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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: P-01(A)-608-09/2024 ANTARA PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH TIMUR LAUT PULAU PINANG … PERAYU DAN PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN TAMAN TEMBAGA … RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang, Malaysia Rujukan Tanah No.: PA-15-7-06/2023 Antara Perbadanan Pengurusan Taman Tembaga ... Pemohon Dan Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Timur Laut Pulau Pinang ... Responden KORAM CHE MOHD RUZIMA BIN GHAZALI, HMR AZIZUL AZMI BIN ADNAN, HMR SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN, HMR PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Pertikaian dalam rayuan ini berbangkit daripada keputusan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi (YA HMT) Pulau Pinang di dalam satu kes rujukan tanah yang memutuskan untuk menaikkan kadar nilaian tanah kepunyaan Perbadanan Pengurusan Taman Tembaga (PPTT) iaitu pemohon/responden yang terlibat dengan satu pengambilan tanah oleh pihak kerajaan negeri untuk tujuan Projek Jalan Utama Pakej 2, Lebuhraya Tun Dr. Lim Chong Eu – Ayer Itam (Projek Lebuhraya TDL). YA HMT telah memutuskan untuk membenarkan bantahan yang dikemukakan oleh pemohon/responden dan jumlah pampasan tambahan ialah sebanyak RM1,378,355.00 dengan kadar faedah 5% setahun dari tarikh Borang K dikeluarkan. Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang (PTD) iaitu responden/perayu mengemukakan rayuan ke Mahkamah ini. [2] Untuk memudahkan sebutan, pihak-pihak akan dirujuk dengan nama singkatan masing-masing iaitu responden/perayu sebagai PTD dan pemohon/responden sebagai PPTT. Latar Belakang Rayuan [3] Tanah seluas 1,319.00 meter persegi daripada luas keseluruhan 29,110.00 meter persegi tanah milik PPTT yang dikenali sebagai Lot 4801 Geran 79138, Seksyen 5 George Town, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang (Lot berkenaan) terlibat dengan pengambilan tanah untuk tujuan Projek Lebuhraya TDL. Tarikh warta dan tarikh nilaian untuk tujuan pengambilan tanah Lot berkenaan ialah pada 9.6.2022. [4] Setelah menjalankan siasatan pengambilan tanah menurut s 12 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 (APT 1960), PTD telah memutuskan untuk memberikan award pada kadar RM455.00 semeter persegi (smp) atau RM42.27 sekaki persegi (skp) yang menjadikan jumlah pampasan yang diterima oleh PPTT ialah sebanyak RM600,145.00 bagi keluasan tanah yang terlibat dengan pengambilan. Tidak dipertikaikan bahawa award PTD tersebut adalah lebih tinggi daripada nilaian tanah yang dinilai oleh penilai PPTT semasa siasatan pengambilan tanah yang disediakan oleh BHL Property Consultants Sdn Bhd (BHL), iaitu pada kadar RM412.71 smp. [5] Setelah menerima keputusan siasatan dan award pampasan yang diserahkan oleh PTD melalui Borang H, APT 1960, pengerusi PPTT bernama Lim Chee Haw (LCH) telah bertemu dengan pemilik tanah lot bersebelahan iaitu Lot 4802 kepunyaan syarikat Chan Li Chai Medical Factory Sdn Bhd (CLCM) dan dimaklumkan bahawa jumlah pampasan yang diterima CLCM adalah jauh lebih tinggi daripada yang diterima PPTT. Memandangkan nilaian tanah yang disediakan BHL sangat rendah berbanding pampasan yang diterima CLCM, sedangkan tanah mereka hanya bersebelahan, PPTT telah mengemukakan bantahan terhadap award pampasan melalui Borang N, APT 1960. Lihat perenggan 5 hingga perenggan 7 Afidavit LCH di muka surat 78 Rekod Rayuan (RR) di Kandungan 6. [6] Dalam bantahannya, PPTT menuntut pampasan tambahan bagi nilaian semasa tanah yang terlibat dengan pengambilan serta turut menuntut pampasan untuk kesan mudarat yang dikatakan dialami bagi baki tanah Lot berkenaan. Bagi tujuan bantahan tersebut, PPTT telah melantik penilai yang baru iaitu IM Global Property Consultants Sdn Bhd (IMG). IMG mencadangkan nilai pasaran semasa Lot berkenaan ialah pada kadar RM5,381.95 smp atau RM500.00 skp. Selain itu, IMG juga berpendapat bahawa wujudnya kesan mudarat kepada baki tanah Lot berkenaan dan telah mencadangkan pampasan yang berjumlah RM44,870,932.50, iaitu hasil daripada perkiraan susut nilai baki tanah Lot berkenaan yang dicadangkan pada kadar 30%. Keputusan YA HMT [7] Setelah mendengar dan