Pendakwa Raya v Rulam Akbal Bin Abd Manan (TA-41LB-10-09/2025)

This is an appeal brought by the Public Prosecutor against the decision of the learned Magistrate dated 7 September 2025, whereby the Respondent (Accused) was acquitted and discharged at the end of the defence case for the offence under Section 354 of the Penal Code (outraging modesty). The learned Magistrate found that the defence had succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case, particularly on the issues of criminal intention (mens rea) and absence of consent.

The prosecution, being dissatisfied with the said decision, filed a Notice of Appeal on 9 September 2025 and subsequently filed a Petition of Appeal on 18 October 2025, raising twelve grounds of appeal. The crux of the appeal is that the learned Magistrate erred in fact and law in finding that the defence had raised a reasonable doubt, and that the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Having considered the Record of Appeal, written submissions, bundle of authorities as well as further oral submission by both parties, this Court now delivers its grounds of judgment. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The Respondent was originally charged with two counts under Section 354 of the Penal Code. The first charge, which is the subject of this appeal, alleged that on 22 November 2020 at approximately 8.30 p.m. at No. 48 Kampung Tapah, Kuala Berang, within the District of Hulu Terengganu, the Respondent had used criminal force against the Complainant (SP3) with the intent to outrage her modesty.

The factual matrix reveals a complex narrative involving traditional Islamic healing practices. The Complainant (SP3) had been experiencing persistent back pain, disturbing nightmares, and difficulties in finding a life partner. She had previously sought treatment at hospitals but to no avail. She was introduced to the Respondent by her friend, SP4, who recommended the Respondent as a traditional healer from Darussyifa', having previously successfully treated her daughter who suffered from hysteria.

On the night of 22 November 2020, the Complainant went to SP4's house to receive treatment from the Respondent. The treatment initially commenced in the living room where the Respondent performed ruqyah (Islamic spiritual healing) on the Complainant. When she was unable to vomit as part of the treatment process, S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw SP4 was asked to act as an intermediary and successfully vomited. Subsequently, the Respondent requested to continue the treatment in SP4's bedroom to protect the Complainant's modesty, as there were other men present in the living room.

In the bedroom, with SP4 present, the treatment continued. SP4 was instructed to insert her hand into the Complainant's clothing to search for "lumps" on the breast and to remove them through the nipple. When SP4 experienced difficulty and her hand became stiff and painful, the Respondent himself proceeded to touch the Complainant's breast to confirm completion. Thereafter, for the purpose of "opening the aura" to facilitate marriage, the Respondent instructed SP4 to insert her hand into the Complainant's trousers. SP4's hand became stiff and painful, and she was unable to continue. The Respondent then inserted his own finger to touch the Complainant's genital area briefly. He also touched the Complainant's buttocks (with a layer of clothing) and choked her neck to induce vomiting.

At the conclusion of the first treatment session, the Complainant paid the Respondent RM50, and the Respondent expressed interest in visiting her house for follow-up treatment. On 24 November 2020, the Complainant herself, accompanied by her aunt and cousin, fetched the Respondent to her house. The Respondent treated the Complainant's mother and performed a follow-up treatment on the Complainant. It was during this visit that S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw the Complainant alleged the Respondent had asked to kiss her when they were alone upstairs.

The Complainant subsequently contacted Darussyifa' to verify the legitimacy of the Respondent's treatment methods and was informed that the Respondent had been suspended from Darussyifa'. She filed a police report on 3 December 2020.

At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the court found that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case and acquitted and discharged the Respondent on both charges. The prosecution appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal on the first charge only and ordered the Respondent to enter his defence on that charge. The acquittal and discharge on the second charge were maintained.

