(vi) To reiterate, in quasi-criminal proceedings where, personal liberty is at stake, the standard of procedural compliance demands that the act of contempt be described with absolute precision and seamless consistency across all cause papers. The applicant’s failure to maintain a singular, clear, and unambiguous definition of the actus reus reduces the charge to a state of speculative flux. By vacillating between a targeted attack on judicial personalities under Enclosure 5 and a generalized critique of procedural steps in the Notice of Application, the cause papers lack the strict material particularization required to establish a charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, such ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the respondent. [19] From a holistic evaluation, the applicant’s case suffers from fatal procedural non-compliance in these material aspects: First, under Order 52 rule 3(2), it is a mandatory requirement that the facts particularized in the applicant’s primary Statement (Enclosure 5) be expressly verified by an accompanying affidavit. A perusal of the affidavits filed by the applicant reveals a total failure to verify the Statement itself. As established by the Court of Appeal in Uthayakumar Ponnusamy v Abdul Wahab Abdul Kassim & Ors [2016] 7 CLJ 896, the absence of an affidavit verifying the core Statement deprives the application of its mandatory evidentiary foundation. Second, the applicant has impermissibly attempted to supplement and expand the factual matrix of the charge by introducing a police report in the Deputy Registrar’s affidavit, an allegation completely absent in the Order 52 Statement. This court aligns itself with the principle in Peguam Negara Malaysia v Tan Sri Muhammad Shafee Md Abdullah [2019] CLJU 2110, which mandates that the act of contempt must be fully described within the Statement itself; an accompanying affidavit cannot be utilized to cure, patch, or alter the boundaries of the charge. To reiterate, the respondent must at once be given full knowledge of the charge he is facing to enable him to answer to it accordingly. On these substantive procedural infractions alone, the application is fundamentally flawed. [20] Given that the burden of proof rests squarely on the applicant to prove the allegation of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard of procedural compliance expected cannot be relaxed. In this context, it would be prudent to refer to the case of Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 458 (FC), wherein the Federal Court re-stated the proposition that in cases of criminal contempt strict compliance with the procedural safeguards is essential and the earlier cases on criminal contempt must be read in the light of this decision. [21] Hence, the lack of strict particularization; the failure of the author of the Statement to verify its contents; the reliance on detached deponents lacking direct locus standi; and the impermissible inclusion of subjective legal deductions collectively destroy the integrity of the cause papers. In a quasi-criminal motion, any ambiguity or procedural doubt must be resolved completely in favour of the subject and on these procedural grounds alone, the application rests on highly precarious foundations. Having noted these serious procedural deficiencies, I leave the matter as it is and move directly to the jugular of the application, to wit, the substantive allegations of contempt. Explanation by the Respondent and Absence of Mens Rea [22] Even if the court were to look past the terminal procedural defects, the substantive merits do not favour the applicant. The respondent has provided a candid, thorough, and contextually grounded explanation of his actions during the Town Hall forum on 30th September 2023. The respondent’s remarks concerning the non-recusal of the learned trial and appellate judges were not scurrilous fabrications designed to lower the authority of the institution; rather, they were opinions anchored strictly upon formal legal submissions and recusal applications that had already been extensively litigated in open court and widely disseminated in the public domain. The respondent’s closed-door commentary on concluded judicial recusal applications falls squarely within the boundaries of fair critique and public interest feedback protected under Article 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution. [23] To sustain a conviction for criminal contempt of this nature, the applicant bears the heavy burden of proving both the actus reus and the mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt (see Zainur Zakaria v PP [2001] 1 MLJ 619; Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241). Aside from proving the utterance of the words, it must be established that the respondent acted with the specific, subjective intention to subvert, disrupt or interfere with the due administration of justice (see Achieva Technology Sdn Bhd v Lam Yen Ling & Ors [2009] 8 MLJ 625). [24] The evidence before this court indicates a total absence of such intent. The respondent’s explanation, which this court accepts, reveals that his objective was to address constitutional and systemic issues within a specific forum, without any malice or improper motive directed at the personalities of the judiciary. As observed by Harun Hashim SCJ in Attorney General v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167, mere robust or defamatory abuse of a judge, even if made out, does not equate to criminal contempt unless it is specifically calculated to impede the performance of judicial duties. Given that the proceedings in the SRC Appeal were completely finalized, the respondent’s remarks could not have been intended to, nor could they practically, interfere with the course of justice. Absence of Prejudice, Derailment, or Scandalisation [25] The claim that the administration of justice was derailed, sullied, or scandalised by the respondent’s town hall remarks does not hold water when viewed against the factual timeline and the record of the courts. [26] The timing of the publication demonstrates that the respondent’s remarks did not, and could not, affect the trajectory or outcome of either proceeding referenced by him. The Federal Court coram in the SRC International