Subsection (1) shall not apply in relation to any question of fact that is for the prosecution to prove in any proceedings for an offence under this Act or any subsidiary legislation under it.”. 72 [39] The Federal Court in PP v. Awalluddin Sham Bokhari [2018] 1 CLJ 305 FC; [2018] 2 MLJ 401; [2018] 1 MLRA 357; [2017] 8 AMR 533 reiterated this position and observed that the standard of proof to be applied in an application for an order of forfeiture of property under section 56(1) of the AMLATFPUAA is that which is applicable in civil proceedings, namely, on the balance of probabilities. Delivering the judgment of the apex Court, His Lordship Abu Samah Nordin FCJ said — “[31] In an application for an order of forfeiture of property under s. 56(1) where there is no prosecution, the standard of proof to determine whether the property has been obtained as a result of or in connection with an offence under s. 4(1) is the standard of proof required in civil proceedings: See s. 56(4) of the Act. Any question of fact to be decided by the court in proceedings under the Act shall be decided on the balance of probabilities: See s. 70(1) of the Act.”. [40] In deciding whether or not the applicant succeeded in proving its case on the balance of probabilities, this Court will 73 consider, based on the affidavit evidence, how likely are certain facts which form the basis for the applicant’s application. If after weighing the evidence the Court believes that such facts point to probabilities which by reasonable conclusion supports the applicant’s contention and are probable in light of the circumstances of the case in its entirety, the applicant is said to have succeeded in establishing its case on the balance of probabilities. On the other hand, if the facts as proved by the evidence led by the applicant give rise to a set of inferences from which the degree of probabilities in favour of the application and the respondent’s case are equal, the applicant, who bears the burden to prove its case on the balance of probabilities, must fail. [41] Between 27.04.2017 and 13.07.2017, there are a total of 19 police reports lodged by individuals who made investments in the JJPTR scheme after being lured with the promise of a monthly 20% returns but did not continue get their returns after two or three months. These police reports are collectively marked as Exhibit “SK – 2” in the affidavit of the I.O. AMLATFPUAA. 74 These individuals parted with their monies and made the investments in the JJPTR scheme believing that it was a true investment scheme in foreign currency whereas the JJPTR scheme is not licensed as such. As a result of the deception, these individuals suffered losses. [42] The statements recorded under section 32 of the AMLATFPUAA are annexed in the affidavit of the I.O. AMLATFPUAA as Exhibits “SK – 58”, “SK – 59”, “SK – 60”, “SK – 61”, “SK – 62”, “SK – 63”, “SK – 64”, “SK – 67”, “SK – 68”, “SK – 69”, “SK – 70”, “SK – 71”, “SK – 72”, “SK – 73”, “SK – 74” and “SK – 75” respectively. The apex Court in PP v. Awalluddin Sham Bokhari (supra.) has held that by virtue of section 40 of the AMLATFPUAA, statements recorded pursuant to this provision are admissible as evidence in any proceedings in relation to an offence or any matter under the Act or any offence under any other written law. It is thus pertinent to consider the conclusions arrived at by the I.O. AMLATFPUAA in the course of 75 her investigations after these statements were examined together with other information and documents. [43] In her affidavit, the I.O. AMLATFPUAA averred that she took into account all the police reports lodged by the individual investors, the statements of accounts of all the bank accounts seized, the issue document of title to the property in Perak and the statement (Exhibit “SK – 76” in the affidavit of the I.O. AMLATFPUAA) recorded from the Developer/Vendor for the property, Dataran Mahir (M) Sdn Bhd together with all the relevant documents, the statement (Exhibit “SK – 78” in the affidavit of the I.O. AMLATFPUAA) recorded from the Group Marketing Manager for Goh Brothers Motor in respect of sale of the Volkswagen Beetle No. PMU 7926 together with all the relevant documents and the statement (Exhibit “SK – 79” in the affidavit of the I.O. AMLATFPUAA) recorded from the sales supervisor Kah Motor Co. Sdn Bhd in respect of sale of the Honda Accord No. PME 7926 together with all the relevant documents. She had also verified with the Central Bank of 76 Malaysia and the Securities Commission Malaysia as to the validity of the JJPTR scheme. Checks with the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia and the Employees Provident Fund were also made to verify whether the monies in the bank accounts seized consist of income and wages which could be properly