Pendakwa Raya v SATIA A/L BALU (WA-42H-12-10/2024)

The trial judge had rejected suggestion by defence that it was impossible for the large-bodied Satia to perform sexual intercourse in the cramped space at back of the car. After examining the car's interior, the judge found that there was no issue for Satia to perform the actions described by the victim. The judge also found that the victim's testimony was corroborated by other evidence, including a CCTV footage. He had also found that, in his defence, the accused Satia had failed to raise a reasonable doubt against the case of the prosecution. He was then found guilty and convicted under section 376(1) of the PC and sentenced to eleven (11) years of imprisonment and to be whipped with two (2) strokes. He then lodged an appeal to this court against the said decision. [7] Findings by the trial judge against Satia were a direct result of the evidence presented during the trial. His reasoning, as stated in the judgment, are the following - • The victim's testimony was found to be credible and reliable. • Her account was corroborated by physical evidence, such as location and movement of the car seen in the CCTV footage, and the timing of Satia's entry into the vehicle after Kanesan had exited. • The judge rejected arguments by the defence, including the claim that the car was too small for the sexual assault to have occurred. • Satia's own defence failed to create a reasonable doubt regarding case of the prosecution. Hence, his determination of what happened was based on the evidence proffered in the case. He had believed the victim's account and found sufficient corroborating evidence to convict Satia. Arguments raised at the Appeal [8] Satia via his counsel had argued that the trial judge erred in fact and law by finding that the prosecution had successfully established a prima facie case. He claims that the trial judge failed to consider all the evidence presented by the prosecution and did not properly evaluate the credibility of victim SP1. A major point of contention is the physical space within the car where the alleged sexual assault and rape had occurred. He had argued that the victim's testimony confirmed the car's space was small and her movements were limited. Therefore, it would have been difficult for the alleged acts against the victim to have taken place. [9] Satia also argued that the trial judge's observation of the car, where it was concluded he could move freely, was flawed because the judge only observed the appellant being alone in the car, and not 6 with the victim, which would have restricted his movement. It is emphasised that the Honda City car is small and not spacious at the back. [10] It was also raised that the time period between the acts by Khanesan followed by him, was too brief. The victim had testified that the sexual intercourse with Satia lasted for approximately less than one minute. Finding by the trial judge was that after Kanesan exited the car, Satia entered and in a period of less than 1 minute (dalam tempoh tidak sampai 1 minit), the alleged sexual acts took place. Therefore, the range of time between both acts was less than one minute. [11] Several inconsistencies in the victim's testimony was highlighted, which includes the following - • She did not see the genitals of Satia but knew he had penetrated her because she felt a stinging sensation. • The car model she had identified differed between her police report and testimony in court. • As pointed out by Satia, she was heavily intoxicated and therefore could not distinguish between fantasy and reality. [12] Aside that, Satia also pointed out a significant gap in the CCTV footage, noting that a period of one hour and 20 minutes was 7 missing and not presented in court, leaving a material gap in the case and narrative of the prosecution. It was his defence, that he only entered the car to wake the victim up, who was intoxicated, and maintained he did not rape her. It was canvassed by him before this court, that the trial judge failed to fully consider the case and arguments by defence, which includes his claim that his side business involves taking tips from customers for providing services, like allowing them to park and rest in their cars, which was duly corroborated by another witness SP7, thus not fabricated. Ultimately, Satia concludes that the conviction entered is unsafe and ought to be set aside, as there is no evidence to link him to the charge of raping the victim. Prosecution's Arguments [13] The prosecution had argued that the trial judge did not err when finding Satia guilty and convicting him. It was contended that the judge's decision was correct both in fact and law. Main points raised are - Prima Facie Case They have successfully proved a prima facie case against the accused for the charge under section 376(1) of the PC. The trial 8 judge's findings, from paragraphs 32 to 64 of the judgment, confirm that all the necessary elements of the offence were proven. Penetration The judge found that penetration had occurred. Lack of Consent It was established that the sexual intercourse took place without the victim's consent, falling under section 375(b) of the PC. The judge had found the testimony of victim on this point to be credible and unwavering. Credibility of Victim The judge had found the victim's testimony to be clear, consistent, and not shaken despite cross-examination. It was insisted by her that she was conscious, rational, and could identify her assailant during the incident. This was supported by CCTV footage showing the movement of Satia at the time and location of the incident. [14] The appellant had claimed, which the prosecution refutes, that the trial judge erred in fact and law by concluding that the prosecution had established a prima facie case after accepting the victim's testimony despite her being in a state of intoxication at the time of incident.

