Pendakwa Raya v Muhamad Mudzamir Bin Mazelan (BA-41LB(A)-5-10/2023)

The Public Prosecutor, the Appellant, appeals against the learned Magistrate's decision to acquit and discharge the Respondent at the end of the defence's case.

At the outset, before the Magistrate, the Respondent was charged with the offence of administering dangerous drugs to himself, which is against section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Act 234) (DDA) and the charge states as follows – 25/04/2024 13:12:14 Kand. 39 S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 “Bahawa kamu pada 14.09.2021 jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi, bertempat di Pejabat Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Kajang, dalam Daerah Hulu Langat, dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah memberikan diri kamu sendiri dadah berbahaya iaitu “Methamphetamine dan Amphetamine” dengan cara memasukkannya ke dalam tubuh badan kamu, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 15(1) Akta yang sama dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 38B Akta yang sama.”

The Respondent was charged under section 15(1)(a) of the DDA and pleaded not guilty when the charge was read to him. The Respondent claimed trial against the charge.

The Prosecution called six (6) witnesses as follows:

Sergeant Mohd Amir Nodin bin Che Abdullah – SP1

Sub-Inspector Mohd Jani bin Kayat – SP2

Sergeant Mohd Zaki bin Hussin (photographer) – SP3

Insp Muhammad Amyriul Naufa bin Mohd Yusoff – SP4 (complainant)

Siti Fatimah binti Ngadi – SP5 (Science Officer)

Insp Nur Nadia binti Jamallulai – SP6 (investigating officer) [5] The narrative of the case started on 14.9.2021 at around 900am. SP1 and SP2, with other officers from the Briged Tengah and CIPS Battalion 19, received the instruction to take the Respondent to the Pejabat Narkotik IPD Kajang to carry out a urine test on the Respondent on suspicion of drug abuse. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ [6] The Respondent, who was working at Cawangan Pengangkutan Batallion 19 when SP1 arrived at the Respondent's workplace, was escorted by car to Cawangan Narkotik IPD Kajang pursuant to a police report BT9 Cheras/011348 (P1). During the cross-examination by the Respondent (the Respondent was unrepresented at this stage), SP1 explained the reason for the arrest to the Respondent. S: Sjn Amir, pada tarikh kejadian, masa sebelum encik bawa saya ke IPD Kajang, ada bagitahu tak sebab saya ditahan J: Ya ada utk buat ujian saringan air kencing [7] At around 1100am, Pejabat Bahagian Jenayah Siasatan Narkotik IPD Kajang, SP4 assisted by SP2, conducted the urine test on the Respondent. [8] Only the Respondent was at IPD Kajang and instructed to give the urine sample at the specified time. [9] SP4 asked the Respondent to choose a bottle in a box prepared by the Narkotik IPD Kajang. The Respondent voluntarily chose a bottle with serial no B057636 (P12) and held the bottle to the toilet. [10] SP4 instructed SP2 to supervise the collection of the urine sample. SP2 was in the toilet with the Respondent when the process took place. [11] Once done, the Respondent closed the bottle and placed the bottle on a table. SP4 asked the Respondent to open the cap of the bottle, S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ and SP4 dipped six (6) test strips into the bottle containing the Respondent's urine. [12] SP4 found that the test strips for MET and AMP turned positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. [13] SP4 informed the Respondent of the result, and the Respondent understood it. SP4 asked the Respondent to close the bottle with the cap. [14] In the presence of the Respondent, SP4 then filled out the UPD form with the details of the Respondent's name and IC no. The Respondent also was asked to sign the UPD form. SP4 later sealed the bottle with the security sealer sticker printed 125 PDRM. [15] SP6 sent the Respondent's urine specimen to the Pathology Department, Kuala Lumpur Hospital (HKL), and it was later confirmed that the urine specimen analysed by SP5 contained methamphetamine and amphetamine, listed as dangerous drugs in the First Schedule of the DDA. [16] At the conclusion of the Prosecution's case, the Magistrate decided that the Prosecution had successfully established a prima facie case against the accused. [17] The Magistrate decided that the Prosecution had satisfied all the ingredients of the offence under section 15(1)(a) DDA, namely-S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ

The Respondent consumed to himself the dangerous drugs as stated in the charge.

