Perbadanan Pengurusan Residensi Novo 8 v Kong Yeng Soon (MA-24NCvC-173-06/2026)

KONG YENG SOON [NO. K/P: 630215-10-6854]

MUHAMMAD SYAHMI BIN AYUB [NO. K/P: 851124-04-5071]

TIAP-TIAP ORANG YANG BERADA DI DALAM PEJABAT PENGURUSAN PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN RESIDENSI NOVO 8 ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION [1] Before the Court is an application by the Plaintiff, by a notice of application filed on 18 June 2026 (Enclosure 3), for an interlocutory injunction of a mandatory character. The application is brought ex parte, and is supported by the affidavit of Hau Suat Lam affirmed on 15 June 2026 (Enclosure 4, the "Afidavit Sokongan"), a supplementary affidavit of the same deponent affirmed on 18 June 2026 (Enclosure 9, the "Afidavit Tambahan"), and a certificate of urgency of Ong Wei Lin, of counsel for the Plaintiff, dated 18 June 2026 (Enclosure 6). It is made under Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, and the originating summons invokes sections 56, 59 and paragraph 2(6) of the Second Schedule to the Strata Management Act 2013, section 17B of the Strata Titles Act 1985, and sections 41, 50, 51, 52 and 53 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. [2] In substance, the Plaintiff seeks an order compelling the First and Second Defendants, together with every person within its management office, to deliver up to the second management committee of the Plaintiff ("MC2") immediate possession of the management office and all keys; access and passwords to two electronic mail accounts, the official mobile telephone and the official messaging account of the Plaintiff; and access and passwords to all other accounts and assets of the Plaintiff under the Defendants' control, to subsist until the final disposal of this action. A consequential order is sought permitting the Plaintiff to use reasonable force, including the cutting of any lock, padlock or grille, to recover those assets. [3] The dispute from which the application arises is, at bottom, a contest for control of a strata management corporation between two rival bodies, each asserting itself to be the lawful management committee. That contest does not present itself on a clean slate. It is overlaid by an award of the Strata Management Tribunal dated 4 December 2025 which has not been stayed; by a pending application for judicial review of that award ("JR 12") in which leave has been granted but which remains undisposed; and by a separate originating summons ("OS 2") between the same factions in which an interim injunction has been granted and an inter partes hearing fixed. [4] The application accordingly raises, for the Court's determination, the proper approach to an interlocutory mandatory injunction which, if granted, would confer upon the applicant ex parte the substance of the final relief it seeks; the threshold an applicant must surmount before such relief is granted; the applicant's duty of full and frank disclosure on an application made without notice; and the bearing of the adequacy of damages, the balance of convenience and the preservation of the status quo upon the exercise of the Court's discretion. These are the matters to which these grounds are directed. B. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [5] As the application is made ex parte, the facts before the Court are those deposed to by the deponent of the Afidavit Sokongan and the Afidavit Tambahan, and the documents there exhibited. The Defendants have not been heard, and nothing in these grounds constitutes a finding upon any contested matter of fact. The facts are recounted only to the extent material to the application, and substantially in the sequence in which they occurred. [6] The Plaintiff is the management corporation of Residensi Novo 8, a stratified development in Melaka. At its first annual general meeting held on 25 May 2025 ("AGM1"), the proprietors elected a first management committee ("MC1") comprising five members, among them the First Defendant, Kong Yeng Soon, and the Second Defendant, Muhammad Syahmi bin Ayub (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.5). Three of those members subsequently vacated office before the expiry of their term (paragraph 7). [7] An extraordinary general meeting was convened on 27 July 2025 (the "EGM"). According to the minutes exhibited as HSL-4, a motion was carried, said to be unanimous, to remove the First Defendant from MC1 and to replace him; and three further individuals were thereafter elected to MC1 (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 8.2 to 8.5). The Second Defendant tendered his resignation from MC1 by letters dated 28 July 2025 and again 9 September 2025 (paragraphs 9, 11 and 12; Exhibits HSL-5 and HSL-7). By a letter dated 3 September 2025, however, the Commissioner of Buildings of the Majlis Bandaraya Melaka Bersejarah ("the COB") recorded the membership of MC1 as including both the First and the Second Defendants (paragraph 10; Exhibit HSL-6). [8] On 18 September 2025 the First and Second Defendants, as claimants, commenced a claim against the Plaintiff before the Strata Management Tribunal, No. TPSZS/M-1065-9/2025 ("TPS 1065"). The relief claimed included an order nullifying the entirety of the EGM proceedings; a declaration that the removal of the First Defendant was ultra vires and of no effect; a declaration that the First and Second Defendants were the remaining validly elected committee members; and a direction that a fresh extraordinary general meeting be convened (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 13.1 to 13.4; Exhibit HSL-8). [9] By its award dated 4 December 2025 (the "Award", Exhibit HSL 9), the Tribunal ordered, in terms: first, that the claim be allowed and the extraordinary general meeting of 27 July 2025 be declared invalid and void (tidak sah dan