Schedule
JADUAL [Cabutan yang berkaitan daripada Borang G termasuk segala pemberian kesemua award, jika ada, kepada orang-orang lain yang berkepentingan pada tanah itu.] 22 No. Lot Luasnya Tanah yang Dikehendaki Orang-Orang Yang Berkepentingan Jenis Kepentingan Bahagian Pemberian Untuk Kegunaan Pejabat 26110 (PT22276) Mukim: Tanjung Dua Belas Daerah: Kuala Langat 3.1820 Hektar Permodalan Negeri Selangor berhad – 1/1 bahagian AMFINANCE BERHAD, No. a/k : 8080- 0196-2200- 000 Caw. Jalan Yap Kwan Seng, Kuala Lumpur Tuan Tanah Pemegang Gadaian Tanah; RM – Tanah: RM 12,091,600.00 Penjejasan Tanah: RM 2,730,110.00 Jumlah: RM 14,821,710.00 HS(D) 16024 PTG.SEL.3/KKR/03/ 70 Sj. 1 [34] Clearly seen from the schedule above, the apportionment of the compensation for PNSB as the Tuan Tanah or Land Owner is nil 23 while the apportionment to AMFinance Berhad as the chargee is for the totality of the compensation amount. [35] This schedule in Form H has been issued circa 2007 and the Plaintiff to date has never issued Form N to object the direct payment of the compensation monies to the chargee. [36] Thus, the Plaintiff cannot now deny the mutual state of understanding of the parties (especially the Plaintiff’s) that the JVAs and the charge documents all unanimously stipulate that the compensation monies can be taken into account to conclude the parties’ entitlement under the JVAs. [37] This Court finds valuable guidance from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. The Federal Court in this case has referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: 24 “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” ( emphasis added) [38] Therefore, it would be unfair to allow the Plaintiff to detract and contra their own underlying understanding on the proper interpretation of the JVAs. 25 [39] In fact this Court is in agreement with the Defendants’ submission that the mere reason that the Plaintiff failed to make the proper objection vide Form N, is already fatal to the Plaintiff’s case praying for declaratory relief. The Defendants referred to the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia v Cahaya Baru Development Bhd [2010] 4 CLJ 419 in which Jeffrey Tan JCA (now FJC) has decided in light of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 the following: “[21] Indeed, apart from case law, s. 41 itself provides that "no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration or title, omits to do so". The position is that the grant of a declaratory order is discretionary and "no action or other proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of right whether or nor consequential relief is or could be claimed" (O. 15 r. 16 of the Rules of the High Court), but "no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration or title, omits to do so" (see Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v. Sakuntalathevy Manickavasagam [2007] 1 CLJ 72, where it 26 was held by Mohd Hishamuddin J, as he then was, that "further relief in the above proviso means alternative remedies"). A declaratory order is a relief of last resort. And in the instant case, there was an alternative remedy under the LAA 1960. The respondent could have waited for the reference under s. 38(5) of the LAA 1960 to be made by the Land Administrator. Even if there were no such reference within the specified period by the Land Administrator, as was the instant case, the respondent could have applied to Court (constituted under s. 40A of the LAA 1960) to deal with the said Form N in accordance with s. 38(7) of the LAA 1960. And at the reference, be it under s. 38(5) or 38(7) of the LAA 1960, the Respondent could have raised and argued their issues on the said Form N (for an analogy, see Singapore Para Rubber Estate Ltd v. Pentadbir Tanah Rembau, Negeri Sembilan [2007] 5 CLJ 71, where it was held by Zulkefli FCJ that the issue of non-compliance of s. 14 of the LAA 1960 should have been taken up and argued at the hearing of the objection in the reference under s. 36 of the LAA 1960). Suffice it to say that the application for the declarations should have been refused on that ground alone.” (emphasis added) [40] It is trite law that indeed declaratory reliefs remain inaccessible when an alternative remedy is readily available to be sought for by the Applicant. 