(ii) The Respondent's urine contained traces of drugs prescribed under Part III of the First Schedule of the DDA. [18] The presumption under section 37(k) of the DDA applies against the Respondent. [19] The Respondent was called to enter his defence. [20] The Respondent opted to give evidence on oath. The Respondent was the sole witness for the defence. THE DEFENCE'S CASE [21] Briefly, the defence argued that the Respondent was arrested after SP2 carried out the urine test. Thus, there was non-compliance with section 31A of the DDA. [22] The Respondent alleged there was doubt about the urine sample sent to HKL because the statement on the urine bottle stated that SP4 collected the urine. However, SP2 was the one who collected the urine. [23] The defence argued that there was contradicting evidence by SP2 and SP4 on the collection of the Respondent's urine process. In other words, there was a break in the chain of evidence. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ [24] The Respondent alleged that the urine sample taken by SP2 was not his urine sample because he alleged that after his urine sample was taken, he was instructed to stay in another room and later was asked to sign on a label of an empty bottle. [25] However, the Magistrate found that SP2 supervised the taking of the urine sample from the Respondent. The Respondent was explained the urine test result and witnessed the whole process when the bottle was sealed. Therefore, the allegation that the Respondent was instructed to stay in another room and was asked to sign an empty bottle was a bare denial and afterthought as it was raised at the defence stage. See: William John a/l P Sandanasamy v Public Prosecutor [2021] MLJU 2272. [26] At the end of the defence case, despite the Magistrate's decision that the Respondent's defence was an afterthought, the Magistrate made a 360-degree turn when the Magistrate decided to follow the High Court decision in PP v Jarizal Jasni [2023] 8 CLJ 951 where according to the Magistrate was the latest development on section 31A of the DDA and binding on the Magistrate. [27] The Magistrate decided to change its original stance that the prosecution had established the facts and evidence that there was an arrest before the Respondent gave his urine sample to that the Respondent was arrested after the Respondent gave his urine sample following the decision in PP v Jarizal Jasni (supra). [28] Dissatisfied with the decision, the Prosecution appealed to this Court against the whole judgment of the learned Magistrate. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ FINDINGS OF THE MAGISTRATE [29] The grounds of judgment by the Magistrate are on pages 8-31 of the Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1. [30] The critical parts of the Magistrate's decision are as follows:

The finding on prima facie – paragraph 16

The Magistrate's finding that there was arrest – paragraph 29

The Magistrate's observation on the latest development of section 31A of the DDA – paragraph 30

The Magistrate's finding that the Respondent's defence was an afterthought – paragraph 41 THE APPEAL [31] For the appeal, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor focused her argument on two main grounds, vis a vis,

The Magistrate erred when she decided that there was non-compliance with section 31A of the DDA when the Respondent was arrested after giving the urine specimen. The Magistrate's conclusion is made based on her reliance on the High Court decision in PP v Jarizal Jasni (supra);

(ii) The Respondent's defence failed to raise a reasonable doubt and was an afterthought and only a bare denial. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ [30] Bearing in mind the limited functions of the appellate Court when hearing the appeal, this Court must now scrutinise and analyse the Magistrate's decision to determine whether it warrants the Court's intervention. Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2004] 3 CLJ 737. WHETHER THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 31A OF THE DDA [32] The learned Magistrate decided that there was non-compliance with section 31A of the DDA following the High Court decision in PP v Jarizal Jasni (supra) while acknowledging the Court of Appeal decision in PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain [2017] 5 MLJ 255. [33] The Magistrate was correct in following the judicial proposition decided in PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain (supra), which was whether there was an arrest depends on the factual matrix and circumstances of each case. [34] However, the Magistrate failed to adopt the concept of constructive arrest and follow PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain, where the facts are similar to the facts of the instant case. Instead, the Magistrate followed the High Court decision in PP v Jarizal Jasni (supra). [35] The crux of the issue is centred on the opening words " when any person is arrested". For a better understanding of the issue at hand, the said provision is reproduced below: S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ "Examination of arrested person by a medical officer

(1) When any person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence against this Act —

which is of such a nature; or

which is alleged to have been committed under such circumstances, as give reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of this person will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence against this Act, it shall be lawful for a medical officer acting at the request of any police officer not below the rank of Sergeant, or any other officer in charge of a police station, or any officer of customs, and for any person acting in aid of a medical officer and under his direction, to make such an examination or examinations of the person arrested as may be reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence, and to use or cause to be used such force as may be reasonably necessary for that purpose.