terbatal); secondly, that a fresh extraordinary general meeting be held within thirty days from the date of the Award, the notice of that meeting to be prepared by the claimants, that is to say the First and Second Defendants; and thirdly, that there be no order as to costs. The Tribunal did not grant the declarations sought to the effect that the removal of the First Defendant was ultra vires, or that the First and Second Defendants were the remaining validly elected committee members (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 14.1 to 14.2 and 26.1 to 26.2). [10] The Plaintiff applied to this Court for judicial review of the Award (JR 12, No. MA-25-12-12/2025), seeking certiorari to quash it. Leave was granted on 25 February 2026. JR 12 has not been disposed of (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 15.1 to 15.2; Exhibit HSL-10). On 25 May 2026 the Plaintiff filed an application in JR 12 to stay execution of the Award. That application, too, remains undisposed (paragraph 28; Exhibits HSL-14 to HSL-16). On the evidence before the Court, the Award has not been stayed. [11] The First and Second Defendants did not convene a fresh extraordinary general meeting within the thirty days fixed by the Award (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraph 17). On 17 April 2026 the Plaintiff issued a notice convening its second annual general meeting ("AGM2"), fixed for 31 May 2026 (paragraph 18; Exhibit HSL-11). Two members of MC1, Tan Kok Wee and Tee Wee Seng, resigned on 6 April 2026 and 18 April 2026 respectively (paragraph 19; Exhibit HSL-12). By a letter dated 11 May 2026 the COB expressed the view that a fresh extraordinary general meeting ought to be convened in accordance with the Award before AGM2 was held (paragraph 20; Exhibit HSL-13). [12] On 14 May 2026 the First Defendant, accompanied by a solicitor acting for the First and Second Defendants in JR 12, an officer of the COB, officers of the Majlis Bandaraya Melaka Bersejarah and members of the police, attended at the management office, took possession of it, secured it, and required the Plaintiff's appointed property manager, NI Property Management Sdn Bhd, to leave (the "14 May 2026 incident"; Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 24 to 27). The Plaintiff's case is that the action was taken on the asserted footing that the Award rendered the existing committee invalid and the Defendants the valid committee, a footing the Plaintiff disputes (paragraphs 25 to 26). [13] There is, in addition, a further proceeding. In OS 2 (No. MA-242-05/2026) the First and Second Defendants, as plaintiffs, sued the four persons elected to MC1 at the EGM, together with the property manager. An interim injunction was granted on 25 May 2026 restraining the defendants in OS 2 from giving effect to certain agenda items of AGM2 (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 29 to 31; Exhibit HSL-17). By the Afidavit Tambahan, the deponent states that at an inter partes hearing on 15 June 2026 an ad interim injunction was granted in OS 2 and the matter fixed for further hearing on 10 July 2026, the terms of the ad interim order being confined to involvement in MC1 (Afidavit Tambahan, paragraph 6). The Plaintiff is not a party to OS 2. [14] AGM2 proceeded on 31 May 2026. The proprietors present elected a second management committee, MC2, of five members, the deponent among them; the First and Second Defendants did not attend and were not elected (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraphs 33 to 36; Exhibits HSL-18 and HSL-19). The formation of MC2 was announced on the development's management portal on 4 June 2026 (paragraph 35; Exhibit HSL-20). [15] MC2 demanded delivery of possession of the management office, assets and accounts by letters dated 2 June 2026 and 16 June 2026, the latter through the Plaintiff's solicitors to the solicitors acting for the First and Second Defendants, requiring compliance by 18 June 2026 at 10.00 a.m. (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraph 38 and Exhibit HSL-21; Afidavit Tambahan, paragraph 7 and Exhibit HSL-23). On 18 June 2026 members of MC2 attended at the management office at about 10.00 a.m. and found it closed and unattended, with no one present to deliver possession; the condition of the premises on that date, the doors shut and bearing posted notices, is depicted in the photographs exhibited as HSL-24 (Afidavit Tambahan, paragraph 8). [16] The matter said to render relief urgent is set out in paragraph 40.3 of the Afidavit Sokongan and in a report of Intentec Elevator Sdn Bhd dated 8 June 2026 (Exhibit HSL-22): the hoisting rope of a lift at Block B was found to be damaged, the lift was closed for safety, and other lifts in the development were reported to be in various states of disrepair. The Plaintiff's case is that, since the 14 May 2026 incident, no property manager has been engaged to conduct the day-to-day management of the development, and that MC2 is unable to discharge its functions (paragraphs 40.1 to 40.2). [17] The Plaintiff has given the undertaking as to damages required of an applicant for interlocutory relief (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraph 44), and has addressed, in paragraphs 43.1 to 43.8, the matters required to be deposed to on an application made without notice, including the points it anticipates the Defendants would raise (paragraph 43.5) and the fact that, beyond the notice of an intention to seek an ex parte injunction conveyed by the solicitors' letter of 16 June 2026 (Afidavit Tambahan, paragraph 9 and Exhibit HSL-23), no specific notice of the filing of the application itself was given (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraph 43.4). C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [18] The application is to be determined upon the following issues:

