a
(a) that s. 45F(2)(a) of the RTA read with s. 45G allowed for evidence of a person’s blood alcohol limit in his system to be proved via a breath test as provided for in ss. 45B(1) or 45C(1) of the RTA;
/akn/my/judgment/high-court/2026/7a0dc981-f37a-4ddf-8fb6-d1c00035c8a7
High Court of Malaysia12 Mar 2026WA-41H-10-05/2025
The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.
Citations and treatment detected automatically from later judgments and the authorities this decision relies on.
Later cases and laws citing this decision
Not yet cited by a later decision.
Earlier cases and laws this decision relies on
“way in which submissions were presented by the parties at the trial, the judge treated the question of admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence as being governed by section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”). She ruled that in the circumstances the breach of procedure had not 10 had such an a”
“of the offence, i.e. R. 4 of the 1995 Rules had not been complied with. Then because of the Court of Appeal decision on 17.6.2025, she made a ‘u-turn’ that her decision was wrong. Now, Art. 5 of the Federal Constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of his personal liberty except in 25 accordance with the law.”
“ion in detail we should refer to an earlier decision of the Divisional Court, which was followed in that case: Howard v Hallett [1984] RTR 353. That case concerned the predecessor to the RTA 1988 the Road Traffic Act 1972. 20 The 1972 Act included a provision, in section 10(2), which was similar to what is now section”
“nt, Sanjay Kumar A/L Selvakumaru, without calling for his defence after finding that the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against him on a charge made under section 45A(1) of 20 the Road Transport Act 1987 [Act 333]. [2] On 20.5.2025, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal appealing against the acquit”
“this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence.” 20 32 The first case to which reference should be made is the decision of the Privy Council in Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197, in which the opinion of the Board was delivered by Lord Goddard CJ. That case concerned evidence which had”
“t [1984] RTR 353 on a pertinent point: “45 The essential foundation for the argument on behalf of the defendant is the 15 decision of the Divisional Court in Murray v Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] RTR 209 (Watkins LJ and Laws J). Before we consider that decision in detail we should refer to an earlier decision”
“rosecution. In that aspect, I refer again to R v Twigg (supra), where 10 their Lordships referred to the case of Murray v Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] RTR 209 which followed Howard v Hallet [1984] RTR 353 on a pertinent point: “45 The essential foundation for the argument on behalf of the defendant is the 15”
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Text
1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR RAYUAN JENAYAH NO : WA-41H-10-05/2025 ANTARA 5 PENDAKWA RAYA …PERAYU DAN 10 SANJAY KUMAR A/L SELVAKUMARU (NO.780228055375) ...RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 15 [1] This was an appeal by the Public Prosecutor to the High Court against the decision of the Magistrate’s Court that had acquitted the Respondent, Sanjay Kumar A/L Selvakumaru, without calling for his defence after finding that the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against him on a charge made under section 45A(1) of 20 the Road Transport Act 1987 [Act 333]. [2] On 20.5.2025, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal appealing against the acquittal order. The appeal was heard by this Court on 12.3.2026, whereby after hearing the submissions of the parties and 25 considering the records of appeal, I had dismissed the Public Prosecutor’s appeal. Dissatisfied with my decision, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeal on 19.3.2026, posing a question to be decided by the appellate court as follows: 26/03/2026 19:59:06 WA-41H-10-05/2025 Kand. 25 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 “Sama ada tatacara yang digariskan dalam Jadual Pertama Kaedah-Kaedah Kenderaan Motor (Ujian Nafas, Darah dan Air Kencing) 1995 merupakan keperluan mandatori (mandatory requirement), di mana sebarang ketinggalan atau ketakpatuhan, walaupun tiada keterangan bahawa bacaan yang dihasilkan oleh 5 alat penganalisis tersebut adalah tidak tepat atau telah terjejas, akan menjejaskan kebolehterimaan (admissibility) bacaan yang dihasilkan oleh alat penganalisis nafas; ataupun tatacara tersebut hanyalah keperluan direktori (discretionary requirement), di mana ketakpatuhan tersebut merupakan suatu ketidakaturan yang boleh 10 diperbaiki (curable irregularity), selaras dengan prinsip dalam R v Twigg [2019] EWCA Crim 1553.”. BACKGROUND [3] The charge against the Respondent was as follows: 15 Bahawa kamu pada 03/11/2021 jam lebih kurang 0010 hrs malam di Jalan Damansara Link dari arah Sprint Highway ke arah Bangsar dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur sebagai pemandu kenderaan nombor pendaftaran NDB 9922 telah memandu kenderaan jenis BMW dimana kandungan alkohol di dalam badan kamu didapati sebanyak 315mg dalam 100ml darah iatu lebih 20 265mg alkohol daripada had yang ditetapkan iaitu 50mg alkolhol di dalam 100ml darah dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 45A(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (Akta 333) Pindaan 2020. 25 HUKUMAN Sekiranya disabitkan hendaklah dihukum penjara selama tempoh tidak melebih dua tahun dan denda tidak kurang daripada RM10,000 dan tidak lebih daripada RM30,000 dan di bawah subsekyen (3) hilang kelayakan daripada memegang atau mendapatkan suatu lesen memandu selama tempoh tidak kurang 30 daripada dua tahun dari tarikh sabitan.”. [4] The brief facts of the case were gathered from the grounds of judgment of the Magistrate as follows: **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 “6. Fakta ringkas bagi kes ini adalah pada 3.11.2021 jam 0010 hrs, Kpl Shazrul Izham bin Abdul Malek (SP2) sebagai anggota bahagian penguatkuasaan Trafik Kuala Lumpur telah menahan sebuah motokar jenis BMW dengan no pendaftaran NDB 9922 di Jalan Damansara Link dari arah Jalan Sprint Highway menghala ke Jalan Bangsar. 5 7. Kereta tersebut dipandu oleh seorang lelaki India bernama Sanjay Kumar A/L Selvakumaru (No. Kad Pengenalan 780828-05-5375) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Tertuduh”) kerana dipercayai di bawah pengaruh alkohol. Kpl Jasni bin Ismail (SP5) telah membawa pulang Tertuduh ke Balai Polis Trafik Tun H.S Lee bagi ujian pernafasan EBA 10 II.