It was maintained by the prosecution, that the defence advanced by Satia was not credible and failed to raise any reasonable doubt on the case of prosecution, hence correctly decided that the accused was guilty and a conviction had ensued. Sum Total [16] Case against Satia for rape hinges on testimony of the victim and corroborating evidence, while the defence centres on inconsistencies in her testimony; improbability of the alleged occurrence; lack of corroborative evidence and procedural flaws which had occurred during the investigation phase of the case. Hence, it was argued that the conviction entered is unsafe and should be set aside. [17] It is stark that the case of prosecution appears to rely primarily on the victim's testimony and in fact a prima facie case was established based on her account of the events. The trial judge had seemingly accepted her version of the events, which led to the conviction. [18] Arguments raised by appellant Satia are - • Inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim. • On details of the sexual acts, the victim had only testified that she felt a stinging sensation, which she took as a sign of penetration, 10 but she did not actually see Satia's genitals. This is a serious point of contention by the defence. • The victim was heavily intoxicated, which could have impaired her ability to accurately recall events or distinguish between reality and fantasy. • Her police report differed from her court testimony regarding the make and model of the car where the alleged rape occurred. • The confined space of the Honda City car would have made it difficult for the alleged acts to have occurred, as described by the victim. • The trial judge's observation of the car was flawed because it was conducted with the presence of the appellant only, and not with both him and the victim, which could have shown restriction of movement at the back of the car. • The significant one hour and 20-minute gap in the CCTV footage, is a material gap in the case of prosecution. • The identification (ID) parade was flawed and unfair. It was claimed that the police had failed to follow proper procedure, citing the investigating officer (IO) had provided information on the characteristics of the suspect to the officer conducting the ID parade. It is also alleged that the participants in the line-up were 11 chosen to resemble the first accused Khanesan and not the appellant Satia. Further, the victim had identified the first suspect, Khanesan, after which ID parade officer SP11 removed him to replace with Satia, without changing any of the other participants. This created a significant physical disparity, making Satia to stand out like a sore thumb. • There is contradiction between the testimony of the ID parade officer SP11 and the victim SP1 with regard to the racial makeup of the participants. SP11 stated all participants were Indian, while the victim claimed those present also include Malay. • The flaws pin-pointed, renders the ID parade held to be invalid, and the evidence ensuing from it should be disregarded. [19] In sum total, the arguments presented by Satia favours a strong case for reasonable doubt. The defence isn't just about a "he said, she said" scenario; it raises specific, concrete issues on both the victim's testimony and investigative procedures by the police. The inconsistencies in the victim's account, such as the differing car models and her admission of not seeing the act, are used to challenge her credibility. While a victim's trauma or intoxication might explain some inconsistencies, but it turns out favouring the defence.

The procedural flaws surrounding the ID parade are particularly significant. If the parade was indeed conducted in a way that unfairly biased the victim's choice towards identifying Satia, the evidence of identification could be considered unreliable. [21] The missing CCTV footage is a major weak point in the prosecution's case. A gap of one hour and 20 minutes is a substantial amount of time and could have potentially provided exculpatory evidence or at least a clearer timeline of events. Moreover, the improbability of the alleged occurrence could have been proven true and the fact that Satia was present only to assist the victim (who was heavily intoxicated) to be moved out of the car could be the truth of the matter, and not as what the victim had alleged and claimed against him. [22] The defence of Satia also provides a plausible alternative explanation for his presence in the car that he was there to provide car services, like to attend to and wake up an intoxicated customer, like the victim. [23] Core to his appeal, is to have the conviction set aside, premised on the argument that the case of prosecution lacks strong, irrefutable evidence. His challenge rests on undermining the evidence proffered by the prosecution and assessment of it by the trial judge.

