(h) Responden terkejut dengan kehadiran SP8 boleh dibuat inferen bahawa responden mempunyai pengetahuan dan relevan di bawah seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950. [16] Dari hujahan puan TPR, kami mendapati bantahan ditujukan terhadap dapatan fakta dan juga berkaitan dengan isu kredibiliti saksi SP1. Adalah menjadi undang-undang mantap bahawa isu berkaitan dengan dapatan fakta dan kredibiliti saksi berada di dalam ruang lingkup ketentuan oleh hakim bicara. Mahkamah atasan tidak wajar dengan sewenang-wenangnya mengubah dapatan hakim bicara tanpa alasan yang kukuh bahawa dapatan hakim bicara itu sememangnya tidak dapat dipertahankan. Keadaan itu tidak berlaku dalam kes rayuan ini. [17] Dalam penghujahannya, puan TPR tidak menafikan hak akses pihak ketiga terhadap tandas-tandas dan bilik tidur di mana dadah-dadah dirampas namun dihujahkan tidak munasabah orang lain telah meletakkan dadah-dadah di situ. Itu bukanlah kedudukan undang-undang mantap yang sebenarnya. Undang-undang menghendaki pihak pendakwaan menolak sebarang kemungkinan akses oleh pihak ketiga terhadap dadah-dadah yang dipertuduhkan (PP v. Denish Madhavan [2009] 2 CLJ 209; Raymond Wahab v. PP [2017] MLJU 799; Muniandy S Subramaniam v. PP [2018] 1 LNS 2; Ghasem Hozouri Hassan v. PP [2016] 1 LNS 5). [18] Jelas dari keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan sendiri malahan diakui oleh puan TPR bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk menolak sama sekali akses oleh pihak ketiga terhadap dadah-dadah yang dipertuduhkan. Terdapat keterangan menunjukkan bahawa selain pelanggan yang datang untuk bergunting rambut di kedai responden, tidak Rayuan Jenayah No: N-05(LB)-174-04/2017 14 kurang juga ramainya orang awam datang ke premis tersebut untuk membeli nombor empat ekor haram di kedai SP1 yang turut berada dalam premis yang sama. Selain dari itu, serbuan polis ke premis tersebut hasil maklumat orang awam di mana unsur perangkap dan penganiayaan tidak dapat diketepikan sama sekali. [19] Kami juga turut menimbangkan keterangan bahawa tidak terdapat sebarang kesan cap jari atau profail DNA milik responden pada semua barang kes melibatkan dadah-dadah yang dipertuduhkan. Perkara ini telah disahkan oleh saksi ahli kimia, Sharifah Nur Haliza Binti Syed A. Rahman (SP6). Ahli Forensik, Supt. Nor Azman Bin Hj. Mohd Noor dalam Laporan Pemeriksaan (P48) tidak dapat mengesahkan tulisan pada barang-barang kes iaitu “Sugu Taman Cempaka”, “Vinod Bahau” dan “Tambi Mahsan” mempunyai sebarang kaitan dengan responden. [20] Mengenai alasan rayuan di (ii), puan TPR berhujah bahawa hakim bicara telah gagal untuk membuat sebarang dapatan terhadap elemen pengedaran walaupun elemen itu telah berjaya dibuktikan melalui keterangan langsung di bawah seksyen 2 Akta. Dihujahkan oleh puan TPR bahawa perbuatan responden “menyimpan” dadah-dadah yang dipertuduhkan terjumlah kepada pengedaran bagi maksud seksyen 2 Akta. [21] Kami mendapati kegagalan hakim bicara dalam membuat sebarang dapatan berkaitan dengan elemen pengedaran bukanlah satu salaharahan yang terjumlah kepada ketidakarahan dalam keadaan kes rayuan ini. Kami berpandangan bahawa setelah hakim bicara membuat dapatan bahawa elemen milikan telah gagal dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan, tidak ada lagi keperluan untuk hakim bicara untuk membuat dapatan mengenai Rayuan Jenayah No: N-05(LB)-174-04/2017 15 elemen pengedaran. Ini adalah berdasarkan undang-undang pembuktian kesalahan pengedaran dadah hanya setelah elemen pemilikan berjaya dibuktikan terlebih dahulu. Dalam kes Nguyen Quoc Tuan v. PP [2016] 6 MLJ 156, Mahkamah ini melalui Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat, HMR menyatakan seperti berikut: “[34] Learned DPP conceded that the learned trial judge made no finding of possession before he ruled on trafficking. What transpired here was the learned trial judge took the ‘reverse approach’ whereby he first ruled that the appellant was trafficking in the dangerous drugs under s 2 of the Act followed by his finding that the appellant was in possession of the said drugs. Learned DPP contended that the finding of trafficking and possession was a situation of ‘chicken and egg’ which did not result in any error or misdirection by the leaned trial judge. [35] We disagreed with learned DPP. It is trite that to prove a charge of trafficking under s 39B(1)(a) of the dangerous drugs and in proving trafficking, the prosecution must frist prove possession of the said drugs, be it under s 37(d) of the Act or mens rea possession. In Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64, Lord Diplock said at p 68: … the ordinary meaning of the verb ‘to traffic’, in the particular context of trafficking in goods of any kind, imports the existence, either in fact or in contemplation, of at least two parties: a supplier and a person to whom the goods are to be supplied. This concept involving transfer or possession, is reflected in the statutory definition itself. Of the seven verbs used to describe the varius kinds of overt acts which constitute trafficking ‘transport’ is sandwiched between, ‘sell, give, administer’ which precede it and ‘send, deliver or distribute’ which follow it. All of these other verbs refer to various ways in which a supplier or distributor, who has drugs in his possession, may transfer possession of them to some other person. Rayuan Jenayah No: N-05(LB)-174-04/2017 16 [36] Since the act of trafficking entails the transfer of possession, it must necessarily mean that possession is a pre-requisite element to be established before trafficking can be made out. [37] Based on the aforesaid, we were of the view that the learned trial judge erred in law in finding that the appellant was trafficking without first making a ruling that the appellant had possession of the dangerous drugs. We were further of the view that in the circumstances, the finding of trafficking was flawed and without legal basis warranting appellate intervention.”