(a) whether the application is properly entertained ex parte, and whether the applicant has discharged the duty of full and frank disclosure that attaches to an application made without notice;

(b) the threshold governing the grant of an interlocutory mandatory injunction, in particular one which would confer upon the applicant the substance of its final relief; and whether that threshold is met on the evidence; and

(c) whether damages would be an adequate remedy, and where the balance of convenience and the preservation of the status quo lie, so as to inform the exercise of the Court's discretion. [19] The second issue is dispositive. The first is anterior to it, and the third bears upon the discretion which arises only if the threshold is crossed. They are taken in that order. D. THE GOVERNING LEGAL FRAMEWORK [20] The jurisdiction to grant an injunction is conferred by Part III of the Specific Relief Act 1950. Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction, temporary or perpetual (sections 50 and 51); and a mandatory injunction, by which the Court compels the performance of acts necessary to prevent the breach of an obligation, is provided for by section 53. By judicial development, that power extends to the grant of an interlocutory mandatory injunction before trial. The procedure is governed by Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012. [21] The principles upon which an interlocutory injunction is granted are settled. The English approach in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (HL) was received, and adapted, by the Court of Appeal in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (CA). The Court there held that a judge hearing such an application must ask whether the totality of the facts discloses a bona fide serious question to be tried; must consider whether damages would be an adequate remedy to either party; and must weigh the balance of convenience, having regard to the desirability of preserving the status quo, the discretion being exercised with the whole of the circumstances in view. [22] Where the injunction sought is mandatory rather than prohibitory, a more exacting standard applies, and the guidelines in American Cyanamid do not govern. The Federal Court in Sivaperuman v Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 150 (FC) held that an interim or interlocutory mandatory injunction is never granted before trial save in exceptional and extremely rare cases. The principle was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Tinta Press Sdn Bhd & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 256 (SC), where it was held that the power under section 53 of the Specific Relief Act 1950, extended by judicial process to the interlocutory stage, is to be exercised only in exceptional and extremely rare cases; that the applicant's case must be unusually strong and clear; and that the Court must feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial a similar injunction would probably be granted, a formulation drawn from Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340. The Court added that, where the case is one of urgency, the application may be made ex parte. [23] A further consideration arises where the interlocutory order, if granted, would confer upon the applicant the substance of the relief claimed in the action. In Gibb & Co v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 271 (FC), the Federal Court held that the Court is not precluded from granting such an order, but only where, on the balance of convenience, there is plainly no defence to the action and the sole object of raising a defence is delay. The corollary is that where there is a substantial and bona fide contest, an interlocutory order which would dispose of the action in the applicant's favour will not issue. [24] An application made without notice attracts a particular discipline. Order 29 rule 1(2A) of the Rules of Court 2012 requires the supporting affidavit to state, among other matters, the facts giving rise to the claim and to the application, the facts relied upon to justify proceeding ex parte (including the giving or withholding of notice), whether any similar application has been made, and the precise relief sought. Beyond compliance in form, the applicant is under a duty to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts, including those adverse to its case; material facts being those which the Court should weigh in exercising its discretion in the absence of the other party, such that their suppression would mislead the Court: Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v Wong Koi [1989] 2 MLJ 153(SC) and Kepong Industrial Park Sdn Bhd & Ors v Teoh Seng Aun & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 688 (HC). An order obtained ex parte endures for twenty-one days only and cannot be extended, and the Court must fix an inter partes hearing within fourteen days of the order (Order 29 rules 1(2B) and 1(2BA)). [25] The statutory provisions governing the management corporation are engaged only at the periphery of the present application, and the law upon them need not be set out at length where it is not seriously in contest. It is sufficient to note that, under section 56 of the Strata Management Act 2013, the management corporation acts through a management committee which it elects, and that, by the Second Schedule to that Act, the members of the management committee retire at each annual general meeting, at which a committee is elected. These provisions bear upon the rival claims to office; but the centre of gravity of the application lies not in their construction, which is not in dispute, but in their application to facts which are. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