For the purpose of preservation of evidence, it shall be lawful for a police officer not below the rank of Sergeant or any officer of customs to require an arrested person to provide a specimen of his urine for the purposes of an examination under subsection (1) if it is not practicable for the medical officer or the person who is acting in aid of or on the direction of a medical officer to obtain the specimen of the urine within a reasonable period." [36] Section 31A of the DDA does not define the word "arrested". However, section 31 of the DDA provides a broad provision relating to the power of arrest under the DDA where any police officer may arrest without warrant any person whom the police officer believes to S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ have committed an offence under the DDA or on suspicion of committing an offence. [37] Section 31 of the DDA provides as follows: "Section 31. Power of arrest and seizure.

Any police officer or any officer of customs may arrest without a warrant any person whom he reasonably believes to have committed or to be committing an offence against this Act, and every offence against this Act shall be deemed to be a seizable offence for the purposes of the Criminal Procedure Code [Act 593]."(emphasis added) [38] The dispute on the interpretation of the words " when any person is arrested" has been resolved by the Court of Appeal. [39] The Court of Appeal in PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain (supra) had articulated extensively on the scope and application of section 31A of the DDA, where the pertinent judicial proposition on the concept of constructive arrest applies to section 31A of the DDA. Other than that, the Court of Appeal decided that whether there was an arrest would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. [40] In PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain (supra), the facts show that the accused was a police officer who was also charged in the magistrate court for the offence of consumption of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) under the same section 15(1)(a) of the DDA. The Magistrate acquitted the accused at the end of the prosecution case. The High Court dismissed the Prosecution's appeal as the accused was not a "person arrested" within the meaning of Section S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ 31A of the DDA. The High Court also held that the meaning of arrest in Section 31A of the DDA did not include constructive arrest. [41] The Court of Appeal reversed the High Court's decision, and the crucial parts of the Court of Appeal decisions which the Court needs to emphasise are as follows. Abdul Karim Abdul Jalil J (now a Federal Court Judge), through his wisdom, said: “[28] Kami telah meneliti dan mempertimbangkan penghujahan kedua-dua pihak dan kes-kes yang dirujuk. Kami tidak berkecenderungan untuk mengikut pendekatan-pendekatan tersebut. Setelah meneliti kes-kes di atas, kami bersetuju dengan pandangan bahawa pendekatan-pendekatan tersebut sukar untuk diseragamkan (reconcile) dan agak malang (unfortunate) untuk digunakan seperti mana dikatakan oleh YA Abdul Hamid Mohamad H (ketika itu) dalam PP v Abdul Rahim Kalandari Mustan. Pada kami, dalam semua perundangan yang berkenaan sama ada dalam KPJ atau pun ADB 1952, apa yang perlu ditentukan adalah sama ada telah berlakunya satu tangkapan atau tidak. Kami berpendapat penentuan isu tersebut akan bergantung pada fakta dan keadaan sesuatu kes itu. Inilah prinsip am yang terpancar daripada pertimbangan kes-kes di atas. [31] Daripada apa yang kami fahami, kekuatan penghujahan TPR boleh terletak pada ungkapan yang berikut "the need to administer the caution under s. 37A of the Act only arises after actual arrest and not constructive arrest" sepertimana diputuskan di perenggan 18, dalam kes PP v. Lim Hock Boon, supra. Kehendak ini boleh diperdebatkan tidak terpakai jika isu tangkapan di situ tidak melibatkan penentuan kebolehterimaan apa-apa pernyataan tertuduh di bawah s. 37A ADB 1952. Ekoran itu, bagi tujuan penentuan orang yang ditangkap di bawah s. 31A, konsep tangkapan konstruktif dengan itu terpakai. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ [33] Walaupun berlainan pendekatan, kami berpendapat kedua-dua penghakiman tersebut berasaskan prinsip am yang sama, iaitu isu tangkapan merupakan persoalan fakta dan harus diputuskan berdasarkan keadaan sesuatu kes itu. Bagaimanapun kami cenderung untuk mengikuti pendekatan YA Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMP yang tidak melihatnya dari sudut dikotomi tangkapan sebenar atau konstruktif. Pada pengamatan kami perkataan tangkapan dan penentuan bilakah sesuatu tangkapan itu berlaku, sama ada bagi tujuan s 37A atau pun s 31A ADB 1952, seharusnya sama, dan akan bergantung pada fakta dan keadaan sesuatu kes itu. [34] Berlandaskan prinsip am di atas, kami mendapati adanya cukup fakta dan keadaan dalam kes ini yang menunjukkan bahawa pada masa responden diarah memberikan spesimen air kencingnya, dia sudah pun ditangkap bagi maksud s. 31A(1A) ADB 1952. Harus dicatatkan di sini bahawa s. 31A tidak memperuntukkan kuasa menangkap kepada pegawai polis. Kuasa tersebut diberikan dalam s. 31 ADB 1952. Seksyen 31 memberikan kuasa tangkapan jika terdapat kepercayaan yang munasabah bahawa sesuatu kesalahan di bawah ADB 1952 telah dilakukan atau akan dilakukan. Ini mewajarkan pengemukaan maklumat yang diterima (information received) oleh pihak polis sebagai keterangan untuk menentukan isu tangkapan ini (rujuk kes Raissi v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2009] 3 All ER 14; dan Shaaban & Ors v. Chong Fook Kam & Anor, supra ). Keterangan SP2, sama ada semasa pemeriksaan utama atau pemeriksaan balas, dengan jelas menunjukkan SP2 dan kumpulannya telah bertindak atas maklumat penyalahgunaan dadah oleh suspek iaitu responden, di tempat dia bekerja iaitu sebagai pegawai balai di Balai Polis Kuala Perlis. Sebelum pergi ke balai tersebut, SP2 telah terlebih dahulu menghubungi balai dan memastikan responden bertugas pada hari serbuan. Setibanya di balai tersebut, SP2 telah memperkenalkan dirinya sebagai Sub Inspektor Narkotik dan telah memaklumkan kedatangan mereka adalah untuk menahan, mengambil dan membuat ujian saringan air kencing ke atas responden. Responden kemudiannya diarahkan untuk menyediakan air kencingnya di tandas balai dengan diiringi dan diperhatikan oleh SP2 dan Koperal Asmadi. SP2 dengan S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ jelas mengatakan responden merupakan sasaran (suspek) serbuan itu dan tiada orang lain yang berada di balai ketika itu. Pada masa yang sama, kumpulan SP2 yang lain telah juga menggeledah kereta responden. Setelah strip ujian ke atas air kencing responden menunjukkan keputusan positif methampethamine, responden telah dibawa ke IPK Perlis untuk tindakan selanjutnya. Dalam keadaan di atas, dan walaupun responden dikatakan memberikan kerjasama, dan sebagai seorang anggota polis sokongan, namun kebebasannya telah disekat dan dia telah dipaksa untuk mengikuti segala arahan yang diberikan-rujuk kes Alderson v. Booth [1969] 2 QB 216 yang memutuskan "Held (1) that an arrest was constituted when any form of words was used which, in the circumstances, were calculated to and did bring to the notice of a defendant that he was under compulsion to which he thereafter submitted". Dalam keadaan di atas, kami dapati responden telah ditangkap sebaik sahaja dia ditahan dan diarahkan memberikan spesimen air kencingnya. Hal keadaan ini disokong oleh laporan polis SP2, P6, yang dengan jelas menyatakan: Bertindak atas maklumat pada 06/05/2014, jam lebih 0930 hrs bertempat dibalai polis Kuala Perlis saya mengetuai sepasukan anggota cawangan narkotik IPK Perlis terdiri dari D/KPL 104368, 124516, 140542, 142263 dan L/KPL 173072 setelah saya memperkenalkan diri "polis" dengan mempamerkan kad kuasa telah menahan seorang anggota Konst/sokongan balai polis Kuala Perlis kerana disyaki terlibat dalam aktiviti penyalahgunaan dadah. Setelah saspek berada dalam kawalan dan memberikan kerjasama saya telah membuat pemeriksaan fizikal ke atas saspek dan pemeriksaan ke atas kereta saspek jenis proton wira warna kelabu nombor pendaftaran PDJ 9002 yang diletakkan di hadapan balai tetapi tidak menjumpai apa apa barang yang menyalahi undang-undang. Seterusnya saya dengan dibantu oleh D/KPL 124516 telah membuat ujian saringan awal polis ke atas saspek dengan menggunakan botol urine nombor siri S/N. 0152174 keputusan ujian saringan awal polis dapati air kencing saspek positif Methamphetamine. Saya tangkap S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ saspek dan telah menerangkan hak hak saspek untuk menghubungi keluarga serta peguam seperti mana peruntukan sek 28a ktj dalam bahasa melayu dan telah diakui faham oleh saspek. (Penekanan diberikan) [35] Kami berpendapat fakta dan keadaan di sini amat jelas terutamanya penahanan telah dibuat berasaskan maklumat berkenaan satu kesalahan di bawah ADB 1952 yang telah dilakukan oleh responden, dan penahanan itu bukanlah suatu tindakan sekadar untuk membuat pertanyaan ke atas responden. Responden tidak