mengambil kira pendapat berkaitan dengan nilai harga pasaran semasa Lot berkenaan yang dikemukakan oleh pengapit-pengapit dalam prosiding perbicaraan bantahan, YA HMT memutuskan untuk membenarkan bantahan PPTT dan telah memerintahkan agar award bagi nilai harga pasaran semasa Lot berkenaan dinaikkan kepada kadar RM1,500.00 smp atau RM139.35 skp. Jumlah pampasan tambahan yang perlu dibayar oleh PTD kepada PPTT ialah sebanyak RM1,378,355.00 dengan caj pembayaran lewat pada kadar 5% setahun bermula daripada tarikh Borang K, APT 1960. Namun begitu, YA HMT telah menolak tuntutan PPTT untuk mendapatkan pampasan kesan mudarat bagi baki Lot berkenaan. [8] Terkilan dengan keputusan YA HMT tersebut, PTD merayu ke Mahkamah ini. Alasan Rayuan PTD [9] PTD mengemukakan 5 alasan rayuan di dalam Memorandum Rayuan. Semasa berhujah di hadapan kami, pihak Penasihat Undang-undang Negeri Pulau Pinang (PUU) membangkitkan hanya dua persoalan undang-undang. Pertama, persoalan berkaitan dengan pemakaian sekatan tuntutan menurut peruntukan perenggan 4(a) Jadual Pertama APT 1960 dan kedua, persoalan berkenaan dengan pemakaian doktrin pilihan dan doktrin estopel susulan daripada tindakan PPTT semasa siasatan pengambilan Tanah. Dapatan Kami [10] Undang-undang berkaitan dengan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan dan seterusnya ke Mahkamah Persekutuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes rujukan tanah adalah jelas. Menurut proviso subseksyen 49 (1) APT 1960, sekiranya keputusan itu hanya melibatkan jumlah pampasan, maka tiada rayuan boleh dibuat terhadapnya. Namun begitu, rayuan masih boleh dikemukakan oleh mana-mana orang yang berkepentingan dalam pengambilan tanah ke Mahkamah Rayuan dan seterusnya ke Mahkamah Persekutuan sekiranya rayuan tersebut melibatkan persoalan undang-undang. Lihat di antara lainnya keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat and another case [2017] 3 MLJ 561; [2017] 5 CLJ 526; Amitabha Guha (as beneficiary for the estate of Madhabendra Mohan Guha) v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2021] 4 MLJ 1; [2021] 3 CLJ 1 dan Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 4 MLJ 570; [2021] 7 CLJ 1 (kes Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd). [11] Di dalam kes Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd, Mahkamah Persekutuan secara ketatnya telah mentafsirkan apakah “persoalan undang-undang” yang boleh dipertimbangkan mahkamah di peringkat rayuan dan kami petik sebahagian keputusan yang berkaitan sepertimana berikut: [51] As a starting point, we would adopt the general proposition as set down in Amitabha Guha No 2, that ‘In a general sense, a question of law is an issue involving the interpretation of law (statutes or legal principles) and the application of the law to the facts of each individual case’, but with a strong rider and only to that extent. This general proposition must be appreciated, understood and applied in the context of the proviso to s 49(1), ruled by this court in Semenyih Jaya to be a valid provision of law, that s 49(1) limiting the right of appeal does not violate arts 13 and 121(1B) of the Federal Constitution - see paras [165] - [173]. [52] This general proposition also is not to be taken as suggesting, even for the slightest moment, that s 49(1) is to be given a liberal reading so as to render nugatory the clear intent of precluding appeals from decisions of the High Court on compensation. This proposition is not to be read as allowing in any way, what in pith and substance, are appeals on compensation. After all, as explained in Semenyih Jaya: … a right of appeal is statutory … it simply means that when conferred by statute, the right of appeal becomes a vested right. Correspondingly, the jurisdiction of the Court to hear appeals is also conferred by statute (see Auto Dunia Sdn Bhd v Wong Sai Fatt & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 549; [1995] 3 CLJ 485); Wan Sagar Wan Embong v Harun Taib [2008] 4 MLJ 473; [2008] 5 CLJ 14). [150] A fortiori, the nature of the appeal depends on the terms of the statute conferring that right. It is a matter of construction to be given to the provisions conferring the right to appeal. Legislative intention can