appeal considered and dismissed the recusal application in limine. The then Chief Justice decided the matter strictly within the confines of the law, holding that the impugned Facebook postings did not establish a real danger of bias, completely unheeding of external public opinions or clamour. The SRC International case survived the full appellate process through the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court, culminating in a final, unassailable decision. [27] In the 1MDB trial, the learned trial judge Colin Sequerah J (now FCJ) was entirely unprejudiced. His Lordship had evaluated and dismissed the recusal application, observing that because his professional relationship with the witness at Messrs. Zain & Co had ceased in 2008, there was no communication, professional or personal, capable of conjuring a real danger of bias. The trial then proceeded unhindered until its complete fruition. At the date of the oral hearing of this committal application, the trial was at the close of the defence case; and at the time of penning these full grounds, the case has reached its absolute completion, resulting in a conviction and sentence according to law and currently pending hearing of an appeal to the Court of Appeal by the accused. [28] Because both recusal applications were lawfully determined and the trials proceeded unhindered, the criticisms levelled by the respondent did not sully the administration of justice. The processes achieved their final legal thresholds completely unaffected by public opinion. Where, then, is the prejudice? Fait accompli. The contempt complained of has no direct, adverse bearing on the courts in which those trials took place. What might have been cautiously regarded as potentially scandalous or sub judice during the active infancy of a trial loses its sting once the matter is determined. In that context, the observation by Justice Munby in Harris v Harris [2001] 3 WLR 765 is relevant, that much of what would formerly have been regarded as scurrilous abuse has today to be recognised as amounting to no more than trenchant criticism. [29] Furthermore, the allegation that the respondent scandalised the judiciary by raising these points is fundamentally untrue. The respondent’s core assertion, that a judge shall not judge his own cause, is an undeniably true, universal concept of natural justice and the rule of law. While standard legal practice dictates that the judge who is the subject of a recusal motion must be the one to hear and determine it, the respondent, as member of public cannot be penalised for lacking familiarity with the intricate technical nuances of interlocutory procedure. Ignorance of the law may be no excuse, but a citizen’s lack of familiarity with complex procedural machinery is highly excusable when evaluating whether they possessed the requisite criminal intent to undermine the bench or the judiciary. The Impact of Case Finality on Public Commentary [30] The pivot upon which this case turns is whether the principle of finality of judgments immunizes subsequent commentary from the law of contempt, or whether the institutional need to preserve public confidence extends indefinitely post-judgment. [31] The applicant heavily relies on the landmark decision of the Federal Court in Attorney-General of Malaysia v Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd [2021] 2 MLJ 452, which reaffirmed that public commentary undermining the system of justice will not be tolerated, as well as the strict strictures historically applied in cases such as Attorney-General & Ors v Arthur Lee Meng Kuang [1987] 1 MLJ 207 and PP v Kalpanath Singh [1995] 4 MLJ 553. The classical position in our jurisprudence establishes that the effect upon the ordinary man is the primary litmus test. If a post-judgment statement objectively tends to bring the court into disrepute, the speaker’s subjective lack of malice will not absolve them. [32] However, this court must interpret those authorities through the lens of a maturing democratic society and the evolving boundaries of constitutional free speech. We must remind ourselves that the finality of a judgment marks the precise point at which a legal matter or issue transforms from a private dispute into a permanent public act done in the seat of justice. [33] It is here that the immortal words of Lord Atkin in the Privy Council case of Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322 at page 335, command attention: "But whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong heeded are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune … Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men." [34] Once the gavel has fallen and the appellate avenues are determined or structured, the court’s legal reasoning enters the public domain. It must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny of ordinary citizens. To hold that any robust, outspoken, or even fundamentally wrong-headed critique of a concluded matter automatically scandalises the court would be to convert a shield for justice into an instrument of censorship. The Principle of Judicial Self-Restraint [35] In evaluating the threshold for criminal contempt in the modern era, this court adopts the robust philosophy by Lord Denning MR in R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 2) [1968] 2 QB 150 at page 155 which is as follows: "It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication." On our shores, the above was applied in Lim Kit Siang v Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamed [1987] 1 MLJ 383 at page 385 (paragraph F right), where His Lordship Harun J (as he then was) said: “… It is important that the courts should be the subject of free criticism. It is equally important that the dignity and authority of the court should be maintained. It is the reconciliation of these two principles that involves the difficulty in deciding cases of contempt of court.” [36] True judicial dignity is not a fragile product that can or should be enforced by the threat of incarceration. It is earned through the transparency of our proceedings, the intellectual rigor of our judgments, and our unwavering impartiality. It cannot be mandated by silencing critics. [37] Furthermore, courts must recognise the practical counter-productivity