It is accepted as trite in criminal jurisprudence, that inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault inflicted on her does not always require corroboration, however the court must still treat her evidence with caution and evaluate and assess her credibility. The viewpoint has to be inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of the victim, especially on the factum of rape which could raise a reasonable doubt. Hence, the court must determine if the inconsistencies are material or immaterial. Material inconsistencies, like those relating to the core facts of the crime, can be fatal to the case of the prosecution. Immaterial inconsistencies, which do not relate to the central issue, may be overlooked. In terms of the law, it is the duty of the trial judge to conduct a thorough analysis on the inconsistencies arising in the case and evaluate it to see if it affects overall credibility of the witness, in this case the victim SP1. Account by victim on the differing car model and not seeing the sexual act would fall under this principle. [25] On the flawed ID parade held, it is argued its integrity is crucial when a victim does not know the accused. Its purpose is to ensure the identification is made fairly and without any suggestiveness. In our jurisdiction, the Turnbull guidelines from the English case R v. Turnbull (1976) 3 AER 549 are widely applied. These guidelines 14 require the judge to caution himself before convicting the accused on the basis of identification evidence. He must examine the quality of identification by considering factors like, duration of the observation, the distance, the lighting, and any previous description of the suspect. Although there is no specific statutory provision governing ID parade in the CPC, established practices shall be followed to ensure fairness to the accused person. The argument raised on the line-up being biased and the contradiction in testimony on race of the participants would be evaluated under these principles, potentially rendering the identification evidence of little or no value. [26] Next is the issue on intoxication of the victim, wherein it was argued that the victim was too intoxicated to provide a reliable account. This defence also relates to the issue of consent. For a conviction of rape, under section 375 of the PC, the prosecution must prove that the sexual intercourse was without the victim's consent. Consent must be free and voluntary. If a person is heavily intoxicated to the point of being unable to understand the nature and consequences of what she is consenting to, any purported consent is invalid. The trial judge must also assess a victim's intoxication, in order to 15 consider the level of intoxication and its effect on the victim's capacity to consent and recall events. [27] Issue was also raised on the missing CCTV Footage. Counsel for the appellant highlight the missing one hour and 20 minutes of CCTV footage as a material gap in the case of prosecution. The prosecution has a duty to provide all evidence relevant and material to the case. The non-production of that crucial evidence can lead to an adverse inference being drawn against the prosecution under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 (EA/Act 56). This provision allows the court to presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the prosecution who withholds it. This principle of adverse inference under section 114(g) was applied in many decided cases, foremost being the case of Munusamy v PP (1987) 1 MLJ 492 (SC)), where the court considered and deliberated on the missing evidence and its potential impact on the case. In the present case, to reiterate, if the entire recording of the CCTV was produced as evidence, the version of Satia that the sexual assault allegations made against him by the victim, which allegedly lasted for less than a minute, was not true and he was merely present to render assistance to her. Thus, non-production of the entire CCTV footage has prejudiced the appellant Satia, in fortifying his defence and raising a reasonable doubt on the case of prosecution, at the outset. It has unfairly prejudiced the right of Satia to a fair trial, wherein he was unable to canvass his defence fully to the court, albeit having other issues of defence favouring him. His constitutional right to defend himself to the charge levelled against him has been jeopardised to the core, thus violating Article 5 (1) of the Federal Constitution, which guarantees him liberty in accordance with law. [28] It was also submitted by the appellant, via his counsel that the issues raised had affected the fact in issue at his trial, to wit, if the crime did in fact take place and if he had in fact committed the alleged sexual acts and ultimately sexual intercourse on the victim. [29] Hence, focus is on two main points:

Irregularity of the ID parade While an ID parade may not always be mandatory, it is necessary when the victim does not know the suspect, like the present case. As alluded to above, the trial judge had erred in fact and law by not considering it to have been conducted by SP11 irregularly, thus unfair to the appellant. Peculiarly, SP11 had received information from SP14, the case IO on both accused persons’ characteristics, such as body size, skin colour, and height. Further, the victim had identified the first suspect, Khanesan, after which SP11 removed him to replace with Satia, without changing any of the other participants. Satia stuck out like a sore thumb, to be easily identified by the victim. To crown it up all, the other participants were chosen based on their resemblance to the first suspect, Khanesan and not the appellant, thus creating a significant physical disparity between the appellant and other participants. This action by SP11, had essentially hinted to the victim who the next suspect was. Her identification at the parade had form the basis for the trial judge to have decided on the guilt of Satia, considering the fact that she does not know him and also did not see his genitals when the alleged sexual intercourse took place.