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8. Hasil ujian pernafasan menggunakan mesin EBA yang dijalankan oleh Insp Mohd Hafiz Hafizul bin Mohd Khaidir (SP6) mendapati bahawa kandungan alcohol dalam darah Tertudh adalah 315 mg/100 ml darah iaitu 265 mg/100 ml melebihi had yang dibenarkan. 15 9. Tertuduh telah dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 13 (Trafik) pada 15.12.2021 bagi pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 45A Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987.” [5] The Magistrate, upon a maximum evaluation of the prosecution 20 evidence acquitted the Respondent without calling for defence stated that: “ELEMEN-ELEMEN PERTUDUHAN Intipati pertama: Tertuduh adalah pemandu motokar yang mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan terhadap motokar pada masa material. 25 14. Elemen ini telah dipenuhi kerana keterangan bahawa Tertuduh sebagai pemandu motokar jenis BMW no pendaftaran NDB 9922 yang berada di Jalan Damansara Link, Kuala Lumpur pada 3.11.2021 jam lebih kurang 0100 pagi tidak dicabar oleh pihak pembelaan semasa pemeriksaan balas. Intipati kedua: Kandungan alkohol di dalam badan Tertuduh melebihi had yang 30 dibenarkan.
section
15. Mahkamah juga berpandangan elemen kedua ini dipenuhi kerana slip EBA eksibit tandaan P3(a) dan P3(b) telah dikemukakan melalui keterangan Pegawai Hembusan (SP6) dan keputusaanya adalah 315mg.
section
16. Keputusan ini menunjukkan kandungan alkohol di dalam badan 35 Tertuduh melebihi kadar 265mg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Intipati ketiga: Ujian pengadaan spesimen nafas bagi analisa yang dijalankan ke atas Tertuduh hendaklah mematuhi peruntukkan seksyen 45C(1)(a) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan Kaedah-kaedah Kenderaan Motor (Ujian Nafas, Darah dan Air Kencing) 1995 [PU(A) 227/1995]
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17. Semasa saya memberikan keputusan di akhir pendakwaan pada 5 16.5.2025, saya telah melepaskan dan membebaskan Tertuduh berdasarkan tiga alasan yang berikut: a) Terdapat ketidakpatuhan Prosedur di bawah Item 4, Jadual Pertama, Kaedah 4 Kaedah-kaedah Kenderaan Motor (Ujian Nafas, Darah dan Air Kencing) 1995 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Kaedah 1995) di mana, SP6 10 gagal memaklumkan kepada Tertuduh keperluan Tertuduh untuk memberikan 2 specimen. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan pembelaan bahawa keperluan memberikan hembusan yang Panjang dan keperluan memberikan dua specimen pernafasan adalah dua perkara yang berbeza. 15 b) Kedua, terdapat ketidakpatuhan Prosedur di Item 5(i) Jadual Pertama Kaedah 4, Kaedah 1995 di mana SP6 gagal membuktikan sebelum hembusan pertama dibuat corong mulut telah ditukar. SP6 hanya menyatakan corong mulut ditukar sebelum hembusan kedua dimulakan. c) Ketiga, terdapat ketidakpatuhan Prosedur di Item 5(iii) & 5(v) Jadual 20 Pertama Kaedah 1995 yang menghendaki selepas ujian hembusan pertama dan ujian hembusan kedua perlu membuat catatan bertulis. SP6 ada memaklumkan keputusan bacaan namun gagal membuat apa apa catatan ujian hembusan pertama dan ujian hembusan kedua.
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18. Mahkamah ini telah merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu 25 KANNAN LETCHUMANAN V PP [2024] 8 CLJ 486, di mana pada perenggan 4, Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: “Section 45C(1) of the Act must be declared as mandatory. PW4, after receiving the appellant from PW3, did not comply with the mandatory provision of s. 45C(1), resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The 30 preliminary test conducted by PW3 under s. 45B(1) was insufficient to prove the offence under s. 45A(1) as the mandatory provision of s. 45C(1) was entirely disregarded. The appellant was deprived of the procedural law, which required him to provide two breath specimens for analysis under s. 45(1)(a). He was also denied the procedural 35 safeguards made under the Motor Vehicles (Breath, Blood and Urine Tests) Rules 1995 (‘BBUT Rules’). The appellant was not given a fair trial and had lost a fair chance of being acquitted, which was reasonably open to him. The failure to strictly observe the provision of s. 45C(1) and the BBUT Rules and to adduce cogent evidence against the appellant, 40 on the prescribed limit of alcohol in the appellant’s body, based on two **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 breath specimens, meant that the prosecution failed to prove the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction against the appellant by the Magistrate was unsafe”.