27 (See also Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41 (Federal Court) at page 44) Court’s finding [41] In finding that the Defendants’ interpretation of the JVAs is more probable than the Plantiff’s interpretation, this Court is guided by the case of Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya (A Firm) v Koperasi Serbaguna Sungei Glugor Berhad [2009] 2 AMR 50. In this case Abdul Malik Ishak, JCA from the available authorities had in para 17 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, with regard to construction of a contract where the language employed is clear, has made the following propositions: “(a) the Court must give effect to the plain meaning of the words, no matter how distasteful the result may be (The Central Bank of India Ltd. Amritsrar v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [1965] AIR Vol. 52, 1288 SC); 28 (b) where the language in the document is unambiguous and clear, the real nature of the document is to be determine solely by looking at its contents, uninfluenced by any intention of the parties ((Nawab Major Sir) Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh and Others [1936] AIR Vol. 23, 171 PC); (c) when the minds of the parties are expressed in an unambiguous manner, the Court cannot override the declared intention of the parties unequivocally expressed (K. Appukuttam Panicker and Another v. S.K.R.A.K.R Athappa Chettiar and Others [1966] AIR Vol.53, 303 Kerala); and (d) there is no scope, at all, for drawing upon hypothetical considerations or the supposed intention of the parties when the words contained in the contract are clear and unambiguous (The Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros. [1959] AIR Vol. 46, 1362 SC).” [42] It is not necessary for the Court to ascertain the construction of the JVAs and the charge documents beyond the plain words and overall operation of the clauses of both the JVAs and the charge documents. It is clear within the wordings of the terms of the JVAs in clauses 5.01 and 28.01 and also the terms of the charges (regarding land 29 acquisition) that the compensation monies may be taken into account to conclude the parties’ entitlement under the JVAs in section 5.01 of the JVAs. There is no case of ambiguous terms here. Clause 28.01 of the JVAs stipulates that all parties inclusive of the Defendants are entitled to the compensation monies. The numerous clauses of the charge documents then stipulate that compensation monies from acquisitions may be taken into account in the equation or formula of Clause 5.01 in determining the parties’ entitlement under the JVAs. The wording and operation of these clauses are linear and move seamlessly with each other. [43] Even if there is such ambiguity (which this Court disagrees), it is also apparent from the intent (from the Plaintiff’s conduct in not objecting to the direct payment of the compensation monies to the charges), that the compensation monies do fall within the ambit of clause 5.01 of the JVAs. [44] Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that it is clear from the plain meaning of the words in the JVAs, the Settlement Agreement and the Charge Documents, it is irrefutable that the compensation monies 30 from the land acquisition should be taken into account in determining the parties’ entitlement under clause 5.01 of the JVAs and consequently finalized vide the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement has finalized the parties’ entitlement taking into account the compensation monies from the acquisition [45] It naturally entails that as the Settlement Agreement concludes and finalizes the parties’ entitlement under clause 5.01 of the JVAs, that this finalization puts the issue of the compensation monies to rest (as the compensation monies is part of the equation in calculating the parties’ entitlement). [46] It is in fact important to note that the Settlement Agreement expressly covers the acquisition as the acreage stated in the Agreement is identical to the acreage stated in all of the JVAs which is inclusive of the portions of the acquired land. Thus, when the parties’ entitlement is finalized vide this Settlement Agreement, it also follows that the parties’ entitlements to the compensation monies have also been 31 concluded under the Settlement Agreement. There is no merit in the Plaintiff’s contention that the Settlement Agreement does not include the acquisition of the acquired lands. [47] The terms of entitlement as per the Settlement Agreement are that: (i) Pursuant to Clause 2.2 the Plaintiff will be paid a further RM54,151,705.52 apart from the sums already received by the Plaintiff; and (ii) The Defendants at the request of the Plaintiff agreed in the event of 30% of the profit of the JVAs exceeds the sum of RM80,500,000.00, the difference will be paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendants upon completion of the whole development projects under the agreements and