of over-enforcement. Initiating the State’s punitive machinery against post-judgment critics frequently induces an amplification effect, drawing disproportionate public attention to the original critique and casting the judiciary as an institution that is overly thin-skinned, defensive, and resistant to accountability. [38] While judges are professionally precluded from descending into the public arena to answer their critics, this structural silence must be recognised as a monument of institutional strength, not vulnerability. This court finds great suasion in the enduring constitutional philosophy articulated by Murphy J of the High Court of Australia in Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238 which deeply mirrors the underlying protective intent behind modern freedom of speech and expression. As profoundly observed by His Lordship, the administration of justice is not served by shielding the judiciary from vigorous public scrutiny, for public confidence cannot be maintained by stifling criticism. In a modern democratic society, the threshold for scandalising the court must remain exceptionally high. While the majority of our Federal Court in Attorney-General of Malaysia v Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd [2021] 2 MLJ 452 focused heavily on the immediate need to protect public confidence against unsubstantiated, destructive allegations of corruption, this court must emphasise that where post-judgment commentary does not impute corruption or systemic partiality, the law of contempt should not be expanded to stifle uncomfortable or outspoken procedural critique. [39] This court further adopts the enlightened perspective that the extraordinary summary jurisdiction to punish for contempt of scandalising the court must be exercised with the utmost judicial self-restraint. Moreover, the foundational elements for the quasi-criminal offence of scandalising the court require a strict, unyielding application of the criminal standard of proof, specifically requiring clear proof of actual knowledge and specific mens rea before a citizen’s liberty can be compromised. To emphasise, true judicial independence and public confidence are more effectively secured through the intellectual integrity of our judgments and absolute procedural transparency then through the punitive suppression of dissent. Where post-judgment commentary remains within the boundaries of a good faith expression of opinion on facts already alive in the public domain, the threshold of criminal contempt is not crossed. The Modern Approach [40] With the advent of social media, public comments and vigorous criticisms concerning high-profile decisions have long existed in the public domain. This long-standing public discourse forms the very backdrop of modern free speech. Viewing the transcript of the town hall sessions in its entirety, it is apparent that the criticisms levelled by the respondent against the interlocutory rulings remain within reasonable limits. [41] Our jurisdiction embraces the constitutional mandate of freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution. While this right is not absolute and is circumscribed by the law of contempt to prevent genuine obstruction or the subversion of justice, an overly broad, sensitive application of these laws would induce a chilling effect on public discourse, discouraging legitimate societal scrutiny of the judiciary. Conversely, the court must distinguish between a genuine risk to justice and uncomfortable public critiques. [42] The modern approach to the law of contempt is that courts are satisfied to leave public opinion attacks or derogatory comments to the judgment of history. This court stands firmly anchored by the timeless common law principles articulated in Ambard v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago referred to above: "The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong heeded are permitted to err therein … Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men." [43] This approach demands a profound degree of institutional resilience. As judges, resilience is not merely a desirable trait; it is part and parcel of our sacred vocation. Our constitutional duty demands that we adjudicate cases with absolute independence, unwavering impartiality, and unassailable integrity, standing resilient in the face of adversity, external pressures, or the shifting tides of public opinion. [44] This court also adopts the classic reasoning of Lord Denning MR in R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 2), establishing that the court will never use its extraordinary contempt jurisdiction to protect its own vanity: "We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication." [45] This court further adopts the modern, enlightened perspective articulated in the dissenting judgment of Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ in Attorney-General of Malaysia v Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd, which mirrors the standard required in a modern democracy. Her Ladyship had decided on the following terms at paragraph 187: “We have also emphasised that the jurisdiction to prosecute for contempt should not be utilised, as we have said on several occasions, to restrict honest criticism, no matter how bluntly or sometimes crudely put, provided it is premised on rational grounds and is calculated to provide feedback on the functioning of the courts, the administration of justice or the basis or result of a particular judgment. Any such discussion conducted bona fide, for and in the public interest is entirely warranted. I say this to re-emphasise the fact that these cases of scandalising the court contempt should in point of fact be an extremely rare occurrence.” [46] Hence, Prosecution for contempt must never be deployed to restrict honest, personal opinions premised on facts already widely discussed in the public domain. Ultimately, the greatest attribute of a judge, the very hallmark of judicial wisdom and skill, lies within the judgment they ultimately deliver. A meticulously reasoned, legally sound, and publicly comprehensible judgment naturally dispels unjustified criticism, directly counters false narratives, and silences the din of public outcry far more potently than any external, punitive