(ii) Contradictory testimony It was argued that there is a notable contradiction between the testimony of SP11 and the victim SP1 on the race of the participants. SP11 stated that there were no other races besides Indian in the parade, while the victim claimed there were other races, including Malay, and was unsure about Chinese participants. Additionally, SP11 did not record or provide identification documents on the participants, making it impossible to prove their existence. Due to these flaws, it is argued the ID parade held is a nullity and evidence ensuing from it should be disregarded in toto. This aspect of the case coupled with the intoxicated victim at point of the incident renders her account of Satia’s involvement with her to be dubious and inherently not credible. Grounds for Acquittal [30] I had reminded myself that an appeal is merely a continuation of the trial, and throws open all the evidence to re-examination in order to determine whether or not the various findings of the trial court are correct (see Tan Boon Teck v PP (1950) MLJ 44; PP v Maarif (1969) 2 MLJ 65). Hence, after a careful review of the trial record, the written and oral submissions from both parties, and the relevant legal principles, this court finds that the conviction entered against Satia is unsafe and must be set aside. [31] Decision of this court is based on the key issues discussed above, that collectively raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. The failure by the trial judge to properly evaluate these issues constitutes a fundamental error in both fact and law. Flawed Identification Parade Identification of appellant by the victim SP1, was a crucial part of the prosecution's case, as the victim was a stranger to him. The integrity of this process is paramount. It is this court's assessment premised on the available evidence on the ID parade conducted, that it was irregular and highly prejudicial to the appellant. Procedural Irregularities The evidence of the officer SP11 who conducted the parade and the victim SP1 revealed significant contradictions. The most concerning issue is that after the first suspect was identified and removed, the appellant was inserted into the line-up without a corresponding change in the other participants. This action was highly suggestive and had easily influenced the victim's identification of Satia. Contradictory Testimony on Race The conflicting testimony between SP11, who stated all participants were Indian, and SP1, who claimed there were Malays and possibly other races, casts serious doubt on the credibility and fairness of the entire procedure. Given these grave flaws, the results from the ID parade are rendered unreliable and inadmissible. But, the trial judge did not consider those flaws when he arrived at a decision to find the accused guilty and convict him. As per the principles in the case of R v. Turnbull which have been adopted in cases like Duis Akim & Ors v PP (2013) 9 CLJ 692 FC, such tainted evidence cannot be a basis for conviction. Obviously, the case against the appellant depends wholly on the correctness of the identification evidence which lacks in good quality, considering the circumstances in which the identification by the victim was made. [32] While the court acknowledges the trauma experienced by victims of sexual assault and does not expect flawless testimony, the inconsistencies in SP1's account were material and went to the core of the prosecution's case. It is – Discrepancy in Car Model The victim's police report identified a different car model than the one she testified in court. While this may seem minor, it undermines the reliability of her observation and recollection of a key detail of the crime scene. The car model is material, as it being the locus in quo of the alleged crime and there were issues raised by the appellant, that back of the car was too small and less spacious for the alleged sexual acts and intercourse to have taken place between two adults, to wit the victim and Satia. This discrepancy too confirms the level of intoxication she was in, which renders her remaining testimony to be also doubtful. Victim's Intoxication The appellant's defence that the victim was heavily intoxicated was not sufficiently rebutted by the prosecution. A high level of intoxication can impact a person's ability to recall events accurately and distinguishes between fantasy and reality. The trial judge failed to properly consider how this might affect the victim's capacity to provide reliable evidence. [33] These inconsistencies are not trivial. It creates a reasonable doubt about the victim's ability to accurately and reliably recall the events of that night. It is also material as it affects the fact in issue in the case against the appellant, if he had in fact committed the alleged sexual acts and intercourse on the victim. [34] Aside the inconsistencies, the prosecution had failed to produce as evidence the full and complete CCTV footage, which had a one hour and 20-minute gap. It is a significant and unexplainable omission. The prosecution is obligated to present all material evidence. The absence of this crucial footage, especially when it could have corroborated or contradicted the timelines and events described, warrants an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the EA. The court must presume that the missing footage, if produced, would have been unfavourable to unfolding of the prosecution narrative. This presumption further weakens the prosecution's already fragile case and adds to the reasonable doubt. The appellant's argument is also that the missing footage could have shed light on the events within that time frame and possibly supported his defence, which points to a noble effort on his part to respectfully remove the victim from the car at that material time and never to ravish her. [35] The trial judge had dismissed the defence advanced by the appellant without a thorough and proper evaluation. His explanation for being in the car, that he was a businessman who was only there