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19. Walaubagaimanpun, kes yang dirujuk tersebut telah dirayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan oleh pihak pendakwaan, no kes adalah A-09-133- 05/2024, 5 Pendakwa Raya lawan Kannan Letchumanan. Pada 17.6.2025, Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengetepikan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut dan mengekalkan sabitan Responden. Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[69] For this reason, we find that the High Court fell into error and was 10 plainly wrong to have read words into the RTA — that the breath test under section 45B was an “initial breath test” and that the breath test, or blood or urine test under section 45C is mandatory if the “initial breath test” under section 45B was “positive” — when no such words are stated in the said sections RTA. 15 [70] Further, we find that the High Court was plainly wrong to hold based on Rule 4 of the BBU Test Rules that a police officer is under a legal duty to procure two specimens of breath for the breath test under section 45B(1) RTA. Rule 4 of the BBU Test Rules expressly state that the procedures in the First Schedule of the BBU Test Rules are 20 applicable for breath tests conducted under section 45C RTA. Nowhere does it state that it is applicable for breath tests conducted under section 45B RTA. Similar to what it did with sections 45B and 45C RTA, the High Court had read words into the BBU Test Rules where none exist.”
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20. Kes di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah tertakluk di bawah seksyen 45B 25 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987. Mahkamah berpandangan memandangkan Seksyen 45C Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 tidak terpakai, maka pematuhan prosedur pengambilan ujian nafas dalam Jadual Pertama, Kaedah 4 Kaedah-kaedah Kenderaan Motor (Ujian Nafas, Darah dan Air Kencing) 1995 adalah tidak terpakai. 30 21. Mahkamah mendapati elemen yang harus dipenuhi hanya melibatkan elemen pertama dan elemen kedua seperti yang dinyatakan di atas. Justeru, pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima faice terhadap Tertuduh.
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22. Pihak pembelaan telah membangkitkan dua isu iaitu (i) ketidakpatuhan 35 terhadap prosedur pengambilan ujian nafas dalam Jadual Pertama, Kaedah 4 Kaedah-kaedah Kenderaan Motor (Ujian Nafas, Darah dan Air Kencing) 1995 dan (ii) hal keadaan butiran dalam Slip EBA/Rekod Ujian Hembusan (P3) yang kabur, tidak boleh dibaca dan mengelirukan telah menyebabkan kesan prejudis kepada OKT. 40 23. Mahkamah telah menjawab isu di bahagian initipati ketiga pertuduhan dan kini menjawab isu kedua yang dibangkitkan. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan bertulis pendakwaan bahawa bacaan yang relevan kepada **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 pertuduhan masih tertera dan dapat dilihat dengan jelas. Dengan merujuk eksibit P3B salinan Rekod Ujian Hembusan, nama OKT dan keputusan 315mg/100ml adalah dapat dibaca.
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24. Mahkamah juga mendapati eksibit P3A dan P3B hanyalah satu keterangan sokongan kerana SP3 telah memberikan keterangan secara lisan 5 berkenaan keputusan bacaan alkohol. Mahkamah menerima pakai eksibit P3B sebagai keterangan sekunder di bawah Seksyen 63(b) Akta Keterangan dibaca bersama Seksyen 65 Akta Keterangan.
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25. Dengan adanya perkembangan kes dari Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap kes PP v Kannan Letchumanan no kes A-09-133-05/2024, saya 10 mohon agar Mahkamah Tinggi mengakas keputusan saya yang telah melepaskan dan membebaskan Tertuduh di akhir kes pendakwaan dan memanggil Tertuduh untuk membela diri.” THE APPEAL 15 [6] The crux of the Appellant’s appeal was that the prosecution had fulfilled the requirements of the charge based on the oral evidence of SP6 who conducted the breath test, EBA slips (Exhibit P3A and P3B) and the result of SP7’s investigations that a new mouthpiece was given to the Respondent and that the latter had successfully 20 blown into the EBA machine such that it had produced a beeping sound, indicating that his breath sample was correctly taken into the machine for analysis and the result of which was as printed on the slip P3A at the material time. P3B was a photocopy of P3A. Further, the prosecution contended that the test was done twice and the EBA 25 slip showed the Respondent’s details and he had signed on the slip. He was also informed about the result of the test and been given a copy of it. [7] The DPP submitted that any technical non-compliance, if any, had 30 not occasioned a miscarriage of justice because the EBA II’s result was a scientific finding which showed the blood alcohol level in a given sample. Additionally, SP4 had testified that the EBA II **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 machine was a suitable equipment for the purposes of s.45A of the RTA. It was also submitted that the Respondent had not shown how he had been prejudiced by any technical compliance in the testing of his breath samples. The DPP further urged the Court to overturn the Magistrate’s decision because the latter had admitted her 5 mistake in relying upon the High Court decision in Kannan v Letchumanan that had been overturned by the Court of Appeal in PP v Kannan Letchumanan [2025] 10 CLJ 177 (after she had made her decision to dismiss the prosecution case but before completing her grounds of judgment). It was submitted further