The trial proceeded before the Magistrate, who heard the defense case. The Respondent testified on oath and called four other defense witnesses. At the conclusion of the defence case, the learned Magistrate found that the defence had raised a reasonable doubt and acquitted and discharged the Respondent on the first charge. The prosecution has now appealed against this decision. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

Having considered the grounds of appeal as set out in the Petition of Appeal and the respective written submissions of both parties, this Court identifies the following principal issues for determination:

Whether the learned Magistrate erred in fact and law in concluding that the defence had succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case;

Whether the learned Magistrate erred in her assessment of the element of criminal intention to outrage modesty;

Whether the learned Magistrate erred in her finding that consent had been given by the Complainant, or that the absence of consent had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt;

Whether the Respondent's actions were justified as part of traditional healing treatment;

Whether the learned Magistrate properly evaluated the evidence as a whole, including the credibility of witnesses and the documentary exhibits. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES The Appellant's Contentions

The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor advanced comprehensive submissions challenging the Magistrate's decision. The prosecution contended that the learned Magistrate had erred in fact and law in finding that a reasonable doubt existed. The prosecution submitted that the following elements had been established beyond reasonable doubt:

On the element of criminal intention, the prosecution argued that the Respondent's actions clearly demonstrated an intent to outrage the Complainant's modesty. The Respondent had touched the Complainant's breast, nipple, genitalia, clitoris, and buttocks without consent. The prosecution submitted that these were not actions consistent with legitimate medical treatment but rather constituted criminal force with intent to outrage modesty. The Respondent had deliberately taken the Complainant into a closed room, which was unnecessary when there were other female family members present who could have acted as intermediaries.

Regarding consent, the prosecution vigorously submitted that the Complainant had never consented to being touched on her private parts by the Respondent. While she had consented to receive S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw traditional treatment in general, she had not been informed of the specific nature of the treatment. The Respondent had not obtained specific consent for touching her private parts. The prosecution emphasized that silence or non-resistance does not equate to consent, particularly when the victim is in a state of shock and fear. The Complainant had testified that she was afraid because they were the only three persons in a locked room.

The prosecution argued that the learned Magistrate had erred in placing undue reliance on the Complainant's subsequent conduct, particularly her decision to seek follow-up treatment from the Respondent. The prosecution submitted that the Complainant's initial trust in the Respondent (based on the representation that he was a Darussyifa' practitioner) and her subsequent realization of the impropriety of the treatment did not negate the element of criminal force.

The prosecution further submitted that the Respondent was not a credible witness. His evidence was self-serving and amounted to a bare denial that was unsupported by any of his own defence witnesses. The defence witnesses, particularly SD2 (a female Darussyifa' practitioner) and SD5 (the Head Practitioner), had confirmed that it was not standard practice to touch a female patient's private parts directly without a female intermediary. Their evidence had effectively contradicted the Respondent's defence. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The prosecution also argued that the Respondent's actions were contrary to Islamic healing principles. SD5 had testified that there were guidelines in Islamic healing and that there were alternatives to touching private parts, such as using a female intermediary or touching with a barrier. The Respondent had taken no initiative to call any female family member (such as SP4's grandmother) to act as intermediary when SP4 was unable to continue.

On the issue of urgency or "darurat", the prosecution submitted that this argument was untenable. The Complainant was not in a life-threatening condition but merely suffered from back pain and nightmares. The urgency argument would, if accepted, open the floodgates for any man to use the same excuse to touch women in the name of treatment. This would be contrary to both law and Islamic principles.

The prosecution placed heavy reliance on the principles established in State of Punjab v Major Singh AIR [1967] SC 63 (SC) concerning the requirement of intention and knowledge. The prosecution further cited Neutral treatment indicated Cantona Lim Xiang Kim v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 MLJ 544 (CA) and Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Nor & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 200b (SC) on the standard of appellate intervention. The prosecution argued that the learned Magistrate's decision was plainly wrong, warranting appellate intervention. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The Respondent, through his learned counsel, submitted that the appeal should be dismissed as the Magistrate's decision was correct and supported by the evidence. The Respondent contended that the Magistrate had properly evaluated all the evidence and had reached a conclusion that was reasonably open to her.

On the element of intention, the Respondent emphasized that his actions were carried out solely for treatment purposes. He had no intention to outrage the Complainant's modesty. The Respondent argued that it was inherently implausible that he would commit such an act in the presence of another person (SP4), with the door closed, and in the knowledge that there were other persons in the house. He also pointed to the fact that he had withdrawn his hand immediately after satisfying himself that the "lump" was no longer present, which was inconsistent with any intention to outrage modesty.