inter alia to awake an intoxicated customer, was plausible and supported by another witness testimony. Rejection of this defence, coupled with numerous weaknesses in the prosecution's case, indicates that the judge failed to consider whether the defence had raised a reasonable doubt. This offends in particular the duty of the trial judge pursuant to section 173 (m) (i) of the CPC which renders that at conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it, which includes the case of the defence and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. So is with the mantra in the case of Mat v PP (1963) MLJ 263, which shall be adopted at the conclusion of a criminal trial, whereby the trial judge has to ask (not a mere lip service) if the defence story casts a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. [36] The trial judge too ought to have considered the probability of the sexual acts and intercourse, if it could have happened in a short period of less than a minute. Albeit having the time, less than one minute in his mind, but he chose not to juxtapose it with probability of the victim’s story vis a vis criminality of Satia, the appellant. Considering the narration, it is humanly impossible for Satia to have inflicted the alleged sexual acts and rape on the victim within that brief period of time of less than a minute, more so in a cramped space at back of the car. The probability of Satia trying to assist her to get out of the car was not adequately considered by the trial judge. He had taken the approach and assumed that the sexual assault by Satia on the victim had taken place immediately after the act of accused Khanesan, although improbability of the victim’s account on Satia persists, which was compounded by the proven fact that she was in a drunken stupor at that point of time. [37] As to the first incident of rape by the accused Khanesan, the victim had testified that he was into her for a good ten (10) minutes and he too had fingered her private part. But for the alleged acts by the accused Satia, she had claimed it was only for about one (1) minute. But the hymen tear relates to the first penetration and not the alleged second one by accused Satia, as confirmed by SP10. When considering testimony of SP10, the trial judge ought to have considered this aspect of her testimony. SP10’s testimony too cannot be viewed in isolation but together with testimony of the chemist SP9, who had confirmed, the DNA of the appellant Satia was not found on the victim but only that belonged to accused Khanesan. This piece of evidence ought to have moved the trial judge pointing toward a reasonable doubt, considering the fact that the alleged sexual acts and rape perpetrated by Satia on to the victim was bodily proximate. SP9’s testimony was totally disregarded by the trial judge which offends the principle of law when receiving forensic or scientific evidence, which excludes the appellant Satia as owner of the DNA found on the victim. Thus, it is against the available evidence to rule that Satia was the assailant, as the DNA evidence of accused Khanesan prevails over the evidence of the victim. (See the decision of the Court of Appeal (CA) in the case of Arshad Masdin v PP (2025) 3 MLRA 793). In that decided case it was the holding of the CA that the learned Sessions Court Judge had not properly considered the DNA evidence, if so, she would have definitely arrived at a different conclusion and found that the identification of the appellant by the victim was not credible and unsafe to rely on. It was also decided in that case, in the absence of any DNA evidence of the appellant, it can give rise to a reasonable inference that the appellant may not be the culprit at the crime scene and it could be a case of mistaken identity. Ultimately it was decided that the DNA evidence was ignored by the trial judge, which totally excluded the appellant as the perpetrator and the failure to consider such material evidence is a miscarriage of justice. That decision applies equally on all fours with the present case on appeal, as the trial judge had also failed to consider the evidence tendered by SP9, who had conclusively testified pursuant to her scientific analysis, the DNA belonging to appellant Satia was not found on the victim at all, in her private part and any other parts of her body as minor or major contributor (see exhibits P22, P24 to P36 as well as Chemist Report P20). This piece of material evidence negates the alleged sexual involvement of the appellant Satia with the victim in toto. That per se would have also assisted the trial judge to conclude that there is no prima facie case proven by the prosecution against Satia, but a converse decision was made, which goes against the material testimony of SP9. That gives rise to the evidential issue, if the trial judge had in fact embarked on a maximum evaluation of the evidence proffered by the prosecution before deciding to order the appellant Satia to enter on his defence. [38] Essentially, on the facts and evidence tendered in this case, the following are obvious - • The case against the accused is centred on the testimony of the victim SP1 • The alleged rape by this accused Satia was supposed to have taken place immediately after the rape by another accused Khanesan. • She could vividly remember in detail, the sexual intercourse which took place on her by Khanesan. • This was confirmed by the DNA evidence collected from Kanesan which matches with the samples taken from SP1. • Confirmation is also present when the time taken corresponds with the sexual act perpetrated by accused Khanesan on her. • Not likewise, the sexual act allegedly performed by accused Satia on her does not correspond with the time taken, which was just for less than one minute. • But the sexual act complained of comprising, full erection of his penis, outrage of SP1's breast, removal of his trousers and her clothes, insertion of private part into her mouth, followed by into her private part, does not jive as it is supposed to have taken place