(iv) If there is non-compliance with the law during the production of the said CCC, it is a non-compliance that can be subject to legal action by the party that certifies the CCC and it does not make the CCC invalid and damages that occur during the time must be claimed within that periods." [43] However, the Appellant in the present case did not pursue their action against the local authority or the relevant authorities regarding the approved building plan and the issuance of the CFs. In our view, this brings the matter to a close. [44] Secondly, the Appellant failed to show that the Respondent had negligently constructed the OTC without adhering to the approved building plan. [45] In the present case, the Appellant relied on the evidence of expert witnesses from ACSB and the Inspection Report to show that there were numerous breaches of the provisions in the UBBL 1984 concerning fire safety. [46] The Appellant submitted that the learned JC erred by failing to consider the Appellant's expert evidence judicially and dismissing it without reasonable grounds. [47] It is well-established that the primary purpose of expert evidence is to assist the court in forming its own opinion. It is the responsibility of the court to resolve any issues presented before it, not the expert. [48] Our primary guidance stems from the principles set forth by the Federal Court in Dr Shanmuganathan v Periasamy s/o Sithambaram Pillai [1997] 3 MLJ 61, which state: "It is trite law that the principal object of expert evidence is to assist the court to form its own opinion. An expert should give his reasons. The court is the final arbiter, not the experts or eyewitness. Despite the wealth of authorities available on this subject, the errors that appear in judgments invite us to elaborate on this matter... ... The learned judge should have considered the reasoning given by the expert and with that assistance arrived at the conclusion. In failing to do so the learned judge had abdicated his function. The learned judge is entitled to reject the evidence but not before considering such evidence. The evidence of the expert is admissible and relevant to the fact in issue properly placed before the learned judge. The learned judge ought to consider all such evidence that is before him prior to arriving at a finding on the issue. Only after such due consideration been given could he come to a finding." (emphasis added) [49] The expert's evidence must be substantiated with reasoning, as a bare expression of his opinion holds no evidential value whatsoever. [50] We are guided by the Supreme Court in United Asian Bank Bhd v Tai Soon Heng Construction Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 182, in which it was held as follows: "Mr Joginder Singh has attacked Mr Phan's evidence on the ground that he did not give reasons for coming to his conclusion that the signatures on each of the 97 cheques had been forged and in support of his submission relied on a passage in the text book The Identification of Handwriting and the Cross-examination of Experts by MK Mehta where the learned author states (at p 23 of the text): It is common failing in a number of experts that they do not clearly state their reasons on which they base their opinions while submitting the reports to the courts. The result is that the courts as well as the lawyers suffer from a distinct disadvantage. It is extremely difficult for them in such cases to test and verify the correctness of the opinions given. The mere opinion of the expert that a particular writing or signature is written or not written by the writer whose standard admitted writings or signatures were supplied to him for comparison, without any cogent reason, is not enough. The function of the expert is to give his honest opinion and place before the court all the data on which he bases his opinion, because it is the court who has to decide the case and accept or reject his opinion. In the absence of a clear and precise statement of his reasons, it is difficult for the court to appreciate the opinion of the expert. It is also not fair to the opposite side who is to cross-examine the expert on the correctness of his opinion. Any opinion given without stating the reasons is valueless and is of no use as evidence. We entirely agree with the passage cited. In a civil case and more so in a criminal case, the evidence of an expert on handwriting unsupported by cogent data showing the process by which he came to his conclusion is not worth the paper on which it is written and any reliance upon such evidence would, in our judgment, constitute a serious misdirection warranting interference by an appellate tribunal. However, having said that, we are of the opinion that the principle contended for has no application to the facts of this case." (emphasis added) [51] On the same note, in the oft-quoted case Sim Ah Song & Anor v Rex [1951] 1 MLJ 150, Brown AG CJ held as follows: "The responsibility for the determination of this question, as in the case of every question upon which expert evidence is called, rested upon the Court and not upon the expert. The business of an expert witness is to draw upon the store of his knowledge and experience in order to explain some matter which his experience should qualify him to understand. He is quite entitled to express his opinion, which indeed is the natural corollary of his explanation. But a bare expression of his opinion has no evidential value at all. Unless he gives an explanation which supplies the understanding of the subject which the Court lacks, the Court is in no better position than it was before to determine the question which it is its duty to determine, and if the Court acts upon a bare expression of the expert's opinion the determination of the question becomes that of the expert and not of the Court." (emphasis added) [52] It is also trite that the court is not obliged to accept expert evidence solely because it is unchallenged or unopposed. Still, the court should generally accept expert evidence if it is based on sound grounds and substantiated by basic facts. Be that as it may, the court is also entitled to reject expert evidence on valid grounds or if it is demonstrated that the expert evidence is clearly lacking in defensibility. [53] On this, we agree with Ramly