The Respondent submitted that his evidence was consistent with the Complainant's own evidence, particularly regarding the duration of the touching ("sekejap je dia buat") and the fact that he had asked about her constipation problem. This consistency S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw supported the finding that the touching was for treatment and not for sexual gratification.

On the issue of consent, the Respondent argued that consent had been clearly given. The Respondent testified that he had sought permission before touching the Complainant, and the Complainant had acquiesced. SP4 also confirmed that the Complainant had consented to continue the treatment. The Respondent relied on the Complainant's subsequent conduct: she had not protested during the treatment, had not stopped the treatment, and had actually requested a follow-up treatment by fetching the Respondent to her own house the next day. This conduct was consistent with consent and was relevant under Section 6 of the Evidence Act 1950 as forming part of the same transaction.

The Respondent also relied on Exhibit P11, the Complainant's own police report, which stated that the Respondent had asked for permission to touch her for treatment purposes and she had allowed it. The Magistrate had correctly found that this report contradicted the Complainant's oral testimony and supported the Respondent's case.

On the issue of traditional healing practices, the Respondent submitted that the defence witnesses had amply demonstrated that such treatment methods, although unconventional, were legitimate. SD2 had testified that when treating spiritual S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw disturbances, the "lump" would move to the private parts and needed to be removed through those parts. SD5 had confirmed that in emergency situations, direct touching might be necessary with the patient's consent. The Respondent argued that there were no absolute prohibitions in Darussyifa' against touching private parts; it was a matter of individual discretion depending on the circumstances.

The Respondent placed great emphasis on the evidence of SP4, a prosecution witness, who had confirmed that the same treatment method had been used on her daughter and had been effective. SP4 had also confirmed that the Respondent did not have any intention to outrage modesty. The Respondent submitted that SP4, being a prosecution witness, was a credible and independent witness whose evidence should be given weight.

The Respondent argued that the Magistrate had properly applied the principles in Mat v Public Prosecutor [1963] MLJ 263 (HC), where the court set out the approach at the end of the defence case. The Magistrate had correctly determined that the Respondent's explanation was reasonable and raised a reasonable doubt, which required an acquittal. The Respondent cited Mohamed Shariff v Public Prosecutor [1964] MLJ 64 (HC), Nadarasa v Public Prosecutor [1972] 2 MLJ 47 (HC), and Chay Hon Song v Public Prosecutor [1967] 1 MLJ 210 (HC) for the S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw proposition that an accused person only needs to raise a reasonable doubt and need not prove his defence conclusively.

On the standard of appellate intervention, the Respondent submitted that the appellate court should be slow to interfere with findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. The Respondent cited Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2014] 4 MLJ 875 (CA) and Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 (CA) for the principle that appellate courts should only intervene where there is a clear and manifest error.

Having carefully considered the entire record of appeal, the evidence adduced at trial, the learned Magistrate's grounds of judgment, and the written submissions of both parties, this Court now proceeds to make its determination. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

It is a well-established principle that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with findings of fact made by the trial court. This principle is rooted in the trial court's advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses testify, and its consequent ability to assess credibility. As stated in Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal (supra), appellate intervention is justified only in limited circumstances: where the judgment is based on a wrong premise of fact or law; where there was insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence; where the trial judge has completely overlooked the inherent probabilities; or where the trial judge has made an unwarranted deduction based on faulty reasoning.

In the present case, this Court must determine whether the learned Magistrate's decision falls within any of these exceptional circumstances warranting appellate intervention.

The prosecution's primary submission is that the learned Magistrate erred in finding that the Respondent's actions were for treatment purposes rather than with the intention to outrage S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw modesty. This Court has given careful consideration to this submission.

The offence under Section 354 of the Penal Code requires proof that the accused used criminal force with the intent to outrage modesty. The prosecution must prove not merely the act of touching, but the criminal intention behind it. As stated in State of Punjab v Major Singh AIR (supra), the test is whether a reasonable man would think that the act was done with the intention of outraging the woman's modesty or with knowledge that it was likely to do so. The court must consider the woman's station and way of life, and the known notions of modesty of such a woman.