also be found by examining the legislation as a whole. Limiting the right to bring an appeal is a way of encouraging finality. If an examination of the language and policy of the Act granting the right of appeal concludes that Parliament intends to limit an appeal, the court must give effect to it. [53] There are several reasons why we advocate for such an approach. [54] Firstly, in coming to that conclusion, as we mentioned, the Federal Court had clearly affirmed the validity and constitutionality of s 49(1). The Federal Court had examined the due process of adjudication under Act 486 and found that by virtue of s 45 and the Third Schedule of Act 486, there was no violation of art 13 of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Court acknowledged that an award of compensation involves two stages of hearings. First, before the Land Administrator and later, at the High Court. At the enquiry before the land administrator, parties are entitled to produce evidence on the valuation of the scheduled land while at the High Court, each party is allowed to bring experts to court to prove their claim on compensation. Although this is through an exchange of affidavits, deponents may be cross-examined. This due process of hearing and decision making on the assessment of compensation ensured adherence of art 13(2) of the Federal Constitution. [55] Further, the added feature of inclusion of assessors in Act 486 (which was not outlawed in Semenyih Jaya) augments and contributes towards that compliance and safeguard. The provisions on assessors were introduced in the same amendments to Act 486 that brought in the proviso to s 49(1) and excluding appeals on compensation. The Court of Appeal in Hartawan Development Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Melaka rightly explained that ‘whilst precluding the right of appeal against an order of compensation issued by the High Court, there are four new sections introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1997 which came into force on 1 March 1998. These sections are intended to provide clearer provisions for assessing the value of lands compulsorily acquired. When an objection in regard to compensation is referred to the court, the judge hearing a land reference shall appoint two assessors to assist and aid the judge who inter alia look into the valuation report and/or any expert evidence before coming to a fair compensation. The requirement for the judge to be guided by assessors is warranted as the judge is not an expert in land valuation. Therefore, the opinion of the assessors is deemed necessary’. Assessors are mandatorily provided for in s 40A. See also Kelana Megah Development Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Kota Tinggi & Satu Lagi [2019] 1 MLJ 723. [56] The Federal Court expressed similar views in Amitabha Guha No 2 whilst giving its rationale for having two assessors under the amended Act 486; that these assessors are ‘trusted to exercise professional integrity in assisting the judge’. The fact that the judge has a choice between the opinions of the government assessor and the private assessor was highlighted to alleviate concerns that the government assessor may give a lower valuation’: [50] Of course, assessors are not the decision-makers; they only act in an advisory capacity to the judge. As members of the land reference court under the LAA 1960, assessors sit with the judge during and after the hearing, and are required to give non-binding opinions in writing on questions of fact based on the evidence. In land reference proceedings, the provisions of the Third Schedule on Evidence and Procedure in Land Reference Cases shall apply to the proceedings: see s 45(1A) of the LAA 1960. Pursuant thereto, the evidence to be considered by the assessors and the judge includes the applicant’s valuer’s report, the respondent’s valuer’s report, including oral evidence by the applicant’s valuer and/or the respondent’s valuer during cross-examination and re-examination, if any. The Government assessor and the private assessor hear and consider the evidence and arrive at an opinion on the facts, which is then presented to the judge in the form of a written opinion: see s 40C of the LAA