic warna putih? Ya, setuju. [RRT(1), pg 34 & 35] Cross-examination of PW7 Kereta yang ditahan adalah kereta jenis Honda Civic warna putih? Setuju. Bila kamu terima kereta ini, apakah model kereta ini? Honda Accord. Setuju rupa bentuk Honda Civiv dan Honda Accord jauh berbeza? [RA, Volume 2(A), pg 137] [35] Apart from that, we find that there is another contradiction as to where the Respondent had stopped his car when the raid was carried out. 23 [36] PW2 had testified that the Respondent was driving a Honda Civic, he parked the car in front the laundry shop and the Respondent was arrested there as well. PW2 made a marking “Y” to show the whereabouts of the Respondent. (see P6(1) at RA, Volume 3, pg 14). [37] On the other hand, PW7 gave evidence that the Respondent was arrested on the opposite direction. PW7 prepared the sketch plan (P50) to show the place where the Respondent parked his car and he was arrested, which was at the opposite of the shop lots but not in front of the shop lots. [38] As such, the prosecution had proffered two sets of conflicting evidence on a material aspect of its case. [39] Such were the discrepancies in the prosecution’s case. [40] We have made these observations to underscore our view that the learned trial judge had correctly taken into account all the evidence presented to the court and correctly decided that the appellant had failed to prove the element of custody, control and knowledge. [41] With the gaps in the prosecution’s case, a conviction will not be the option available to the learned judge as it would have been an unsafe one -(see PP v. Lee Eng Kooi (1993) 2 CLJ 534; Adzahaar Bin Ahmad v. PP (1996) 4 MLJ 85; Lee Ah Seng v. PP (2007) 5 CLJ 1). 24 CONCLUSION [42] For the reasons adumbrated above we unanimously dismissed the prosecution’s appeal and affirm the acquittal and discharge of the respondent. We so order. Dated: 9th November 2020 sgd AHMAD NASFY HAJI YASIN Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya 25 Counsel/Solicitors For the Appellant: Nik Shahril bin Nik Ab Rahman Deputy Public Prosecutor (Attorney General’s Chambers) For the Respondent: Rajpal Singh (Tiew Poh Nee with him) (Messrs. Rajpal, Firah & Vishnu)