In this case, the evidence is clear that the Respondent did touch the Complainant's private parts. The question is whether this touching was done with the intent to outrage her modesty or whether it was done for a legitimate purpose, namely treatment.

The following factors are significant in this Court's analysis:

First, the treatment took place in a context where the Complainant had specifically sought traditional healing for spiritual disturbances. She had been recommended to the Respondent by SP4, who herself had sought treatment from the Respondent for her daughter. The Complainant had S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw informed the Respondent of her problems, including difficulty in finding a partner, and had consented to receive treatment.

Second, the touching was not done in secret. While the more sensitive part of the treatment was conducted in a bedroom, SP4 was present throughout. The Respondent had insisted that SP4 remain in the room. The presence of a third party throughout the treatment significantly undermines any inference that the Respondent had a sexual motive. As the Respondent himself stated, "Kalau saya nak cabul, buat apa saya nak cabul depan orang." It is inherently improbable that a person intending to outrage modesty would do so in the presence of another person.

Third, the duration of the touching was minimal. According to the Complainant's own evidence, the touching of her genitalia was only for a very short moment ("sekejap je dia buat"). The Respondent immediately withdrew his hand after checking. This is consistent with a treatment objective rather than sexual gratification.

Fourth, the Respondent's evidence was consistent with the Complainant's evidence on key aspects of the touching. The Complainant herself confirmed that the Respondent had asked about her constipation problem after touching her genitalia. This question appears to be relevant to treatment, S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw as constipation may be related to the type of spiritual disturbances the Respondent claimed to be treating.

Fifth, the Complainant's subsequent conduct is highly relevant. She not only did not immediately report the incident, but she actually arranged for a follow-up treatment at her own house two days later. She herself, accompanied by her aunt and cousin, went to fetch the Respondent from Kuala Berang. This is not the behaviour of a person who felt she had been violated. It is only after the Respondent asked to kiss her (a separate incident on the second visit) that the Complainant began to have doubts and contacted Darussyifa'.

This Court is mindful of the argument that the Complainant was afraid and too shocked to protest. However, while fear and shock may explain non-resistance during the incident, they do not adequately explain the active steps taken by the Complainant to continue the treatment. A person who was traumatized by being touched without consent would not ordinarily arrange to be alone with the same person again, let alone invite him to her home.

The learned Magistrate was correct in applying Section 7 of the Evidence Act 1950, which provides that facts which constitute the "state of things" under which relevant facts happened are relevant. The Magistrate properly considered the circumstances before, S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw during, and after the incident in assessing whether the touching was with criminal intent.

The prosecution also argued that the Magistrate erred in finding that there was consent. This Court must consider this issue carefully.

The law is clear that in sexual offences, the absence of consent is a crucial element. However, consent need not be express; it may be inferred from conduct. It is also clear that silence or non-resistance does not, by itself, amount to consent, particularly in circumstances where the victim is in a state of fear or shock.

In this case, the evidence on consent is conflicting. The Complainant testified that the Respondent did not ask for permission to touch her private parts. However, SP4, who was present throughout, testified that consent had been given. According to SP4, the Respondent had asked for permission at the outset, and because the same process was being repeated in the bedroom, no further specific permission was sought. There is also Exhibit P11, the Complainant's police report, which states that the Respondent had asked for permission to touch her for treatment purposes and she had allowed it. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The learned Magistrate concluded that the absence of consent as alleged by the Complainant was a "pemikiran semula" (afterthought). This conclusion was open to the Magistrate based on the evidence. The Magistrate specifically noted that the Complainant's evidence that she was afraid conflicted with her ability to answer the Respondent's questions calmly and to continue the treatment. The Magistrate's finding that the Complainant's conduct was inconsistent with her claim of non-consent was a reasonable assessment of the evidence.