(a) Whether the application is properly entertained ex parte, and the duty of disclosure [26] The Afidavit Sokongan is, in form, carefully drawn to the requirements of Order 29 rule 1(2A). Paragraphs 43.1 to 43.8 address the facts giving rise to the claim and to the application, the justification advanced for proceeding without notice, the absence of any similar application, and the precise relief sought. To the deponent's credit, the affidavit does not confine itself to matters favourable to the Plaintiff. It discloses the Award and its terms; the views of the COB of 3 September 2025 and 11 May 2026, which run counter to the Plaintiff's position; the interim injunction in OS 2; the pendency of JR 12 and of the unresolved application to stay the Award; and the resignations which had depleted the body that convened AGM2. That candour is what the duty of full and frank disclosure requires. [27] Two observations follow. First, on the question of notice, the deponent acknowledges, in paragraph 43.4 of the Afidavit Sokongan read with paragraph 9 of the Afidavit Tambahan, that although the solicitors' letter of 16 June 2026 gave notice of an intention to seek an ex parte injunction, no specific notice of the filing of this application was itself given. Relief granted without notice is an exceptional course, justified only by a true urgency or impossibility of notice; the candour of the disclosure does not, of itself, supply that justification, which must be found in the substance of the case. [28] Secondly, and more fundamentally, the discharge of the duty of disclosure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of relief. Disclosure does not strengthen a case; it merely presents it honestly. The significance of the matters disclosed here is not that they were disclosed, but that they are the very matters which bear upon whether the stringent threshold for the relief sought is met. To that question I now turn, the application being, in point of form, properly before the Court to be considered on its merits.