that 10 the procedures laid down in the First Schedule of the Motor Vehicles (Breath, Blood And Urine Tests) Rules 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1995 Rules”) only applied to s.45B and not s.45C of the RTA, and that any non-compliance with the technical procedures under the 1995 Rules did not make the breath 15 test result illegal as long as the equipment was functioning well and handled by a qualified officer for the testing. [8] The Respondent in reply submitted that the Magistrate’s decision on 16.5.2025 to acquit him without calling for his defence was correctly 20 made upon a maximum evaluation of the prosecution case, and that she should not have suddenly made a “u-turn” based on the Court of Appeal decision of Kannan A/L Letchumanan (supra) that came about while she was writing her judgment. They submitted that the Magistrate had made the correct findings of fact regarding SP6’s 25 failure to inform the Respondent about the requirement of 2- specimens, and the necessity of placing a new mouthpiece before the first test as well as the failureof SP6 to write down the result of the first test. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [9] The Respondent urged the Court not to disturb the findings of the Magistrate because at the time of the decision on 16.5.2025, the Court of Appeal’s written grounds in Kannan A/L Letchumanan (supra) was not yet available and that the overturned decision of the High Court was irrelevant because the Court of Appeal decision on 5 17.6.2025 stated:
a
(a) that s. 45F(2)(a) of the RTA read with s. 45G allowed for evidence of a person’s blood alcohol limit in his system to be proved via a breath test as provided for in ss. 45B(1) or 45C(1) of the RTA;
b
(b) that a breath test under s. 45B(1) of the RTA was not subjected to the 1995 Rules; and
c
(c) that a breath test under s. 45C(1) of the RTA must comply with the 1995 Rules. 15 EVALUATION AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT [10] The important question to be addressed by this Court, according to the Respondent during the appeal, and which has been raised by the Public Prosecutor in the Notice of Appeal is whether the procedures laid down in the 1995 Rules is a mandatory 20 requirement which will affect its admissibility as evidence in trial when there is technical non-compliance with the rules, or whether it is merely discretionary where any such non-compliance is a “curable irregularity”, following the principle in the English case of R v Twigg. The question posed by the 25 Public Prosecutor is qualified in that there is no evidence that the reading of the EBA II machine was inaccurate of compromised. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [11] Before I go further to analyse the issue(s) raised in the appeal, it is noted that the 1995 Rules is enacted under the enabling provision of s.66(1) of the RTA which states:
section
66. (1) The Minister may make rules for any purpose for which rules may be made under this Part and for prescribing anything which may be prescribed 5 under this Part and generally as to the construction, maintenance, use, age and equipment of motor vehicles and the conditions under which they may be used, and otherwise for the purpose of carrying this Part into effect and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, may make rules— 10 …
subparagraph
(mm) to prescribe the procedures relating to the use and testing of breath analyzers and the procedures relating to the blood and urine tests of drivers of motor vehicles and the types of breath analyzers to be used; 15 [12] The relevant provisions of s.45B are as follows: Breath test 45B. (1) Where a police officer in uniform has reasonable cause to suspect—
a
(a) that a person has committed an offence under section 44 or 45 involving 20 intoxicating liquor or under section 45A; or
b
(b) that a person was the driver of or attempted to drive or was in charge of a motor vehicle in an accident involving one or more vehicles on a road or other public place, he may, subject to section 45D, require that person to provide a specimen of 25 breath for a breath test.
subsection
(2) A person may be required under subsection (1) to provide a specimen either at or near the place where the requirement is made or, if the requirement is made under paragraph (1)(b) and the police officer making the requirement thinks fit, at a police station specified by the police officer.
subsection
(3) A breath test required under subsection (1) shall be conducted by the police officer making the requirement or any other police officer. … [13] Meanwhile, the relevant provisions of s.45C are the following: Provision of specimen for analysis 35 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10
section
45C. (1) In the course of an investigation whether a person has committed an offence under section 44 or 45 involving intoxicating liquor or under section 45A a police officer may, subject to the provisions of this section and to section 45D, require him—
a
(a) to provide two specimens of breath for analysis by means of a prescribed 5 breathanalyser; or
b
(b) to provide a specimen of blood or urine for a laboratory test, notwithstanding that he has been required to provide a specimen of breath for a breath test under subsection 45B(1).
subsection
(2) A requirement under this section to provide a specimen of breath can 10 only be made at a police station.
subsection
(3) A breath test under this section shall only be conducted by a police officer not below the rank of sergeant or by an officer in charge of a police station and shall only be conducted at a police station.