within a short period of time. • Further, the entire episode is supposed to have taken place after accused Satia had handled the car which was handed over to him by accused Khanesan. • That jives with his statement D59 in the course of investigation and repeated in court, that he was merely trying to get SP1 out of the car, by assisting her to do so, thus he entered the car partially to do so. • A further consistency and probability of accused Sathia's testimony is that, there is no DNA evidence of his found on SP1. This is despite the alleged sordid and continuing sexual acts by him on her. This aspect of the case revealed by the chemist is not adequately considered by the SCJ. All these, cumulatively points to innocence of the accused Satia and not to his guilt. Unfortunately, when finding him guilty and convicting him, the trial judge too erred in law when he did not consider the statement given by him to the police officer in the course of investigation which is contemporaneous by its nature as it was made so soon after the alleged incident. It syncs with his oral testimony in court, which had been subjected to vehement cross examination, and juxtaposed with evidence tendered by the prosecution before a finding of guilty was arrived at. If that mode was embarked on by the trial judge, there would have been consideration of all the evidence adduced in the case in its entirety, pointing to a reasonable doubt raised by accused Satia. The omission by the trial judge to deliberate on Satia’s out of court statement D59, corroborating his testimony in court, vitiates the conviction. That statement corroborates the evidence of the appellant in court pursuant to section 157 of the EA which renders the following – In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by him whether written or verbal, on oath, or in ordinary conversation, relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved. (Emphasis is mine) (See also the case of Lim Guan Eng v PP (1998) 3 CLJ 769; by analogy the case of Sathya Vello v PP (2022) 4 AMR 902 FC). [39] The cumulative effect - of the flawed identification parade; the material inconsistencies in the victim's testimony; the missing CCTV evidence; no show of Satia’s DNA on the victim; leads this court to conclude that a reasonable doubt does in fact, exist. Appellate Intervention [40] The test to be applied by this court when deciding on appellate intervention is the following - • Was there proper judicial appreciation of the facts and evidence by the trial judge. • Was there correct application of the law to the facts, evidence and circumstances of the case • Did the trial judge arrive at proper and correct findings of fact and law premised on the evidence proffered in the case • Ultimately is the conviction entered against the accused safe? No hard and fast rule can be adopted about appreciation of evidence. It is after all a question of fact and each case, including the present has to be decided on the facts as they stand. But, in appreciating the evidence, the trial judge will have to be definitely guided by human probabilities. On that premise, the totality of the circumstances is to be considered by the trial judge, and it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Satia too had committed rape on the victim, since the other accused was also involved. Hence, the onerous duty is on the trial judge to scrutinise the evidence before convicting the accused. Further, like in the present case, as the circumstances proved in the case are consistent with the innocence of accused Satia, he is thus entitled to the benefit of doubt. On the evidence proffered in the case, two possibilities are available – one which favours the prosecution and another that benefits the accused, hence the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. (See the Supreme Court case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116). Further when there is no iota of evidence against the accused, save for his noble attempt to remove the victim from the car as she remained intoxicated after accused Khanesan handed over the car to him, the question of acquitting him by giving the benefit of doubt arises. [41] Given the above elucidation; totality of the evidence proffered in the case; and the legal flaws and errors identified; renders the conviction of the appellant in this case by the trial judge unsafe. (See the case of Mohd Johi bin Said & Anor v PP (2005) 1 CLJ 389 CA). It is the finding of this court that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, appellate intervention is justified, as this court is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence. I am able to do so as the audio-visual advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, does not justify his conclusion, (See Maria Elvira Pinto Exposto v PP (2020) 5 CLJ 1 FC). Further this court cannot adopt the approach of applying a brake and not going any further the moment it sees the trial judge says, that is his finding of facts. This court ought to go further, which it did as above, and examine the evidence and circumstances under which that finding was made to see if there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding. Otherwise no finding of fact could be reversed on appeal, and an appeal could only be sustained on a question of law, which is not the law of the land. (See the case of DSAI v PP & Anor Appeal (2004) 3 CLJ 737 FC). Ensuing from that, this court deems appellate intervention is justified. Therefore, the appeal is allowed, the finding of guilty, conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellant Satia is thus acquitted and discharged. Consequently, the appeal by prosecution against inadequacy of sentence is thus dismissed. Accused acquitted and discharged. Dated 21 October 2025 SGD Muniandy Kannyappan Judge, High Court 2 (Criminal) Kuala Lumpur. Parties For the appellant – DC Muhammad Amin bin Abdullah with Julie Faralisa of Tetuan Amin, Iqhmar & Razman. For the prosecution – DPP Natasha binti Zaini of the Attorney General’s Chambers.