bebas malahan telah mengikut apa yang diarahkan oleh SP2. Selaras dengan s. 15 KTJ dan penjelasan dalam kes Shaaban & Ors v. Chong Fook Kam, supra, Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke, supra, serta kes yang dirujuk dan setelah mempertimbangkan secara keseluruhan keadaan ini, kami berpendapat semasa spesimen air kencing responden diambil bagi tujuan pemeliharaan dan pemeriksaan di bawah s. 31A(1) dan (1A) ADB 1952, responden merupakan seorang yang telah ditangkap dan orang tangkapan (an arrested person) dalam maksud peruntukan tersebut. [37] Setelah membuat pertimbangan yang mendalam serta setelah mengambil kira keseluruhan premis di atas, kami menjawab isu undang-undang yang dikemukakan secara negatif. Kami mendapati penggunaan dikotomi tangkapan sebenar atau tangkapan konstruktif tidak tepat di sini dan tidak membantu dalam resolusi isu yang dirujuk (lihat kes R v Whitfield [1970] SCR 46 (Kanada) yang telah menolak konsep sebegitu termasuk tangkapan simbolik). Pendekatan yang sebaiknya adalah sama ada telah berlakunya sesuatu tangkapan atau tidak. Penentuan isu ini seterusnya akan bergantung pada keadaan dan fakta sesuatu kes itu (PP v Lim Hock Boon). Pada pengamatan kami YA Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman telah terkhilaf dalam penghakimannya apabila mengambil pendekatan secara dikotomi tersebut. Walaupun kami gagal menemukan isu tangkapan ini dihujahkan di kedua-dua peringkat mahkamah, kami mendapati YA Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman telah gagal menilai fakta-fakta di atas dalam membuat inferens bahawa responden pada masa pengambilan spesimen dilakukan dia belum lagi ditangkap. Kami S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ dapati YA Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman telah juga gagal untuk menilai laporan P6 bersama-sama dengan keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP3 serta skop pemakaian peruntukan ss 31 dan 31A ADB 1952. Kami juga dapati, jika hendak dikatakan spesimen air kencing itu tidak sah diambil daripada responden sekalipun, YA Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman seharusnya, setelah mendapati isu (a) dan (b) bermerit terutamanya memutuskan spesimen air kencing dalam P10 mengandungi Methamphetamine, mendapati perayu telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie ke atas responden”. [Emphasis added]. [42] Similarly, in the instant case, during the examination in chief and cross-examination of SP1, SP2, SP4, and SP6, the evidence clearly shows that SP1 was informed by his superior that the Respondent, a police staff from Batallion 19 PGA was involved in drug abuse. SP1 was instructed by his superior to bring the Respondent to IPD Kajang for the urine test. The Respondent was brought to IPD Kajang by car. In the car, SP1 informed the Respondent of the urine test. At IPD Kajang, the Respondent was instructed to give his urine specimen. SP2 and SP4 supervised the process. The urine test on the Respondent was positive, further confirmed by the HKL's Pathology Department science officer. [43] Based on the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the Court found evidence that the Respondent had been arrested before giving his urine specimen. The Respondent was the only person instructed to provide the urine specimen, and evidence shows that the Respondent complied with the instructions. When the Respondent was escorted in the car from his workplace to IPD Kajang, he was constructively detained, and the Magistrate failed to draw an inference from the facts and evidence of the case. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ [44] A detention that restricts one's freedom of movement to procure that person's urine specimen should be deemed an arrest within the context of Section 31A of the DDA. See: Fakhrurrazi bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 LNS 1221; [2021] MLJU 1461. [45] It is also outside of the stretch of one's imagination to think that the Respondent was in the vehicle for purposes other than for the urine test on suspicion of drug abuse. [46] The testimony of SP6 that the arrest was made after the Respondent's urine was positive should not be taken by the Magistrate as the true meaning of the word "arrested" within the context of section 31A of the DDA. [47] The Magistrate should strictly follow the ratio in PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain (supra), where the facts are similar to the facts of the instant case and binding on the Magistrate. [48] This Court must also emphasize that the facts in PP v Jarizal Jasni (supra) are relatively different from the facts of the instant case. [49] On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that the word "arrested" mentioned in the opening word of section 31A of the DDA is a past tense. Therefore, there must be an arrest before the Respondent gives his urine specimen. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ [50] The Respondent's contention is devoid of merit for the apparent reason that the interpretation of the word "arrested person" has been dealt with by PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain (supra). [51] The Court of Appeal consistently applied the decision in PP v Mohd Safwan bin Husain (supra), as seen in subsequent cases. See: PP v Samsul Ariffin Bakar [2020] 7 CLJ 503; Pendakwa Raya v Safarulazmi Salehudin [2023] MLJU 2273. [52] To argue that there must first be an arrest before one gives the urine sample would limit the application of section 31A of the DDA. The provision of section 31A of the DDA must be read in totality so that the object and purpose for which the Parliament introduced the law are not frustrated. See: Tebin bin Mostapa v Hulba-Danyal bin Balia & Anor [2020] MLJU 944. WHETHER THE MAGISTRATE WAS CORRECT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENCE RAISED A REASONABLE DOUBT [53] The learned Counsel raised doubt about who collected the urine specimen. Whether SP2 or SP4 collected the urine specimen is immaterial. Most importantly, the police officer conducting the urine test must not be below the sergeant rank according to section 31A of the DDA. [54] In her judgment, the Magistrate clearly said there was a contradiction in the evidence between SP1, SP2, and SP4 regarding who collected the urine specimen. Notwithstanding that, SP1 a Sergeant, SP2 a S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ Sub-Inspector, and SP4 an Inspector, are officers legally allowed in the statutory provision of section 31A of the DDA to collect the urine sample. Thus, the Magistrate dismissed the contention raised by the Respondent on this point, to which this Court agrees. [55] The defence failed to challenge the presence of the drugs in the Respondent's urine. Thus, the testimony of the Prosecution's witnesses is tantamount to accepting the witness's testimony. See: Wong Swee Chin v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 212. CONCLUSION [56] Analysing the evidence in totality, despite the clear evidence of constructive arrest and the Respondent consuming the illegal drugs and the application of the presumption against the Respondent, the Magistrate had erred when she decided that the defence had successfully raised a reasonable doubt. [57] In Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2002] 3 CLJ 457, Mohamad Dzaiddin, Chief Justice (as he then was) held: "It is of the utmost importance to stress here that the appellate Court will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence passed by the lower Court is manifestly inadequate or excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed or that the Court has clearly erred in applying correct principles in the assessment of sentence. See: PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102, [1976] 2 MLJ 257.” S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ [58] This Court is satisfied that the learned Magistrate had misdirected herself to occasion an error either on the law or the facts, which would warrant the appellate intervention. [59] This Court found that there are substantial and compelling reasons to disagree with the finding by the Magistrate. Thus, this is a fit and proper case for this Court to intervene. [60] Having heard the oral submissions of both counsels and read the written submissions and the Records of Appeal, the Court allowed the Prosecution's appeal. [61] The Court set aside the Magistrate's decision to acquit and discharge the Respondent. [62] I convict the Respondent as charged. SENTENCE [63] The Respondent relied on the following grounds as mitigating factors: first-time offence, and the Respondent has been serving the police force since 2009 until now. He is a divorcee and the sole breadwinner of three children. The Respondent was suspended from work in 2022 and only received half pay. On 15.1.2024, the Respondent came back to work full-time. However, the Respondent has not received his salary to date. The Respondent shows remorse and regret for the unfortunate incident in his life due to this case. S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ S/N kbBhmwSgmUysJ4UyIkEPiQ