subsection
(4) A requirement under this section to provide a specimen of blood or urine 15 can only be made at a police station or at a hospital, but it cannot be made at a police station unless—
a
(a) the police officer making the requirement has reasonable cause to believe that for medical reasons a specimen of breath cannot be provided or should not be required;
b
(b) at the time the requirement is made, the prescribed breathanalyser is not available at the police station or it is for any other reason not practicable to use the breathanalyser, and may be made notwithstanding that the person required to provide the specimen has already provided or been required to provide two specimens of breath. 25 … [14] A breath test is defined in s.45G(1) of the RTA to mean “ "breath test" includes a preliminary test for the purpose of obtaining, by means of a prescribed breathanalyser, an indication whether the proportion of alcohol in a person's breath, blood or urine equals or 30 exceeds the prescribed limit;”. And at present, "prescribed limit" means - “(a) 22 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath;
b
(b) 50 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood; or
c
(c) 67 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of urine.”. 35 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [15] The Court of Appeal in Kannan A/L Letchumanan (supra) held the view that ss. 45F and 45G do not state that the breath test conducted under s.45B is an initial breath test or that 'if positive' the investigating officer is obliged to request for further specimens of breath or specimens of blood or urine under s.45(1) of the RTA. 5 (refer to paras 63-65 of the CoA Judgment by Faizah Jamaluddin JCA). Hence, the High Court was wrong to have read into these provisions that the breath test under section 45B was an “initial breath test” and that the breath test, or blood or urine test under section 45C is mandatory if the “initial breath test” under section 45B 10 was “positive” — when no such words are stated in the said sections of the RTA. [16] A summary of the case of Kannan A/L Letchumanan (supra) is reproduced here from the respective law journal as follows: 15 The respondent was charged, and convicted, at the Magistrates' Court for driving a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit, an offence under s. 45A(1) of the Road Transport act 1987 (‘RTA’). Upon appeal at the High Court, the respondent was acquitted and discharged of the said charges. The High Court Judge's ('HCJ') acquittal of the respondent was 20 premised on his interpretation that the breath test under s. 45B(1) of the RTA was 'an initial breath test' which, if positive, made it mandatory for the investigating officer to request the accused to provide two specimens of his breath or a specimen of blood or urine under s. 45C(1) of the RTA. The HCJ held that the respondent's conviction was unsafe as the investigating officer did 25 not request for two specimens of the respondent's breath, or specimens of his blood or urine under s.45C(1) of the RTA. Hence, the present appeal against the HCJ's finding that the provisions in s.45C(1) of the RTA was mandatory; not against the respondent's acquittal. The issues that arose for adjudication concerned the interpretation of the RTA governing: (i) the request for 30 specimens of breath, blood and urine under ss. 45B and 45C of the RTA from persons suspected of having committed an offence either under: (a) ss. 44 or 45, involving intoxicating liquor; or (b) s.45A for driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit; and (ii) the tests of these specimens under the RTA and the Motor Vehicles (Breath, Blood 35 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 And Urine Tests) Rules 1995, made by the Minister under s. 66 of the RTA ('BBU Test Rules'). [17] The 1995 Rules is also reproduced below for ease of reference, particularly when discussing Rules 4 and 5: 5 FIRST SCHEDULE PROCEDURES IN BREATH TEST
section
1. The breath test shall be carried out by a police officer who has been trained and duly authorised to operate the breathanalyser.
section
2. No person shall be required to undergo a breath test within twenty minutes of his taking of any type of food, drink (alcoholic or otherwise), mouthspray or any type of medication. 15
section
3. No person shall be required to undergo a breath test within five minutes of his smoking.
section
4. No breath specimen may be taken from any person unless he is first informed of the requirement to provide two specimens of breath in the manner provided 20 by the Act.
section
5. The police officer conducting the test shall ensure that the breathanalyser has been issued with the certificate of fitness pursuant to rule 5 of of the Motor Vehicles (Breath, Blood and Urine Tests) Rules 1995 and thereafter conduct 25 the test in the following manner:
a
(a) attach a new mouthpiece to the breath tube;
b
(b) instruct the person to blow through the mouthpiece in one long continuous 30 breath until his breath specimen is accepted by the breathanalyser for an analysis;
c
(c) note in writing the reading given by the evedential breathanalyser; 35
d
(d) repeat the procedure as in paragraph (b);
e
(e) note in writing the reading given by the breathanalyser and thereafter inform the person of his reading and the reading referred to in paragraph (c); 40
f
(f) sign the print-out indicating such information and details as the Chief Police Officer may determine from time to time and ensure that the said print-out is also signed by the person; and
g
(g) give a copy of the print-out referred to in paragraph (f) to the person. 45 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [18] For the purpose of this appeal, it is then necessary to determine from the evidence which test was done on the Respondent at the material time. The Respondent contended that it was done under s.45C(1) of the RTA since he had given 2 breath samples at the police station which was conducted by an officer with the rank of 5 Inspector i.e. SP6, and the DPP seemed to focus on this section too by showing that they have complied with R.4 of the 1995 Rules. The earlier test done by SP5 at the location where the Respondent was detained was only via a single breath specimen on the SD2+ machine which allegedly gave a reading of 400. The Respondent 10 submitted that the Magistrate was plainly wrong when she concluded that SP6 had conducted a test under s. 45B(1) despite the evidence adduced as above by the prosecution. But she found that SP6 had breached Rules 4, 5(a), (c) and (e) of the 1995 Rules. 15 [19] Although SP6 told the court that he had explained the requirements of the law to the Respondent, particularly “memberikan hembusan yang panjang”, this was not the same as the requirement of R. which states:
section