(b) The Threshold For An Interlocutory Mandatory Injunction Conferring Final Relief [29] The relief sought is mandatory in substance and not merely in form. It would require the Defendants to surrender possession of the management office and its keys, to deliver up the electronic mail accounts, the official telephone and messaging account, and to yield access and passwords to all accounts and assets of the Plaintiff, with liberty to the Plaintiff to break locks to that end. An order in those terms would not preserve a state of affairs pending trial. It would transfer to MC2 the entirety of the control and possession that is the very subject of the action, to subsist until final disposal. In practical effect it would give the Plaintiff now, and without trial, the whole of what it seeks to obtain at the end. [30] The application therefore engages the most exacting standard known to this branch of the law. It is not enough that there be a serious question to be tried in the sense of Keet Gerald Francis Noel John. The applicant must show a case that is unusually strong and clear, such that the Court feels a high degree of assurance that a like injunction would be granted at trial: Sivaperuman and Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Tinta Press Sdn Bhd & Ors. And because the order would confer the substance of the final relief, it may issue only if, within the principle of Gibb & Co v Malaysia Building Society Bhd, there is plainly no defence and the only object of contest is delay. The question is whether the Plaintiff's case answers that description. In my judgment it does not, for the reasons which follow. [31] First, the foundation of the application is the proposition that MC2 is the lawful management committee, presently entitled to possession, and that the Defendants are no more than usurpers withholding it. That proposition is not unarguable; but neither is it clear and beyond serious contest. AGM2, at which MC2 was elected, was convened by a notice issued on 17 April 2026 by the Plaintiff acting through the very persons elected at the EGM whose election the Award had declared void. By the time AGM2 was held, that body had itself been depleted by the resignations of Tan Kok Wee, on 6 April 2026, and Tee Wee Seng, on 18 April 2026, the former before and the latter immediately after the notice convening AGM2. Whether those persons retained the authority to convene a general meeting of the corporation is a question of substance, not form; and if they did not, the regularity of AGM2, and with it the constitution of MC2, is open to genuine challenge. [32] That this is a live question, and not one manufactured for the purposes of resistance, appears from the Plaintiff's own evidence. The COB, the statutory officer charged with the administration of the Act, twice took a position inconsistent with the Plaintiff's: by the letter of 3 September 2025, which recorded the First and Second Defendants as members of MC1; and by the letter of 11 May 2026, which advised that a fresh extraordinary general meeting be held in accordance with the Award before AGM2. The Court does not, on this application, decide whether the COB is right. It is enough that a serious and bona fide issue is shown to exist as to whether AGM2 and MC2 are valid; and a serious issue, however genuine, falls well short of the high assurance the law requires for a mandatory injunction in final terms. [33] Secondly, the legal effect of the Award, upon which much of the Plaintiff's case is built, is itself contested and unresolved. The Award declared the EGM void, but it withheld the declaration sought that the First and Second Defendants were the remaining validly elected committee members. The Plaintiff fastens upon that withholding to contend that the Defendants have no recognised status. But the Award also directed the First and Second Defendants, as claimants, to convene the fresh extraordinary general meeting, thereby treating them as the organ competent to do so. The Plaintiff's further contention, that the Award imposed no positive obligation upon it and that any obligation lay upon the Defendants, has force as far as it goes; but it does not answer the anterior question of who lawfully controls the corporation in the interim. Far from being settled, the meaning and effect of the Award are the subject of JR 12, in which this Court has granted leave and which awaits disposal, and of an application to stay the Award which has not been determined. On the evidence, the Award stands unstayed and binding. [34] Thirdly, the contest which the Plaintiff invites this Court to resolve summarily, and without the Defendants, is already before other fora seised of it. The validity of the EGM and the composition of the committee are the subject of TPS 1065 and JR 12. The entitlement of the EGM faction to act, and the conduct of AGM2, are the subject of OS 2, in which an interim and then an ad interim injunction have been granted and an inter partes hearing fixed for 10 July 2026. For this Court, on an application made without notice and upon the untested affidavit of one party, to pronounce MC2 lawful and the Defendants' possession unlawful would be to pre-empt the determination of those very questions in proceedings constituted to decide them. That is not a course the Court should take, still less ex parte. [35] Fourthly, the difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Plaintiff's standing to bring this application rests upon the same premise that is in issue. The Plaintiff sues through MC2; the authority of MC2 to cause the Plaintiff to litigate, and to seek possession, depends upon MC2 being validly constituted. Where that premise is itself genuinely contestable, the applicant's case cannot be said to be unusually strong and clear. The point is not that the Plaintiff is shown to be wrong; it is that the Plaintiff is not shown to be clearly right, which is what the threshold demands. [36] I have not overlooked the matters relied upon by the Plaintiff, and I give them their due weight. There is force in the proposition that an annual general meeting must be convened within the period fixed by law, and that the term of MC1 was, on any view, drawing to its close; in the proposition that the First and Second Defendants did not convene the fresh extraordinary general meeting which the Award required of them; and in the concern, genuinely raised by the report of 8 June 2026, for the safety of the residents in the face of failing lifts. These matters are not immaterial. But, taken at their highest, they establish that there is a serious question to be tried as to the lawful management of the corporation. They do not establish that the Plaintiff's case is so clear, and so free from substantial answer, that the Court may feel the high degree of assurance which alone would warrant a mandatory injunction granting final relief. Within Gibb & Co v Malaysia Building Society Bhd, this is plainly not a case in which there is no defence and the only object of contest is delay; it is, on the contrary, a case of a real and unresolved dispute. The threshold is not met.