. [22] Kami ingin sekali lagi mengingatkan diri kami tentang apa yang dimaksudkan dengan kes prima facie telah terbukti. Untuk itu, kami merujuk kepada penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes tersohor, PP v. Mohd Radzi Bin Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393 seperti berikukt: “This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter upon his or her defence. It involves an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses called by the prosecution and the drawing of inferences admitted by the prosecution evidence. Thus, if the prosecution evidence admits of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused’s favour, then it is the duty of the court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. See Tai Chai Keh v Public Prosecutor [1948-49] MLJ Supp 105; Public Prosecutor v Kasmin bin Soeb [1974] 1 MLJ 230. If the court, upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence placed before it at the close of the prosecution case, comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has not been made out, it should acquit the accused. If, on the other hand, the court after conducting a maximum evaluation of the evidence comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out, it mus call for the defence. If the accused then elects to remain silent, the Rayuan Jenayah No: N-05(LB)-174-04/2017 17 court must proceed to convict him. It is not open to the court to then re-assess the evidence and to determine whether the prosecution had established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any evidence from the accused that casts a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case renders the prima facie case one that is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Put shortly, what the trial court is obliged to do under ss 173(f) and 180 of the CPC is to ask itself the question: If the accused elects to remain silent, as he is perfectly entitled to do, am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? See Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 MLJ 232. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the defence must be called. And if the accused remains silent, he must be convicted. If the answer is in the negative, then the accused must be acquitted. [Penekanan oleh kami]. [23] Akhirnya, jika responden dipanggil untuk membela diri atas pertuduhan dan dia memilih untuk berdiam diri, adakah sabitan terhadap responden selamat. Kami dengan sebulat suara berpendapat bahawa dalam keadaan kekurangan dan kelemahan yang terdapat dalam kes pendakwaan, sabitan terhadap responden adalah tidak selamat. Memakai ujian yang sama, kami mendapati dan bersetuju dengan hakim bicara bahawa kes pihak pendakwaan telah gagal mencapai tahap pembuktian kes prima facie. [24] Dalam kes PP v. Kuna Segaran a/l Muniandy [2012] 4 MLJ 216 Mahkamah ini telah mengulangi kedudukan undang-undang pembuktian kes prima facie seperti berikut: “[11] It is well settled that the test at the end of the prosecution’s case is ‘prima facie case’ based on a maximum evaluation of evidence. The Federal Court reiterated this principle in our criminal jurisprudence in Rayuan Jenayah No: N-05(LB)-174-04/2017 18 Magendran Mohan v Public Prosecutor [2011] 6 MLJ 1; [2011] 1 CLJ 805, and went on to add: The evidence has to be scrutinised properly and not perfunctorily, cursorily or superficially. If the evaluation of the evidence results in doubts in the prosecution’s case, then a prima facie case has not been made out. The defence ought not to be called merely to clear or clarify such doubts.’ [Penekanan oleh kami] Kesimpulan [25] Atas alasan-alasan yang telah kami huraikan di atas, kami dengan sebulat suara mendapati tiada merit dalam rayuan ini. Rayuan Pendakwa Raya ditolak. Perintah pembelaan dan pelepasan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi disah dan dikekalkan. Bertarikh: 25 Oktober 2018 t.t. (KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM) Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia Rayuan Jenayah No: N-05(LB)-174-04/2017 19 Peguam Cara Bagi Pihak Perayu: Jasmee Hameeza Binti Jaafar Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Bahagian Perbicaraan dan Rayuan Jabatan Peguam Negara Putrajaya Bagi Pihak Responden: Manian Raju (Pung J Jiang, bersamanya) Tetuan Krishna Dallumah, Manian & Indran No. 62 & 63-1, Jalan S2 D36 Regency Avenue 2, Seremban 2 70300 Seremban Negeri Sembilan