The Complainant's subsequent conduct is again relevant here. The fact that she made the arrangements for the follow-up treatment herself, without any coercion or persuasion from SP4, strongly suggests that she had, at least at that time, accepted the Respondent's treatment and the manner in which it was conducted. It is only after the incident on 24 November 2020 that she began to have doubts and reported the matter.

This Court also notes that the Complainant did not immediately make a police report even after her conversation with Darussyifa'. She made the report on 3 December 2020, some days after the incident. While she provided explanations for this delay, the delay, combined with her continued association with the Respondent, supports the Magistrate's finding that the complaint of non-consent may have been a later development. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The prosecution argued that the Respondent's evidence was unsupported by his own witnesses. This submission is not entirely accurate. The defence witnesses provided relevant context regarding traditional healing practices:

SD2, a female Darussyifa' practitioner of many years' experience, confirmed that when treating spiritual disturbances, the disturbances would often move to the private parts and needed to be removed from those parts. She confirmed that it was sometimes necessary to touch private parts for treatment purposes. While she stated that she personally used a barrier, she also acknowledged that touching without a barrier was more effective in removing the disturbance.

SD5, the Head Practitioner of Darussyifa' Hulu Terengganu, gave evidence that in emergency situations (darurat), it might be necessary to touch private parts with the patient's consent. He confirmed that there were no absolute prohibitions against such touching; it depended on individual discretion based on the circumstances. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

What is particularly significant is the evidence of SD3, the husband of a patient whom the Respondent had treated. SD3 testified that the same treatment method had been used on his wife, and he had observed the Respondent's hands moving in the same manner as described by the Complainant. He confirmed that the Respondent's presence during the treatment was to assist when the female practitioners were unable to continue. This evidence supports the Respondent's explanation that his direct involvement was necessitated by the difficulty of the case.

It is also important that the Respondent's defence did not rely solely on his own testimony. The video recordings (Exhibits D16A and D16B) showed similar treatment methods being used on other patients, including the involvement of the Respondent in assisting. SD4, the videographer, provided a certificate under Section 90A of the Evidence Act 1950, and no issue was taken with the admissibility of the videos.

The prosecution did not call any rebuttal evidence to address the defence evidence on traditional healing practices. This is significant because the prosecution's case depends on showing that the Respondent's actions were not part of legitimate treatment. In the absence of any evidence to contradict the defence's explanation, the Magistrate was entitled to accept it. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

This Court has carefully examined the learned Magistrate's grounds of judgment. The Magistrate provided detailed reasoning and demonstrated a proper understanding of the applicable legal principles. She correctly identified the elements of the offence and considered all the evidence before her.

In Mat v Public Prosecutor (supra), Suffian J (as His Lordship then was) laid down the correct approach: "The correct law for Magistrates to apply is as follows. If you accept the explanation given by or on behalf of the accused, you must of course acquit. But this does not entitle you to convict if you do not believe that explanation, for he is still entitled to an acquittal if it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as the onus of proving his guilt lies throughout on the prosecution. If upon the whole evidence you are left in a real state of doubt, the prosecution has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon it."

Suffian J further summarized the legal position into five clear steps as follows: "(a) If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt – Convict.

If you accept or believe the accused's explanation – Acquit. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation – Do not convict but consider the next steps below.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation and that explanation does not raise in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt – Convict.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt – Acquit."

This principle is crucial because it emphasizes that a trial court cannot convict an accused person merely because it does not believe the accused's explanation. The court is still obliged to acquit the accused if the explanation, even if not believed, raises a reasonable doubt in the court's mind as to the accused's guilt. The burden of proving the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests throughout on the prosecution.

Suffian J also advised that Magistrates would assist the appellate court if they indicate in their grounds that they are aware of the tests laid down in steps (d) and (e) above. In the present case, the learned Magistrate has clearly shown that she understood these principles. She cited and applied the principle from Mat v Public Prosecutor (supra) in her grounds of judgment.