(c) Adequacy Of Damages, Balance Of Convenience And The Status Quo [37] The conclusion upon the threshold is sufficient to dispose of the application. I address the remaining considerations briefly, since they point the same way and would inform the discretion were the threshold crossed. [38] The Plaintiff contends that damages would not be an adequate remedy because the welfare and safety of the residents are at stake. The safety of the residents is a serious matter, and I do not minimise it. But the question is not whether the management of the development is important; it is whether the apprehended harm can be averted only by transferring possession to MC2 at once, without notice, and in displacement of the party presently in possession under an unstayed Award. The disrepair of the lifts is a matter of maintenance. It is not self-evident, and the evidence does not establish, that it can be addressed only by the drastic relief sought, rather than by the engagement of contractors, by recourse to the COB, or by an application made on notice. The Plaintiff's own undertaking as to damages, and its assertion that the Defendants would suffer no loss, remain untested in the absence of the Defendants. [39] As to the status quo, the position at the date of the application is that the Defendants have been in possession of the management office since 14 May 2026, and that the office is presently closed and unattended, no property manager having been engaged to conduct its day-to-day management since that date (Afidavit Sokongan, paragraph 40.1). A mandatory injunction would not hold that position pending trial; it would reverse it. An order which disturbs rather than preserves the existing state of affairs is, for that very reason, one to be granted only in the exceptional case. The balance of convenience and of justice, weighed against the background of an unstayed Award, a pending judicial review, and a subsisting injunction in OS 2, does not lie clearly with the Plaintiff. The orderly course is for the competing claims to office to be determined upon full argument and with both parties before the Court, not for one faction to be installed in possession by an order made in the absence of the other. Finally, and even if the threshold were regarded as arguably met, the Court would decline in its discretion to grant relief of this character ex parte. To compel the delivery of possession, accounts and the means of digital control of a corporation, with liberty to break locks, upon the untested evidence of one side and in a dispute already before other courts and a tribunal, would be to exercise the jurisdiction in precisely the circumstances in which restraint is called for. The Court's reluctance is not a refusal to assist a corporation in difficulty; it is a recognition that the assistance sought is of a kind that ought not to be given without hearing those against whom it is directed. F. CONCLUSION [41] The application is, in form, properly constituted and candidly presented, and the Court has considered it on its merits. It fails because the relief it seeks, and the basis on which it is sought, do not meet the requirements of the law. The injunction sought is mandatory and would confer upon the Plaintiff the substance of its final relief, ex parte and pending trial. Such relief is reserved for the exceptional and extremely rare case in which the applicant's case is unusually strong and clear and the Court feels a high degree of assurance that a like injunction would issue at trial. This is not such a case. The validity of MC2, upon which the whole application depends, is genuinely in issue; the effect of the unstayed Award is contested and the subject of a pending judicial review; and the competing claims to the management of the corporation are already before a tribunal and another court. Damages and the balance of convenience do not displace that conclusion, and the preservation of the status quo tells against, not for, the order sought. The high threshold is not crossed, and the discretion would in any event be exercised against granting such relief without notice. [42] It does not follow that the Plaintiff is without recourse. The Plaintiff itself invites the Court, in paragraph 45 of the Afidavit Sokongan, to entertain the application not only ex parte but also inter partes. The genuine concerns raised, including the safety of the residents and the conduct of the development's management, are properly to be ventilated at a hearing on notice, at which the Defendants may answer the case made against them and the Court may decide the matter upon a complete record. That is the course the Court adopts. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [43] For the reasons given, the Court makes the following orders:

(a) the prayers for an interlocutory mandatory injunction and for liberty to use reasonable force, sought in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the notice of application (Enclosure 3), are not granted on an ex parte basis;

(b) the notice of application (Enclosure 3) shall be heard inter partes, and is adjourned to be so heard on an expedited basis, a date to be fixed by the Registry;

(c) the Plaintiff shall, within three (3) days of the date of this order, serve upon the First and Second Defendants the originating summons, the notice of application (Enclosure 3), the Afidavit Sokongan (Enclosure 4), the Afidavit Tambahan (Enclosure 9), the certificate of urgency (Enclosure 6) and this Decision;

(d) the Defendants may file and serve any affidavit in reply within seven (7) days of service, and the Plaintiff any affidavit in reply within five (5) days thereafter;

(e) costs of the present application shall be costs in the cause; and

(f) there shall be liberty to apply. Dated 22 June 2026 (YA Dato' Sri Raja Segaran A/L S. Krishnan) (Judicial Commisioner) High Court Of Malaya Malacca High Court (MELAKA) Lawyer For Plaintiff Encik Ooi Jia Liang Tetuan Willie Ong. & JL Ooi Peguamcara dan Peguambela Suite 4.06, Level 4, Penang Chinese Town Hall, No.22, Jln Masjid Kapitan Keling, 10200 Georgetown, Pulau Pinang.