4. No breath specimen may be taken from any person unless he is first 20 informed of the requirement to provide two specimens of breath in the manner provided by the Act. [20] The Court of Appeal rightly pointed out that ss. 45F and 45G do not 25 state that the breath test conducted under s.45B is an initial breath test or that 'if positive' the investigating officer is obliged to request for further specimens of breath or specimens of blood or urine under s.45(1) of the RTA. But, with all due respect, the manner of drafting of the provisions of ss. 45B and 45C appear to compel the courts to 30 read the first breath test at the location as an “initial” breath test. It **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 is noted that s.45B(2) provides for the giving of specimen at the location where the requirement is made i.e. at the roadblock, or if under subsection(1)(b) i.e. that a person was the driver of or attempted to drive or was in charge of a motor vehicle in an accident involving one or more vehicles on a road or other public place, then 5 the specimen may be required to be given at a police station. There was no evidence of the Respondent being involved in an accident. From the evidence of SP5, it was clear that the Respondent was firstly asked to give a breath specimen at the place where the requirement was made as provided for under ss.45B(1)(a) and 10 45B(2). [21] The Court of Appeal correctly pointed out that s.45C(1) is NOT a mandatory requirement to require the suspect to undergo a second test at the police station. It is a discretion (from the word ‘may’ used 15 in s.45C(1)) for an investigation officer investigation the case to require him to undergo further testing to determine whether the person has committed an offence under section 44 or 45 involving intoxicating liquor or under section 45A of the RTA. A requirement under this section may only be made at a police station. The person 20 may be asked-
a
(a) to provide two specimens of breath for analysis by means of a prescribed breathanalyser; or
b
(b) to provide a specimen of blood or urine for a laboratory test, notwithstanding that he has been required to provide a 25 specimen of breath for a breath test under subsection 45B(1). [22] Therefore, from my reading of the above provisions’ construction, when a police officer chooses to require the person to give a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 breath specimen under s.45C(1), as opposed to s.45B(1), during the course of his investigation, the police officer shall comply with the provisions of either subsection 45C(1)(a) or (b) and the rest of the provisions of s. 45C. It is noted that s.45B is titled “Breath test” whereas s.45C is titled “Provision of sample”. 5 S.45B provides for what is a breath test and where it can be required as well as penalty for refusal to undergo a blood test when required. Then it goes on to s. 45C about providing of sample for testing, who may require it, where to provide the sample, providing a specimen of blood or urine can only be made at a police station or at a hospital 10 and additional requirements in that regard as well as penalty for refusal to give a sample when required. Since s.45C does not have detailed provisions on how the testing is to be in conducted, the Minister has provided for this by s.66(1)(mm) of the RTA which is to be read with the 1995 Rules prescribing the manner of testing. 15 Hence, we have to come back to the provisions of the 1995 Rules. Otherwise what is the point of having such detailed provisions on the manner of giving the specimens as required in ss. 45B or 45C of the RTA. 20 [23] The Court of Appeal in Kannan A/L Letchumanan (supra) also held that the High Court was plainly wrong to hold based on r.4 of the 1995 Rules that a police officer is under a legal duty to procure two specimens of breath for the breath test under s.45B(1) of the RTA. Rule 4 of the 1995 Rules expressly state that the procedures in the 25 First Schedule of the 1995 Rules are applicable for breath tests conducted under s. 45C(1) of the RTA. Nowhere does it state that it is applicable for breath tests conducted under s. 45B of the RTA. Similar to what it did with ss. 45B and 45C of the RTA, the Court of **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Appeal held that the High Court had read words into the 1995 Rules where none exist. Therefore, the High Court decision to acquit the respondent because of non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of testing under s. 45C of the RTA was wrong and liable to be set aside. 5 [24] This Court noted that s.45F of the RTA provides that evidence of the proportion of alcohol in a specimen of breath, blood or urine provided by the accused shall be taken into account and it shall be assumed that the proportion of alcohol in the accused‘s breath, 10 blood or urine at the time of the alleged offence was not less than in the specimen; but the assumption shall not be made if the accused proves certain things (as stated in that section). This would of course be made during the course of the trial. Nevertheless, it is trite that the burden of proving a case beyond a reasonable doubt is always 15 on the prosecution throughout the trial and whereas the accused only bears the evidential burden of raising a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case. [25] The Magistrate had already made a finding of fact that the 20 requirements of the third ingredient of the offence, i.e. R. 4 of the 1995 Rules had not been complied with. Then because of the Court of Appeal decision on 17.6.2025, she made a ‘u-turn’ that her decision was wrong. Now, Art. 5 of the Federal Constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of his personal liberty except in 25 accordance with the law. The prosecution as the guardian of public interest is now saying that the requirements of the law need not be complied with in order to save this case, by virtue of the fact that the BAC reading of the Respondent was 265 mg above the prescribed **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 limit. Reliance is placed on the English case principle in R v Twigg [2019] 1 WLR 6533. The following passages from the said case have been reproduced below for effect: “4 This case raises a potentially important point of principle in relation to the admissibility as evidence of blood samples unlawfully obtained by the police in 5 breach of statutory duties imposed by section 7 of the RTA 1988. In accordance with the way in which submissions were presented by the parties at the trial, the judge treated the question of admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence as being governed by section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”). She ruled that in the circumstances the breach of procedure had not 10 had such an adverse impact on the fairness of the trial that it would be unfair for it to be admitted. At the hearing before this court, it became apparent that there may be a logically prior question which needs to be determined: whether the evidence was inadmissible as a matter of law. If it was, the issue under section 78 of PACE would never arise, since there can be no question of a court 15 permitting evidence to be adduced at a trial if it is inadmissible as a matter of law. … 21 The judge found that this was not a case where there was no basis for supposing that the defendant’s driving at the time was affected by the 20 consumption of drugs. The officer who first arrested him plainly suspected the smell of cannabis. Further, in answer to the question “have you smoked anything?”, the defendant had replied “not recently”. 