Sesuatu rayuan boleh dibuat kepada Mahkamah Rayuan, dengan kebenaran Mahkamah Rayuan, terhadap mana-mana keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi pada menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuan atau penyemakannya berkenaan dengan apa-apa perkara jenayah yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Majistret tetapi rayuan itu hendaklah terbatas kepada soal undang-undang sahaja yang berbangkit semasa rayuan atau penyemakan itu dan penentuan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi yang melibatkan kesudahan rayuan atau penyemakan itu. [48] Mengimbas kembali sejarah pada tahun 1998, satu daripada otoriti terkemuka berkaitan perkara ini adalah keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam Saad Abbas & Anor v. PP [1998] 4 CLJ 575 di mana terdapat permohonan bersama oleh dua orang pemohon, memohon untuk kebenaran kepada Mahkamah Rayuan untuk merayu di bawah seksyen 50 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (Akta 91). Secara ringkasnya latar belakang kes ini adalah seperti berikut: [49] Pada 11 Januari 1995, kedua-dua pemohon masing-masing telah dikenakan pertuduhan di atas kesalahan menggunakan kekerasan jenayah (criminal force) ke atas seorang wanita dewasa suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 354 Kanun Keseksaan. Mereka telah dibicarakan bersama dan pada 1 September 1996, di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah Majistret telah melepaskan dan membebaskan mereka berdua. Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang bijaksana telah memfailkan rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap keputusan tersebut. Pada 2 April 1997, Mahkamah Tinggi Alor Setar telah membenarkan rayuan tersebut dan mengarahkan kedua-dua pemohon di panggil untuk membela diri di hadapan Mahkamah Majistret. Tidak berpuashati dengan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut, S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw pemohon-pemohon telah memohon kebenaran untuk merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan di bawah seksyen 50(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 ('Akta'). [50] Di hadapan Hakim-Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan yang bijaksana, pemohon-pemohon berhujah, antara lain, bahawa kebenaran harus diberi oleh kerana terdapat kemuktamadan dalam keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi. Sewaktu memfailkan permohonan mereka, pemohon-pemohon bagaimanapun gagal merumuskan "persoalan undang-undang" di mana mereka berhasrat untuk menumpukan rayuan mereka, dan dengan itu berbangkit soalan samada kebenaran untuk merayu, dalam hal keadaan yang wujud, harus diberikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. [51] Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Lamin Mohd Yunus PMR (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: “The present s. 50(2) also carries the words "has affected the event of the appeal" and we therefore do not propose to depart from what has just been said above. The order of the High Court in the present case for which leave to appeal is sought was that the applicants were to enter their defence. At the stage of making the order certainly it has no finality in its intent. Only after the close of the defence as a result of that order will there be finality. Only after the close of the defence will there be a decision to "affect the event of the appeal" meaning that the defence story will finally determine the result of the whole case which was the purpose of the appeal. S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw Now we may recall s. 50(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, it employs the word "decision" which is defined in s. 3. Early this year by Amendment Act A 1031 of 1998, that definition was amended to read: "decision" means judgment, sentence or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. So, for the purpose of s. 50(2), this court has first to ascertain whether the "decision" of the High Court in ordering the applicants before us to enter on their defence was a ruling that had the effect of finally disposing of their rights. Certainly not and it would only happen after a decision had been made at the close of the defence.” [52] Rujukan juga dibuat kepada kes Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [1999] 1 CLJ 537, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh NH Chan HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: “In other words, what has been excluded from the meaning of the word 'decision' is the type of judgments and orders which is termed 'interlocutory' by Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Ed) para 506 at p. 240, which reads: Interlocutory judgments and orders. An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw before judgment, and give no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment and merely directs how declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed 'interlocutory. An interlocutory order, even though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Shortly stated, what the amendment means is that judgment or order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but is made pendente lite, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, is not a “decision” within the meaning of that word in the current version of s. 3 Courts of Judicature Act, and therefore is not appealable.” [53] Di dalam kes Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v. PP [2012] 5 CLJ 537, [2012] 5 MLJ 293, Mahkamah Rayuan setelah mendengar rayuan pendakwaraya telah mengenepikan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi melepaskan dan membebaskan Tertuduh di akhir kes pendakwaan atas pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 4(1) Akta Hasutan 1948. Mahkamah Rayuan mendapati berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan, terdapat suatu kes prima facie yang berjaya dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan selanjutnya mengarahkan Tertuduh dipanggil untuk membela diri dan mengemukakan pembelaannya. Kes dikembalikan semula kepada Mahkamah Tinggi. Persoalan yang harus ditentukan adalah samada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan yang mendapati wujudnya suatu kes prima facie tersebut boleh dirayu. Mengupas mengenai isu ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Suriyadi Halim Omar HMP (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw “[15] Section 3 of the CJA defines 'decision' to mean judgment, sentence or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. It is not disputed here that the appeal relates to a criminal matter, as witnessed by the procedure adhered to, and in the event of a conviction, may be sentenced to imprisonment or fined (Seaman v. Burley [1896] 2 QB 344; Armand v. Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government [1943] AC 147; Hamid's on Criminal Procedure). [16] The rationale for non-final decisions being non-appealable is primarily geared towards the speedy disposal of cases; such a policy prejudices nobody in light of the many complaints of ageing cases before. The explanatory notes, clarifying the amendment of s. 3 of the CJA introduced by the Amendment Act A1031 of 1998 reads:- Pada masa ini, semasa mendengar kes, jika mahkamah membuat keputusan tentang kebolehterimaan apa-apa keterangan atau dokumen, pihak yang tidak berpuas hati boleh memfailkan rayuan. Jika rayuan sedemikian difailkan, mahkamah terpaksa memberhentikan pendengaran kes itu sementara menanti keputusan rayuan itu oleh mahkamah atasan. Ini menyebabkan pendengaran itu lambat selesai, lebih-lebih lagi apabila rayuan difailkan terhadap tiap-tiap keputusan yang dibuat oleh mahkamah bicara. Pindaan ini dicadangkan untuk membantu mempercepat pendengaran kes di mahkamah bicara. S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw [17] From the above explanation it is obvious that Parliament is not oblivious to mid-stream appeals that tend to stall proceedings and delay speedy completion of cases. With justice not being served by unnecessary delays, what with the amended meaning of 'decision' being crystal clear, such technical appeals that have the effect of stalling hearings, are now things of the past (see Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 6 MLJ 585; Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 2 CLJ 845). No appeal is permitted if viewed as incompetent and precluded by law, and with the facts as they were before us, we agree with the learned DPP that there was no finality in the decision of the Court of Appeal. [18] In order for a decision to be final, the defence must first be heard, and after a maximum evaluation of the total evidence a decision eventually be made. It is at that conclusive stage, when the fate of the appellant is known, the right of appeal is triggered (Saad bin Abas & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1999] 1 MLJ 129; Maleb bin Su v. Public Prosecutor; Cheak Yoke Thong [1984] 1 MLJ 311; [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 232)... [19] A scrutiny of the scope of the term 'decision' in s. 3 of the CJA reveals that its definition does not extend to the types of 'judgments or orders' which can be termed as 'interlocutory'. In other words, if a judgment or order is not final, in the sense that it does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties in the trial, then it would not fall within the definition of the word 'decision' under s. 3 of the CJA, and thus not appealable.” S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw [54] Di atas isu yang sama juga, di dalam kes PP v. Mohamed Shahabuddin Mohamed Ali & Ors [2018] 8 CLJ 535, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Mohd Zawawi Salleh HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: “[23] So too here. We are of the considered opinion that the decision of the learned trial judge in reducing the charge from the offence of murder under s. 302 of the Penal Code to one of culpable homicide under s. 304(a) of the same Code and in calling the respondents to enter their defence on the amended charge is not a decision within the meaning of s. 3 of the CJA and, therefore, is not appealable. [24] In this instant appeal, the respondents were scheduled to plead on amended charge on 7 September 2017. However, the trial was postponed due to the appeal filed by the PP against the decision of the learned trial judge in amending the charge. Certainly, the decision of the learned trial judge has not finally disposed of the rights of the parties. The learned trial judge had not made a final determination of the rights of the parties at this stage. Something still had to be done by the learned trial judge, ie, to hear the respondents’ defence and make a decision pursuant to s. 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code. Only a decision at the close of the defence case would effectively dispose of the rights of the parties. Further, to have a final decision in this case, the respondents must be convicted and sentenced or discharge and acquitted, as the case may be. It would, in our view, be incongruous to allow the PP to appeal to this court before the final judgment is meted out by the trial court. S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw [25] Our courts have applied a “salutary general rule” in criminal and civil proceedings for many years that appeals are not entertained piecemeal. Decision of the High Courts has generally been held to be appealable only if they have three attributes. They must be final in effect, definitive of the rights of the parties, effectively dispose of a substantial part of the relief claimed in the main proceedings and it does not leave anything to be done in the trial with respect of the merits of the case. In other words, the rule, in general, permits an appeal to be taken only from a final decision which disposes of all the issues presented in the trial. Quite obviously, all the issues in the case at bench were not disposed of if the respondents have yet to testify in their defence.” Kesimpulan [55] Bersandarkan kepada nas undang-undang di atas, kami sebulat suara memutuskan bahawa rayuan Pendakwa Raya tidak bermerit. Keputusan dan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi meminda pertuduhan asal dan memanggil Tertuduh Pertama untuk membela diri di atas pertuduhan pindaan pada hemat kami tidak terjumlah kepada satu perintah atau keputusan yang memuktamadkan hak pihak-pihak. Keputusan muktamad adalah sesuatu yang menentukan kausa atas merit dan tidak meninggalkan apa-apa persoalan terbuka untuk penentuan kehakiman. [56] Dengan itu keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bagi maksud seksyen 3 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 tidak boleh dirayu. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana perlu mendengar pembelaan Tertuduh Pertama dan kemudiannya membuat keputusan menurut seksyen 182 S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Hanya keputusan di penghujung kes pembelaan sahaja yang akan melupuskan hak pihak-pihak secara muktamad yakni sama ada Tertuduh Pertama disabitkan atau pun disebaliknya. Oleh itu, amat tidak wajar sama sekali untuk membenarkan rayuan di peringkat ini sebelum penghakiman muktamad diputuskan. [57] Justeru itu, kami memerintahkan kes ini diremit kembali ke Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka untuk Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana mendengar pembelaan Tertuduh Pertama dan saksi-saksinya (jika ada) di atas pertuduhan pindaan tersebut. Tarikh: 6 Nov 2024 - Sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia Kaunsel Bagi Perayu Pertama : 1) Aida Khairuleen Binti Azli 2) Zaki Asyraf Zubir [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR)] Bagi Responden : 1) G Subramaniam Nair 2) Devika Suppiah [Maniam Nair & Co.] S/N yu1IkyfkdkyZebb4SdIwmw