Ali J (as he then was) in PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2009] 7 MLJ 681 as follows: "The duties of a judge in dealing with unopposed expert witness are succinctly stated in an extract of 10 Halsbury's Laws of Singapore [2000] (120.257) which cited in para 26 of the Singapore Court of Appeal's decision in Saeng-Un Udom v Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 SLR 1(per LP Thean JA) as follows: ... The court should not, when confronted with expert evidence which is unopposed and appears not to be obviously lacking in defensibility, reject it nevertheless and prefer to draw its own inferences. While the court is not obliged to accept expert evidence by reason only that it is unchallenged (Sek Kim Wah v PP [1987] SLR 107), if the court finds that the evidence is based on sound grounds and supported by the basic facts, it can do little else than to accept the evidence. In this case, it certainly cannot be said that Dr Lau's opinion was 'obviously lacking in defensibility'. In our opinion, his evidence was based on sound grounds and supported by the basic facts. In the face of such evidence, the judge, with respect, was not entitled to venture his own opinion on a matter which was clearly 'outside the learning of the court'. In our judgment, in this case, he was not entitled to reject Dr Lau's opinion and substitute it with one of his own. This principle was followed in another Singapore Court of Appeal's case, Dr Lo Sook Ling Adela v Au Mei Yin Chistine & Anor [2002] 1 SLR 408 where Chao Hick Tin JA held at para 48: ... In law, while a judge is not obliged to accept the opinion of an expert, even in a situation where there is no contrary expert evidence, such rejection must be based on sound grounds: see Saeng-Un Udom v PP ... We did not think just because the age (of a tree) given was an estimate, that in itself was a good ground to reject the expert opinion. In the realm of expert evidence, it invariably involves a matter of judgment. This was a scientific issue outside the learning of a judge...” (emphasis added) [54] In the present case, the learned JC made the following findings with regard to the Appellant's expert evidence: [64] This court also found that the expert report prepared by the Plaintiff's witness admitted that he did not refer to the Plan that had been approved by BOMBA. If reference is not made to the plan that has been approved by the Fire Department, how can he conclude that the Fire Department's plan does not meet the fire safety requirements. The Plaintiff's witness also admitted and accepted that their report shall not prevail over local authorities." [55] We have reviewed the Appeal Records and agree with the findings of the learned JC above. [56] Based on the evidence, it is apparent that the Inspection Report was prepared without reference to the duly approved building plan. This was even admitted by the Appellant's expert witnesses PW2 and PW3 and noted in the report. [57] PW2 also admitted during cross-examination that it is more appropriate and ideal for the Inspection Report to be prepared with reference to the approved building plans. PW3 also admitted during cross examination that the recommendations in the report would differ had he seen the plan. The Appellant's experts further acknowledged that the Inspection Report does not take precedence over local authorities. [58] We hold that the approved building plan is a crucial piece of evidence in the present case as it would have indicated whether the local authority had wrongfully approved the building plan without due consideration of the provisions in the UBBL 1984 or whether the Respondent had constructed the OTC without adhering to the approved building plan or the provisions in the UBBL 1984. [59] In light of the above and the surrounding evidence in the present case, we believe that the learned JC was justified in rejecting the Appellant's expert evidence. There was no appealable error on the part of the learned JC in doing so. [60] Thirdly, as the burden of proving its claim still rests with the Appellant, the Appellant could have subpoenaed the relevant authorities, including local authority officers or representatives from the Fire Department, to provide evidence. However, the Appellant failed to do so. [61] We disagree with the Appellant's assertion that the burden has shifted to the Respondent based on all that has been discussed above. We also see no reason to accept the Appellant's suggestion to consider the possibility that the Fire Department approved the fire safety plans submitted by the Respondent's consultants despite the fact that such plans may have breached the UBBL 1984. We do not venture into the realm of speculation and conjecture. [62] Even though the learned JC did not invoke the presumption of an adverse inference against the Appellant for the non-calling of these witnesses, the Appellant was found to have fallen short in proving its case against the Respondent for the same reason. We see no reason to depart from the findings of the learned JC on this issue. [63] In a nutshell, we found that this is not the case where the learned JC had accepted at face value the issuance of the CFs as irrefutable proof that the Respondent had duly complied with the approved building plan and the relevant laws in constructing the OTC. In our considered view, based on the peculiar facts of this case, the Appellant should have determined whether the issue lies in the approved building plan or the construction of the OTC. Conclusion [64] In conclusion, based on all of the above, we found no merit in this appeal. We also found that the learned JC committed no appealable error in his findings and decision. [65] The Appellant's appeal is hereby dismissed, and the decision of the High Court is affirmed. Costs of RM20,000.00 to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondent subject to allocator fee. Dated: 23 April 2025 Solicitors For The Appellant: Raymond Mah Mun Kitt, Michael Koh Boon Han & Rachel Ng Ker Chi Messrs. Mah Weng Kwai & Associates Level 10-1, Tower B, Menara Prima 47301 Petaling Jaya Selangor Solicitor For Respondent: M. Thayalan, Chan Kheng Yam & Low She Warne Messrs. Khor Lai & Partners Suite 7-02 & 7-03, Wisma Pantai Jalan Wisma Pantai, Kg Gajah 12200 Butterworth Penang