22 The judge said that, whilst the defendant presented as alert and coherent to 25 the healthcare professional, this was after nearly an hour’s delay, caused because the defendant had absconded from the scene. The healthcare professional had asked the defendant if he had taken any drugs. He lied. He could have told the truth. Had he answered honestly then it was highly likely that the healthcare professional would have reviewed her opinion about 30 whether he was affected by cannabis. 23 The judge concluded that, although there had been a breach of procedure in taking the blood sample, in all the circumstances, admission of that evidence would not have such an adverse impact on the fairness of the trial that it would 35 be unfair to allow the prosecution to adduce it. 28 Section 7 of the RTA 1988, as amended, so far as material, provides: “(1) In the course of an investigation into whether a person has committed an offence under section 3A … of this Act a constable may, subject to the following 40 provisions of this section and section 9 of this Act, require him— (a) to provide two specimens of breath for analysis by means of a device of a type approved by the Secretary of State, or (b) to provide a specimen of blood or urine for a laboratory test. 45 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 “(2) A constable may make a requirement under this section to provide specimens of breath only if— (a) the requirement is made at a police station or a hospital, (b) the requirement is imposed in circumstances where section 6(5) of this Act applies, or (c) the constable is in uniform …” 5 29 It was subsection (3)(c) that was not complied with in the present case, since the healthcare professional did not advise the police that the defendant’s condition might be due to some drug. … 31 Section 78 of PACE provides that: 10 “(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 15 admit it. “(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence.” 20 32 The first case to which reference should be made is the decision of the Privy Council in Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197, in which the opinion of the Board was delivered by Lord Goddard CJ. That case concerned evidence which had been obtained as a result of a search. The Board proceeded on the basis that the evidence was illegally obtained: see pp 226–227. On the same page 25 Lord Goddard said: “In their Lordships’ opinion the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was 30 obtained. While this proposition may not have been stated in so many words in any English case there are decisions which support it, and in their Lordships’ opinion it is plainly right in principle.” [26] It is noted that s.7 of the RTA 1988 is similar to the provision of 35 s.45C of the Malaysian RTA 1987. In the English case of R v Twigg (supra), the Court of Appeal there held that: “44 We have seen therefore that the general approach of English law is to regard the manner in which evidence was obtained (including where it was obtained unlawfully) as not leading to its automatic exclusion. The 40 manner in which it was obtained will be a relevant factor to be taken into account when performing the exercise required by section 78 of PACE and article 6 of the ECHR but ultimately the question for the court is whether there will be a fair trial. However, in the present case, it is submitted on behalf of the defendant that, even before one gets to that issue, the blood 45 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 sample in question was inadmissible as a matter of law, so there could be no question of admitting it at all.”. [Emphasis added] [27] It is the above principle that the prosecution relies on in arguing that the Respondent’s BAC reading should be admissible by the Court. 5 However, based on the above passage, the ultimate question for the Court is still “whether there will be a fair trial”. This question does not run counter to the principle of right to a fair trial as enshrined in the Federal Constitution. In the case of Yahya Hussein Mohsen Abdulrab v PP [2021] 9 CLJ 414, the Federal Court stated: 10 “[55] We will first deal with the "fault" point. The prosecution is but one aspect of the administration of justice albeit a significant one. The system is made up of many other actors including the judge, defence counsel, the police, interpreters and various other parties. The core of the criminal justice system is 15 to dispense justice to the public for the wrongs committed by the "criminal". In this regard, the primary duty of the prosecution, after determining that there is a sound case and preferring a charge, is to marshal and lead evidence pointing towards guilt. [56] The entire system of law that we have curated in our democratic system of 20 Government therefore means that the prosecution does not have the ultimate say in the guilt or innocence of a person. That is the exclusive duty and role of the courts. In this regard, the prosecution must not approach all cases with the mindset that they must secure a conviction at all costs in the same way defence counsel must not entertain the idea that he must secure an 25 acquittal at all costs. Their paramount duty, apart from their duties to their clients (defence) or the public/State (prosecution), is to conduct the trial in a candid, honest and fair manner so that the ultimate truth of the case is presented to the court. [57] Now, if any of these numerous components of the machinery of the justice 30 system fail to function correctly, the entire administration of justice will collapse. Trials would become merely a façade or an act to simply secure a conviction without regard to the due process of law which assumes that all persons are innocent unless proven otherwise. The passage we quoted earlier from the judgment of McHugh J in TKWJ (supra), clarifies this point beyond doubt. As 35 such, the strength of the prosecution's case is irrelevant if the accused is not **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 given a fair trial as required by art. 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. And the question of fault simply does not arise.”. [Emphasis added] [28] Although that case was in regard to the issue of “flagrant incompetence of counsel”, I referred to the useful guidance by the 5 Federal Court in respect of what is a fair trial, what are the duties of the prosecution, defence and the courts. This Court opined that a fair trial also meant that the requirements of a subsidiary legislation to be read with the principle law must also be complied with by the prosecution. In that aspect, I refer again to R v Twigg (supra), where 10 their Lordships referred to the case of Murray v Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] RTR 209 which followed Howard v Hallet [1984] RTR 353 on a pertinent point: “45 The essential foundation for the argument on behalf of the defendant is the 15 decision of the Divisional Court in Murray v Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] RTR 209 (Watkins LJ and Laws J). Before we consider that decision in detail we should refer to an earlier decision of the Divisional Court, which was followed in that case: Howard v Hallett [1984] RTR 353. That case concerned the predecessor to the RTA 1988 the Road Traffic Act 1972. 