accounted for. [44] In her affidavit, the I.O. AMLATFPUAA averred that her investigations concluded that the respondents were involved in accepting deposits for investments in the JJPTR scheme and the bank accounts of the 1st to the 33rd respondents were used in a number of remittances from the JJPTR scheme. The property in Perak and the two vehicles were purchased with monies which emanated from the JJPTR scheme. The JJPTR scheme was not licensed to carry on trading in foreign currencies as required by the Financial Services Act 2013. [45] On the other hand, the 1st to 11th, 13th to 16th, 20th, 23rd to 28th & 30th to 32nd respondents took an obviously contrary 77 position. Their respective affidavits contain substantially similar averments. In their respective affidavits, these respondents deny that the monies in the seized accounts are proceeds from an offence under section 420 of the Penal Code and aver that none of them were prosecuted for the alleged offence or in respect of the offence of illegal deposit-taking. They aver that there was no element of deception in the JJPTR scheme and that the investment scheme did not require any license from the Central Bank of Malaysia. They contend that the monies in the seized bank accounts are partly proceeds from legitimate business activities and that the property in Perak and the two vehicles were purchased using monies obtained from legitimate business activities. They challenge that the averments contained in the affidavits of the I.O. Predicate and I.O. AMLATFPUAA are purely hearsay and that the statements recorded under section 32 of the AMLATFPUAA were not voluntary. [46] The property in Perak and the two vehicles were registered under the name of the 23rd respondent only. In his 78 affidavit, the 23rd respondent himself did not challenge the fact that the property in Perak was purchased using monies from the JJPTR scheme. In respect of the two vehicles, it is interesting to note that apart from the 23rd respondent himself, even all the other respondents too, other than the 12th and the 17th respondents, in their respective affidavits claim that the two vehicles were purchased with monies obtained from legitimate business activities. It is observed that apart from averment of these facts, there are no contemporaneous documents exhibited in support those facts, especially one which could shed some light as to the earnings from the alleged legitimate business activities. [47] The learned counsel for the 12th respondent contends that there was no evidence to show that the monies in the bank account of the 12th respondent are the subject matter or evidence relating to the commission of an offence of money laundering under section 4(1)(a) of the Act. There was also no nexus between the 12th respondent and the offence of cheating 79 involving the JJPTR scheme. In the affidavit affirmed by Khoo Boo Eam (Enclosures 111 and 112) as a director and shareholder of the 12th respondent, it was deposed that the money which was deposited on 06.01.2017 was an investment meant to upgrade the business premises of the 12th respondent. The learned counsel for the 12th respondent maintains that at most, the only evidence is the statement of the 23rd respondent (Exhibit “SK – 58”) but that is hearsay and should not be taken into consideration. It is observed that there is no contemporaneous documents exhibited by the 12th respondent to show the fact of the alleged investment to upgrade its business premises. [48] The 17th respondent’s case is somewhat different. The 17th respondent is a casino junket involved in the business of arranging for gambling excursions at the casino at Genting Highlands. The 17th respondent received approval to operate as a Casino Programme Operator of Genting Malaysia Berhad vide the letter of approval dated 12.12.2015 issued by Genting 80 Malaysia Berhad. The 17th respondent earns its commission from Genting Malaysia Berhad at the rate of 0.1% of the gambling chip turnover. In its business, the 17th respondent will issue a cheque for a certain sum to be kept by Genting Malaysia Berhad and in turn, the 17th respondent will be entitled to gambling chips equivalent to the amount of the cheque on a 14 days credit terms. The 17th respondent will then disburse the gambling chips to its customers. If the 17th respondent did not make payment for the gambling chips at the end of the 14 days period, Genting Malaysia Berhad will encash the cheque. [49] In the present case, the 17th respondent received a total of RM7,725,030.00 in 11 transactions from the 32nd respondent. The RM7,725,030.00 was meant for the gambling excursions of 8 customers of the 32nd respondent. The 17th respondent had disbursed gambling chips for the 32nd respondent for the total sum of RM9,705,095.00 as follows: 81