In applying the principles from Mat v Public Prosecutor (supra), the learned Magistrate clearly concluded that the Respondent's S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw explanation fell under limb (b) of the test. The Magistrate expressly stated that she found the Respondent's explanation to be "reasonable and credible" (munasabah dan boleh dipercayai). This is a clear acceptance of the Respondent's defence. Under limb (b), where the court accepts or believes the accused's explanation, the court must acquit. The Magistrate did not merely find that the explanation raised a reasonable doubt (which would fall under limb e); rather, she went further and expressly accepted the explanation as credible. She specifically noted the implausibility of the Respondent committing the alleged act in the presence of SP4 and with other people in the house; the Complainant's subsequent conduct in seeking follow-up treatment; the consistency of the Respondent's evidence with the documentary evidence (Exhibit P11); and the support from SP4's evidence. These findings demonstrate that the Magistrate accepted the Respondent's version of events as truthful, thereby triggering limb (b) which mandates an acquittal.

This Court is also mindful that the Magistrate had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify. She was in the best position to assess their credibility. This Court should not disturb her findings of fact unless there is a clear and manifest error. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The prosecution cited State of Punjab v Major Singh AIR (supra) for the proposition that the test of outraging modesty is objective, based on what a reasonable man would think. This Court accepts that principle. However, applying this objective test to the facts of this case, this Court is not satisfied that the Respondent's actions, viewed objectively, were done with the intent to outrage the Complainant's modesty. The presence of a third party, the brevity of the touching, the consistency with treatment methods, and the Complainant's subsequent conduct all militate against such a finding.

The prosecution also cited Cantona Lim Xiang Kim v Public Prosecutor (supra) and Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Nor & Ors (supra) on appellate intervention. These cases establish that appellate courts should not readily interfere with trial court findings. The exception is where the trial court was plainly wrong or failed to judicially appreciate the evidence. This Court finds that the Magistrate's decision does not fall within any of the exceptional circumstances warranting intervention. Her findings were based on a proper evaluation of the evidence, and she was not plainly wrong. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The Respondent cited Mohamed Shariff v Public Prosecutor (supra), Nadarasa v Public Prosecutor (supra), and Chay Hon Song v Public Prosecutor (supra) on the standard of proof in criminal cases. These cases establish the principle that an accused only needs to raise a reasonable doubt and need not prove his innocence conclusively. This Court accepts that principle and finds that the Respondent succeeded in raising such a doubt in this case.

The Respondent also cited Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal (supra), which sets out the limited grounds for appellate intervention. This Court finds that none of those grounds are present in this case. The Magistrate's decision was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and was not plainly wrong.

This Court considers the evidence of SP4 to be crucial. SP4 was a prosecution witness, not a defence witness. She had no reason to favour the Respondent. Her evidence was consistent and corroborative of the Respondent's defence. She testified that:

The same treatment method had been used on her daughter with positive results; S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

The Respondent had asked for permission before starting the treatment;

She was present throughout the treatment in the bedroom;

She had asked the Respondent to continue the treatment when she was unable to proceed;

The Complainant had agreed to continue the treatment;

The Complainant's hand had been stiff and painful, and the Respondent was forced to continue.

SP4's evidence significantly undermines the prosecution's case. If SP4, the Complainant's close friend, testified that the treatment was conducted with consent and for treatment purposes, and that she did not consider it to be an act of outraging modesty, then the prosecution's case is seriously weakened.

The prosecution argued that the Respondent's reliance on "darurat" (necessity) was unjustified and would open the floodgates for abuse. This Court acknowledges the validity of this S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw concern. However, this is not a case where a person simply claimed "darurat" without justification. There was evidence:

That SP4 was unable to continue due to pain and stiffness in her hand;

That the Complainant agreed to continue the treatment;

That the Respondent's direct involvement was only for a brief moment;

That SP4 was present throughout.

This Court does not accept the prosecution's submission that accepting the Respondent's explanation would open the floodgates. Each case must be determined on its own facts. In this case, there was sufficient evidence to support the Respondent's claim of necessity. The Magistrate was entitled to accept this evidence.