20 The 1972 Act included a provision, in section 10(2), which was similar to what is now section 15(2) of the RTOA 1988. 46 In Howard v Hallet, at p 360, Robert Goff LJ stated that: “It would, it seems to me, be a most extraordinary consequence if, where the Act of 1972 lays down a careful and statutory procedure for requiring 25 a suspected motorist to provide specimens of breath and for analysing them and presenting them before a court, it is possible to disregard that procedure altogether. I cannot believe that that was the intention of the legislature.” 30 47 He continued at p 361: “In my judgment, it is plain that section 10(2) is referring to specimens taken in accordance with the statutory procedure laid down under section 8 of the Act. There must be read into the section as implicit in it, after the words ‘specimen of breath, blood or urine provided by the accused’, the 35 words ‘pursuant to the provisions of this Act’. That must include a reference in particular, to the procedure laid down under section 8 of the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Act. So read, in my judgment, section 10 of the Act takes effect in a sensible manner and precludes any of the startling consequences which flow from Mr Lofthouse’s argument [for the prosecution]. It follows that I, for my part, am unable to accept Mr Lofthouse’s primary submission made in response to Mr Sellick’s argument.” 5 [Emphasis added] [29] It cannot be the intention of Parliament for the respective law enforcement agency to disregard the procedures that have been painstakingly enacted via the powers of the Minister to make subsidiary legislations. Therefore, this Court could not agree with 10 the Public Prosecutor that the 1995 Rules may be disregarded and only be considered as discretionary in the prosecution of this type of offence (ss. 44, 45 and 45A of the RTA). [30] Having perused the Notes of Evidence, I could not find anywhere in 15 there that the prosecution witnesses had informed the Respondent of the requirements of R.4 pertaining to the 2-sample provision before ANY breath specimen was given by him and also R.5 in regard to attaching a NEW mouthpiece to the breath tube prior to the first test. I agreed with the Respondent’s submission that SP6 20 only testified that he had changed the mouthpiece after the first test (at the police station). In fact, the witness had used words in his testimony which gave me the impression that he was describing what he would normally do in carrying out such tests, not how he had carried out the tests on this particular Respondent on that night. 25 SP6 stated in his examination-in-chief: “Q: Ok teruskan Tuan, so dia dah direhatkan dia tak makan dia tak minum apa yang jadi selepas tu? SP6: Ok apabila semua tu dipatuhi, ujian untuk subjek boleh dilakukan dengan menggunakan mesin EBA tersebut. Untuk permulaan kita perlu 30 membuat dua tiupan terhadap subjek, dua tiupan mesin EBA. Untuk tiupan pertama kita akan membuat tiupan pertama, selepas tiupan pertama berjaya tiupan kedua akan dilakukan dan sebelum tiupan **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 kedua dilakukan pemipit ataupun straw perlu ditukarkan, maknanya pemipit perlu ditukarkan untuk membuat tiupan kedua. Maknanya kita tidak akan mengguna pemipit yang sama antara tiupan pertama dan tiupan kedua. Kita akan buat penukaran pemipit pertama dan kedua untuk tiupan kedua. Apabila kedua-dua tiupan 5 tersebut berjaya dibuat, barulah kita akan, barulah mesin tersebut akan keluarkan slip ataupun keputusanlah untuk bacaan dan tiupan tersebut. Q: Ok sekali lagi Tuan, Tuan kata perlu ditukar, soalan saya ada tak benda tersebut dipatuhi bagi OKT ini, ada tak ditukar? 10 SP6: Ya ditukar.”. [31] I also agreed with the Respondent that SP6 had conducted the test wrongly by changing the mouthpiece after the first blow of the breath test into the EBA II machine when the 1995 Rules did not require 15 him to do so. He was only required to place a new mouthpiece on the machine before he started taking the first breath; and prior to that, he must also explain R.4 to the Respondent. A new mouthpiece is compulsory to avoid cross-contamination or mix up with other respondents who were to undergo the breath test that night. I noted 20 in SP5’s evidence, under cross-examination, he admitted that the incident happened almost 3 years ago and “… terlalu ramai kita buat pemeriksaan”. This conflicted with another witness’s testimony (SP2) that they had only tested 3-4 drivers that night. Therefore, the benefit of doubt should have and had actually been given by the 25 Magistrate to the Respondent. [32] The Respondent submitted that the breach of procedural fairness by the police had occasioned a miscarriage of justice as he did not receive a fair trial. Counsel referred to the Australian case of Mraz 30 v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493 where the court held: “ ... every accused person is entitled to a trial in which the relevant law is correctly explained to the jury and the rules of procedures and evidence are **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 strictly followed. If there is any failure in any of these respects, and the appellant may thereby have lost a chance which was fairly opened to him of being acquitted, there is, in the eye of the law, a miscarriage of justice. Justice has miscarried in such cases, because the appellant has not had what the law says that he shall have, and justice is justice according to law.”. 5 [33] Based on the above considerations, despite the very high reading of the BAC over the prescribed limit, unfortunately I have to agree with the defence that the prosecution have not shown in their evidence that they have complied with the requirements of the 1995 10 Rules. The Respondent was warned by this Court that he “got off” on a technicality issue which had raised a doubt on the prosecution case. But he may not be so lucky in future if he is caught for the same offence. [34] Let this also be a lesson to the prosecution witnesses, not to take 15 for granted the task of giving evidence in court. CONCLUSION [35] In the circumstances, I did not find any appealable error in the decision of the Magistrate to acquit and discharge the Respondent 20 at the end of the prosecution case. Appeal dismissed. Dated 26 March 2026 signed 25 NOOR RUWENA BINTI MD. NURDIN Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 30 (Criminal Division) **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Counsels For the Appellant: Mr. Ahmad Ishrakh Bin Mohd Saad with Mr. Dony Abdullah Messrs. Ishrakh Saad & Co., Kajang. 5 For the Respondent DPP Faridah Nurdinie Bte Bahrum Pejabat Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Jabatan Peguam Negara Cawangan Kuala Lumpur 10 15 20 25 30 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal
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