restriction on speech. The clear and resourceful judgments delivered by the High Court in the 1MDB trial and the appellate corams in the SRC International cases stand as their own unyielding defence, proving to the public that the administration of justice is guided strictly by law and facts, completely unaffected by external clamour. [47] On a strict evaluation of the evidence before this court, the respondent’s comments are undoubtedly provocative, sharp and highly critical of the legal conclusions achieved by this court in the underlying trial. They are not couched in the preferred lexis of polished legal diplomacy. [48] However, a clear line must be maintained between speech that insults a judge’s institutional stature and speech that actively subverts the administration of justice. The standard for a finding of criminal contempt post-judgment must match the rigorous clear and present danger threshold recognised in other jurisdictions. As established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bridges v California 314 U.S. 252 (1941), albeit persuasive, out of court publications or comments regarding the courts cannot be punished as contempt under a mere reasonable tendency standard to cause disrespect. Rather, the law demands a showing that the substantive evil to the administration of law is both extremely serious and the degree of imminent peril to the functioning of the court is extremely high. Where a trial has fully concluded and its processes operate unimpeded, a citizen’s outspoken critique, like that of the respondent, can never satisfy this stringent legal test. Findings [49] In sum total, the applicant contends that the respondent’s post-judgment commentary, by its derogatory tone and targeted criticism, constitutes a public wrong calculated to lower the authority of this court, impede the administration of justice, and systematically erode public confidence in the judicial institution. The respondent, conversely, pleads that the impugned statements fall squarely within the protection of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution, representing fair, objective and permissible post-verdict critique. He merely expressed personal opinions following interlocutory recusal rulings on facts deep within the public domain. [50] Evident in the present case is the fatal procedural non-compliance under Order 52 of the ROC; the rational and justified explanation offered by the respondent; and the absolute failure of the applicant to discharge the high burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent’s statements posed a serious, real, or a substantial risk of prejudice, or scandalised the court and judiciary as a whole. There has also been a failure to establish that the respondent’s post-judgment commentary creates a real and present danger to the functioning of the courts. The trial is over; the order has been drawn up; the machinery of justice operated entirely unimpeded. To punish the respondent would be to elevate institutional vanity over our constitutional commitment to free expression under Article 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution. [51] In conclusion, striking a proper balance between the fundamental right to freedom of speech under Article 10(1)(a) and the need to preserve public confidence in the judiciary requires this court to exercise its arbitrary power of committal with scrupulous care and only as a last resort. (See Re Kumaraendran, An Advocate & Solicitor [1975] 2 MLJ 45; Attorney General & Ors v Arthur Lee Meng Kuang [1987] 1 MLJ 206). The power to punish for contempt exists purely to protect the administration of justice, not to insulate judges from trenchant or unpopular public commentary. [52] For the reasons set out above, this court crystallises the applicable rule of law into the following ratio decidendi: The power of the Court to punish for criminal contempt via the doctrine of scandalising the court must not be invoked to shield the judiciary from the rigors of public scrutiny once a legal matter has reached finality. While the administration of justice requires the maintenance of public confidence, such confidence is more effectively secured through judicial transparency and the intellectual integrity of judgments than through the punitive suppression of dissent. Therefore, post-judgment commentary, even where outspoken, erroneous, or highly provocative, shall not be deemed contemptuous unless it is proven beyond reasonable doubt to pose a real and present danger to the institutional functioning of the judiciary, or where it involves unsubstantiated, malicious allegations of corruption or systemic partiality that transcend the bounds of fair, objective, and good-faith critique. Order of the Court [53] In the upshot, this court declines to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction to commit the respondent for contempt of court. The motion by the applicant is hereby dismissed. This court makes no order as to costs. [54] I am deeply grateful to all parties for the high quality of their submissions, which greatly assisted the court in reaching its decision. I wish to specifically acknowledge counsel for respondent and his team of associates for their meticulous effort in tracing the evolution of the law on contempt of court, spanning from its historical origins to the contemporary approaches currently utilized in other jurisdictions. [55] Finally, I wish to put on record that the responsibility for the timeline in delivering these full grounds of judgment rests solely with me. The delay was occasioned by the meticulous care required to fully amplify and anchor the foundational principles pronounced to the parties in the broad grounds of judgment read out in open court on the date of decision, alongside the demanding exigencies of my current judicial schedule. Application for committal dismissed. Dated 27 July 2026 SGD Muniandy Kannyappan Judge, High Court 2 (Criminal) Kuala Lumpur. Parties DPP Mohamad Mustaffa P Kunyalam together with DPP Nadia Mohd Izhar of the Attorney General’s Chambers appearing for and on behalf of the Applicant, Attorney General. DC Tan Sri Azhar Azizan Harun together with DC Jamie Wong and DC Kelvesh Deshenraj of Messrs. Jamie Wong appearing for and on behalf of the Respondent.