finalization of all accounts. [48] And these terms of payment shall be considered as a full settlement of PNSB’s entitlement under the JVAs under Clause 2.1 of the Settlement Agreement: 32 “2.1 The parties hereby agree that subject always to Additional Entitlement (in the present case referring to the differential sum in case 30% of profits exceeds the determined entitlement sum of RM 80,500,000.00)… the Final Balance Agreed Settlement of PNSB’s (Plaintiff’s) Entitlement by the Developers shall be deemed as the full and final settlement of PNSB Entitlement by the Developers to PNSB…” [49] Thus, it is this Court’s considered view that the Settlement Agreement has indeed concluded the parties’ entitlement under the JVAs taking into account the compensation monies from the land acquisitions There is No Unjust Enrichment to the benefit of the Defendants [50] The elements to prove unjust enrichment has been succinctly laid down in the Court of Appeal decision in Air Express International (M) Sdn Bhd v MISC Agencies Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 59: 33 “To determine unjust enrichment, either in relation to s 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 or the common law, the appellant in this appeal must satisfy the following three enquiries: (a) that the respondent was enriched by receiving a benefit; (b) that the benefit was received at the appellant’s expense; and (c) that the retention of the benefit by the respondent was unjust [51] Hypothetically speaking, if the acquisition never arose, then the Defendants would have the opportunity to develop the acquired lands and sell it off for revenues would in turn be translated into larger overall profits. The larger revenues would also in turn translate into the parties’ profits inclusive of the Defendants’ overall returns from the development. The Defendants could have used the same monies from the sale of the developed acquired lands and pay off their indebtedness to the chargees. [52] Now, derivative from the above hypothesis, it is difficult for the Court to follow that there is any unjust enrichment on the part of the 34 Defendants in applying the monies from the compensation to pay off the charges on the project land. The acquisitions have not only deprived the Plaintiff as landowner, but also deprived the Defendants of valuable business opportunities to develop, sell the land for proceeds and ultimately use the same proceeds to pay off their indebtedness to the chargees. In this perspective, it is only fair that upon the Defendants’ deprivation of their business, that the compensation paid from the acquisition be used to pay off their indebtedness, especially considering the fact that the loans acquired was for the security of the project land. It is only just that Defendants are given the opportunity to profit from the totality of the project land when their indebtedness is based on the totality of the project land. Thus, it is also only just that the Defendants be allowed to pay their indebtedness vide the compensation monies, when the acquisition deprived them of the opportunity in proceeds and profits, as the Defendants are no longer able to develop and sell off the acquired lands. [53] Thus, the circumstances of the present case do not even fulfil the 1st element of unjust enrichment. The Defendants received what was 35 entitled to them. They have not received a benefit especially a benefit unjustly retained at the expense of the Plaintiff. [54] Therefore, it is this Court’s considered view that the inclusion of the compensation monies in determining the parties’ entitlement under the JVAs, the Settlement Agreement and the charge documents does not constitute an unjust enrichment to the unwarranted benefit of the Defendants. COURT’S DECISION AND DIRECTIONS [55] In light of all of the above findings, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has ultimately failed to prove their case. [56] Hence, this Court hereby dismisses the Plaintiff’s claims in terms of (a),(b),(c),(d) and (e) as prayed in Enclosure 1. And in view of the above finding, the Plaintiff’s alternative prayer in prayer (f) in Enclosure 1 must also fail. 36 On the issue of costs [57] Having heard the submissions from the counsels for the Plaintiff and the Defendants, this Court hereby orders the Plaintiff to pay the Defendants sum of RM 15,000.00 in costs. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 21st day of August, 2015 For the Plaintiff - Tetuan Kamaruzaman Arif Amran & Chong En. P.Y Chong, Pn. Sofiah Omar dan Puan Qairuneesa For the Defendants - Tetuan Zul Rafique & Partners Puan Idza Hajar Ahmad Idzan