This Court notes that the High Court had previously allowed the prosecution's appeal and ordered the Respondent to enter his defence. However, that decision was made at the prima facie S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw stage, applying a different standard of proof. At the prima facie stage, the court only considers whether there is evidence that, if unrebutted, would support a conviction. The standard is significantly lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The fact that the High Court found a prima facie case does not preclude the Magistrate from acquitting the Respondent at the end of the defence case if the defence evidence raises a reasonable doubt. The Magistrate carefully considered the defence evidence and found that it did raise such a doubt. This Court finds no error in that approach.

After careful consideration of all the evidence, the submissions of both parties, the cases cited, and the learned Magistrate's grounds of judgment, this Court makes the following findings:

First, the learned Magistrate's findings of fact were based on a proper evaluation of the evidence. She considered all the evidence, both prosecution and defence, and assessed the credibility of the witnesses. She was entitled to accept the Respondent's explanation and the supporting evidence from the defence witnesses and SP4. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

Second, the Magistrate correctly applied the burden and standard of proof. She recognized that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. She applied the principles in Mat v Public Prosecutor (supra) and correctly determined that the Respondent's explanation, whether accepted or not, had raised a reasonable doubt.

Third, the Magistrate's finding that the element of criminal intention had not been proven was reasonable. The presence of SP4 throughout the treatment, the brevity of the touching, and the consistency with treatment methods all pointed away from any intention to outrage modesty.

Fourth, the Magistrate's finding on consent was also reasonable. The documentary evidence (Exhibit P11), the evidence of SP4, and the Complainant's subsequent conduct all supported a finding that consent had been given.

Fifth, the Magistrate's acceptance of the defence evidence on traditional healing practices was justified. The defence witnesses provided credible evidence that such treatment methods were used and that there were legitimate reasons for touching private parts in certain circumstances. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

Sixth, the Magistrate properly considered the totality of the evidence, including the Complainant's conduct before, during, and after the incident. This was a proper application of Section 7 of the Evidence Act 1950.

This Court finds no basis to interfere with the learned Magistrate's decision. Her findings were not plainly wrong, and she did not fail to properly appreciate the evidence. The Magistrate's decision was a reasonable one that was open to her on the evidence before her.

This Court is mindful of the seriousness of the allegations and the importance of protecting victims of sexual offences. However, the criminal justice system requires that the prosecution prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to meet that high standard. The Respondent's explanation was not merely a bare denial; it was supported by credible evidence and raised a reasonable doubt.

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the appeal has no merit. The prosecution has failed to demonstrate any error, whether of fact or law, in the learned Magistrate's decision.

S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

Accordingly, this Court makes the following orders:

The prosecution's appeal against the decision of the Magistrates’ Court at Kuala Berang in Criminal Trial No. TE- 83JS-1-12/2020 is dismissed;

The order of acquittal and discharge of the Respondent, Rulam Akbar bin Abd Manan, on the first charge under Section 354 of the Penal Code is affirmed;

The Respondent's bail bond is discharged. Dated: 14 July 2026 Yusrin Faidz Bin Yusoff Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Terengganu S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw Counsel for the Appellant: TPR Noradila Binti Ab Latif (Together with TPR Nur Atifah Binti Manaf) Timbalan Pendakwaraya Negeri Terengganu, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Terengganu, Tingkat 14, Wisma Darul Iman, 20200 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. Counsel for the Respondent: Ghazali bin Ismail Messrs. Ghazali Ismail & Co. PT 14194 A, Jalan Balai Besar, Kampung Alor Tempoyak, 23000 Dungun, Terengganu Darul Iman. CASE REFERENCE:

State of Punjab v Major Singh AIR [1967] SC 63 (SC).

Cantona Lim Xiang Kim v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 MLJ 544

Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Nor & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 200b (SC). S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw

Mat v Public Prosecutor [1963] MLJ 263 (HC).

Mohamed Shariff v Public Prosecutor [1964] MLJ 64 (HC).

Nadarasa v Public Prosecutor [1972] 2 MLJ 47 (HC).

Chay Hon Song v Public Prosecutor [1967] 1 MLJ 210 (HC).

Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2014] 4 MLJ 875 (CA).

Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 (CA).

Section 354 of the Penal Code.

Sections 6, 7, & 90A of the Evidence Act 1950. S/N iFSTqRgoiUeM2M0qcffwYw